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VOL. CCCXXXIV.

HISTORY OF EUROPE
FROM THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

IV.

HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS



IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

"*BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt.*"—*TRT. Liv. lib. 21.*

VOL. IV.



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Revival of the spirit of Europe by the battle of the Nile. THE cannon of Nelson, which destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir, re-echoed from one end of Europe to the other, and every where revived the spirit of resistance to their ambition. That great event not only destroyed the charm of Republican invincibility, but relieved the Allies of the dread arising from the military talents of Napoléon and his terrible-Italian army, whom it seemed to sever for ever from the soil of Europe. The subjugation of Switzerland and the conquest of Italy were no longer looked upon with mere secret apprehension; they were the subject of loud and impassioned complaint over all Europe, and the allied sovereigns, upon this auspicious event, no longer hesitated to engage in open preparations for the resumption of hostilities (1).

Preparation of Austria. Austria felt that the moment was approaching when she might regain her lost provinces, restore her fallen influence, and oppose a barrier to the revolutionary torrent which was overwhelming Italy. She had accordingly been indefatigable in her exertions to recruit and remodel her armies since the treaty of Leoben; and they were now, both in point of discipline, numbers, and equipment, on the most formidable footing. She had two hundred and forty thousand men, supported by an immense artillery, ready to take the field, all admirably equipped and in the finest order, and to these were to be added sixty thousand Russians, who were advancing under the renowned Suwarrow, flushed with the storming of Ismael and Warsaw, and anxious to measure their strength with the conquerors of southern Russia. And Russia. then Europe. The Emperor of Russia, though he had been somewhat tardy in following out the designs of his illustrious predecessor, had at length engaged warmly in the common cause; the outrage committed on the Order of Malta, which had chosen him for their protector, filled him with indignation, and he seemed desirous not only to send his armies to the support of the Germanic states, but to guarantee the integrity of their Confederation. Turkey had forgotten its ancient enmity to Russia, in animo-

(1) Th. x. 144, 145. Ann. Reg. 1799, 236. Jom. xi. 10, 11.

sity against France for the unprovoked attack upon Egypt, and its fleets and armies threatened to enclose the conqueror of the Pyramids in the kingdom he had won. Thus, while the ambition of the Directory in Switzerland and Italy roused against them the hostility of the centre of Europe, their impolitic and perilous expedition to the shores of Africa arrayed against France the fury of Mussulman zeal and the weight of Russian power (1).

Treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between England and Russia. On the 18th December, 1798, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between Great Britain and Russia, for the purpose of putting a stop to the further encroachments of France. By this treaty, Russia engaged to furnish an auxiliary force of forty-five thousand men, to act in conjunction with the British forces in the north of Germany; and England, besides an immediate advance of L.225,000, was to pay a monthly subsidy of L.75,000. The Emperor Paul immediately entered, with all the vehemence of his character, into the prosecution of the war; he gave an asylum to Louis XVIII in the capital of Courland; behaved with munificence to the French emigrants who sought refuge in his dominions; accepted the office of Grand Master of the Knights of St.-John of Malta, and excited by every means in his power the spirit of resistance to the advances of republican ambition. All his efforts, however, failed in inducing the Prussian cabinet to swerve from the cautious policy it had adopted ever since the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick, and the neutrality it had observed since the treaty of Basle (2). That power stood by in apparent indifference, and saw a desperate strife between the hostile powers, in which her own independence was at stake, when her army, now 220,000 strong, might have interfered with decisive effect in the struggle; and she was rewarded for her forbearance by the battle of Jena.

Dec. 3, 1798. Great Britain made considerable exertions to improve the brilliant prospects thus unexpectedly opened to her view. Parliament met on the 20th November, 1798, and shortly after entered on the arduous duty of finance. To meet the increased expenses which the treaty with Russia, and the vigorous prosecution of the war in other countries, were likely to occasion, Mr. Pitt proposed a new tax, hitherto unknown in Great Britain, that Income-Tax. on property. No income under L.60 a-year was to pay any duty at all; those under L.105 only a fortieth part, and above L.200 a tenth. The total income of the nation was estimated at L.102,000,000, including L.20,000,000 as the rent of lands; and the estimated produce of the tax on this graduated scale was L.7,500,000. This tax proceeded on the principle of raising as large a portion as possible of the supplies of the year by taxation within its limits, and compelling all persons to contribute, according to their ability, to the exigencies of the state; an admirable principle, if it could have been fully carried into effect, and which, if practicable and uniformly acted upon, would have prevented all the financial embarrassments consequent on the war. But this was very far indeed from being the case. The expenses incurred so far exceeded the income, even in that very year, that a supplementary budget was brought forward on June 6th, 1799, which very much augmented the annual charges (3).

The principle of making the supplies of the year as nearly as possible keep pace with its expenditure, is the true system of public as well as

(1) Arch. Ch. i. 40, 41, 47. Jom. xi. 96. Th. x. 146. Ann. Reg. 1799, 238.

(2) Hard. vii. 6, 7. Ann. Reg. 1799, 76, 78. Jom. xi. 9, 10.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1799, 176, 191. Parl. Hist. xxxi. 174.

Between the two budgets, loans were contracted to the amount of L.15,000,000; and the total expenditure, including L.13,653,000 for the army; L.8,840,000 for the navy; and a subsidy of L.825,000 to Russia; amounted, exclusive of the charges of the debt, to no less than L.31,000,000.

Observations on the expedience of this tax.

private finance; which has suffered, in every country, from nothing so much as the convenient but ruinous plan of borrowing for immediate exigencies, and laying the undying burden of interest upon the shoulders of posterity. But a greater error in finance never was committed than the introduction of the income-tax. In appearance the most equal, it is in reality the most unequal of burdens; because it assesses at the same rate many different classes whose resources are widely different. The landed proprietor, whose estate is worth thirty years' purchase of the rental at which he is rated; the fundholder, whose stock is worth twenty or twenty-five of the same annual payment; the merchant, whose profits one year may be swallowed up by losses the next season; the professional man, whose present income is not worth five years' purchase; the young annuitant, whose chance of life is as twenty, and the aged spinster, in whom it is not two, are all rated at the same annual sum. The tax, in consequence, falls with excessive and undue severity upon one class, and with unreasonable lightness upon others; it extinguishes the infant accumulations of capital, and puts an end to the savings of laborious industry; while it is comparatively unfelt by the great capitalist and the opulent landed proprietor. Unlike the indirect taxes, which are paid without being felt, or forgotten in the enjoyments of the objects on which they are laid, it brings the bitterness of taxation, in undisguised nakedness, to every individual, and produces, in consequence, a degree of discontent and exasperation which nothing but the excitement of continual warfare, or a sense of uncontrollable necessity, can induce a nation to bear.

Land and sea forces voted by Parliament.

A considerable addition was made to the army this year. The land forces were raised to 158,000 men; the sea to 120,000, including 20,000 marines; and 104 ships of the line were put in commission. Besides this, 80,000 men were embodied in the militia of Great Britain alone, besides 40,000 in Ireland; an admirable force, which soon attained a very high degree of discipline and efficiency, proved, through the whole remainder of the war, the best nursery for the troops of the line, and was inferior only in the quality and composition of its officers to the regular army (1).

Universal discontent at the French government.

The forces with which France was to resist this formidable confederacy were by no means commensurate either to the ambition of the Directory, or the vast extent of territory that they had to defend. Both externally and internally the utmost discontent and dissatisfaction existed. The Republican armies, which in the outset divided so many states by the delusive promises of liberty and equality, had excited universal hatred by the exactions which they had made, and the stern tyranny to which they had every where subjected their new allies. Their most devoted adherents no longer attempted to palliate their conduct; from the frontier of the Jura to the extremity of Calabria, one universal cry had arisen against the selfish cupidity of the Directory, and the insatiable rapacity of its civil and military officers. The Swiss democrats, who had called in the French to revolutionize their country, made the loudest lamentations at the unrelenting severity with which the great contributions, to which they were so little accustomed, were exacted from the hard-earned fruits of their industry. The Cisalpine republic was a prey to the most vehement divisions; furious Jacobinism reigned in its legislative assemblies; the authorities imposed on them by the French bayonets were in the highest degree unpopular; while in

(1) Parl. His. xxxi. 231, 242. James' Naval, Hist. App. Vol. iii. Ann. Reg. 1799, 193. App. to Chron.

Holland, the whole respectable class of citizens felt the utmost dissatisfaction at the violent changes made, both in their government and representative body, by their imperious allies. From the affiliated republics, therefore, no efficient support could be expected; while the French government, nevertheless, was charged with the burden of their defence. From the Texel to Calabria, their forces were expanded over an immense surface, in great, but still insufficient numbers; while the recent occupation of Switzerland had opened up a new theatre of warfare hitherto untrod by the Republican soldiers (1).

State of the military forces of France. During the two years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities, the military force of France had signally declined. Sickness and desertion had greatly diminished the ranks of the army; twelve thousand discharges had been granted to the soldiers, but more than ten times that number had deserted from their colours, and lived without disguise at their homes, in such numbers as rendered it neither prudent nor practicable to attempt the enforcing their return. Five-and-thirty thousand of the best troops were exiled under Napoléon on a distant shore, and though the addition of two hundred thousand conscripts had been ordered, the levy proceeded but slowly, and some months must yet elapse before they could be in a condition to take the field. The result of the whole was, that for the actual shock of war, from the Adige to the Maine, the Directory could only count on one hundred and seventy thousand men; the remainder of their great forces were buried in the Italian peninsula, or too far removed from the theatre of hostilities, to be able to take an active part in the approaching contest. The administration of the armies was on the most corrupted footing; the officers had become rapacious and insolent in the command of the conquered countries; and the civil agents either lived at free quarters on the inhabitants, or plundered without control the public money and stores which passed through their hands. Revolutionary energy had exhausted itself; regular and steady government was unknown, and the evils of a disordered rule and an abandoned administration were beginning to recoil on those who had produced them (2).

Their disposition over the theatre of approaching war. The disposition of the Republican armies was as follows: Of one hundred and ten thousand men, who were stationed in Italy, thirty thousand under Macdonald, were lost in the Neapolitan dominions, and the remainder so dispersed over the extensive provinces of Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Roman states, that only fifty thousand could be collected to bear the weight of the contest on the Adige. Forty-two thousand, under General Jourdan, were destined to carry the war from the Upper Rhine, across the Black Forest, into the valley of the Danube. Masséna, at the head of forty-five thousand, was stationed in Switzerland, and intended to dislodge the Imperialists from the Tyrol and the upper valley of the Adige. Thirty thousand, under Bernadotte, were designed to form a corps of observation on the Lower Rhine from Dusseldorf to Manheim; while Brune at the head of fifteen thousand French, and twenty thousand Dutch troops, was intrusted with the defence of the Batavian republic. The design of the Directory was to turn the position of the Imperialists on the Adige by getting possession of the mountains which enclosed the upper part of the stream, and then drive the enemy before them, with the united armies of Switzerland and Italy, across the mountains of Carinthia, while that of the Upper Rhine,

(1) Jom. xi. 88, 89. Th. ii. 161, 173, 174, 207.

(2) Th. x. 182, 208, 209. Jom. xi. 89, 94. Dum. i. 33. Arch. Ch. Campagne de 1799, i. 48, 51.

descending the course of the Danube, was to unite with them under the walls of Vienna (1).

Forces of
the Impe-
rialists, and
their dispo-
sition.

The forces of the Austrians were both superior in point of number, better equipped, and stationed in more advantageous situations. Their armies were collected behind the Lech, in the Tyrol, and on the Adige. The first, under the command of the Archduke Charles, consisted of fifty-four thousand infantry and twenty-four thousand cavalry; in the Grisons and Tyrol, forty-four thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse were assembled under the banners of Bellegarde and Laudon; twenty-four thousand foot-soldiers and one thousand four hundred horse, under the command of Hotze, occupied the Vorarlberg; while the army on the Adige, seventy-two thousand strong, including eleven thousand cavalry, obeyed the orders of Kray; and twenty-four thousand on the Maine, or in garrison at Wurtzburg, observed the French forces of the Lower Rhine. Thus two hundred and forty-six thousand men were concentrated between the Maine and the Po, and their centre rested on the mountains of Tyrol; a vast fortress, which had often afforded a sure refuge in case of disaster to the Imperial troops, and whose inhabitants were warmly attached to the House of Austria. Above fifty thousand Russians were expected (2); but they could not arrive in time to enter into operations either on the Danube or the Adige at the commencement of the campaign.

These dispositions on both sides were made on the principle that the possession of the mountains ensures that of the plains, and that the key to the Austrian monarchy was to be found in the Tyrol Alps; a great error, and which has been since abundantly refuted by the campaigns of Napoléon, and the reasoning of the Archduke Charles (3). The true avenue to Vienna is the valley of the Danube; it is there that a serious blow struck is at once decisive, and that the gates of the monarchy are laid open by a single great defeat on the frontier. It was not in the valley of the Inn, nor in the mountains of the Grisons, but on the heights of Ulm and the plains of Bavaria, that Napoléon prostrated the strength of Austria in 1805 and 1809; and of all the numerous defeats which that power had experienced, none was felt to be irretrievable but that of Hohenlinden, on the banks of the Iser, in 1800. There is no analogy between the descent of streams from the higher to the lower grounds, and the invasion of civilized armies from mountains to the adjacent plains. A ridge of glaciers is an admirable fountain for the perennial supply of rivers, but the worst possible base for military operations (4).

Ruinous ef-
fects of the
invasion of
Switzerland
and Italy to
the French
military
power.

By the invasion of Switzerland the French government had greatly weakened, instead of having strengthened, their military position. Nothing was so advantageous to them as the neutrality of that republic, because it covered the only defenceless frontier of the state, and gave them the advantage of carrying on the campaigns in Germany and Italy, for which the fortresses on the Rhine and in Piedmont afforded an advantageous base, without the fear of being turned by a reverse in the mountains. But all these advantages were lost when the contest was conducted in the higher Alps, and the line of the Rhine or the Adige was liable to be turned by a single reverse on the Aar or the St.-Gothard. The surface over which military operations were carried, was by this conquest immensely extended, without any proportionate addition either to the means of offensive

(1) Dum. i. 32, 33. Jom. xi. 90, 91. Arch. Ch. i. 50, 51.

(2) Arch. Ch. i. 40, 41. Dum. i. 33. Jom. xi. 95.

96. Th. x. 226.

(3) Archduke, i. 117, 162. Camp de 1796.

(4) Jom. x. 286, and xi. 96. Archduke, i. 53, Guerre de 1799.

or defensive warfare. The Tyrol was a great central fortress, in which the Imperialists had often found shelter in moments of disaster, but no such advantage could be hoped for by the Republicans from their possession of the hostile or discontented cantons of Switzerland; while no avenue to the heart of Austria was so difficult as that which lay through the midst of the brave and indomitable inhabitants of that almost inaccessible province (1).

Nor had the invasion of the Roman and Neapolitan states, and the banishment of Napoléon to the sands of Egypt, contributed less to weaken the formidable powers with which two years before he had shattered the Austrian monarchy. Now was seen the sagacity with which he had chosen the line of the Adige for tenacious defence, and the wisdom of the declaration, that if he had listened to the suggestions of the Directory, and advanced to Rome, he would have endangered the Republic. Though the forces in the Peninsula were above one hundred and ten thousand, and were soon increased by the arrival of conscripts to one hundred and thirty thousand men, the Republicans were never able to meet the Imperialists in equal force on the Adige; and Italy was lost, and the retreat of the army from Naples all but cut off, while yet an overwhelming force, if it could only have been assembled at the decisive point, existed in the Peninsula (2).

The French commence hostilities, March 1, 1799. Notwithstanding the deficient state of their military preparations, and the urgent representations of all their generals that the actual force under their command was greatly inferior to the amount which the Directory had led them to expect, the French government, led away by ill-founded audacity, resolved to commence hostilities. The Austrian cabinet having returned no answer to the peremptory note, in which the Directory required the sending back of the Russian troops, Jourdan received orders to cross the Rhine, which was immediately done at Kehl and Huningen, and the Republicans advanced in four columns towards the Black Forest. A few days after, Bernadotte, with ten thousand men, took possession of Mannheim, and advanced against Philipsburg, which refused to capitulate, notwithstanding an angry summons from the Republican general. Upon receiving this intelligence, the Archduke passed the Lech, and advanced in three columns towards Biberach, Waldsee, and Ravensberg, at the head of thirty-seven thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry; while Starry, with thirteen thousand men, was moved upon Neumarkt, and six thousand men were thrown into the fortifications of Ulm (3).

Operations in the Grisons. March 5 and 6. While the hostile armies were thus approaching each other, in the space between the Rhine and the Danube, the contest had commenced, on the most extended scale, in the mountains of the Grisons. During the night of the 5th March, Masséna marched upon Sargantz, and having summoned the Austrian general, Auffenberg, to evacuate the district, his troops advanced at all points to cross the Rhine. The left wing, under OUDINOT, afterwards, Duke of Reggio, "a general," said Napoléon, "tried in a hundred battles," was destined to make a false attack on the post of Feldkirch, so as to hinder Hotze, who commanded at that important point, from sending any succour to the centre at Coire, and the right at Reichenau; the right wing, under Dumont, was destined to cross at that place, and turn the position of Coire by the upper part of the stream, while Masséna himself, in the centre, was to force the passage opposite to Luciensteg, and carry the intrenchments of that fort. Subordinate to these principal attacks, Loison, with

(1) Th. x. 217. Arch. Ch. i. 56.

(2) Jom. xi. 95, 96 Th. x. 218, 219, 226.

(3) Jom. xi. 95, 96. Th. x. 227, 229. Arch. Ch. i. 140.

a brigade, was directed to descend from the valley of Urseren upon Disentis, and support the attack of Dumont; while Lecourbe, who lay at Bellinzona, received orders to penetrate by Tisis, over the snowy summit of the Bernhardin and down the stupendous defile of the Via-mala, into the Engadine, and open up a communication with the Italian army on the Adige (1).

March 6,
The French
are at first
successful.

These attacks were almost all successful. The Rhine, yet charged with melting snows, was crossed under a murderous fire; after an obstinate resistance, the fort of Luciensteg was carried by the intrepidity of the French chasseurs, who scaled an almost inaccessible height which commanded it, and eight hundred men, with five pieces of cannon, were made prisoners. Meanwhile Dumont, having forced the pass of Kunkel, and made himself master of the central point and important bridge of Reichenau, situated at the junction of the two branches of the Rhine, not only succeeded in maintaining himself there, but made prisoners an Austrian detachment which had resisted Loison at Disentis. The result of this movement was, that Auffenberg, who fell back slowly, contesting every inch of ground, towards Coire, found his retreat cut off up the Rhine: and, being surrounded there by superior forces, he had no alternative but to lay down his arms, with two thousand men and ten pieces of cannon, while a battalion he had stationed at Embs underwent the same fate (2).

March 7.

While these successes were gained on the centre and right, Oudinot advanced against Feldkirch. Hotze instantly collected his troops, and advanced to meet him, in order to preserve his communication with Auffenberg; but, after maintaining his ground for a whole day, he was at length driven back to the intrenchment of Feldkirch, with the loss of a thousand men and several pieces of cannon.

The Austrians
are driven back
with great
loss into the
Tyrol.

At the same time, Lecourbe, having broken up from Bellinzona, crossed the Bernhardin, yet encumbered with snow, and arrived at Tisis by the terrible defile of the Via-mala, where he divided his forces into two columns, one of which moved over the Julian Alps, towards the sources of the Inn, while the other, under Lecourbe in person, began to ascend the wild and rocky valley of the Albula. The intention of the Republicans was to have supported this irruption by Dessoles, who received orders to debouche from the Valteline into the valley of the Upper Adige; but the march of the latter column across the mountains having been retarded by unavoidable accidents, General Bellegarde, who commanded the Austrian forces in that quarter, made preparations, by occupying all the passes in the neighbourhood, to envelope the invaders (5).

March 14.

Martinsbruck in consequence was assailed by Lecourbe without success; but although Laudon, in his turn, made an attack with his own troops, combined with its garrison, in all fourteen thousand men, upon the French forces, he was unable to gain any decisive advantage; and the Republicans, awaiting their reinforcements, suspended their operations for ten

March 24. days. At length Dessoles having come up, and other reinforcements arrived, Lecourbe commenced a general attack on Laudon's forces, leading his division against Martinsbruck, while Dessoles and Loison were directed to cross the mountains into the Munsterthal and cut off their retreat. To arrive at that valley it was necessary for the division of the former to cross the highest ridges in Europe, amidst ice and snow, which might have deterred the most intrepid chasseurs. With undaunted courage his soldiers

(1) Arch. Ch. i. 141, 142. Dum. i. 36, 37. Jom. xi. 100, 101. Th. x. 230, 231.

(2) Jom. xi. 101, 102. Dum. i. 38, 39. Arch. Ch. i. 58, 62.

(3) Arch. Ch. i. 98. Jom. xi. 114.

ascended the glaciers of the Wurmser Joch, which separates the sources of the Adda from one of those of the Adige. After having turned the fortifications on the summit, which the Imperialists occupied in perfect security, he descended by the wild and rocky bed of the torrent of Rambach, amidst frightful precipices, where a handful of men might have arrested an army, sur-

March 25. prised the post of Taufers, which Laudon had fortified with care, and totally routed its garrison, after a desperate resistance, with the loss of four thousand prisoners and all its artillery. The situation of the Austrian general was now altogether desperate; for while Dessoles was achieving this decisive success, Loison had seized upon Nauders, and Lecourbe forced the post and passage of Martinsbruck, so that all the avenues by which his retreat could be effected were cut off, and he had no resource but to throw himself, with three hundred men, into the glaciers of Gebatch, from whence, after undergoing incredible hardships, he at length reached the valley of Venosta, and joined General Bellegarde, who was marching to his relief. After this glorious victory, achieved with forces hardly half the number of the vanquished, and which cannot be appreciated but by those who have traversed the rugged and inhospitable ridges among which it was effected, Dessoles advanced to Glurns (1); and the French found themselves masters of the upper extremity of the two great valleys of the Tyrol, the Inn and the Adige; but here their advance was arrested by General Bellegarde, who had collected nearly forty thousand men to oppose their progress, and the intelligence of events in other quarters, which restored victory to the Imperial standards.

But Masséna is defeated in repeated attacks on Feldkirch.

The intelligence of the first success in the Grisons reached Jourdan on the 11th, and induced him to move forward. On the 12th, he passed the Danube, and advanced in four marches to Pfullendorf and Mengen, between that river and the lake of Constance. Judging, however, that he was not in sufficient strength to attempt any thing until the post of Feldkirch was carried, he urged Masséna to renew his attacks in

March 11, 12, that quarter. That important town, situated on a rocky eminence and 14. in the middle of the valley, and supported by intrenchments extending from the river Ill, which bathed its feet, to inaccessible cliffs on either side, was repeatedly attacked by Oudinot, at the head of the French grenadiers, with the utmost impetuosity; but all his efforts recoiled before the steady courage of the Imperialists. Masséna, conceiving this post to be of the utmost importance, from its commanding the principal passage from the Vorarlberg into the Tyrol, united the whole division of Ménard to the troops of Oudinot, and advanced in person to the attack. But the great strength of

March 23. the works, and the invincible tenacity of the Austrians, defeated all his efforts. In vain the French sought to establish themselves on the right of the position; the Tyrolese sharpshooters ascended the adjacent eminences, and assailed the Republicans with such a close and destructive fire, as rendered it impossible for them to maintain their ground (2); and Masséna, after beholding the flower of his army perish at the foot of the intrenchments, was obliged to draw off his forces, with the loss of three thousand men, to Luciensteg and Coire, while Oudinot recrossed the Rhine, and established himself at Reineck.

Jourdan, to compensate the inferiority of his force, had taken up a strong position between the lake of Constance and the Danube. Two torrents, the

Jourdan, to compensate the inferiority of his force, had taken up a strong position between the lake of Constance and the Danube. Two torrents, the

(1) Dum. i. 54, 56. Jom. x. 114, 116. Arch. Ch. i. 98, 136.

(2) Jom. xi. 110, 113. Dum. i. 47, 48. Arch. Ch. i. 112, 118.

Jourdan received a check from the Archduke Charles. Ostrach and the Aach, flowing in opposite directions, the one into the Danube, the other into the lake, from a marsh in his centre, ran along the front of his position. St.-Cyr, with the left, was stationed at Mengen; Souham, with the centre, at Pfullendorf; Ferino, with the right, at Barnsdorf, while Lefebvre, with the advanced guard, occupied the heights behind the village of Ostrach. That point was the most accessible of the line: placed at the source of the two torrents, it was to be reached by a chaussée, which crossed the marshy ground from which they descended. It was against this part of the line that the principal efforts of the Imperialists were directed, while subordinate attacks were simultaneously commenced on the right and left against St.-Cyr and Ferino. The force brought to bear against Ostrach, under the Archduke in person, was long resisted, notwithstanding the great superiority of numbers in the attacking columns, by the Republicans, under Jourdan; but at length the left, under St.-Cyr, having been outflanked at Mengen, and the centre being on the point of sinking under the increasing masses of the assailants, a general retreat was ordered, and such was the danger of the left wing, that it was continued, without intermission, on the day following, till they reached the position of STOCKACH (1).

Importance of this success. This affair did not cost above two thousand men to the vanquished party, and the loss of the victors was nearly as great; but it had the most important effect upon the fate of the campaign. It broke the charm of Republican invincibility, compelled the French standards openly to retreat before the Imperial, and gave to the Austrians all the advantage of a first success. Now appeared the good use which they had made of their time during the short interval of peace. Their cannon, well served and formidable, were much more numerous in proportion to the troops engaged than they had been in the former war, and the light artillery in particular, formed on the French model, had attained a degree of perfection which entirely deprived the Republicans of their advantage in that important weapon of modern warfare (2).

Position of the French at Stockach. Jourdan clearly saw the importance of the village of Stockach, where all the roads to Swabia, Switzerland, and the valley of the Neckar, unite, and beyond which he could not continue his retreat, without abandoning his communications with Masséna and the Grisons. Perceiving that the Archduke was preparing an attack, he resolved to anticipate him, and obtain the advantage of the initiative, always an object of importance in the commencement of a campaign. The Austrians were by this time in great force on the Stockach, a small stream which flows in a winding channel before the village of the same name, and terminates its devious course in the lake of Constance; their centre occupied the plateau of Nellemberg in front of the river, their right extended along the same plateau towards Liptingen, their left from Zollbruck to Wahlweis. On the side of the Republicans, Souham commanded the centre, Ferino the right, and St.-Cyr, whose vanguard was led by Soult, the left wing. This last body was destined to attack Liptingen, where Meerfeld was stationed; and it was in that quarter that the principal effort was to be made, with a view to turn the Austrians, and force them to retreat by the single chaussée of Stockach in their rear, where they of necessity must, in case of disaster, have lost all their artillery (3).

At five in the morning all the columns were in motion, and the advanced

(1) Arch. Ch. i. 147, 151. Th. x. 233. Dum. i. 43, 45. Jom. xi. 120, 124. St.-Cyr, i. 130, 132.

(2) Dum. i. 42, 43. Arch. Ch. i. 156, 165.

(3) Jom. xi. 128. Dum. i. 49. St.-Cyr, i. 133, 135. Arch. Ch. i. 171, 175.

guard of Soult soon came in sight of the videttes of Meerfeld. He was soon attacked so vigorously by that general and St.-Cyr, that he was driven from Liptingen, and thrown back in confusion into the woods which lay along the road of Stockach. Speedily were they expelled from that stronghold; the infantry, in great disorder, retreated to Stockach, and the cavalry on the road towards Mäskirch. Meanwhile the two armies were engaged along the whole

March 26. line. Souham in the centre repulsed the light troops of the enemy as far as Wahlweis and Orsingen on the Stockach, and menaced the plateau of Nellemberg, while Ferino was actively engaged on the right. A violent cannonade was heard along the whole front of the army; a decisive success had been gained on one point, the Austrian right was turned, the victory seemed already decided (1).

Battle of Stockach. No sooner, however, did the Archduke perceive the impression which the French had made on his right wing, than he set off at the gallop for that quarter of the field, followed by twelve squadrons of cuirassiers, after whom succeeded six battalions of grenadiers; while a powerful body of cavalry were stationed in the plateau of Nellemberg to protect the retreat of the army, in case of its becoming necessary to have recourse to that extremity. These dispositions, rapidly adopted at the decisive moment, changed the fortunes of the day, and their effect was increased by a faulty step of Jourdan, who, instead of supporting the menaced point with all his disposable force, sent orders to St.-Cyr to advance to Mäskirch, in the idea of cutting off the retreat of the Imperialists. A violent struggle now ensued in the woods of Liptingen, which Soult had gained in the first moment of success. The Archduke attacked them with fresh troops, the Republicans defended them with heroic valour; and one of the most furious combats that occurred in the whole war, took place, without intermission, for several hours. Three times the French advanced out of the wood to meet their enemies, and three times, notwithstanding the most vigorous efforts, they were repulsed by the obstinate perseverance of the Germans. At length the Imperialists became the assailants; the Archduke charged in person at the head of the Hungarian grenadiers. Prince Furstemburg and Prince Anhalt Bemburg were killed while leading on their respective regiments, and the flower of the army on both sides perished under the terrible fire which overspread the field of battle. St.-Cyr, who felt that he had gained what, if properly supported, might have become a decisive success, long and obstinately maintained his ground; but at length, finding that the principal effort of the Austrians was directed against his wing, and that their reserves were coming into action, he ordered Soult to evacuate the wood, and retire into the plain of Liptingen. This perilous movement was performed by that able officer in presence of a victorious enemy, and when his rear-guard was almost enveloped by their cuirassiers, with admirable steadiness; but, when they reached the open country, they were charged by Kollowrath, at the head of the six battalions of grenadiers and twelve squadrons of cuirassiers, which the Archduke had brought up from the reserve. This effort proved decisive. In vain Jourdan charged the Austrian cavalry with the French horse; they were broken and driven back in disorder by the superior weight and energy of the cuirassiers, and the general-in-chief narrowly escaped being made prisoner in the flight. This overthrow constrained the infantry to a disastrous retreat, during which two regiments were enveloped and made prisoners; and St.-Cyr, who was now entirely cut off from the centre of his army, alone escaped total destruc-

(1) Jom. xi. 130 Dum. i. 49, 50. St.-Cyr, i. 136, 139. Arch. Ch. i. 175, 180.

tion by throwing himself across the Danube, the sole bridge over which he was fortunate enough to find unoccupied by the enemy (1).

Defeat of
the French.

This great success, and the consequent separation of St.-Cyr from the remainder of the army, was decisive of the victory. Souham and Ferino, with the centre and right, had maintained their position, notwithstanding the superiority of force on the part of their opponents; but they had gained no advantage, and they were totally unequal, now that the left wing of the army was separated, and unable to render any assistance, to maintain their ground against the victorious troops of the Archduke. Although, therefore, the French had bravely withstood the superior forces of the enemy, and the loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about five thousand men to each party, yet, by the separation of their left wing, they had sustained all the consequences of a serious defeat; and it became necessary, renouncing all idea of co-operating with the Republicans in Helvetia, which could not be approached without the sacrifice of St.-Cyr and his wing (2), to endeavour to reunite the scattered divisions of the army by a retreat to the passes of the Black Forest.

Jourdan was so much disconcerted with the result of this action, that, after reaching the defiles of that forest, he surrendered the command of the army to Ernouf, the chief of the staff, and set out for Paris, to lay in person his complaints as to the state of the troops before the Directory (5).

Retreat of
the French
across the
Rhine.

With superior forces, and twenty thousand cavalry, in admirable order, the Austrians had now an opportunity of overwhelming the French army in the course of its retreat to the Rhine, such as never again occurred to them till the battle of Leipsic. The Archduke clearly perceived that there was the important point of the campaign: and had he been the unfettered master of his actions, he would, in all probability, have constrained the French army to a retreat as disastrous as that from Wurtzburg in 1796; but the Aulic Council, influenced by the erroneous idea that the key to ultimate success was to be found in the Alps, forbade him to advance towards the Rhine till Switzerland was cleared of the enemy. He was compelled, in consequence, to put his army into cantonments between Engen and Wahlweis, while the Republicans leisurely effected their retreat through April 6.

the Black Forest, by the valley of Kintzig and that of Hell, to the Rhine, which stream they crossed at Old Brisach and Kehl a few days after, leaving only posts of observation on the right bank. This retreat compelled April 7. Bernadotte, who, with his little army of eight thousand men, had already commenced the siege of Philipsburg, to abandon his works with precipitation, and regain the left bank (4); so that, in a month after the campaign had been commenced with so much presumption and so little consideration by the Directory, their armies on the German frontier were every where reduced to the defence of their own territory.

The bad success of their armies at the opening of this campaign, to which the French had been so little accustomed since the brilliant era of Napoléon's victories, might have proved fatal to the government of the Directory, had it not been for an unexpected event which occurred at this time, and restored to the people much of the enthusiasm and vigour of 1793 (3). This was the massacre of the French plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Rastadt.

(1) St.-Cyr, i. 139, 150. Th. x. 238, 240. Jom. x. 131, 134. Dum. i. 50, 52. Arch. Ch. i. 190, 193.

(2) Arch. Ch. i. 198, 202. Jom. xi. 136, 137. Th. x. 241. St. Cyr, i. 150, 156. Dum. i. 51.

(3) Th. x. 241, 242. Jom. xi. 138, 139. St.-Cyr, i. 160, 167.

(4) Arch. Ch. i. 211, 218. Jom. xi. 139, 140. Th. x. 242.

(5) Jom. xi. 141.

Congress of Rastadt is still sitting. Though at war with Austria, France was yet at peace with the German empire, and the Congress at Rastadt was still continuing, under the safeguard of neutrality, its interminable labours. When the victory of Stockach had placed that city in the power of the Imperialists, the Cabinet of Vienna ordered the Count Lehibach, their minister plenipotentiary, to endeavour to obtain intelligence of the extent to which the princes of the empire had made secret advances to the Directory. The Count conceived the most effectual way would be to seize the papers of the French embassy at the moment of their leaving the city, and for this purpose he solicited and obtained from his court authority to require an armed force from the Archduke Charles. That gallant officer refused, in the first instance, to comply with the request, alleging that his soldiers had nothing to do with the concerns of diplomacy; but fresh orders from Vienna obliged him to submit, and a detachment of the hussars of Szeckler was in consequence placed at the disposal of the Imperial plenipotentiary (1).

Its dissolution. Towards the end of April, the communications of the ministers at Rastadt having been interrupted by the Austrian patrols, the Republicans addressed an energetic note on the subject to the Austrian authorities, and the remonstrance having been disregarded, the Congress declared itself dissolved. The departure of the diplomatic body was fixed for the 28th April, but the Austrian colonel gave them orders to set out on the 19th, as the town was to be occupied on the following day by the Imperial troops, and refused to grant the escort which they demanded, upon the plea that it was wholly unnecessary. The French plenipotentiaries in consequence, Jean Debry, Bonnier, and Roberjot, set out on the same evening for Strasburg, but they had scarcely left the gates of Rastadt when they were attacked by some drunken hussars of the regiment of Szeckler, who seized them, dragged them out of their carriages, slew Bonnier and Roberjot, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the wife of April 19. the latter to save her husband, and struck down Jean Debry, by sabre blows, into a ditch, where he escaped destruction only by having the presence of mind to feign that he was already dead. The assassins seized and carried off the papers of the legation, but committed no other spoliation; and leaving two of their victims lifeless, and one desperately wounded, on the ground, disappeared in the obscurity of the night. Jean Debry, whose wounds were not mortal, contrived to make his way, after their departure, into Rastadt, and presented himself, bleeding and exhausted, at the hotel of M. Gœrtz, the Prussian envoy (2).

General horror which it excites in France, and throughout Europe. This atrocious violation of the law of nations excited the utmost indignation and horror throughout Europe. The honour of the Germans felt itself seriously wounded by the calamitous event, and the members of the deputation who remained at the Congress unanimously signed a declaration expressive of detestation at its authors. It is, perhaps, the strongest proof of the high character and unstained honour of the Emperor Francis and the Archduke Charles, that although the crime was committed by persons in the Austrian uniform, and the hussars of Szeckler had been detached from the army of the Archduke to the environs of Rastadt, no suspicion fell upon either of these exalted persons as having been accessory to the nefarious proceeding. That it was committed for political purposes, and not by common robbers, is evident from their having

(1) *Jom.* xi. 142. *Lac.* xiv. 318. *Th.* x. 255.*Ministres Plénipotent.* à Rastadt. *Lac.* xiv. 435.(2) *Hard.* vii. 236, 238. *Jom.* xi. 142, 143. *Lac.* xiv. 318, 328. *Th.* x. 256, 275. *Procès-Verbal des**Arch.* Ch. i. 224.

taken nothing but state papers; and although the Directory has not escaped the suspicion of having been the secret authors of the crime (1), in order to inflame the national spirit of the French, there seems no ground for imputing to them so atrocious a proceeding, or ascribing it to any other cause than an unauthorized excess by drunken or brutal soldiers of a duty committed to them by their government, requiring more than ordinary discretion and forbearance. But though Austria has escaped the imputation of having been accessory to the guilt of murder, she cannot escape from the disgrace of having been remotely the cause of its perpetration; of having authorized an attack upon the sacred persons of ambassadors, which, though not intended to have been followed by assassination, was at best a violation of the law of nations and a breach of the slender links which unite humanity together during the rude conflicts of war, and of having taken guilt to herself by adopting no judicial steps for the discovery of the perpetrators of the offence (2). As such, it is deserving of the severest reprobation, and, like all other unjustifiable actions, its consequences speedily recoiled upon the head of its authors. The military spirit of the French, languid since the commencement of hostilities, was immediately roused to the highest pitch by this outrage upon their ambassadors. No difficulty was any longer experienced in completing the levies of the conscription (3); and to this burst of national feeling is, in a great measure, to be ascribed the rapid augmentation of Masséna's army, and the subsequent disasters which overwhelmed the Imperialists at the conclusion of the campaign.

Commence-
ment of hos-
tilities in
Italy.

While an implacable war was thus breaking out to the north of the Alps, reverses of a most serious character attended the first commencement of hostilities in the Italian plains. The approach

of the Russians, under Suwarrow, who, it was expected, would reach the Adige by the middle of April, rendered it an object of the last importance for the Republicans to force their opponents from the important line formed by that stream before the arrival of so powerful a reinforcement; but by the senseless dispersion of their vast armies through the whole peninsula, they were unable to collect a sufficient force in the plains of the Mincio, in the

Imprudent
dispersion of
the French
forces there.

commencement of the campaign, to effect that object. The total force commanded by Schérer on the Adige was now raised, by the arrival of conscripts, to fifty-seven thousand men; Macdonald was at the head of thirty-four thousand at Rome and Naples; ten thousand were in the Cisalpine republic, the like number in Piedmont, five thousand in Liguria; but these latter forces were too far removed to be able to render any assistance at the decisive point; while, on the other hand, the Imperial forces consisted of fifty-eight thousand combatants, including six thousand cavalry, cantoned between the Tagliamento and the Adige, besides a reserve of twenty thousand infantry and five thousand horse in Carinthia and Croatia. Their field-artillery amounted to 180 pieces; the park of the army to 170 more; and a heavy train of eighty battering guns, admirably provided with horses and ammunition, was ready at Palma Nuova, for the siege of any of the fortresses that might be attacked. This summary is sufficient to demonstrate the erroneous principles on which the Directory proceeded in their plan of

(1) Nap. in Month. vi. 40.

(2) The Queen of Naples was the real instigator of this atrocious act, though the catastrophe in which it terminated was as little intended by her as the single-hearted general who detached from his

army the hussars by whom it was committed.—D'ABRANTES, ii. 304.

(3) Th. x. 257, 250. Jom. xi. 143, 144. Lac. xiv. 324. Hard. vii. 244, 245.

the campaign, and their total oblivion of the lessons taught by Napoléon as to the importance of the line of the Adige to the fate of the Peninsula; while the Imperialists were collecting all their force for a decisive blow in that quarter, half the French troops lay inactive and scattered along the whole extent of its surface, from Piedmont to Calabria (1).

Position of
the Imper-
ialists on
the Adige.

The Austrians had, with great foresight, strengthened their position on the Adige during the cessation of hostilities. Legnago, commanding a bridge over that river, had become a formidable fortress; the castles of Verona were amply supplied with the means of defence; a bridge of boats at Polo enabled them to communicate with the intrenched camp of Pastrengo, on the eastern slope of the Montebaldo; Venice, placed beyond the reach of attack, contained their great magazines and reserves of artillery stores; all the avenues by which it could be approached were carefully fortified; a flotilla of forty boats, carrying three hundred pieces of cannon (2), was prepared, either to defend the Lagunæ of that capital, or carry the supplies of the army up the Po; while bridges, established over the Piave and the Tagliamento, secured the communication of the army in the field with the reserves by which it was to be supported.

Schérer had obtained the command of the French army; an officer who had served with distinction in the Pyrenees and the Alps during the campaign of 1795, but being unknown to the Italian army, he possessed the confidence neither of the officers nor soldiers; while Morcau, the glorious commander of the retreat through the Black Forest in 1796, occupied the unworthy situation of inspector of infantry. On the side of the Austrians, Melas had obtained, upon the death of the Prince of Orange, the supreme command; an officer of considerable experience and ability, but whose age, above seventy years, rendered him little competent to cope with the enterprising generals of the Republic. Until his arrival, however, the troops were under the orders of General Kray, a Hungarian by birth, and one of the most distinguished officers of the empire. Active, intrepid, and indefatigable; gifted with a cool head and an admirable *coup-d'œil* in danger, he was one of the most illustrious generals of the Imperial army, and, after the Archduke Charles, has left the most brilliant reputation in its military archives of the last century (3).

French plan
of opera-
tions.

The plan of the Directory was for Schérer to pass the Adige, near Verona, drive the Austrians over the Piave and the Brenta, while the right wing of Masséna's army, commanded by Lecourbe, was to form a junction with a corps detached from the Italian army into the Valteline, and fall, by Brixen and Botzen, on the right flank of the Imperial army. But at the very time that they meditated these extensive operations, they detached General Gauthier, with five thousand men, to occupy Tuscany; a conquest which was indeed easily effected, but was as unjustifiable as it was inexpedient, both by weakening the effective force on the Adige, and affording an additional example of that insatiable desire for conquest which the allied powers so loudly complained of in the Republican government. Meanwhile Schérer, having collected his forces, established himself on the right bank of the Adige, opposite to the Austrian army, the right at Sanguinetto, the left at Peschiera; and immediately made preparations for crossing the river. At the same time Kray threw eight thousand men into the intrenched camp of Pastrengo, under Generals Gottesheim and Elnitz, while the divisions

(1) Jom. xi. 147, 148. Dum. i. 58. Th. x. 243, 244. St.-Cyr, i. 172, 173. Arch. Ch. i. 225.

(2) Jom. xi. 149. St.-Cyr, i. 173, 175.

(3) Jom. xi. 149, 153.

March 25. Kaim and Hohenzollern, twenty thousand strong, were established around Verona, with detachments at Arcola; Frœlich and Mercantin, with an equal force, were encamped near Bevilacqua; and Klenau, with four thousand, was stationed near Acqua; and the reserves, under Ott and Zoph, received orders to draw near to the Brenta (1).

Preliminary movements of both parties. The French general having been led to imagine that the bulk of the Austrian forces were encamped at Pastrengo, between Verona and the lake of Guarda, resolved to make his principal effort in that quarter. With this view, the three divisions of the left wing, commanded by Serrurier, Delmas, and Grenier, were moved in that direction; while Moreau, with the divisions of Hatry and Victor, received orders to make a false attack near Verona, and, on the extreme right, Montrichard was to advance against Legnago. Kray, on his part, being led to believe that their principal force was directed against Verona, repaired in haste to Bevilacqua, where he concerted with Klenau an attack on the right flank of the Republicans. Thus both parties, mutually deceived as to each other's designs, manœuvred as if their object had been reciprocally to avoid each other; the bulk of the Austrian forces being directed against the French right, and the principal part of the Republicans against the Imperial left (5).

At three in the morning of the 26th March, the whole French left wing was in motion, while the flotilla on the lake of Guarda set sail during the night to second their operations. In this quarter they met with brilliant success; the redoubts and intrenchments of Pastrengo were carried, Rivoli fell into their hands; and the garrison of the intrenched camp, crossing in haste the bridge of Polo, left fifteen hundred prisoners and twelve pieces of cannon in the

March 26. hands of the Republicans. The action did not begin in the centre till near ten o'clock, but it soon became there also extremely warm. The

First success of the French on the Adige. villages in front of Verona were obstinately contested, but after a desperate resistance, the Republicans pressed forward, and nearly reached the walls of Verona. At this sight, Kaim, who was apprehensive of being attacked in the town, made a general attack on the front and flanks of the assailants with fresh forces; but, although the village of San Massimo, taken and retaken seven times during the day, finally remained in the possession of the Austrians till night separated the combatants, they sensibly lost ground, upon the whole, in that quarter; and the post of Saint Lucie, also the theatre of obstinate contest, was carried by the Republicans. But, while fortune favoured their arms on the left, and divided her favours in the centre, the right was overwhelmed by a superior force, conducted by Kray in person. General Montrichard advanced in that quarter to Legnago, and had already commenced a cannonade on the place, when Frœlich debouched in three columns, and commenced a furious attack along the dikes which led to the French column, while the division of Mercantin advanced as a reserve. The Republicans were speedily routed; attacked at once in front and both flanks, they lost all their artillery, and were driven with great loss behind Torre on the road to Mantua (5).

Leads to no decisive result. The loss of the French in this battle amounted to four thousand men, while that of the Imperialists was nearly seven thousand; but nevertheless, as the success on the left and centre was in some degree balanced by the disaster on the right, they were unable to derive any decisive advantage from this large difference in their favour. The capture of the

(1) Jom. xi. 153, 156. Dum. i. 58, Th. x. 245.
Bot. iii. 216, 217. Arch. Ch. i. 226.

(2) Th. x. 246. Jom. 162. Dum. i. 58.

(3) Jom. xi. 166, 170. Th. x. 247. Dum. i. 59,
60. St. Cyr, i. 177, 179. Arch. Ch. i. 226.

camp at Pastrengo and of the bridge at Polo was of little importance, as the Austrians held Verona, and the only road from thence to the plain passed through that town. Kray, abandoning the pursuit of Montrichard, hastened to Verona with the divisions of Mercantin and Frœlich, leaving a few battalions only to guard the line of the Lower Adige; while the Republicans recrossed the upper part of that river above Verona, and retired towards Peschiera. Thus the bulk of the forces on both sides were assembled near Verona, which was felt to be the key to the Adige equally by the Imperialists and Republicans. Already the courage of the Austrians was elevated by the balanced success which they had obtained (1); and from the hesitation of the enemy in following up his advantage at Pastrengo, they perceived with pleasure that the genius of Napoléon had not been inherited by his successor (2).

Scherer experiences a check in endeavouring to cross the Adige. After much irresolution, and assembling a council of war, Schérer resolved to descend the Adige with the bulk of his forces, to attempt a passage between Verona and Legnago at Ronca or Albarredo, while Serrurier, with one division, was thrown across the upper stream at Polo to distract the attention of the enemy. Preparatory to this design, the army was countermarched from left-right, a complicated operation, which fatigued and embarrassed the soldiers without any adequate advantage. At length, on the 30th March, while the main body of the army was descending the river, Serrurier crossed with seven thousand men

March 30. at Polo, and boldly advanced on the high-road leading to Trent towards Verona; Kray, debouching from the central point at Verona, assailed the advancing columns with fifteen thousand men of the divisions Frœlich and Elnitz, and attacking the Republicans with great vigour, drove them back in disorder to the bridge, and pressing forward, approached so near, that it would have fallen into his hands, if the French had not sunk the boats of which it consisted. The situation of Serrurier was now altogether desperate; part of his men dispersed and saved themselves in the mountains; a few escaped over the river at Rivoli; but above fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and the total loss of his division was nearly three thousand men (3).

Counter-marches of both parties. Notwithstanding this severe check, Scherer persisted in his design of passing the Adige below Verona. After countermarching his troops, without any visible reason, he concentrated them below Villa Franca, between the Adige and the Tartaro; his right encamped near Porto-Legnago, the remainder in the position of Magnano. Kray, perceiving the defects of their situation, wisely resolved to bring the weight of his forces to bear on the Republican left, so as to threaten their communications with Lombardy. For this purpose, he directed Hohenzollern and St.-Julien to the Montebaldo and the road to Trent; while Wukassowich, who formed part of Bellegarde's corps in the Tyrol, was to move on La Chiesa, by the western side of the lake of Guarda, and he himself debouched from Verona, at the head of the divisions of Kaim, Zoph, and Mercantin, right against the Republican centre at Magnano. The peril of the left wing of the French was now extreme, and it became indispensable to move the right and centre towards it, in order to avoid its total destruction. Had Kray, whose army was now raised, by the arrival of his reserves, to forty-five thousand, attacked on the 4th April, he would have surprised the French in the midst of their

(1) Dum. i. 60, 61. Jom. xi. 172, 173. St.-Cyr, i. 179, 181.

(2) Saguntinis quia præter spem resisterent, cre-

vissent animi. Pœnus quia non vicisset pro victo esset.—Liv. xxi. 9.

(3) Jom. xi. 177. Dum. i. 62, 63. Th. x. 246, 249. St.-Cyr, i. 182, 183.

lateral movements, and destroyed two of their divisions; but by delaying the action till the day following, the perilous change of position was completed, and the opportunity lost (1).

Decisive
battle at
Magnano.

It was just when the lateral movement was on the point of being accomplished that the hostile armies encountered each other on the plains of MAGNANO. The French force amounted to thirty-four thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry; the Austrians were superior, having nearly forty-five thousand in the field, of whom five thousand were horse. Mercantin was intrusted with the attack of the French right; Kaim the centre, and Zoph the left, while Frœlich, at the head of a powerful reserve, was to follow the steps of Kaim, and Hohenzollern was moved forward against Villa Franca on the road to Mantua. The marshy plain, to the south of Magnano, is intersected by a multitude of streams, which fall into the Tartaro and the Menago, and render the deploying of infantry difficult, that of cavalry impossible (2).

The right wing of the French, commanded by Victor and Grenier, overwhelmed the division of Mercantin to which it was opposed. But while this success attended the Republicans in that quarter, the Austrian centre, under Kaim, penetrated, without opposition, between the rear of Montrichard and the front of Delmas, who were in the act of completing their lateral movement from right to left, and occupied a salient angle in the centre of the French position. Had the Imperialists been in a situation to have supported this advantage by fresh troops, it would have been decisive of the fate of the day; but Kray, alarmed at the progress of the Republican right, was at the moment hastening to support Mercantin with the reserve of Frœlich; and thus time was given to Moreau and Delmas, not only to restore affairs in that quarter, by causing their rear and vanguards to form in line to resist the farther progress of the enemy, but even to attack and carry the village of Buttapreda, notwithstanding the most vigorous resistance from Kaim's division. On the left, Moreau, having arrived at the open plain, favourable to the operations of cavalry, executed several brilliant charges, and drove the Austrians from all the villages which they occupied, almost into the walls of Verona. Victory on every side seemed to incline to the Republican standard, though decisive success was no longer to be expected from the insulated situation of all the divisions, and the unconnected operations which they were severally

Brilliant
attack of
Kray with
the reserve
gives the
Austrians
the victory.

carrying on. But Kray changed the fortune of the day, by a decisive operation against the French right. Putting himself at the head of the reserve of Frœlich, supported by two batteries of heavy artillery, he fell unawares upon the division of Grenier, and put it to the rout; Victor, trying to restore the combat, was charged in flank by the Imperial horse, and driven back in disorder, while the overthrow of that wing was completed by the attack of Mercantin's division, which had now rallied in its rear. Meanwhile, Moreau continued to maintain his ground in the centre, and Serrurier made himself master on the left of Villa Franca, and advanced near to Verona. But the rout of the right wing, which was now driven a mile and a-half from the field of battle, so as to leave the centre entirely uncovered, was decisive of the victory. Before night, Scherer drew off his shattered forces behind the Tartaro, carrying with them two thousand prisoners and several pieces of cannon, a poor compensation for the loss of four thousand killed and wounded, four thousand prisoners, seven standards,

(1) Jom. xi. 179, 181. Dum. i. 65. Th. x. 250. (2) Dum. i. 65. Jom. xi. 186, 187. St.-Cyr, i. 184.

eight pieces of cannon, and forty caissons, which had fallen into the hands of the Imperialists (1).

Its decisive results. This victory, one of the most glorious in the annals of the Austrian monarchy, was decisive of the fate of Italy. Thenceforth, the French fell from one disaster into another, till they were driven over the Maritime Alps, and expelled from the whole peninsula—a striking example of the importance of early victory to the whole fate of a campaign, and of the facility with which the confidence and vigour resulting from long-continued triumphs may, by a single well-timed success, be exchanged for the depression and irresolution which are the sure forerunners of defeat. The advantages gained by the Imperialists were mainly owing to the possession of the fortified posts of Verona and Legnago, and the interior line of operations which they afforded them on the Adige,—another instance, among the many which this war exhibited, of the inestimable importance of a central position in the hands of one who can avail himself of it, and the degree to which it may sometimes, in the hands of a skilful general, counterbalance the most decided superiority in other respects (2).

Disorderly retreat of the French. The Republicans, thrown into the deepest dejection by this defeat, retired on the following day behind the Mincio; and not feeling themselves in security there, even with the fortress of Mantua on one flank, and that of Peschiera on the other, Scherer continued his retreat

April 12. behind the Oglio, and then the Adda. This retrograde movement was performed in such confusion, that it entirely lost that general the little consideration which remained to him with his troops, and they loudly demanded the removal of a leader who had torn from their brows the

April 14. laurels of Rivoli and Arcola. The Austrians, astonished at their own success, and fearful of endangering it by a precipitate advance, moved slowly after the beaten army. Eight days after the battle elapsed before they crossed the Mincio, and established themselves at Castillaro, after detaching Elnitz, with ten thousand men, to observe Mantua, and three battalions to form the investment of Peschiera (5).

Corfu surrenders to the Russian and Turkish fleets. While the Republican fortunes were thus sinking in Italy, another disaster awaited them, in the capture of Corfu, which capitulated to the combined forces of Russia and Turkey, shortly after the commencement of hostilities; and thus deprived them of their last footing in the

March 3. Ionian isles. Thus on every side the star of the Republic seemed to be on the wane, while that of Austria was rising in the ascendant (4).

Operations in Germany. While these important events were in progress to the south of the Alps, the Austrians evinced an unpardonable tardiness in following up their success at Stockach. In vain the Archduke urged them not to lose the precious moments; the Aulic Council, desirous not to endanger the advantage which they had already gained, enjoined him to confine his operations in clearing the right bank of the Danube by detached parties. April 13. After several engagements, the French were finally expelled from the German side, but in their retreat they, with needless barbarity, burned the celebrated wooden bridge at Schaffhausen, the most perfect specimen of that species of architecture that existed in the world (5).

(1) Th. x. 251, 252. Jom. xi. 190, 194. Dum. i. 64, 65. St.-Cyr, i. 185, 190.

(2) Jom. xi. 195.

(3) Th. x. 252, 253. Jom. xi. 198, 199. Dum. i. 66. St.-Cyr, i. 191, 195.

(4) Ann. Reg. 1799, 80. Jom. xi. 199.

(5) Jom. xi. 205. Dum. i. 72. Arch. Ch. i. 215, 221.

Masséna
falls back on
the Alps,
and takes a
defensive
position in
the Grisons.

Masséna, to whom the command of the army on the Rhine, as well as in the Alps, was now intrusted, found himself under the necessity of changing entirely the disposition of his army. Turned on the one flank by the Imperialists on the lake of Constance, and on the other by the advance of Kray beyond the Adige, he was necessitated to retire into the central parts of Switzerland, and the Directory now found how grievous an error they had committed by attacking that country, and rendering its rugged frontiers the centre of military operations. Deprived of the shelter which they had hitherto found for their flanks in the neutral ridges of the Alps, the Republicans were now compelled to maintain one uninterrupted line of defence from the Texel to the gulf of Genoa, and any considerable disaster in one part of that long extent weakened their operations in every other. Masséna was well aware that a mountainous country, in appearance the most easy, is frequently in reality the most difficult of defence; because the communication from one part of the line to another is often so much obstructed, and it is so easy for a skilful adversary to bring an overwhelming force to bear against an unsupported part. Impressed with those ideas, he drew back his advanced posts at Taufers, Glurentz on the Adige, and Fintermuntz on the Inn, and arranged his forces in the following manner. The right wing was composed of Lecourbe in the Engadine, Ménard in the Grisons, and Lorges in the valley of the Rhine, as far down as the lake of Constance; the centre, consisting of four divisions, supported by an auxiliary Swiss corps, occupied the line of that river as far as Huningen. Headquarters were established at Basle, which was put in a respectable posture of defence. The left wing, scattered over Huningen, Old Brisach, Kehl, and Mannheim, was destined to protect the line of the Rhine below that place. The whole of these forces amounted to one hundred thousand men, of whom about two-thirds were stationed in Switzerland and the Grisons (1).

Description
of the
theatre of
war.

Three impetuous streams, each flowing within the other, descend from the snowy ridges of the Alps towards the north, and form, by their junction, the great river of the Rhine. The first of these is the Rhine itself, which, rising in the Glaciers near the St.-Gothard, and flowing through the Grisons to the north, loses itself in the great lake of Constance; issues from it at Stein, and flows to the westward as far as Basle, where it commences its majestic and perpendicular course towards the sea. This river covers the whole of Switzerland, and contains within its ample circuit all its tributary streams. The second is formed by the course of the Linth, which, rising in the Alps of Glarus and the Wallenstatter sea, forms in its course the charming lake of Zurich, and issuing from its northern extremity at the town of the same name, under the appellation of the Limmat, falls into the Aar, not far from the junction of that river with the Rhine. That line only covers a part of Switzerland, and is of much smaller extent than the former; but it is more concentrated, and offers a far more advantageous position for defence. Lastly, there is the Reuss, which, descending from the St.-Gothard through the precipitous valley of Schollenen, swells into the romantic lake of the four cantons at Altdorf, and leaving its wood-clad cliffs at Lucerne, falls into the Aar, near its junction with the Rhine. All these lines, shut in on the right by enormous mountains, terminating on the left in deep rivers, and intersected by vast lakes and ridges of rock, present the greatest advantages for defence. Masséna soon found that the exterior circle, that of the Rhine, could not be maintained, with the troops at his disposal,

(1) Dum. i. 74. Jour. xi. 214, 213, 215. Th. x. 277, 278. Archduke, i. 233, 241.

against the increasing forces of the Austrians, and he retired to the inner line, that of the Limmat and Linth, and established his head-quarters at Zurich, in a position of the most formidable strength (1).

General attack upon Masséna's line in the Grisons April 30.

Meanwhile Hotze and Bellegarde were combining a general attack upon the whole line of the Republicans in the Grisons. Towards the latter end of April, their forces were all in motion along the immense extent of mountains from the valley of Coire to the Engadine. After a vigorous attack, Bellegarde was repulsed by Lecourbe, from the fortified post of Ramis, in the Lower Engadine, while a detachment sent by the Col de Tcherfs to Zemetz was cut to pieces, with the loss of six hundred prisoners, among whom was the young Prince de Ligne. But as the Imperialists were advancing through the valleys on his flanks, Lecourbe retreated in the night, and next day was attacked by Bellegarde at Suss, whence, after an obstinate resistance, he was driven with great loss to the sources of the Albula. At the same time, a general attack was made, in the valley of the Rhine, on the French posts; but though the Imperialists were at first so far successful as to drive back the Republicans to Luciensteg and the heights of Mayenfeld, yet, at the close of the day, they were obliged to fall back to their former position (2).

Insurrection of the Swiss in his rear; being unsupported, is crushed.

This general attack upon the French line in the Grisons, was combined with an insurrection of the peasants in their rear and in the small cantons, where the desire for revenge, on account of the cruelties of the French during the preceding year, had become extremely strong. This feeling had been worked up to a perfect fury by an attempt of the Directory to complete the auxiliary forces of eighteen thousand men, which Switzerland was bound to furnish, by levies from the militia of the different cantons. Determined to combat rather against than for the destroyers of their liberties, ten thousand men took up arms in the small cantons and adjoining districts of the Grisons, and fell with such rapidity upon the French posts in the rear, that they not only made themselves masters of Disentis and Ilantz, but surprised the important bridge of Reichenau, which they strongly barricaded, thus cutting off all communication between the divisions of Lecourbe, at the sources of the Albula, and the remainder of the army. Had the attack of Hotze and Bellegarde succeeded at the same time that this formidable insurrection broke out in their rear, it is highly probable that Masséna's right wing would have been totally destroyed; but the defeat of Hotze at Luciensteg gave the Republicans time to crush it before it had acquired any formidable consistency. Masséna, aware of the vital importance of early success in subduing an insurrection, acted with the greatest vigour against the insurgents; Ménard moved towards Reichenau, which was abandoned at his approach, and pursued the peasants to Ilantz and Disentis. At this latter place they stood firm, in number about six thousand, and, though destitute of artillery, made a desperate resistance. At length, however, they were broken, and pursued with great slaughter into the mountains, leaving above one thousand men slain on the spot. At the same time, Soult proceeded with his division to Schwytz, where he overthrew a body of peasants; and, embarking on the lake of Lucerne, landed, in spite of the utmost resistance, at Altdorf, and cut to pieces a body of three thousand men, supported by four pieces of cannon, who had taken post in the defiles

(1) Th. x. 278, 279. Jom. xi, 213.

(2) Jom. xi. 215, 219. Dum. i. 114, 117. Archduke, i. 253, 256.

PENNA STATE
LIBRARY

of the Reuss above that place. The broken remains of this division fled by Wasen to the valley of Schollenen, but there they were met and entirely dispersed by Lecourbe, who, after subduing the insurrection in the Val-levantine, had crossed the St.-Gothard, and fallen upon the fugitives in rear. In this affair, above two thousand peasants were killed and wounded; and such was the consternation excited by the military execution which followed, that the people of that part of Switzerland made no further attempt, during the progress of the campaign, to take a part in hostilities. They saw that their efforts were of little avail amidst the immense masses of disciplined men, by whom their country was traversed; and suffering almost as much, in the conflicts which followed, from their friends as their enemies, they resigned themselves, in indignant silence, to be the spectators of a contest, from which they had nothing to hope, and no power to prevent (1).

Masséna
draws back
his right
wing in the
Italian
Alps.

These movements, however, rendered it indispensable for the French to evacuate the Engadine, as great part of the troops who formed the line of defence had been drawn into the rear to quell the insurrection. Loison retired from Tirrano, and joined Lecourbe at S.-Giacomo; and as the Imperialists, who were now far advanced in Lombardy, were collecting forces at Lugano, evidently with the design of seizing upon the St.-Gothard, and so turning the flank of Masséna's position, that active general instantly crossed the Bernhardine, and descending the Misocco, advanced to Bellinzona, in order to protect the extreme right of his interior line, which rested on the St.-Gothard, the lake of Zurich, and the Limmat (2).

General at-
tack by the
Austrians on
the French
in the Gri-
sons. Lucien-
steg is
carried.

The Archduke, convinced that it was by turning the right of Masséna in the mountains, that he would be most easily forced from this strong line of defence, strengthened Hotze by fresh troops, and combined a general attack with Lecourbe for the 14th May. The forces they brought into action on that day were very considerable, amounting to not less than thirty thousand men, while those of Ménard, since the greater part of Lecourbe's division had retreated to Bellinzona, did not exceed fourteen thousand men. Luciensteg, since it fell into the hands of the Republicans, had been greatly strengthened; a narrow defile, bounded by the precipices of the Alps on one side, and a rocky eminence bathed by the Rhine on the other, was crossed by strong intrenchments, mounted with a formidable artillery; but the intelligence which the Archduke received of the approach of thirty thousand Russians to support his army, who had already arrived in Gallicia, determined him without delay to commence offensive operations. Accordingly, on the 12th May, the columns were every where put in motion in the mountains, and two days afterwards this important post was attacked. The assailants were divided into four columns; one was destined to engage the attention of the enemy by a false attack in front; the second to make a circuit by the Alps of Mayenfeld, and descend on the intrenchments in rear; a third to cross the Suvisir Alps; and the fourth, to which the cavalry and artillery were attached, to assail the pass called the Slapiner Joch. Hotze commanded in person the attack in front, while Jellachich directed the other columns. After twelve hours of fatiguing march, the latter succeeded in bringing his troops in rear to attack the intrenchments. When the animating sound of their hurra was heard, Hotze pressed forward to assail the works in front, and, after a stout resis-

(1) *Journ.* xi. 219, 221. *Dum.* i. 117, 119. *Arch.* i. 267, 268.

(2) *Dum.* i. 120, 121. *Journ.* xi. 222, 223. *Arch.* i. 263, 267.

tance, the barriers were burst open, and the fort carried, with the loss to the Republicans of fifteen hundred prisoners (1).

This important success occasioned the immediate retreat of the French armies from the Grisons. Their left fell back by Sargans to Wallenstadt; the centre by the gorge of Vettis; the right by Reichenau, Ilantz, and Disentis, into the valley of Urseren. The centre of the army was forced; and had Bellegarde been at hand to follow up the successes of Hotze, it would have been all over with the Republicans in Helvetia. As it was, they did not effect their retreat from the Grisons without sustaining a loss of three thousand men in prisoners alone; while the total loss of the Imperialists was only seventy-one men; an extraordinary, but well-authenticated proof of the immense advantage of offensive operations in mountain warfare, and the great disasters to which even the best troops are subjected by being exposed, when acting on the defensive, to the loss of their communications, by their adversary turning their position (2).

Retreat of Masséna behind the Lake of Zurich. May 20. This catastrophe obliged Masséna to alter entirely his line of defence. The right wing in the Alps being driven back, it was no longer possible to maintain the line of the lake of Constance and the Rhine from Stein to Eglisau. In consequence, he fell back from the Rhine behind the Thur; Lecourbe received orders to evacuate the St.-Gothard and concentrate his forces below the Devil's Bridge, in the valley of the Reuss, while the bulk of his army was assembled round the headquarters at Zurich, all the approaches to which were fortified with the utmost care (3).

Part of the Austrian left wing is detached into Lombardy. Notwithstanding the strength of this position, Lecourbe would have been unable to have maintained his ground with the right wing against the impetuous attacks of Hotze, had that enterprising general been supported by Bellegarde; but the Aulic Council, conceiving that Italy was to be the theatre of decisive operations, directed him to descend into Lombardy, and reinforce the army there, now commanded by Suwarrow, leaving only ten thousand men to guard the Valteline and gain possession of the St.-Gothard. In pursuance of these orders he crossed the Splugen, and proceeded by the lake of Como to Milan, while Hotze vigorously pursued the retreating enemy in the valley of the Rhine, and every where drove him back to the Swiss frontiers (4).

May 22. Encouraged by these successes, and the near approach of the Russian auxiliaries, to push the war with vigour, the Archduke published a proclamation to the Swiss, in which he announced that he was about to enter their territory, to deliver them from their chains, and exhorted them to take up arms against their oppressors. At the same time the Rhine was passed at all points, a large column crossed at Stein, under Nauendorf; another at Eglisau, while Hotze crossed the upper part of the stream in the Grisons, and penetrated, by the source of the Thur, into the Toggenberg. To May 24. prevent the junction of the Archduke and Hotze, Masséna left his intrenchments on the Limmat, and commenced an attack on the advanced guard of Nauendorf. A desultory action ensued, which was maintained with great vivacity on both sides; fresh troops continually came up to reinforce those who were exhausted with fatigue, and though undecisive upon the whole, Oudinot gained a considerable advantage over an Austrian division, commanded by Petrasch, which was defeated, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners.

(1) Dum. i. 123, 124. Jom. xi. 224, 225. Arch. Ch. i. 271, 278.

(3) Jom. xi. 228. Dum. i. 127.

(2) Jom. xi. 226, 227. Dum. i. 124, 125. Arch. Ch. i. 271, 281.

(4) Dum. i. 124, 126. Jom. xi. 228, 230. Arch. Ch. i. 283, 284.

May 25.
French
centre is
forced by
the Arch-
duke.

Notwithstanding that check, however, the object was gained; the Archduke marched on the following day, towards Winterthur, while Hotze descended with all his forces to support him. The important post called the Steigpass was attacked at noon, and carried by that intrepid general (1), while the Archduke effected his junction with the left wing of his army at Winterthur and Nestenbach. Masséna, upon this, fell back to Zurich, and the Republicans confined themselves to their defensive position on the Limmat.

Their right
wing is
driven from
the St.-
Gothard.

While the French centre was thus forced back to their interior line of defence, the right wing, under Lecourbe, was still more severely pressed by the Imperialists. No sooner had Bellegarde arrived in Lombardy, than Suwarrow detached General Haddick, with ten thousand men, to drive them from the St.-Gothard. Loison's division, defeated at the Monte Cenere, by Hohenzollern, retired up the valley of the Ticino, to

May 29.

Airola, where it was reinforced by several additional battalions, in order to maintain the passage of the St.-Gothard, and give time for the baggage and artillery to defile to Altdorf. Overwhelmed by numbers, Loison was at length driven over the snowy summit of that rugged mountain, through the smiling valley of Urseren, and down the deep descent of the Devil's Bridge, to Wasen, with the loss of six hundred prisoners. An Austrian brigade even chased him from Wasen down to Amsteg, within three miles of Altdorf; but Lecourbe, justly alarmed at so near an approach, sallied forth from that place, at the head of a considerable body of troops, and attacked them with such vigour, that they were obliged to retrace their steps in confusion up the whole valley of Schollenen, and could only prevent the irruption of the enemy into the valley of Urseren by cutting an arch of the Devil's bridge. At the same time, General Xaintrailles, at the head of a strong French division, which Masséna had dispatched to the support of the army of Italy, attacked and routed a body of six thousand peasants, which had taken post at Leuk (2), in the upper Valais, and made himself master of Brieg, the well-known village at the foot of the Simplon.

Masséna's
position at
Zurich.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the Austrian forces were concentrated in the environs of Zurich, where Masséna still maintained, with characteristic obstinacy, his defensive position. The French lines extended from the intrenched heights of Zurich, through those of Regensberg, and thence to the Rhine, in a direction nearly parallel to the course of the Aar. The camp around Zurich was strengthened by the most formidable redoubts, at which the army had laboured for above a month; while the whole country by which it could be approached, situated between the Glatt, the Limmat, and the Aar, filled with wooded heights, and intersected by precipitous ravines, presented

June 5.
He is there
unsuccess-
fully attack-
ed by the
Archduke.

the greatest obstacles to an attacking army. On the 5th June, the Archduke, having assembled all his forces, assailed him along the whole line. The chief weight of his attack was directed against Masséna's centre and right. At the latter point, Hotze gained at first what seemed an important success; his advanced posts even penetrated into the suburbs of Zurich, and carried the whole intrenchments which covered the right of the army; but before the close of the day, Soult coming up with the reserve, regained the lost ground and forced back the Imperialists, after a desperate struggle, to the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the action. The combat at the same time raged in the centre with un-

(1) Dum. i. 161, 167. Jom. xi. 235. 237. Arch. Ch. i. 292, 303.

(2) Jom. xi. 240, 244. Dum. i. 158. Arch. Ch. i. 286, 290.

certain success; and at length the Archduke, seeing the repulse of Hotze, and deeming the heights of the Zurichberg the decisive point, detached General Wallis, with a portion of the reserve, to renew the attack, while the Prince of Lorraine made a simultaneous effort on the side of the Attisberg. Wallis at first made a great impression, carried the farm of Zurichberg, and, after a vehement struggle, arrived at the palissades of the intrenchments; but Masséna, seeing the danger, flew to the spot, at the head of a column of grenadiers, and assailed the Imperialists in flank, while a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from the summit of the works tore down the foremost of their ranks. Notwithstanding all their efforts, the Imperialists were unable to force the intrenchments; Hotze himself was severely wounded; and, after a bloody conflict, they retired over the Glatt, leaving three thousand killed and wounded on the field battle (1).

He prepares a second and better arranged attack. Masséna prevents it by a retreat.

Noways discouraged by this check, the Archduke, after a day's repose, made arrangements for a renewal of the attack; and, taught, by experience, adopted such dispositions as must have ensured success. Before daybreak on the morning of the 6th, two columns, of eight thousand men each, were destined to assault the heights of Zurich and Wipchengen, while all the left, the reserve, and part of the centre, were to support their attack. But Masséna, apprehensive of the result, retreated during the night, defiled over the bridges of Zurich and Wetingen, and took post, between Lucerne and Zurich, on Mount Albis, a rocky ridge stretching from the lake of Zurich to the Aar, in a position even stronger than the one he had left. The retreat was effected without loss under cover of night; but the great arsenal of Zurich, containing 150 pieces of cannon, and immense warlike stores, fell on the day following into the hands of the Imperialists (2).

Dissolution of all the Swiss forces in the service of France.

The evacuation of the intrenched camp at Zurich, drew after it the dissolution of the forces of the Swiss Confederacy in the interest of France. The battalions of Berne and Soleure, already much weakened by desertion, were entirely dissolved by that event; while those of Zurich and Turgovia, menaced with military execution on their dwellings, if they continued longer with the enemy, made haste to abandon a cause of which they were already ashamed in their hearts. In a week the battalions of the Pays de Vaud, and a few hundreds of the most ardent of the Zurich democrats, alone remained of the eighteen thousand auxiliaries first assembled under the tricolor standard. At the same time, the provisional government of Helvetia, no longer in safety at Lucerne, set off for Berne; the long file of its carriages excited the ironical contempt of the peasantry, still ardently attached to the institutions of their fathers, in the rural districts through which they passed (3).

Reflections on the magnitude of the preceding operations in the Alps.

The details which have now been given of the campaign in the Alps, though hardly intelligible to those who have not traversed the country, or studied the positions with care in an excellent map, offer the most remarkable spectacle, in a military point of view, which the revolutionary war had yet exhibited (4). From the 14th May, when the attack on the fort of Luciensteg commenced, to the 6th June, when the intrenched camp at Zurich was abandoned, was nothing but one

(1) Jom. xi. 249, 251. Dum. i. 169, 170. Th. x. 295. Arch. Ch. i. 327, 344.

(2) Jom. xi. 251, 252. Th. x. 296. Dum. i. 169, 170. Arch. Ch. i. 345, 350.

(3) Jom. xi. 255, 256. Arch. Ch. i. 350, 357.

(4) Those who have enjoyed the advantage of

having travelled over these mountains will require the aid of no map to remind them of places whose relative position is indelibly imprinted in their memory. Those who have not, will find them delineated in the common *Carte Routière de la Suisse*.

continual combat, in a vast field of battle, extending from the snowy summits of the Alps, to the confluence of the great streams which flow from their perennial fountains. Posterity will hardly credit that great armies could be maintained in such a situation, and the same unity of operations communicated to a line, extending from Bellinzona to Basle, across the highest mountains in Europe, as to a small body of men manœuvring on the most favourable ground for military operations. The consumption of human life during these prolonged actions for twenty days; the forced marches by which they were succeeded; the sufferings and privations which the troops on both sides endured; the efforts necessary to find provisions for large bodies in those inhospitable regions, in many of which the traveller or the chamois hunter can often hardly find a footing, combined to render this warfare both the most memorable and the most animating which had occurred since the fall of the Roman empire (1).

Arrival of
the Rus-
sians, under
Suwarrow,
on the Min-
cio.

While success was thus attending the Imperial standards on the Rhine and the Alps, events of a still more decisive character occurred on the Italian plains. A few days after the important battle of Magnano, twenty thousand Russians, under Suwarrow, joined the Imperial army, still encamped on the shores of the Mincio. Thus were the forces of the north, for the first time since the origin of the Revolution, brought into collision with those of the south, and that desperate contest commenced which was destined to inflict such terrible wounds on both empires; to wrap in flames the towers of the Kremlin, and bring the Tartars of the Desert to the shores of the Seine, and ultimately establish a new balance of power in Europe, by arraying all its forces under the banners either of Asiatic despotism or European ambition.

The Emperor Paul, who now entered, with all the characteristic impetuosity of his character, into the alliance against France, had embraced the most extensive and visionary ideas as to the ulterior measures which should be adopted upon the overthrow of the French Revolutionary power. He laboured to effect the formation, not only of a cordial league between all the sovereigns of Europe, to stop the progress of anarchy, but the restoration of all the potentates and interests which had been subverted by the French arms, and the closing of the great schism between the Greek and Catholic Churches, which had so long divided the Christian world. He went even so far as to contemplate the union of the Catholics and Protestants, the stilling of all the controversies which distracted the latter body, and the assemblage of the followers of Christ, of whatever denomination, under the banners of one Catholic Church. Captivating ideas, which will never cease to attract the enthusiastic and benevolent in every age, but which the experienced observer of human events will dismiss to the regions of imagination, and class with the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, or the probable extinction of death, which amused the reveries of Condorcet (2).

Character
of these
troops and
their com-
manders.

The troops thus brought against the Republicans, though very different from the soldiers of Eylau and Borodino, were still formidable by their discipline, their enthusiasm, and their stubborn valour. Their cavalry, indeed, was poorly equipped, and their artillery inferior in skill and science to that of the French, but their infantry, strong, hardy and resolute, yielded to none in Europe in the energy and obstinacy so essential to military success. Field-marshal Suwarrow, who commanded

(1) Dum. i. 172, 173. Jom. xi. 257, 258.

(2) Hard. vii. 245, 247.

them, and now assumed the general direction of the allied army, though the singularity of his manner and the extravagance of his ideas in some particulars have detracted, in the estimation of foreigners, from his well-earned reputation, was yet unquestionably one of the most remarkable generals of the last age. Impetuous, enthusiastic, and impassioned, brave in conduct, invincible in resolution, endowed with the confidence and ardour which constitute the soul of the conqueror, without the vigilance or foresight which are requisite to the general, he was better calculated to sweep over the world with the fierce tempest of Scythian war, than conduct the long and cautious contests which civilised nations maintain with each other. His favourite weapon was the bayonet, his system of war incessant and vigorous attack, and his great advantage the impression of superiority and invincible power which a long course of success under that method had taught to his soldiers. The first orders he gave to General Chastelar, chief of the staff to the Imperialists, were singularly characteristic, both of his temper of mind and system of tactics. That general having proposed a reconnoissance, the marshal answered warmly, "Reconnoissance! I am for none of them; they are of no use but to the timid, and to inform the enemy that you are approaching. It is never difficult to find your opponents when you really wish it. Form column; charge bayonets; plunge into the centre of the enemy; these are my reconnoissances;" words which, amid some exaggeration, unfold more of the real genius of war than is generally supposed (1).

Fearless and impetuous in conversation as action, the Russian veteran made no secret of the ultimate designs with which his imperial master had entered into the war. To restore every thing to the state in which it was before the French Revolution broke out; to overturn the new republics, re-establish, without exception, the dispossessed princes, restrain universally the spread of revolutionary ideas, punish the authors of fresh disturbances, and substitute for the cool policy of calculating interest a frank, generous, disinterested system, was the only way, he constantly maintained, to put down effectually the Gallic usurpation. The Austrian officers, startled at such novel ideas, carefully reported them to the cabinet of Vienna, where they excited no small disquietude. To expel the French from the whole Italian peninsula, and, if possible, raise up an effectual barrier against any future incursions in that quarter from their ambition, was, indeed, a favourite object of their policy; but it was no part of their designs to sanction a universal restitution of the possessions acquired since the commencement of the war, or exchange the distant and rebellious provinces of Flanders for the rich and submissive Venetian territories adjoining the Hereditary States, and affording them at all times a secure entrance into the Italian plains. Hence a secret jealousy and distrust speedily arose between the coalesced Powers, and experienced observers already began to predict, from the very rapidity of the success with which their arms were at first attended, the evolution of such causes of discord as would ultimately lead to the dissolution of the confederacy (2).

The plan of operations concerted between the Archduke and Suwarrow was to separate entirely the French armies of Switzerland and Italy, and to combine the movements of the two allied armies by the conquest of the Italian Alps, Lombardy, and Piedmont, in order to penetrate into France on its most defenceless side by the Vosges mountains and the defiles of the Jura, the

(1) Jom. xi. 261, 262. Dum. i. 173. Hard. vii. 213, 219.

(2) Hard. vii. 220.

same quarter on which the great invasion of 1814 was afterwards effected. It was on this principle that they maintained so vigorous a contest under Bellegarde and Hotze, in the Val-levantine and Grisons; and by their successes the right wing of Masséna was forced to retire; the Imperialists were interposed in a salient angle between the Republican armies, and the one thrown back on the line of the Po, the other on that of the Aar (1).

Moreau succeeds to the command of the Italian army. Its wretched condition. Moreau succeeded Sherer in the command of the army of Italy at this momentous crisis. He found it reduced, by sickness and the sword, to twenty-eight thousand combatants; and, after a vain attempt to maintain the line of the Oglio, the troops retired towards Milan, leaving the immense military stores and reserve artillery parks at Cremona to the Conquerors, while a bridge equipage, which was descending the Mincio from Mantua, with a view to gain the waters of the Po, also fell into the hands of the Imperialists (2).

Moreau retreats behind the Adda. Moreau finding himself cut off from his connexion with Masséna in the Alps, and being unable to face the Allies in the plain of Lombardy, resolved to retire towards the mountains of Genoa, in order to facilitate his junction with Macdonald, who had received orders to evacuate the Parthenopean republic, and retire upon the Apennines. Mantua was invested; and all the frontier towns of the Cisalpine republic were abandoned to their own resources. Soon after, Peschiera was carried by assault; April 20. Ferrara besieged; and Brescia summoned. Kray, to whom the right wing was intrusted, carried the latter town without opposition; and the garrison, eleven hundred strong, which had retired into the castle, soon after surrendered at discretion. The French now retired behind the line of the Adda, a rapid stream, which, descending from the lake of Lecco, runs in a deep and swift torrent, over a surface of twenty-four leagues, to the Po. The right bank is almost every where so lofty as to command the left; and the bridges at Lecco, Cassana, Lodi, and Pizzighitona are defended either by fortified towns or strong *têtes-de-pont*. On the 25th April the Allies approached this formidable line; and a sharp skirmish ensued between the Russians, under Prince BAGRATIION, destined to meet a glorious death on the field of Borodino, and the French, before the walls of Lecco, in which the former were repulsed: commencing thus a contest which was never destined to be finally extinguished till the Russian standards waved on the heights of Montmartre (3).

The passage of the Adda is forced with immense loss to the French. Suwarrow now left twenty thousand men, under Kray, to besiege Peschiera and blockade Mantua, and prepared to force the passage of the Adda. To frustrate this intention, Moreau accumulated his troops in masses on that part of the river which seemed chiefly threatened. But while actively engaged in this design, the Austrian division of General Ott succeeded in throwing a bridge, during the night, at Trezzo, and before morning his whole troops had crossed over to the right; while, at the same time, Wukassowich surprised the passage at Brivio. The French line was thus divided into three parts; and Serrurier's division, eight thousand strong, which formed the extreme left, was not only cut off from all support, but even from receiving any orders from the remainder of the army. The divisions of Ott and Zoph commenced a furious attack on Grenier's division, and after a brave resistance, drove it back towards Milan, with the loss of two thousand four hundred men, including eleven hundred pri-

(1) Dum. i. 174. Jom. xi. 262. Arch. Ch. ii. 33, 34.

(3) Jom. xi. 265, 267. Dum. i. 79. St.-Cyr, i. 200, 202.

(2) Jom. xi. 262, 263. Dum. i. 174, 175.

soners, while Serrurier, whose division was entirely isolated by the passage of Wukassowich at Brivio, took post at Verderio, in a strong position, determined to defend himself to the last extremity. Guillet, with the brigade under his orders, who was returning from the Valteline, escaped destruction by embarking on the lake of Como, steering for Menagio, and making his way to the lake of Lugano by the beautiful valley which leads from that place to Porlezza. By remaining in his position at Verderio while the Allied army

was advancing, Serrurier necessarily was soon enveloped by their columns; evincing thus rather the courage of a soldier who disdains to retreat, than the conduct of an officer who knows how to extricate his men from difficulties. He was soon surrounded on all sides by the Imperialists; and, after an honourable resistance, finding his retreat cut off, and the assailants triple his own force, laid down his arms with seven thousand men. At the same time, Melas carried the *tête-de-pont* at Cassano, and pursued the fugitives with such vigour that he passed the bridge pell-mell with them, and pushed on before night to Gorgonzelo, on the road to Milan (1).

The situation of the French was now in the highest degree critical. In these engagements they had lost above eleven thousand men, and could now, even with all the reinforcements which they received, hardly muster in their retreat twenty thousand to meet the great army of the Allies, above sixty thousand strong, which was advancing in pursuit. In these disastrous circumstances, Milan was abandoned, and the army withdrawn behind

the Ticino. Suwarrow, the same day, made his triumphal entry into that capital, amidst the transports of the Catholic and aristocratic party, and the loud applause of the multitude, who greeted him with the same acclamations which they had lavished, on a similar occasion, on Napoléon three years before. The Republican army, having left a garrison of two thousand men in the castle, moved slowly in two columns towards Turin, in deep dejection, and heavily burdened with the numerous families compromised by the Revolution, who now pursued their mournful way towards the frontiers of France (2).

Nothing now remained to Moreau but to retire to such a position as might enable him to rally to his standards the yet unbroken army which Macdonald was bringing up from the south of the peninsula. For this purpose he divided his forces into two columns, one of which, under his own command, escorting the parks of artillery, the baggage, and military chest, took the road of Turin, while the other, consisting of the divisions of Victor and Laboissiere, moved towards Alexandria, with a view to occupy the defiles of the Bochetta and the approaches to Genoa. Having effected the evacuation of the town and the arsenal, provided for the defence

of the citadel, in which he left a garrison of three thousand men, under General Fiorilla, and secured the communications with the adjacent passes of the Alps, the French general moved the remainder of his army into the plain between the Po and the Tanaro, at the foot of the northern slope and principal debouches of the Apennines, where they encircle the bay of Genoa and join the Maritime Alps. This position, extending only over a front of four leagues, supported on the right by Alexandria, and on the left by Valence, affording the means of manœuvring either on the Bormida or the Po, and covering at once the roads from Asti to Turin and Coni (3), and those

(1) Th. x. 284. Jom. xi. 276, 278. Dum. i. 112. St.-Cyr, i. 194, 199. Arch. Ch. i. 230, 231.

(3) Jom. xi. 280, 281. Th. x. 286, 287. Dum. i. 141, 142. St.-Cyr, i. 200, 203.

(2) Arch. Ch. i. 35, 36. Th. x. 286. Jom. xi. 278, 9. St.-Cyr, i. 199, 201.

from Acqui to Nizza and Savona, was better adapted than any other that could have been selected to enable the Republicans to maintain their footing in Italy, until they were reinforced by the army of Macdonald, or received assistance from the interior of France.

Whither he
is tardily
followed by
Suwarrow.

Master of all the plain of Lombardy, and at the head of an overwhelming force, Suwarrow did not evince that activity in pursuing the broken remains of his adversary which might have been expected from the general vigour of his character. For above a week he gave himself up to festivities at Milan, while an army hardly a third of his own was in full retreat, by diverging columns, before him. At length, finding his active disposition wearied with triumphal honours, he set out for Alexandria, leaving Latterman to blockade the castle of Milan with four thousand men. At the same time Orzi, Novi, Peschiera, and Pizzighetone surrendered to the Allies, with a hundred pieces of cannon, twenty gun-boats, a siege equipage, and immense stores of ammunition and provisions; an advantage which enabled Kray to draw closer the blockade of Mantua, and dispatch Hohenzollern to assist at the siege of the castle of Milan. On the 9th the Allies reached Tortona, blew open the gates, and drove the French into the citadel; while their advanced posts were pushed to San-Juliano, Garofalo, and Novi. Meanwhile, though a reinforcement of six thousand Russians arrived at Tortona, Moreau remained firm in his position behind the Po and the Tanaro. To divert his attention, the Russian general extended his right from Novi to Serravalle and Gavi, threatening thereby his communications with Genoa and France (1), but this was a mere feint, intended to mask his real design, which was to cross the Po, turn his left, and force him to a general and decisive action.

Check of
the Rus-
sians, under
Rosenberg,
in endeavouring
to cross the Po.

The right, or southern bank of the Po, from the junction of the Tanaro to Valence, is more lofty than the northern, which is low, marshy, and approachable only on dykes. Some large islands opposite Mugarone having afforded facilities for the passage, Rosenberg, who commanded one of Suwarrow's divisions directed against Valence, was induced, by his military ardour, to attempt to cross it in that quarter. In the night of the 11th, he threw six thousand men across the principal arm into a wooded island, from whence they shortly passed over, some by swimming, others by wading, with the water up to their armpits, and took possession of the village of Mugarone. Moreau no sooner heard of this descent, than he directed an overwhelming force to the menaced point; the Russians, vigorously attacked in the village, were soon compelled to retire; in vain they formed squares, and, under Prince Rosenberg and the Archduke Constantine, defended themselves with the characteristic bravery of their nation; assailed on every side, and torn to pieces by a murderous fire of grape-shot, they were driven back, first into the island, then across to the northern bank, with the loss of eight hundred killed and wounded, four pieces of cannon, and seven hundred prisoners. No sooner was Suwarrow informed of the first success of Rosenberg's attack, than he pushed forward two divisions to support him, while another was advanced towards Marengo to effect a diversion; but the bad success of the enterprise, which failed because it was not combined with sufficient support at the first (2), rendered it necessary that they should be recalled, and the Allied army was concentrated anew in the intrenched camp of Garofalo.

(1) Dum. i. 142, 145. Join. xi. 289, 290. St.-Cyr, i. 203. Arch. Ch. iii. 37, 39.

(2) Join. xi. 292, 294. Dum. i. 146. St.-Cyr, i. 204, 205. Th. x. 288.

Indecisive
action be-
tween Su-
warrow and
Moreau
near Alex-
andria.

At the same instant that this was passing in one quarter, Suwarrow raised his camp at S.-Juliano, with the design of crossing the Po near Casa Tenia, and marching upon Sesia. This attempt was not attended with decisive success. A warm action ensued between the division of Victor and the Russian advanced guard, nine thousand strong, under the orders of Generals Bagrathion and Lusignan. Victory was long doubtful, and although the French were at length forced to retreat under shelter of the cannon of Alexandria, the demonstration led to no serious impression at the time on the position of the Republican general (1).

Moreau at
length re-
treats to the
crest of the
Apennines
and Turin.

Tired with the unsatisfactory nature of these manœuvres, Suwarrow resolved to march with the bulk of his forces upon Turin, where the vast magazines of artillery and military stores of the French army were assembled, in the hope that, by reducing its citadel, and occupying the plains of Piedmont to the foot of the Alps, the position of Moreau on the Po and the Tanaro might be rendered no longer tenable, from the interruption of its communications with France. By a singular coincidence, not unusual in war, at the very time that the Russian marshal was adopting this resolution, Moreau had resolved, on his part, to retire by Asti, upon Turin and Coni, and, abandoning the line of the Apennines, concentrate his forces for the preservation of his communication with the Alps. Invincible necessity had compelled him to adopt this retrograde movement. Great part of Piedmont was in a state of insurrection; a large body of peasants had recently occupied Ceva, another had made themselves masters of Mondovi, which closed the principal line of retreat for the army, the sole one then practicable for artillery and carriages. The recent success of the Rus-

May 19. sians towards Alexandria led him to believe that the weight of their force was to be moved in that direction, and that he would soon be in danger of having his communications with France cut off. Influenced by these considerations, he detached the division of Victor, without artillery or baggage, by the mountain paths, towards Genoa, in order to maintain the crest of the Apennines, and reinforce, when necessary, the army of Macdonald, which was approaching from Naples, while he himself, having first thrown three thousand men into Alexandria, retired by Asti towards Turin, with the design of maintaining himself, if possible, at Coni, the last fortified place on the Italian side of the Alps, until he received the promised reinforcements from the interior of France (2).

May 27.
Suwarrow
surprises
Turin.

No sooner was Suwarrow informed of the retreat of Moreau, than he occupied Valence and Casala, which had been abandoned by the Republicans, and, after having moved forward a strong body under Schwickowsky to form the investment of Alexandria, advanced himself with the main body of the army towards Turin. Wukassowich, who commanded the advanced guard, with the aid of some inhabitants of the town who favoured his designs, surprised one of the gates, and rapidly introducing his troops, compelled the French to take refuge in the citadel. The fruits of this conquest were 261 pieces of cannon, eighty mortars, 60,000 muskets, besides an enormous quantity of ammunition and military stores, which had been accumulating in that city ever since the first occupation of Italy by the arms of Napoléon. This great stroke, the success of which was owing to the celerity and skill of the Russian generals, deprived Moreau of all his resources, and rendered the situation both of his own army and that of Macdonald in the high-

(1) Jom. xi. 296, 297. Dum. i. 146. St.-Cyr, i. 205.

(2) Th. x. 291. Dum. i. 148, 149. Jom. xi. 300, 301. St.-Cyr, i. 206, 208. Arch. Ch. ii. 44, 45.

And the
Castle of
Milan is
taken.
May 24.

est degree critical. At the same time, intelligence was received of the fall of the castle of Milan, after four days of open trenches, an advantage which permitted the division of Hohenzollern to reinforce the besieging army before Mantua, while the artillery was dispatched to Tortona, which was now closely invested (1).

Moreau
retreats
towards
Genoa.

Unable from these disasters, to maintain his ground in the basin of Piedmont, Moreau now thought only of regaining his position on the ridge of the Apennines, and covering the avenue to the city of Genoa, the only rallying point where he could still hope to effect a junction with Macdonald, and which covered the principal line of retreat for both armies into France. For this purpose he retired to Savigliano, having first moved forward an advanced guard, under Grouchy, to clear the road he was to follow, by retaking Mondovi and Ceva, into the latter of which the Austrians had succeeded in throwing a small garrison to support the insurgents who had occupied it. That general retook Mondovi, but all his efforts failed before the ramparts of Ceva. The closing of the great road through this town rendered Moreau's situation apparently hopeless. Suwarrow, with a superior force, was close in his rear; the only route practicable for artillery by which he could regain the Apennines was blocked up; and he could not retire by the Col di Tende without abandoning all prospect of rejoining Macdonald, and leaving his army to certain destruction. From this desperate situation the Republicans were extricated by the skill and vigour of their general, aided by the resources of Guillemot and the engineer corps under his directions.

He retires
over the
Apennines
to that
town.

By their exertions and the indefatigable efforts of one-half of the French army, a mountain path, leading across the Apennines from the valley of Garesio to the coast of Genoa, was, in four days, rendered practicable for artillery and chariots; and as soon as this was done, the blockade of Ceva was raised, three thousand men were thrown as a garrison into Coni, which was abandoned to its own resources; and the remainder of

Still occu-
pying the
crest of the
mountains.

the army, after a strong rear-guard had been posted at Murialto to cover the passage, defiled over the narrow and rocky path, and arrived in safety at Loano, on the southern side of the mountains. No sooner were they arrived there than they formed a junction with Victor, who had successfully accomplished his retreat by Acqui, Spigno, and Digo, and occupied all the passes leading towards Genoa over the Apennines; Victor was intrusted with the important post of Pontremoli, while the other divisions placed themselves on the crest of the mountains from Loano to the Bocchetta (2).

Suwarrow
spreads over
the whole
of Piedmont
and Lombardy.

Suwarrow, on being informed of the retreat of Moreau from the plain of Piedmont, spread his troops over its rich surface, and up the glens which run from thence into the heart of the Alps. The Russian divisions entered into the beautiful valleys of Suza, St.-Jean de Maurienne, and Aosta. Frélich pushed his advanced posts to the neighbourhood of Coni; Pignerol capitulated; Suza surrendered at discretion: and the advanced posts of the Allies every where appearing on the summit of the Alpine passes, spread consternation over the ancient frontiers of France. At the same time the citadel of Turin was closely invested; the sieges of Tortona and Alexandria were pushed with vigour, while intelligence was received at the same time that a detachment, sent by Kray from before Mantua, had made itself master of Ferrara; that a flotilla from Venice had surprised Ravenna,

(1) *Jom.* xi. 302, 305 *Dum.* i. 152, 153, *Th.* x. 292. *Arch.* Ch. ii. 45.

(2) *Jom.* xi. 307, 308, *Th.* x. 292. *Arch.* Ch. ii. 45. *Dum.* i. 176, 177.

and an insurrection had broken out in the mountainous parts of Tuscany and the Ecclesiastical States, which threatened Ancona, and had already wrested Arezzo and Lucca from the Republican dominions (1).

Thus, in less than three months after the opening of the Campaign on the Adige, the French standards were driven back to the summit of the Alps; the whole plain of Lombardy was regained, with the exception of a few of its strongest fortresses; the conquests of Napoléon had been lost in less time than it had taken to make them; and the Republican armies, divided and dispirited, were reduced to a painful and hazardous defence of their own frontiers, instead of carrying the thunder of their victorious arms over the Italian Peninsula. A hundred thousand men were spread over the plain of Lombardy, of whom forty thousand were grouped under Suwarrow round Turin (2). History has not a more brilliant or decisive series of triumphs to record; and they demonstrate on how flimsy and insecure a basis the French dominion at that period rested; how much it was dependent on the genius and activity of a single individual; how inadequate the revolutionary government was to the long-continued and sustained efforts which were requisite to maintain the contest from their own resources; and how easily, by a combined effort of all the powers at that critical period, when Napoléon was absent, and time and wisdom had not consolidated the conquests of democracy, they might have been wrested from their grasp, and the peace of Europe established on an equitable foundation. But, notwithstanding all their reverses, the European governments were not as yet sufficiently awakened to the dangers of their situation; Prussia still kept aloof in dubious neutrality; Russia was not irrevocably engaged in the cause; and Great Britain, as yet confining her efforts to the subsidizing of other powers, had not descended as a principal into the field, or begun to pour forth, on land at least, those streams of blood which were destined to be shed before the great struggle was brought to a termination.

These successes, great as they were, were yet not such as might have been achieved, if the Russian general, neglecting all minor considerations, and blockading only the greater fortresses, had vigorously followed up with his overwhelming force the retreating army of the Republicans, and driven it over the Maritime Alps. Unable to withstand so formidable an assailant, they must have retired within the French frontier, leaving not only Mantua and Genoa, but the army which occupied the Neapolitan territory, to its fate. This bold and decisive plan of operations was such as suited the ardent character of the Russian general, and which, if left to himself, he would unquestionably have adopted; but his better judgment was overruled by the cautious policy of the Aulic Council, who, above all things, were desirous to secure a fortified frontier for its Venetian acquisitions, and compelled him, much against his will, to halt in the midst of the career of victory, and besiege in form the fortresses of Lombardy. Something was no doubt gained by their reduction (3); but not to be compared with what might have been expected if an overwhelming mass had been interposed between the French armies, and the conquerors of Naples had been compelled to lay down their arms between the Apennines and the Po (4).

(1) Jom. xi. 310, 315. Dum. i. 176, 179. Arch. Ch. ii. 46, 48.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 47.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 47, 48. Hard. vii. 243, 249.

(4) A Russian officer of Suwarrow's staff at this juncture wrote to Count Rostopchin at St. Petersburg:—"Our glorious operations are thwarted by those

very persons who are most interested in their success. Far from applauding the brilliant triumphs of our arms, the cursed cabinet of Vienna seeks only to retard their march. It insists that our great Suwarrow should divide his army, and direct it at once to several points, which will save Moreau from total destruction. That cabinet, which fears a too

Affairs of
the Parthe-
nopeian Re-
public at
Naples.

While these disastrous events were in progress in the north of the Peninsula, the affairs of France were not in a more favourable train in its southern provinces. The Parthenopeian republic, established at Naples in the first fervour of revolutionary success, had been involved in those consequences, the invariable attendant on a sudden concession of power to the people, spoliation of the rich, misery among the poor, and inextricable embarrassment in the finances of the state. In truth, the Directory, pressed by extreme pecuniary difficulties, looked to nothing so much in their conquests as indemnifying themselves for the expenses of their expeditions, and invariably made it the first condition with all the revolutionary states which they established, that they should pay the expenses of the war, and take upon themselves the sole support of the armies which were to defend them. In conformity with these instructions, the first fruits of democratic ascendancy in Naples were found to be bitter in the extreme; the successive contributions of twelve and fifteen millions of francs on the capital and provinces, of which mention has already been made, excited the utmost dissatisfaction, which was greatly increased soon after by the experienced insolence and rapacity of the civil agents of the Directory. A provisional government was established, which introduced innovations that excited general alarm; the Jacobin clubs speedily began to diffuse the arrests and terror of revolutionary times; the national guard totally failed in producing any efficient force, while the confiscation of the church property, and the abolition of its festivals, spread dismay and horror through that large portion of the population who were still attached to the Catholic faith. These circumstances speedily produced partial insurrections: Cardinal Ruffo, in Calahria, succeeded in exciting a revolt, and led to the field an army, fifteen thousand strong, composed of the descendants of the Bruttians and Lucanians, while another insurrection, hardly less formidable, broke out in the province of Apulia. But these tumultuary bodies, imperfectly armed and totally undisciplined, were unable to withstand the veteran troops of France. Trani, where the principal force of the insurgents of the latter province had established themselves, was carried by assault with great slaughter; but, on the other hand, Ruffo, in Calabria, defeated an attack on Castelluccia by the democratic bands of the new republic, and, encouraged by this success, marched into Apulia, where his forces were soon greatly augmented, and he was reinforced by some regular troops dispatched from Sicily (1).

Revolt ex-
cited by the
oppression
of the
French.

May 7.
Macdonald
commences
his retreat.

Affairs were in this dangerous state in the Neapolitan dominions, when orders reached Macdonald to evacuate, without loss of time, the south of Italy, in order to bring his army to support the Republican arms in Lombardy. He immediately assembled all his disposable forces, and after having left garrisons in fort St.-Elmo, Capua and Gaeta, set off for Rome at the head of twenty thousand men. His retreat, conducted with great rapidity and skill, was exposed to serious dangers. The peasantry, informed by the English cruisers of the disasters experienced by the French in Upper

rapid conquest of Italy, from designs which it dares not avow, as it knows well those of our magnanimous Emperor, has, by the Aulic Council, forced the Archduke Charles into a state of inactivity, and enjoined our incomparable chief to secure his conquests rather than extend them; that it is to waste its time and strength in the siege of fortresses which would fall of themselves if the French army was destroyed. What terrifies them even more than the

rapidity of our conquests, is the generous project, openly announced, of restoring to every one what he has lost. Deceived by his ministers, the Emperor Francis has, with his own hand, written to our illustrious general to pause in a career of conquest of which the very rapidity fills him with alarm."—HABER, vii. 249, 250.

(1) JOURN. xi. 316, 338. Orloff's Memoirs, ii. 190, 220.

Italy, broke out into insurrection in every quarter. Duhesme left Apulia in open revolt, and had a constant fight to maintain before he reached Capua; a few hundred English landed at Salerno, and, aided by the peasantry, advanced to Vietri and Castello-mare; while the insurgents of the Roman and Tuscan states, becoming daily more audacious, interrupted all the communications with the north of Italy. Notwithstanding these menacing circumstances, Maedonald effected his retreat in the best order, and without sustaining any serious loss. He arrived at Rome on the 16th, where he reinforced his army by the divisions of Grenier, continued his route by Acquapendente to Florence, where he rallied to his standards the divisions of Gauthier and Montrichard, who were in the environs of Pistoia and Bologna, and established his headquarters at Lucca in the end of May. The left wing, composed of the Polish division Dombrowsky, took post at Carzana and Aula; the centre occupied the great road from Florence to Pistoia, the right, the high road to Bologna, and all the passes into the Modena, with an advanced guard in the city of Bologna itself (1).

Though repeatedly assailed, he retreats in safety to the north of Tuscany.

He enters into communication with Moreau, and concert measures with him.

In this situation, Moreau and Maedonald were in open communication; and it was concerted between them that the chief body of their united forces should be brought to bear upon the Lower Po, with a view to threaten the communications of the Allies, disengage Mantua, and compel their retreat from the plain of Lombardy.

For this purpose it was agreed that Maedonald should cross the Apennines and advance towards Tortona; his right resting on the mountains, his left on the right bank of the Po, while Moreau, debouching by the Bochetta, Gavi, and Serravalle, should move into the plain of that river. As the weight of the contest would in this view fall upon the former of these generals, the division of Victor, which formed the eastern part of Moreau's army, was placed under his orders, and a strong division directed to descend the valley of the Trebbia, in order to keep up the communication between the two armies, and support either as occasion might require (2).

Position of the Allies at this juncture.

The position of the allied armies, when these formidable preparations were making to dislodge them from their conquests, were as follows: Kray, who commanded the whole forces on the Lower Po, had 24,000 men under his orders, of whom one-half were engaged in the siege of Mantua, while 5,000 under Hohenzollern, had been dispatched to cover Modena, and 6,000, under Ott, watched the mouths of the lateral valleys of the Taro and the Trebbia. The main body of the army, consisting of the divisions Zoph, Kaim, and the Russians, amounting to 28,000 men, was encamped in the neighbourhood of Turin, with its advanced posts pushed into the entrance of the Alpine valleys. Frœlieh, with 6,000 men, observed Coni; Wukassowieh, with 5,700, occupied Mondovi, Ceva, and Salieetto; Lusignan, with 3,000 combatants, blockaded Fenestrelles; Bagrathion, with a detachment of 1,500 men, was posted in Cezanna, and the Col di l'Assietta; Schwickousky, with 6,000 men, blockaded Tortona and Alexandria; the corps of Count Bellegarde, 15,000 strong, detached from the Tyrol, was advancing from Como to form the siege of these two fortresses; while that of Haddick, amounting to fourteen thousand bayonets, which formed the communication between the rear of the army and the left wing of the Archduke

(1) Th. x. 297. Jom. xi. 338, 341. Dum. i. 151.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 49. Jom. xi. 341, 342. Th. x. 299.

Charles, was preparing to penetrate into the Valais by the Simplon and the pass of Nufenen (1).

Dangers
arising from
their great
dispersion.

Thus, though the Allies had above a hundred thousand men in the field, they could hardly assemble thirty thousand men at any one point; so immensely had they extended themselves over the plains of Lombardy, and so obstinately had the Aulic Council adhered to the old system of establishing a cordon of troops all over the territory which they occupied. This vast dispersion of force was attended with little danger as long as the shattered army of Moreau alone was in the field; but the case was widely different when it was supported by thirty-five thousand fresh troops, prepared to penetrate into the centre and most unprotected part of their line. Had Macdonald been able to push on as rapidly from Florence as he had done in arriving at that place, he might have crushed the divisions of Klenau, Hohenzollern, and Ott, before they could possibly have been succoured from other quarters; but the time consumed in reorganizing his army in Tuscany, and concerting operations with Moreau, gave Suwarrow an opportunity to repair what was faulty in the disposition of his forces, and assemble a sufficient body of men to resist the attack at the menaced point (2).

June 12.
Macdonald's
advance.
First
combats
with the
Republicans.

Macdonald, having at length completed his preparations, raised his camp in the neighbourhood of Pistoia on the 7th June, with an army, including Victor's division, of thirty-seven thousand men, and marched across the Apennines to Bologna. Hohenzollern, who commanded in the Modena, withdrew his posts into the town of Modena, where he was attacked in a few days, and, after a bloody engagement, driven out with the loss of fifteen hundred men. Had the right wing of the Republicans punctually executed his instructions, and occupied the road to Ferrara during the combat round the town, the whole of the Imperialists would have been made prisoners. Immediately after this success, Macdonald advanced to Parma, driving the Imperial cavalry before him, while Ott, who was stationed at the entrance of the valley of the Taro, seeing that his retreat was in danger of being cut off, retired to Placentia, leaving the road open to Victor, who upon that debouched entirely from the Apennines, and effected his junction with Macdonald at Borgo San Denino, entirely to the north of the mountains. On the day following, Placentia was occupied by the Republicans, and their whole army established in the neighbourhood of that city (3).

Able and
energetic
resolution
immediately
adopted by
Suwarrow.

No sooner was Suwarrow informed of the appearance of Macdonald's army in Tuscany, than he adopted the same energetic resolution by which Napoléon had repulsed the attack of Wursmer on the Adige three years before. All his advanced posts in Piedmont were recalled; the brigade of Lusignan near Fenestrelles, the divisions Frœlich, Bagrathion and Schwiekousky began their march on the same day for the general rendezvous at Asti; and Kray received orders instantly to raise the siege of Mantua, dispatch his artillery with all imaginable speed to Paschiera and Verona, and hasten with all his disposable force to join the main army in the neighbourhood of Placentia. The vigour of the Russian general communicated itself to all the officers of his army. These movements were all punctually executed, notwithstanding the excessive rains which impeded the movements of the troops; the castles of Milan and Pizzighitone

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 48, 49. Jom. xi. 343, 344.
Dum. i. 160, 182, 185. Th. x. 297, 298.

(2) Th. x. 298, 299. Dum. i. 184, 189. Jom. xi. 344.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 51, 52. St.-Cyr, i. 213, 214.
Dum. i. 191, 192. Jom. xi. 346, 349.

were provisioned, a great intrenched camp formed near the *tête-de-pont* of Valence, and all the stores recently captured, not necessary for the siege of the citadel, removed from Turin. By these means the Allied army was rapidly reassembled, and on the 15th June, although Kray with the troops from Mantua had not yet arrived, thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry were encamped at Garofalo, on the ground they had occupied six weeks before (1).

The two
armies meet
on the
Trebbia.

The intelligence of Suwarrow's approach induced Macdonald to concentrate his forces; but, nevertheless, he flattered himself with the hope that he would succeed in overwhelming Ott before he could be supported by the succours which were advancing. Three torrents, flowing parallel to each other, from the Apennines to the Po, intersected the plain occupied by the French army; the Nura, the TREBBIA, and the Tidone. The bulk of the Republican forces were on the Nura; the divisions Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, were in advance on the Trebbia, and received orders to cross it, in order to overwhelm the Austrian division stationed

June 17.

behind the Tidone. For this purpose, early on the morning of the 17th, they passed both the Trebbia and the Tidone, and assailed the Imperialists with such vigour and superiority of force, that they were speedily driven back in great disorder; but Suwarrow, aware, from the loud sound of the cannonade, of what was going forward, dispatched Chastellar with the advanced guard of the main army, which speedily re-established affairs. By degrees, as their successive troops came up, the superiority passed to the side of the Allies; the Austrians rallied, and commenced a vigorous attack on the division of Victor, while the Russian infantry, under Bagrathion, supported the left of the Impérialists. Soon after, Dombrowsky, on the left, having brought up his Polish division by a sudden charge, captured eight pieces of cannon, and pushed forward to Caramel; but at this critical moment, Suwarrow ordered a charge in flank by Prince Gortschakoff, with two regiments of Cossacks and four battalions, while Ott attacked them in front. This movement proved decisive; the Poles were broken, and fled in disorder over the Tidone. Meanwhile the right of the Republicans, composed of Victor's division, withstood all the efforts of Bagrathion, and was advancing along the Po to gain possession of the bridge of S.-Giovanni, when the rout of Dombrowsky's division obliged them to retire. This retreat was conducted in good order, till the retiring columns were charged in flank by the Cossacks, who had overthrown the Poles; in vain the French formed squares, and received the assailants with a rolling fire; they were broken, great part cut to pieces, and the remainder fled in disorder over the Trebbia. The Russians, in the heat of the pursuit (2), plunged like the Carthaginians of old into that classic stream, but they were received with so destructive a fire of musketry and grape-shot from the batteries of the main body of the French on the other side, that they were forced to retire with great loss; and the hostile armies bivouacked for the night on the same ground which had been occupied nineteen hundred years before by the troops of Hannibal and the Roman legions (3).

(1) St.-Cyr, i. 215, 217. Jom. xi. 349, 353. Dum. i. 193. Arch. Ch. ii. 55.

(2) Jom. xi. 354, 357. Dum. i. 195, 197. Th. x. 300, 301. Arch. Ch. ii. 53.

(3) It is remarkable, that the fate of Italy has thrice been decided on the same spot; once in the battle between the Romans and Carthaginians, again, in 1746, in that between the Austrians and French, and in 1799, between the French and

Russians. A similar coincidence will frequently again occur in the course of this work, particularly at Vittoria, Leipsic, Lutzen, Fleurus, and many others; a striking proof how permanent are the operation of the causes, under every variety of the military art, which conduct hostile nations, at remote periods from each other, to the same fields of battle.—See ARCADEUR CHARLES, ii. 61. The author visited this field in 1818, along with his

Suwarrow's judicious plan of attack. During the night, Suwarrow brought up all his forces, and, encouraged by the success of the preceding day, made his dispositions for a general action. Judging, with great sagacity, that the principal object of Macdonald would be to maintain his ground on the mountains, by which the communication with Moreau was to be preserved, he directed towards his own right, which was to assail that quarter, his best infantry, consisting of the divisions Bagrathion and Schwiekousky, under the orders of Prince Rosenberg. These troops received orders to pass the Trebbia, and advance by Settimo to St. Georgia, on the Nura, in order to interpose between the French left and the mountains. Melas commanded the centre, supported by a powerful reserve under Frœlich; while Ott, with a small corps, formed the left, and was established on the high-road to Placentia, rather to preserve the communication with its castle, than to take any active part in the engagement. The day was the anniversary of the battle of Kolin; and Suwarrow, to stimulate the ardour of the Austrians; gave for the watchword, "Theresa and Kolin," while the general instructions to the army were to combat in large masses, and as much as possible with the bayonet (1).

Battle of the Trebbia, and success of the Russians on the second day. Macdonald, who intended to have delayed the battle till the day following, had only the divisions Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, with the brigade of Salm, in position on the Trebbia; those of Olivier and Montrichard could not arrive in line till noon. A furious action commenced at six o'clock, between the troops of Bagrathion and Victor's division, which formed the extreme left of the French and rested on the mountains. The French general, seeing he was to be attacked, crossed the Trebbia, and advanced against the enemy. A bloody battle ensued on the ground intersected by the Torridella, till at length, towards evening, the steady valour of the Russians prevailed, and the Republicans were driven back with great slaughter over the Trebbia, followed by the Allies, who advanced as far as Settimo. On the French right, Salm's division, enveloped by superior forces, retreated with difficulty across the river. In the middle of the day, the divisions of Olivier and Montrichard arrived to support the centre; but though they gained at first a slight advantage, nothing decisive occurred, and at the approach of night they retired at all points over the Trebbia, which again formed the line of separation between the hostile armies (2).

Singular nocturnal combat on the second night. Worn out with fatigue, the troops, on both sides, lay down round their watchfires, on the opposite shores of the Trebbia, which still, as in the days of Hannibal, flows in a gravelly bed, between banks of moderate height, clothed with stunted trees and underwood. The corps of Rosenberg alone had crossed the stream, and reached Settimo, in the rear of the French lines; but disquieted by its separation from the remainder of the army, and ignorant of the immense advantages of its position, it passed an anxious night, in square, with the cavalry bridled and the men sleeping on their guns, and before daybreak withdrew to the Russian side of the river. Towards midnight, three French battalions, misled by false reports, entered, in disorder, into the bed of the Trebbia, and opened a fire of musketry upon the Russian videttes, upon which the two armies immediately started to their arms; the cavalry on both sides rushed into the river, the artillery played, without distinguishing, on friends and foes, and the extraordinary spectacle

valued friend, Captain Basil Hall: the lapse of two thousand years had altered none of the features described by the graphic pen of Livy.

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 54. Jom. xi. 358, 359. Dum. i. 196, 197. Th. x. 302.

(2) Th. x. 302, 303. Dum. i. 197, 198. Jom. xi. 360, 361. Arch. Ch. ii. 54.

was exhibited of a nocturnal combat by moonlight, by hostile bodies up to the middle in water. At length the officers succeeded in putting an end to this useless butchery,^[1] and the rival armies, separated only by the stream, sunk into sleep within a few yards of each other, amidst the dead and the dying (1).

Preparations of both parties for battle on the third day. The sun arose for the third time on this scene of slaughter; but no disposition appeared on either side to terminate the contest. Suwarrow, reinforced by five battalions and six squadrons, which had come up from the other side of the Po, again strengthened his right, renewed to Rosenberg the orders to press vigorously on in that quarter, and directed Melas to be ready to support him with the reserve. Hours, even minutes, were of value; for the Russian general was aware that Moreau had left his position on the Apennines, that the force opposed to him was totally inadequate to arrest his progress, and he was in momentary expectation of hearing the distant sound of his cannon in the rear of the army. Every thing, therefore, depended on a vigorous prosecution of the advantages gained on the two preceding days, so as to render the co-operation of the Republican armies impossible. On the other hand, Macdonald, having

June 19. now collected all his forces, and reckoning on the arrival of Moreau on the following day, resolved to resume the offensive. His plan was to turn at once both flanks of the enemy; a hazardous operation at all times, unless conducted by a greatly superior army, by reason of the dispersion of force which it requires, but doubly so in the present instance, from the risk of one of his wings being driven into the Po. The battle was to be commenced by Dombrowsky moving in the direction of Niviano to outflank the corps of Rosenberg, while Rusca and Victor attacked it in front; Olivier and Montrichard were charged with the task of forcing the passage of the river in the centre, while the extreme right, composed of the brigade of Salm and the reserve of Watrin, were to drive back the Russian left by interposing between it and the river Po (2).

Desperate conflict on the Trebbia. Such was the fatigue of the men on both sides, that they could not commence the action before ten o'clock. Suwarrow at that hour was beginning to put his troops in motion, when the French appeared in two lines on the opposite shore of the Trebbia, with the intervals between the columns filled with cavalry, and instantly the first line crossed the river with the water up to the soldiers' arm-pits, and advanced fiercely to the attack. Dombrowsky pushed on to Rivallo, and soon outflanked the Russian right; and Suwarrow, seeing the danger in that quarter ordered the division Bagrathion to throw back its right in order to face the enemy, and, after a warm contest, that general succeeded in driving the Poles across the river. But that manœuvre having uncovered the flank of the division Schwiekousky, it was speedily enveloped by Victor and Rusca, driven back to Casaleggio, and only owed its safety to the invincible firmness of the Russian infantry, who formed square, faced about on all sides, and by an incessant rolling fire maintained their ground till Bagrathion, after defeating the Poles, came up in their rear, and Chastellar brought up four battalions of the division of Forster to attack them in front. The Poles, entirely disconcerted by their repulse, remained inactive; and, after a murderous strife, the French were overwhelmed, and Victor and Rusca driven, with great loss, over the Trebbia (3).

In the centre, Olivier and Montrichard had crossed the river, and attacked

(1) Jom. xi. 362. Th. x. 304.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 55. Jom. xi. 363. Th. x. 303.

(3) Jom. xi. 364, 365. Dum. i. 200, 201. Th. x. 304. Hard. vii. 256, 257.

Decisive
attack of
Prince
Lichtenstein
on the
French
centre.

the Austrians, under Melas, with such vigour, that they made themselves masters of some pieces of artillery, and threw the line into disorder. Already Montrichard was advancing against the division Forster, in the middle of the Russian line, when the Prince of Lichtenstein, at the head of the reserve, composed of the flower of the Allied army, who at that moment was defiling towards the right to support Schwiebkowsky, suddenly fell upon their flank, when already somewhat disordered by success, and threw them into confusion, which was soon increased into a defeat by the heavy fire of Forster on the other side. This circumstance decided the fate of the day. Forster was now so far relieved as to be able to succour Suwarrow on the right, while Melas was supported by the reserve, who had been ordered, in the first moment of alarm, in the same direction. Prince Lichtenstein now charged the division of Olivier with such fury, that it was forced to retire across the river. At the extreme left of the Allies, Watrin advanced, without meeting with any resistance, along the Po; but he was ultimately obliged to retreat, to avoid being cut off and driven into the river by the victorious centre. Master of the whole left bank of the river, Suwarrow made several attempts to pass it; but he was constantly repulsed by the firmness of the French reserves, and night at length closed on this scene of carnage (1).

Victory re-
mains with
the Rus-
sians. Ex-
cessive loss
on both
sides.

Such was the terrible battle of the Trebbia, the most obstinately contested and bloody which had occurred since the commencement of the war, since, out of thirty-six thousand men in the field, the French, in the three days, had lost above twelve thousand in killed and wounded, and the Allies nearly as many. It shows how much more fierce and sanguinary the war was destined to become when the iron bands of Russia were brought into the field, and how little all the advantages of skill and experience avail, when opposed to the indomitable courage and heroic valour of northern states. But though the losses on both sides were nearly equal, the relative situation of the combatants was very different at the termination of the strife. The Allies were victorious, and soon expected great reinforcements from Hohenzollern and Klenau, who had already occupied Parma and Modena, and would more than compensate their losses in the field; whereas the Republicans had exhausted their last reserves, were dejected by defeat, and had no second army to fall back upon in their misfortunes. These considerations determined Macdonald; he decamped during the night (2), and retired over the Nura, directing his march to re-enter the Apennines by the valley of the Taro.

The disas-
trous re-
treat of the
French over
the Apen-
nines.

Early on the following morning, a despatch was intercepted from the French general to Moreau, in which he represented the situation of his army as almost desperate, and gave information as to the line of his retreat. This information filled the Allied generals with joy, and made them resolve to pursue the enemy with the utmost vigour. For this purpose, all their divisions were instantly dispatched in pursuit; Rosenberg, supported by Forster, moved rapidly towards the Nura, while Melas, with the divisions Ott and Frœlich, advanced to Placentia. Victor's division, which formed the rear-guard on the Nura, was speedily assailed by superior forces both in front and flank, and, after a gallant resistance, broken, great part made prisoners, and the remainder dispersed over the mountains. Melas, on his side, quickly made himself master of Placentia, where the

(1) Dum. i. 201, 202. Jom. ii. 367, 368. Th. x., 305, 306. Harl. vii. 257, 258. Arch. Ch. ii. 55. (2) Jom. xi. 367, 368. Th. x., 306, 307. Dum. i. 202, 203.

French wounded, five thousand in number, were taken prisoners, including the generals Olivier, Rusca, Salm, and Cambray; and had he not imprudently halted the division Frœlich at that town, the whole troops of Watrin would have fallen into his hands. Macdonald, on the following day, retired to Parma, from whence he dislodged Hohenzollern, and with infinite difficulty rallied the remains of his army behind the Larda, where they were reorganized

June 21. in three divisions. The melancholy survey showed a chasm in his ranks of above fifteen thousand men since crossing the Apennines. At the same time, Lapoype, defeated at Casteggio by a Russian detachment, was driven from the high-road, and with great pain escaped by mountain paths into the neighbourhood of Genoa (1). All the French wounded fell into the hands of the Allies; they made prisoners in all, during the battle and in the pursuit, four generals, five hundred and six officers, and twelve thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight private soldiers (2).

The pursuit of Suwarrow was not continued beyond the Larda, in consequence of intelligence which there reached him of the progress of Moreau. Macdonald retired, therefore, unmolested to Modena and Bologna, where he repulsed General Ott, who made an attack on his army at Sassocolo, and regained the positions which it had occupied before the advance to the Trebbia (3).

Successful operations, during the battle, of Moreau against Bellegarde. In effect, the return of Suwarrow towards Tortona was become indispensable, and the dangerous situation of matters in his rear showed the magnitude of the peril from which, by his rapid and decided conduct, he had extricated his army. Moreau, on the 16th, debouched from the Apennines by Gavi, and moved in two columns towards Tortona, at the head of fourteen thousand men. He advanced, however, with such circumspection, that on the 18th he had not passed Novi and Serravale; and on that day the fate of the Neapolitan army was determined on the banks of the Trebbia. Bellegarde, unable with four brigades to arrest his progress, retired to a defensive position near Alexandria, leaving Tortona uncovered, the blockade of which was speedily raised by the French general. Immediately after, Moreau attacked Bellegarde with forces so immensely superior, that he defeated him, after a sharp action, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners and five pieces of cannon. The Austrians, in disorder, sought refuge behind the Bormida, intending to fall back under the cannon of Valence (4); and Moreau was advancing towards Placentia, when he was informed of the victory of Suwarrow and the fall of the citadel of Turin.

Fall of the citadel of Turin. June 20. The vast military stores found by the Allies in the city of Turin, enabled them to complete their preparations for the siege of its citadel with great rapidity. A hundred pieces of heavy cannon speedily armed the trenches; forty bombs were shortly after added; the batteries were opened on the night of the 10th June, and on the 19th the second parallel was completed. Night and day the besiegers from that time thundered on the walls from above two hundred pieces of artillery, and such was the effect of their fire, that the garrison capitulated within twenty-four hours after, on condition of being sent back to France. This conquest was of immense importance. Besides disengaging the besieging force of General Kaim, which instantly set out to reinforce Bellegarde, and rendering the Allies masters of one of the strongest fortresses in Piedmont, it put into their hands 61 pieces of cannon, 40,000 muskets, and 50,000 quintails of powder, with the loss of only fifty men (5).

(1) Dum. i. 205. Th. x. 306. Jom. xi. 374, 373.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 56.

(3) Jom. xi. 374, 375. Dum. i. 205.

(4) Jom. xi. 379, 380. Dum. i. 204. Th. x. 307.

Arch. Ch. ii. 57.

(5) St.-Cyr, i. 220. Jom. xi. 380, 381. Dum. i. 206.

June 23.
Moreau re-
treats on
Suwarrow
turning
against him,
and Macdo-
nald regains
Genoa after a
painful cir-
cuit.

No sooner was Suwarrow informed, upon the Larda, of the advance of Moreau and the defeat of Bellegarde, than, without losing an instant, he wheeled about, and marched with the utmost expedition to meet this new adversary. But Moreau fell back as rapidly as he approached, and after revictualling Tortona, retired by Novi and Gavi to his former defensive position on the Apennines. The Allies occupied Novi, and pushed their advanced posts far up the valleys into the mountains, while the blockade of Tortona was resumed; and the besieging force, removed from the lines before Mantua, sat down again before that important fortress. Macdonald commenced a long and painful retreat over the Apennines into Tuscany and the Genoese territory; a perilous lateral operation at all times in presence of an enemy in possession of the plain of the Po, and doubly so after the recent disaster which they had experienced. Fortunately for the French, Suwarrow had received at this time positive orders from the Aulic Council, ever attached to methodical proceedings, to attempt no operation beyond the Apennines till the fortresses of Lombardy were reduced (1), in consequence of which he was compelled to remain in a state of inactivity on the Orba, while his antagonist completed his hazardous movements. Macdonald arrived, leaving only a detachment on the Apennines July 17. near the sources of the Trebbia, at Genoa by Lerici, in the middle of July, in the most deplorable state; his artillery dismounted or broken down, the cavalry and caissons without horses, the soldiers half naked, without shoes or linen of any sort, more like spectres than men. How different from the splendid troops which, three years before, had traversed the same country, in all the pomp of war, under the standards of Napoléon (2)!

Reorganiza-
tion of both
French ar-
mies under
Moreau.

Mutual exhaustion, and the intervening ridge of the Apennines, now compelled a cessation from hostilities for above a month. Suwarrow collected forty-five thousand men in the plain between Tortona and Alexandria, to watch the Republicans on the mountains of Genoa, and cover the sieges of those places and of Mantua, which were now pressed with activity. The French, in deep dejection, commenced the reorganization of their two armies into one; Macdonald was recalled, and yielded the command of the right wing to St.-Cyr; Pérignon was intrusted with the centre, and Lemoine, who brought up twelve fresh battalions from France, put at the head of the left. Montrichard and Lapoye were disgraced, and Moreau continued in the chief command. Notwithstanding all the reinforcements he had received, this skilful general was not able, with both armies united, to reckon on more than forty thousand men for operations in the field; the poor remains of above a hundred thousand that might have been assembled for that purpose at the opening of the campaign (3).

Reflections
on Suwar-
row's admi-
rable con-
duct in the
preceding
movement.

The remarkable analogy must strike the most inattentive observer, between the conduct of Suwarrow previous to the battle of the Trebbia, and that of Napoléon on the approach of Wurmser to succour Mantua. Imitating the vigour and activity of his great predecessor, the Russian general, though at the head of an army considerably inferior to that of his adversaries, was present every where at the decisive point. The citadel of Turin, with its immense magazines, was captured by an army of only forty thousand men, in presence of two whose united force exceeded fifty thousand; for although Suwarrow ordered up great part of the garrison of Mantua to reinforce his army previous to the battle of the Trebbia,

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 63.

(3) Jom. xi. 388, 390. Dum. i. 220, 223. St.-Cyr,

(2) Jom. xi. 381, 387, 388. St.-Cyr, i. 218, 219. i. 220.

Arch. Ch. ii. 65, 67.

they were prevented from joining by an autograph order of the Emperor, who deemed the acquisition of that fortress of greater importance than any other consideration to the Austrian empire (1). The Russian general, therefore, had to contend not only with the armies of Macdonald and Moreau, but the obstacles thrown in his way by the Imperial authorities; and when this is considered, his defeat of the Republicans, by rapidly interposing the bulk of his forces between them, and turning first on the one, and then on the other, must be regarded as one of the most splendid feats which the history of the war afforded.

Naval efforts of the Directory to get back the army from Egypt.

During these critical operations at the foot of the Apennines, the Directory had succeeded in assembling a great naval force in the Mediterranean. Already convinced, by the disasters they had experienced, of the impolicy of the eccentric direction of so considerable a part of their force as had resulted from the expedition to Egypt, they exerted all their efforts to obtain the means of their return, or at least open a communication with that far-famed, now isolated army. No sooner was intelligence received of the defeat of Jourdan at Stockach, than Bruix, minister of marine, repaired to Brest, where he urged, with the utmost diligence, the preparations for the sailing of the fleet. Such was the effect of his exertions, that, in the end of April, he was enabled to put to sea, with twenty-five ships of the line, at the time when Lord Bridport was blown off the coast with the Channel fleet. As soon as intelligence was received that they had sailed, the English admiral steered for the southern coast of Ireland, while Bruix, directing his course straight to Cadiz, raised the blockade of that harbour, which Admiral Keith maintained with fifteen ships of the line, and passed the straits of Gibraltar. The entrance of the combined fleet into the Mediterranean seemed to announce decisive events, but nevertheless it came to nothing. The immense armament, amounting to fifty ships of the line, steered for the bay of Genoa, where it entered into communication with Moreau, and for a time powerfully supported the spirits of his army. But after remaining some weeks on the Italian coast, Bruix sailed for Cadiz, from whence he returned to Brest, which he reached in the middle of August, without either having fallen in with any of the English fleets, or achieved any thing whatever, with one of the most powerful squadrons that ever left a European harbour (2).

Which come to nothing.

August 13.

June 20.
Expulsion of the Republicans from Naples.

July 29.

July 31.

Bloody revenge of the Royalist party at Naples.

The retreat of Macdonald was immediately followed by the recovery of his dominions by the King of Naples. The army of Cardinal Ruffo, which was soon swelled to twenty thousand men, advanced against Naples, and having speedily dispersed the feeble bands of the revolutionists who opposed his progress, took possession of that capital; and a combined force of English, Russians, and Neapolitans having a few days after entered the port, the fort St.-Elmo was so vigorously besieged, that it was obliged to capitulate, the garrison returning to France, on condition of not again serving till exchanged. Capua was next attacked, and surrendered, by capitulation, to Commodore Trowbridge, which was followed, two days after, by the reduction of the important fortress of Gaeta, on the same terms, which completed the deliverance of the Neapolitan dominions (3).

The French, who surrendered in these two last fortresses, gave up unconditionally to their indignant enemies the revolted Neapolitans who had taken a part in the late revolution. A special commission

(1) Jom. xi. 386. Hard. vii. 250, 251.

(2) Jom. xi. 394, 396. Ann. Reg. 1799; 291.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1799, 292. Bot. iii. 395, 410.

was immediately appointed, which, without much formality, and still less humanity, condemned to death the greater part of those who had been engaged in the insurrection; and a dreadful series of executions, or rather massacres, took place, which but too clearly evinced the relentless spirit of Italian revenge. But the executions at Naples were of more moment, and peculiarly call for the attention of the British historians, because they have affixed the only stain to the character of the greatest naval hero of his country. The garrisons of the Castello Nuovo, and the Castella del Uovo, had capitulated to Cardinal Ruffo, on the express condition that they themselves, and their families, should be protected, and that they should have liberty either to retire to Toulon, or remain in Naples, as they should feel inclined; but in this latter case they were to experience no molestation in their persons or property. This capitulation was subscribed by Cardinal Ruffo, as viceroy of the kingdom; by Kerandý, on the part of the Emperor of Russia; and by Captain Foote, on the part of the King of Great Britain; and the cardinal, in the name of the King, shortly after published a proclamation, in which he granted an entire amnesty to the Republicans; guaranteeing to them perfect security, if they remained at Naples, and a free navigation to Marseilles, if they preferred following the fortunes of the tricolor standard. In terms of this treaty, two vessels, containing the refugees from Castellomare, had already arrived safe at Marseilles (1).

Violation of
capitulations
by the
Neapolitan
Court.

But these wise and humane measures were instantly interrupted by the arrival of the King and Queen, with the court, on board of Nelson's fleet. They were animated with the strongest feelings of revenge against the Republican party; and unfortunately the English admiral, who had fallen under the fascinating influence of Lady Hamilton, who shared in all the feelings of the court, was too much inclined to adopt the same principles. He instantly declared the capitulation null, as not having obtained the King's authority, and entering the harbour at the head of his fleet, made all those who had issued from the castles, in virtue of the capitulation, prisoners, and had them chained, two and two, on board his own fleet. The King, whose humanity could not endure the sight of the punishments which were preparing, returned to Sicily, and left the administration of justice in the hands of the Queen and Lady Hamilton. Numbers were immediately condemned and executed; the vengeance of the populace supplied what was wanting in the celerity of the criminal tribunals; neither age, nor sex, nor rank were spared; women as well as men, youths of sixteen, and grey-headed men of seventy, were alike led out to the scaffold, and infants of twelve years of age sent into exile. The Republicans behaved, in almost every instance, in their last moments with heroic courage, and made men forget, in pity for their misfortunes, the ingratitude or treason of which they had previously been guilty (2).

Nelson concurs in these iniquitous proceedings.

Deplorable fate of Prince Carraccioli on board Nelson's own ship.

The fate of the Neapolitan admiral, Prince Francis Carraccioli, was particularly deplorable. He had been one of the principal leaders of the revolution, and after the capitulation of the castles had retired to the mountains, where he was betrayed by a domestic, and brought bound on board the British admiral's flag-ship. A naval court-martial was there immediately summoned, composed of Neapolitan officers, by whom he was condemned to death. In vain the old man entreated that he might be shot, and not die the death of a malefactor; his prayers were disregarded, and after being strangled by the executioner, he was thrown from the vessel into the sea. Before night his body was seen erect

(1) Bot. iii. 401, 402. Ann. Reg. 1792, 292.

(2) Bot. iii. 406, 407. Southey's Nelson, ii. 47, 49.

in the waves from the middle upwards, as if he had risen from the deep to reproach the English hero with his unworthy fate (1).

For these acts of cruelty no sort of apology can or ought to be offered. Whether the capitulation should or should not have been granted, is a different and irrelevant question. Suffice it to say, that it had taken place, and that, in virtue of its provisions, the Allied powers had gained possession of the castles of Naples. To assert in such a case that the King had not ratified the capitulation, and that without such a sanction it was null, is a quibble, which, though frequently resorted to by the French, is unworthy of a generous mind, and destitute of any support in the law of nations. The capitulation of the vanquished should ever be held sacred in civilized warfare, for this reason, if no other existed, that, by acceding to it, they have deprived themselves of all chance of resistance, and put the means of violating it with impunity in the hands of their adversaries—it then becomes a debt of honour which must be paid. The sovereign power which takes benefit from one side of a capitulation by gaining possession of the fortress which the capitulants held, is unquestionably bound to perform the other part of the bilateral engagement, by whomever entered into, which, so far from repudiating, it has, by that very act, homologated and acquiesced in. If the Neapolitan authorities were resolutely determined to commit such a breach of public faith, the English admiral, if he had not sufficient influence to prevent it, should at least have taken no part in the iniquities which followed, and not stained the standard of England by judicial murders committed under its own shadow. In every point of view, therefore, the conduct of Nelson in this tragic affair was inexcusable; his biographer may perhaps with justice ascribe it to the fatal ascendancy of female fascination (2); but the historian, who has the interests of humanity and the cause of justice to support, can admit of no such alleviation, and will best discharge his duty by imitating the conduct of his eloquent annalist, and with shame acknowledging the disgraceful deeds (3).

The events of this campaign demonstrate, in the most striking manner, the vast importance of assuming the offensive in mountain warfare; and how frequently a smaller force, skilfully led, may triumph over a greater in such a situation, by the simple expedient of turning its position by the lateral valleys, and appearing unexpectedly in its rear. The nature of the ground is singularly favourable to such an operation, by the concealment which lofty intervening ridges afford to the turning column, and the impossibility of escape to the one turned, shut in on both sides by difficult, perhaps impassable ridges, and suddenly assailed in rear when fully occupied in front. The brilliant successes of Lecourbe at Glarus and Martinsbruck, and of Hotze at Luciensteg, were both achieved, in opposition to superior forces, by the skilful application of this principle. Against such a danger, the intrenchments usually thrown up in the gorge or at the summit of mountain passes, afford but little protection; for open behind (4), they are easily taken by the column which has penetrated into the rear by a circuitous route, and, destitute of casements, they afford no sort of protection against a plunging fire from the heights on either side.

Nor did this memorable struggle evince in a less convincing manner the erroneous foundation on which the opinion then generally received rested,

(1) Southey, ii. 47, 53. Bot. iii. 414, 415.

(2) Southey, 47, 53, Bot. iii. 415, 416. Hard. vii. 332, 333.

(3) It deserves to be recorded to the honour of Napoleon, that he endeavoured to palliate Nelson's

share in these dark transactions, ascribing it to misinformation, and the fascinating ascendancy of Lady Hamilton.—O'MEARA, i. 308.

(4) Arch. Ch. i. 95, 96.

that the possession of the mountains ensured that of the plains at their feet; and that the true key to the south of Germany and north of Italy was to be found in the Alps which were interposed between them. Of what avail was the successful irruption of Masséna into the Grisons, after the disaster of Stockach brought the Republican standards to the Rhine; or the splendid stroke of Lecourbe in the Engadine, when the disaster of Magnano caused them to lose the line of the Adige? In tactics, or the lesser operations of strategy, the possession of mountain ridges is often of decisive importance, but in the great designs of extensive warfare seldom of any lasting value. He that has gained a height which commands a field of battle is often secure of the day; but the master of a ridge of lofty mountains is by no means equally safe against the efforts of an adversary, who by having acquired possession of the entrance of all the valleys leading from thence into the plain, is enabled to cut him off both from his communications and his resources. Water descends from the higher ground to the lower; but the strength and sinews of war in general follow an opposite course, and ascend from the riches and fortresses of the plain to the sterility and desolation of the mountains. It is in the valley of the Danube and the plain of Lombardy that the struggle between France and Austria ever has and ever will be determined (1); the lofty ridges of Switzerland and Tyrol, important as an accessory to secure the flanks of either army, are far from being the decisive point.

Although the campaign had lasted so short a time, it was already apparent how much the views of the Austrian cabinet were hampered by the possession of Venice, and how completely the spoliation of that republic had thrown the apple of discord between the Allied Powers. The principle laid down by the Emperor Paul, of restoring to every one what he had lost, though the true foundation for the anti-revolutionary alliance, which had been eloquently supported by Mr. Burke, and afterwards became the basis of the great confederacy which brought the war to a successful issue, gave the utmost uneasiness to the cabinet of Vienna. They were terrified at the very rapidity of the Russian conqueror's success, and endeavoured, by every means in their power, to moderate his disinterested fervour, and render his surprising success the means only of securing their great acquisitions in the north of Italy. Hence the jealousies, heartburnings, and divisions which destroyed the cordial co-operation of the Allied troops, which led to the fatal separation of the Russian from the Austrian forces both in Italy and Switzerland, and ultimately brought about all the disasters of the campaign. Had the hands of Austria been clean, she might have invaded France by the defenceless frontier of the Jura, and brought the contest to a glorious issue in 1799, while Napoleon was as yet an exile on the banks of the Nile. Twice did the European powers lose the opportunity of crushing the forces of the Revolution, and on both occasions from their governments having imitated its guilt; first by the withdrawal of Prussia in 1794, to secure her share in the partition of Poland, and next from the anxiety of Austria, in 1799, to retain her iniquitous acquisitions in Italy. England alone remained throughout unsullied by crime, unfettered by the consciousness of robbery, and she alone continued to the end unsubdued in arms. It is not by imitating the guilt of a hostile power, but steadfastly shunning it, that ultimate success is to be obtained; the gains of iniquity to nations, not less than individuals, are generally more than compensated by their pains; and the only true foundation for durable prosperity is to be found in that strenuous, but upright course, which resists equally the seduction and the violence of wickedness.

(1) Arch. Ch. i. 53, 54.

CHAPTER XXIX.

CAMPAIGN OF 1799.—PART II.

FROM THE BATTLE OF THE TREEBIA TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

ARGUMENT.

Dangerous position of the Republic at this juncture—Enormous consumption of human life since the commencement of the Campaign—Clear proof thus afforded of the error of the Directory in attacking Switzerland and Italy—Military preparations of the Allies and Republicans—Objects of the contending generals—Great Levy of troops by the Directory—Their Measures to reinforce the Armies—The Aulic Council injudiciously restrain Suwarrow from active operations—This leads to an agreement for a disastrous separation of the Austrian and Russian forces—Resumption of hostilities by the Republicans around Genoa—Progress of the Siege of Mantua—Description of that fortress—Commencement of the Siege by Kray—Its Surrender—Fall of Alexandria—Commencement of the Siege of Tortona—Position of the Republicans in front of Genoa—Magnanimous conduct of Moreau on Joubert's assuming the Command—Advance of the French to raise the Siege—Positions of the Allies—and of the French—Joubert had resolved to retreat on learning the fall of Mantua—He is attacked before doing so by Suwarrow—Death of Joubert—Battle of Novi—The Allies are at first repulsed—Combined Attack of all their forces—The advance of Melas at length decides the Victory—Great Loss on both sides—Moreau still maintains himself on the crest of the Apennines—Separation of the victorious force—Operations of Championnet in the Alps at this time—Fall of Tortona—Situation of Masséna and the Archduke at Zurich—Insane dislocation of the Allied forces at this period by the Aulic Council—Description of the Theatre of War—Plan of the Allies—and of Masséna—Commencement of the Attack by Lecourbe on the St.-Gothard—The Imperialists are forced back at all points—They are driven from the Grimsel and the Furca—and the St.-Gothard—Successes of the French near Schwytz, who drive the Austrians into Glarus—Unsuccessful Attempt of the Archduke to cross the Limmat below Zurich—Being foiled, he marches to the Upper Rhine—Austrian left is defeated in Glarus—Successful Expedition of the Archduke against Mannheim—Plan of the Allies for a combined attack by Suwarrow and Korsakow on Masséna—Relative situation of the French and Russian centres at Zurich—Unfounded confidence of the latter—Masséna's able Plan of Attack—The passage of the Limmat is surprised below Zurich—Feigned attacks on Zurich and the Lower Limmat—Dreadful Confusion in the town of Zurich—Brave Resolution of Korsakow to cut his way through the enemy—He does so, but loses all his artillery and baggage—Success of Soult against Hotze above the Lake—Death of the latter officer—Operations of Suwarrow on the Ticino—Bloody Conflict above Airolo—The St.-Gothard is at length forced by the Russians—Dreadful Struggle at the Devil's Bridge—Arrived at Altdorf, Suwarrow is forced to ascend the Schächenthal—Difficult passage of that ridge to Mutten—He finds none of the expected reinforcements there—and is surrounded on all sides, and reluctantly compelled to retreat—He crosses the mountains into Glarus—Desperate Struggle at Naefels—Dreadful passage of the Alps of Glarus to Ilanz on the Rhine—Bloody Conflicts with Korsakow near Constance—The Archduke hastens to his aid, and checks the further pursuit—Treaty between Russia and England for an Expedition to Holland—Vigorous Preparations for the Expedition in England—The Expedition sails, and lands on the Dutch coast—Action at the Helder—Defeat of the enemy—Capture of the Dutch Fleet at the Texel—The British are attacked by the Republicans, but repulse them with great loss—The English, joined by the Russians, at length advance—Plan of the attack—Disaster of the Russians on the right—Victory of the British in the centre and left—But the continued retreat of the Russians arrests the British in the midst of their success—Removal of the Dutch Fleet to England—The Duke of York renews the attack, and is successful—His critical Situation notwithstanding—Indecisive Action—Which leads to the Retreat of the British—Who first Retire, and at length Capitulate—Reflections on this disaster in the nation—Affairs of Italy after the Battle of Novi—The Imperialists draw round Coni—Championnet is constrained to attempt its relief—Measures to effect that object—Preparations for a decisive battle—Battle of Genola, in which the French are defeated—Success of St.-Cyr near Novi—Siege and Fall of Coni—Gallant Conduct of St.-Cyr in the Bocchetta Pass—Unsuccessful Attempt of the Imperialists upon Genoa—Who go into Winter Quarters—Fall of Ancona—Position of the respective parties at the conclusion of the Campaign—Contrast

between the comforts of the Imperialists and the privations of the French—Death of Championnet—Jealousies between the Russians and Austrians—Swarrow retires into Bavaria—Which leads to a rupture between the Cabinets of Vienna and St.-Petersburg—Positions assumed by the Austrians when so abandoned—Operations on the Lower Rhine—Reflections on the vast successes gained by the Allies in the campaign—Deplorable internal situation of the Republic—Causes of the Rupture of the alliance Comparison of the Passage of the St.-Gothard by Suwarrow and the St.-Bernard by Napoléon—Deplorable insignificance of the part which England took in the Continental Struggle—Causes of the rapid fall of the French power in 1799.

SINCE the period when the white flag waved at Saumur and the tricolor was displaced at Lyon and Toulon, the Republic had never been in such danger as after the first pause in the campaign of 1799. It was, in truth, within a hairbreadth of destruction. If the Allied forces in 1795 were nearer her frontier, and the interior was torn by more vehement dissensions, on the other hand, the attacking powers in 1799 were incomparably more formidable, and the armies they brought into the field greatly superior both in military prowess and moral vigour. The war no longer languished in affairs of posts, or indecisive actions, leading to retreat on the first reverse; a hundred thousand men no longer fought with the loss of three or four thousand to the victors and the vanquished; the passions had been roused on both sides, and battles were not lost or won without a desperate effusion of human blood. The military ardour of the Austrians, slow of growth, but tenacious of purpose, was now thoroughly awakened, from the reverses the monarchy had undergone, and the imminent perils to which it had been exposed; the fanatical ardour of Suwarrow had roused to the highest pitch the steady valour of the Russians; and Great Britain, taught by past misfortunes, was preparing to abandon the vacillating system of her former warfare, and put forth her strength in a manner worthy of her present greatness and ancient renown. From the bay of Genoa to the mouth of the Rhine, nearly three hundred thousand veteran troops were advancing against the Republic, flushed by victory, and conducted by consummate military talent; while the Revolution had worn out the capacity which directed, as well as the energy which sustained its fortunes. The master spirit of Carnot had ceased to guide the movements of the French armies; the genius of Napoléon languished on the sands of Egypt; the boundless enthusiasm of 1795 had worn itself out; the resources of the assignats were at an end; the terrible Committee of Public Safety no longer was at the helm to wrench out of public suffering the means of victory; an exhausted nation and a dispirited army had to withstand the weight of Austria and the vigour of Russia, guided by the science of the Archduke Charles and the energy of Suwarrow.

Though the war had lasted for so short a time since its recommencement, the consumption of human life had already been prodigious; the contending parties fought with unprecedented exasperation, and the results gained had outstripped the calculations of the most enthusiastic speculators. In little more than four months, the French and Allied armies had lost nearly a half of their effective force, those cut off or irrevocably mutilated by the sword were above 116,000 (1); while the means of supplying these vast chasms were much more ample on the part of the Allied Monarchs than the French Directory. Never, in ancient or modern times, had such immense armies contended on

(1) *Dain*, i. 434.

so extensive a field. The right of the Allies rested on the Maine; their centre was posted in Switzerland; while their left stretched over the plain of Lombardy to the foot of the Apennines; and a shock was felt all along this vast line, from the rocks of Genoa to the marshes of Holland. The results hitherto had been, to an unprecedented degree, disastrous to the French. From being universally victorious, they had everywhere become unfortunate; at the point of the bayonet they had been driven back, both in Germany and Italy, to the frontiers of the Republic; the conquests of Napoléon had been lost as they had been won; and the power which recently threatened Vienna, now trembled lest the Imperial standards should appear on the summits of the Jura or the banks of the Rhone.

Clear proof thus afforded of the error of attacking Switzerland and Italy. It was now apparent what a capital error the Directory had committed in overrunning Switzerland, in extending their forces through the Italian peninsula, instead of concentrating them to bear the weight of Austria on the Adige; and exiling their best army and greatest general in Africa at the very time when the Allies were summoning to their aid the forces of a new monarchy and the genius of a hitherto invincible conqueror. But these errors had been committed; their consequences had fallen like a thunderbolt on France; the return of Napoléon and his army seemed impossible; Italy was lost; and nothing but the invincible tenacity and singular talents of Masséna enabled him to maintain himself in the last defensive line to the north of the Alps, and avert invasion from France in the quarter where its frontier is most vulnerable. To complete its misfortunes, internal dissension had paralysed the Republic at the very time when foreign dangers were most pressing, and a new government added to its declining fortunes the weakness incident to every infant administration.

Military preparations of the Allies and Republicans. The preparations of the allies to follow up this extraordinary flow of prosperous affairs were of the most formidable kind. The forces in Italy amounted to one hundred and fifteen thousand men; and after deducting the troops required in the siege of Mantua, Alexandria, and other fortresses in the rear, Suwarrow could still collect above fifty thousand men to press on the dispirited army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, which could not muster twenty thousand soldiers around its banners. This army was destined to clear the Maritime Alps and Savoy of the enemy, and turn the position of Masséna, who still maintained himself with invincible obstinacy on the banks of the Limmat. The Archduke had not under his immediate orders at that period above forty-three thousand men, twenty-two thousand having been left in the Black Forest, to mask the garrisons in the *têtes-de-pont* which the French possessed on the Upper Rhine, and sixteen thousand in the Grisons and the central Alps, to keep possession of the important ridge of the St.-Gothard. But a fresh Russian army of twenty-six thousand men was approaching under Korsakow, and was expected in the environs of Zurich by the middle of August; and something was hoped from the insurrection of the Swiss who had been liberated from the French armies (1).

To meet these formidable forces, the French, who had directed all the new levies to the north of Switzerland, as the chiefly menaced point, had seventy-five thousand men, under Masséna, on the Limmat, and the utmost efforts were made in the interior to augment to the greatest degree this important army. The English and Russians also had combined a plan for the descent of forty thousand men on the coast of Holland, for which purpose seventeen thousand men were to be furnished by his Imperial Majesty and

(1) Archduke, ii, 2, 92. Dum, i, 223, 225. Jom. xii, 60, 72.

twenty-five thousand by Great Britain; and this force, it was hoped, would not only liberate Holland, but paralyse all the north of France, as General Brune had only fifteen thousand French troops in the United Provinces, and the native soldiers did not exceed twenty thousand (1). Thus, while the centre of the French was threatened with an attack from overwhelming forces in the Alps, and an inroad preparing, by the defenceless frontier of the Jura, into the heart of their territory, their left was menaced by a more formidable invasion from the northern powers than they had yet experienced, and their right with difficulty maintained itself with inferior forces on the inhospitable summits of the Maritime Alps.

But although the plan of the Allies was so extensive, the decisive point lay in the centre of the line, and it was by the Archduke that the vital blow was to be struck, which would at once have opened to them an entrance into the heart of France. This able commander impatiently awaited the arrival of the Russians under Korsakow, which would have conferred a superiority of thirty thousand men over his opponent, and enabled him to resume the offensive with an overwhelming advantage. The object of Masséna, of course, was to strike a blow before this great reinforcement arrived; as, though his army was rapidly augmenting by conscripts from the interior, he had no such sudden increase to expect as awaited the Imperial forces. It was equally indispensable for the Republicans to resume the offensive without any delay in Italy, as the important fortresses of Mantua and Alexandria were now hard pressed by the Allies, and if not speedily relieved, must not only, by their fall, give them the entire command of the plain of Lombardy, but enable them to render the position of Masséna untenable to the north of the Alps (2).

To meet these accumulating dangers, the French government exhibited an energy commensurate to the crisis in which they were placed. The imminence of the peril induced them to exhibit it without disguise to both branches of the legislature. General Jourdan proposed to call out at once all classes of the conscripts, which, it was expected, would produce an increase of two hundred thousand men to the armies, and to levy a forced loan of 120,000,000 francs, or L.4,800,000 on the opulent classes, secured on the national domains. Both motions were at once agreed to by the Councils. To render them as soon as possible available, the conscriptions were ordered to be formed into regiments, and drilled in their several departments, and marched off, the moment they were disposable, to the nearest army on the frontier, while the service of Lisle, Strasbourg, and the other fortresses was, in great part, intrusted to the national guards of the vicinity. Thus, with the recurrence of a crisis in the affairs of the Republic, the revolutionary measures which had already been found so efficacious were again put in activity. Bernadotte, who at this crisis was appointed minister at war, rapidly infused into all the departments of the military service his own energy and resolution; and we have the best of all authorities, that of his political antagonist Napoléon himself, for the assertion, that it was to the admirable measures which he set on foot, and the conscripts whom he assembled round the Imperial standards, that not only the victory of Zurich, at the close of the campaign, but the subsequent triumph of Marengo, were, in a great degree, owing (3).

(1) *Jom.* xii. 60, 178, 182. *Ann. Reg.* 1799, 301. *Arch. Ch.* ii. 2, 92.

(2) *Arch. Ch.* ii. 79, 86. *Dum.* i. 226.

(3) *Nap. in Las Casas*, ii. 241. *Gob.* i. 90. *Jom.* xii. 18, 20. *Th.* x. 336, 337.

Their measures to reinforce the armies.

In order to counteract as far as possible the designs of the Allies, it was resolved to augment to thirty thousand men the forces placed on the summit of the Alps, from the St.-Bernard to the Mediterranean; while the army of Italy, debouching from the Apennines, should resume the offensive, in order to prevent the siege of Coni and raise those of Mantua and Alexandria; and Masséna should execute a powerful diversion on the Limmat ere the arrival of the Russians under Korsakow. For this purpose, all the conscripts on the eastern and southern departments were rapidly marched off to the armies at Zurich and on the Alps, and the fortresses of Grenoble, Briançon, and Fenestrelles, commanding the principal entrances from Piedmont into France, armed and provisioned. At the same time the direction of the troops on the frontier was changed. Championnet, liberated from prison, was intrusted with the command of the army of the Alps, while that of the army of Italy was taken from Moreau, under whom, notwithstanding his great abilities, it had experienced nothing but disaster, and given to Joubert; a youthful hero, who joined heroic valour to great natural abilities, and though as yet untried in the separate command of large armies, had evinced such talents in subordinate situations as gave the promise of great future renown if it had not been cut short in the very outset of his career on the field of Novi (1).

The Aulic Council injudiciously restrain Suwarrow from active operations.

Suwarrow, who was well aware of the inestimable importance of time in war, was devoured with anxiety to commence operations against the army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, now not more than twenty thousand strong, before it had recovered from its consternation, or was strengthened by the arrival of Macdonald's forces, which were making a painful circuit by Florence and Pisa in its rear. But the Aulic Council, who looked more to the immediate concerns of Austria than the general interest of the common cause, insisted upon Mantua being put into their hands before any thing was attempted either against Switzerland, Genoa, or the Maritime Alps; and the Emperor again wrote to Suwarrow, positively forbidding any enterprise until that important fortress had surrendered. The impetuous marshal, unable to conceal his vexation, and fully aware of the disastrous effects this resolution would have upon the general fate of the campaign, exclaimed, "Thus it is that armies are ruined!" but nevertheless, obeying the orders, he dispatched considerable reinforcements and a powerful train of artillery by the Po, to aid the siege of Mantua, and assembled at Turin the stores necessary for the reduction of Alexandria. Disgusted, however, with the subordinate part thus assigned to him, the Russian general abandoned to General Ott the duty of harassing the retreat of the army of Naples, and encamped with his veterans on the Bormida, to await the tedious operations of the besieging forces (2).

Leads to an agreement for a disastrious separation of the Russian and Austrian forces.

This circumstance contributed to induce an event, attended ultimately with important effects on the fate of the campaign, viz., the separation of the Austrian and Russian forces, and the rupture of any cordial concert between their respective governments. The cabinet of Vienna were too desirous of the exclusive sovereignty of the conquests in Italy, to be willing to share their possession with a powerful rival; while the pride of the Russians was hurt at beholding their unconquered commander, whom they justly regarded as the soul of the confederacy, subjected to the orders of the Aulic Council, who could not

(1) Jom. xii. 25, 26. St.-Cyr, i. 221, 222.

(2) Chastellar's Memoirs, 137. Jom. xii. 27, 28. Hard. vii. 250, 251.

appreciate his energetic mode of conducting war, and frequently interrupted him in the midst of the career of conquest. At the same time, the English government were desirous of allowing the Russian forces to act alone in Switzerland, aided by the insurrection which they hoped to organize in that country, and beheld with satisfaction the removal of the Muscovite standards from the shores of the Mediterranean, where their establishment in a permanent manner might possibly have occasioned them some uneasiness. These feelings on all sides led to an agreement between the Allied Powers, in virtue of which it was stipulated, that the whole Russian troops, after the fall of Alexandria and Mantua, should be concentrated in Switzerland under Marshal Suwarrow; that the Imperialists should alone prosecute the war in Italy, and that the army of the Archduke Charles should act under his separate orders on the Upper Rhine. This plan itself was highly advisable; but, from the time at which it was carried into execution, it led to the most calamitous results (1).

The whole forces of the Republic, at this period actually on foot, did not exceed 220,000 combatants; and although the new conscription was pressed with the utmost vigour, it could not be expected that it could add materially to the efficiency of the defending armies for several months, in the course of which, to all appearance, their fate would be decided (2).

July 29.
Resumption
of hostilities
by the Im-
perialists
around
Genoa. The arrival of the army of Naples at Genoa in the end of July having raised the French force to forty-eight thousand men, including three thousand cavalry and a powerful artillery, it was deemed indispensable on every account to resume offensive operations, in conjunction with the army of the Alps, which had now been augmented to a respectable amount. Every thing, accordingly, was put in motion in the valleys of the Alps and Apennines; and the French army, whose headquarters were at Corneghiano, occupied at Voltri, Savona, Vado, and Loano nearly the same position which Napoléon held, previous to his memorable descent into Italy in March 1796. But it was too late; all the activity of Moreau and Joubert could not prevent the fall of the bulwarks of Lombardy and Piedmont (3).

Progress of
the siege of
Mantua. The siege of Mantua, which had been blockaded ever since the battle of Magnano, was pressed in good earnest by General Kray after the victory of the Trebbia. The capture of Turin having placed at the disposal of the Allies immense resources, both in artillery and ammunition, the defeat of Macdonald relieved them from all anxiety as to the raising of the siege, thirty thousand men were soon collected round its walls, and the batteries of the besiegers armed with two hundred pieces of cannon. The garrison originally consisted of nearly eleven thousand men; but this force, barely adequate at first to man its extensive ramparts, was now considerably weakened by disease. The peculiar situation of this celebrated fortress rendered it indispensable that, at all hazards, the exterior works should be maintained, and this was no easy matter with an insufficient body of troops. The soldiers were provisioned for a year; but the inhabitants, thrice impoverished by enormous contributions, were in the most miserable condition, and the famine with which they were menaced, joined to the natural unhealthiness of the situation during the autumnal months, soon produced those contagious disorders ever in the rear of protracted war, which in spite of every precaution, seriously weakened the strength of the garrison (4).

(1) Archduke, ii. 83, 84.

(2) Dum, i. 283.

(3) Dum. i. 256. Jom. xii. 29, 30. St.-Cyr, i. 222.

(4) Dum. 258, 260. Jom. xii. 31, 35.

Description of that fortress Mantua, situated in the middle of a lake, formed by the Mincio in the course of its passage from the Alps to the Po, depends entirely for its security upon its external works, and the command of the waters which surround its wall. Two chaussées traverse its whole extent on bridges of stone; the first leads to the citadel, the second to the faubourg St.-George. Connected with the citadel are the external works and intrenched camp, which surround the lake, and prevent all access to its margin. These works, with the exception of the citadel, are not of any considerable strength; the real defence of Mantua consists in the command which the garrison has of the waters in the lake, which is formed by three locks. That of the citadel enables them at pleasure to augment the upper lake; that of Pradella gives them the command of the entrance of its waters into the Pajolo; while that of the port Cerese puts it in their power to dam up the canal of Pajolo, and let it flow into inundations to obstruct the approach of the place. But, on the other hand, the besiegers have the means of augmenting or diminishing the supply of water to the lake itself, by draining off the river which feeds it above the town; and the dykes which lead to Pradella are of such breadth as to permit trenches to be cut and approaches made along it. Upon the whole, an exaggerated idea had been formed both of the value and strength of Mantua, by the importance which it had assumed in the campaign of 1796, and the result of the present siege revealed the secret of its real weakness (1).

Commencement of the siege by Kray. Kray, taking advantage with ability of all the means at his disposal, had caused his flotilla to descend by Peschiera and Goito from the lake of Guarda, and brought up many gunboats by the inferior part of the Mincio into the lower lake. By means of these vessels, which were armed with cannon of the heaviest calibre, he kept up an incessant fire on the dykes, and at the same time established batteries against the curtain between the citadel and fort St.-George. These were intended merely as feints to divert the attention of the besiegers from the real point of attack,

July 14. which was the front of fort Pradella. On the night of the 14th July, while the garrison were reposing, after having celebrated by extraordinary rejoicings the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, the trenches were opened, and after the approaches had been continued for some days, the tower of Cerese was carried by assault, and the besiegers' guns rapidly brought close up to the outworks of the place. On the night of the 24th, all

July 19. the batteries of the besiegers being fully armed, they opened their fire, from above two hundred pieces, with such tremendous effect, that the defences of the fortress speedily gave way before it; in less than two hours the outworks of fort Pradella were destroyed; while the batteries, intended to create a diversion against the citadel, soon produced a serious impression. Nothing could stand against the vigour and sustained weight of the besiegers' fire; their discharges gradually rose from six thousand cannon-shot to twelve thousand in twenty-four hours, and the loss of the garrison from its effects was from five to six hundred a-day. Under the pressure arising from so terrible an attack, the fort of St.-George and the battery of Pajolo were suc-

Its surrender. cessively abandoned; and at length the garrison, reduced to seven thousand five hundred men, surrendered, on condition of being sent back to France, and not serving again until regularly exchanged. Hardly were the terms agreed to, when the upper lake flowed with such violence into the under, through an aperture which the governor had cut to let in the waters, that sixty feet of the dike were carried away, and the inundation of

Pajolo deepened to such a degree, that it might have prolonged for at least eight days his means of defence, and possibly, by preventing the besieging force taking a part in the battle of Novi, which shortly followed, altered the fate of the campaign (1).

July 8.
Fall of
Alexandria.
July 21. While the bulwark of Lombardy was thus falling, after an unexpectedly short resistance, into the hands of the Imperialists, Count Bellegarde was not less successful against the citadel of Alexandria. Trenches were opened on the 8th July, and in a few days, eighty pieces of cannon were placed in battery; and such was the activity with which they were served, that in seven days they discharged no less than forty-two thousand projectiles. On the 21st, the garrison, consisting of sixteen hundred men, surrendered at discretion. This conquest was of great importance to the future projects of Suwarrow; but it was dearly purchased by the loss of General Chastellar, his chief of the staff, who was severely wounded soon after the first trenches were opened, an officer whose talents and activity had, in a great degree, contributed to the success of the campaign (2).

Commence-
ment of the
siege of
Tortona.
Aug. 2. After the fall of Alexandria and Mantua, Suwarrow, faithful to the orders he had received from Vienna, to leave no fortified place in the enemy's hands in his rear, drew his forces round Coni, and commenced the siege of Tortona. His army was soon augmented by the arrival of General Kray with twenty thousand men from the siege of the latter place, who entered into line on the 12th August. The trenches were opened before Tortona on the 5th August, and on the 7th, the castle of Serravalle, situated at the entrance of one of the valleys leading into the Apennines, was taken after a short cannonade. But the French army, who were now concentrated under Joubert on the Apennines, was preparing an offensive movement, and the approaches to Genoa were destined to be the theatre of one of the most bloody battles on record in modern times (3).

The Republicans at this epoch occupied the following positions. The right wing, fifteen thousand strong, under St.-Cyr, guarded the passes of the Apennines from Pontremoli to Torriglio, and furnished the garrison of Genoa. The centre, consisting of ten thousand, held the important posts of the Bocchetta and Campo Freddo; while the left, twenty-two thousand strong, was encamped on the reverse of the mountains on the side of Piedmont, from the upper end of the valley of Tanaro, and both guarded the communications of the whole army with France, and kept up the connexion with the corps under Championnet, which was beginning to collect on the higher passes of the Alps. On the other hand, the Allies could only muster forty-five thousand in front of Tortona; General Kaim, with twelve thousand being at Cherasco to observe the army of the Alps, and Klenau in Tuscany, with seven thousand combatants; and the remainder of their great army occupied in keeping up the communications between their widely scattered forces (4).

Position of
the Repub-
licans in
front of
Genoa. The arrival of Joubert to supersede him in the command of his army, had no tendency to excite feelings of jealousy in the mind of his great predecessor. Moreau was incapable of a personal feeling when the interest of his country was at stake; and with a magnanimity truly worthy of admiration, he not only gave his youthful successor the full benefit of his matured counsel and experience, but offered to accompany

(1) Jom. xii. 37, 47. Dum. i. 262, 272.

(2) Dum. i. 254, 255. Jom. xii. 48, 54.

(3) Jom. xii. 98. Arch. Ch. ii. 70, 71. Dum. i.

(4) Arch. Ch. ii. 71. Jom. xii. 96, 97. St.-Cyr, i. 221, 222.

him for some days after he opened his campaign ; contributing thus, by his advice, to the glory of a rival who had just supplanted him in the command. Joubert, on his side, not only profited by the assistance thus generously proffered, but deferred on every occasion to the advice of his illustrious friend ; and to the good understanding between these great men, the preservation of the Republican forces after the defeat at Novi and the death of Joubert is mainly to be ascribed (1). How different from the presumption of Lafeuillade, who, a century before, had caused the ruin of a French army near the same spot, by neglecting the advice of Marshal Vauban before the walls of Turin.

Advance of
the French
to raise the
siege.

On the 9th of August, the French army commenced its forward movements ; and after debouching by the valleys of the Bormida, the Erro, and the Orba, concentrated, on the 15th, at Novi, and blockaded Serravalle, in the rear of their right wing. A fourth column, under the orders of St.-Cyr, destined to raise the siege of Tortona, descended the defiles of the Bocchetta. Suwarrow no sooner heard of this advance than he concentrated his army, which, on the evening of the 14th, occupied the

Aug. 14.

Positions of
the Allies—

following positions : Kray, with the divisions of Bellegarde and Ott, was encamped in two lines on the right, near the road from Novi to Bosco ; the centre, consisting of the divisions of Forster and Schwiekowsky, commanded by Derfelden, bivouacked in rear of Pozzolo-Formigan, while Melas, with the left, consisting of the Austrian divisions of Frélich and Lichtenstein, occupied Rivalta. The army of Joubert was concentrated on the plateau in the rear of Novi, with his right on the Scrivia, his centre at Novi, and his left at Basaluzzo ; a position which enabled him to cover the march of the columns detached from his right, which were destined

And of the
French.

to advance by Cassano to effect the deliverance of Novi. The French occupied a semicircle on the northern slopes of the Monte Rotonda ; the left, composed of the divisions Grouchy and Lemoine, under the command of Perignon, extended itself, in a circular form, around Pacturana ; in the centre, the division Laboissiere, under St.-Cyr, covered the heights on the right and left of Novi ; while the division Watrin, on the right, guarded the approaches to the Monte Rotonde from the side of Tortona, and Dombrowsky, with the Polish division, blockaded Serravalle. The position was strong, and the concentrated masses of the Republicans presented a formidable front among the woods, ravines, slopes, and vineyards with which the foot of the Apennines was broken. On the side of the French, forty-three thousand men were assembled ; while the forces of the Allies were above fifty-five thousand ; a superiority which made the first desirous to engage upon the rugged ground at the foot of the hills, and the latter anxious to draw their opponent into the plain, where their great superiority in cavalry might give them a decisive advantage (2).

Joubert had
resolved to
retreat on
learning the
fall of Man-
tua.

Joubert, who had given no credit to the rumours which had reached the army of the fall of Mantua, and continually disbelieved the asseverations of St.-Cyr that he would have the whole Allied army on his hands, received a painful confirmation of its truth, by beholding the dense masses of Kray encamped opposite to his right wing. He was thrown by this unexpected discovery into the utmost perplexity ; to engage with so great an inferiority of force was the height of temerity, while retreat was difficult in presence of so enterprising an enemy. In these cir-

(1) *Jom.* xii. 97. *Dum.* i. 349, 320. *St.-Cyr.* i. 222.

(2) *Arch. Ch.* ii. 71, 72. *Jom.* xii. 98, 103. *Dum.* i. 521, 523. *Th.* x. 349, 350. *St.-Cyr.* i. 227, 231.

cumstances, he resolved, late on the night of the 14th, after such irresolution as throws great doubts on his capacity as general-in-chief, whatever his talents as second in command may have been, on retiring into the fastnesses of the Apennines, and only waited for the arrival of his scouts in the morning to give the necessary orders for carrying it into effect; when the commencement of the attack by the Allies compelled him to accept battle in the position which he occupied (1).

Aug. 15.
He is at-
tacked be-
fore doing
so by
Suwarrow.
Death of
Joubert.

Suwarrow's design was to force back the right of the French, by means of the corps of Kray, while Bagrathion had orders to turn their left, and unite in their rear, under cover of the cannon of Serravalle, with that corps; while Derfelden attacked Novi in the centre, and Melas commanded the reserve, ready to support any part of the army which required his aid. In pursuance of these orders, Kray commenced the attack at five in the morning; Bellegarde attacked Grouchy, and Ott Lemoine; the Republicans were at first taken by surprise; and their masses, in great part in the act of marching, or entangled in the vineyards, received the fire of the Austrians without being able either to deploy or answer it. Notwithstanding the heroic resistance of some brigades, the Imperialists sensibly gained ground, and the heads of their columns were already mounting the plateau, when Joubert hurried in person to the spot, and received a ball in his breast, when in the act of waving his hat, and exclaiming, "Forward, let us throw ourselves among the tirailleurs!" He instantly fell, and with his last breath exclaimed, "Advance, my friends, advance (2)."

Battle of
Novi.

The confusion occasioned by this circumstance would have proved fatal, in all probability, to the French army, had the other corps of the Allies been so far advanced as to take advantage of it; but, by a strange fatality, though the attacks of the Allies were all combined and concentric, they were calculated to take place at different times; and while this important advantage was gained on their left, the Russians in the centre were still resting at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and Melas had merely dispatched a detachment from Rivolta to observe the course of the Scrivia. This circumstance, joined to the opportune arrival of Moreau, who assumed the command and harangued the troops, restored order, and the Austrians were at length driven down to the bottom of the hill, on their second line. During this encounter, Bellegarde endeavoured to gain the rear of Pasturana by a ravine which encircled it, and was on the point of succeeding, when Pérignon charged him so vigorously with the grenadiers of Partouneaux and the cavalry of Richepanse, that the Imperialists were driven back in confusion, and the whole left wing rescued from danger (3).

The Allies
are at first
repulsed.

Hitherto the right of the Republicans had not been attacked, and St.-Cyr availed himself of this respite to complete his defensive arrangements. Kray, finding the whole weight of the engagement on his hands, pressed Bagrathion to commence an attack on Novi; and though the Russian general was desirous to wait till the hour assigned by his commander for his moving, he agreed to commence, when, it was evident, that unless

(1) Jom. xii. 103. St.-Cyr. i. 237, 243.

Suwarrow's order of battle at Novi was highly characteristic of that singular warrior. It was simply this: "Kray and Bellegarde will attack the left, the Russians the centre, Melas the right." To the soldiers he said, "God wills, the Emperor orders, Suwarrow commands, that to-morrow the enemy be conquered." Dressed in his usual costume, in his shirt down to the waist, he was on horseback at the advanced posts the whole preceding evening, at-

tended by a few horsemen, minutely reconnoitring the Republican position. He was recognised from the French lines by the singularity of his dress, and a skirmish of advanced posts in consequence took place.—HARD. vii. 271, and St.-Cyr. i. 236.

(2) Jom. xii. 105, 107. Dunn. i. 323. Th. x. 351. St.-Cyr. i. 245, 246.

(3) Jom. xii. 106, 108. Th. x. 352. St.-Cyr. i. 247, 248.

speedily supported, Kray would be compelled to retreat. The Russians advanced with great gallantry to the attack; but a discharge from the division Laboissiere of musketry and grape, at half gunshot threw them into confusion; and, after an obstinate engagement, they were finally broken by a charge by Watrin, with a brigade of infantry, on their flank, and driven back with great loss to Pozzolo-Formigaro (1).

Combined attack of all their forces. The failure of these partial attacks rendered it evident that a combined effort of all the columns was necessary. It was now noon, and the French line was unbroken, although the superiority of numbers on the part of the Allies was nearly fifteen thousand men. Suwarrow, therefore, combined all his forces for a decisive movement; Kray, whom nothing could intimidate, received orders to prepare for a fresh attack; Derfelden was destined to support Bagrathion in the centre, Melas was directed to break up from Rivolta to form the left of the line, while Rosenberg was ordered in all haste to advance from Tortona to support his movement. The battle, after a pause, began again with the utmost fury at all points. It was for long, however, most obstinately disputed. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Kray, who returned above ten times to the charge, the Imperialists could make no impression on the French left; in vain column after column advanced to the harvest of death; nothing could break the firm array of the Republicans; while Bagrathion, Derfelden, and Milaradowitch, in the centre, after the most heroic exertions, were compelled to recoil before the terrible fire of the infantry and batteries which were disposed around Novi. For above four hours, the action continued with the utmost fury, without the French infantry being any where displaced, until at length the fatigue on both sides produced a temporary pause, and the contending hosts rested on their arms amidst a field covered with the slain (2).

The advance of Melas decides the victory. The resolution of any other general but Suwarrow would have been shaken by so terrible a carnage without any result; but his moral courage was of a kind which nothing could subdue. At four o'clock the left wing of the Allies came up, under Melas, and preparations were instantly made to take advantage of so great a reinforcement. Melas was directed to assail the extreme right of the Republicans, and endeavour, by turning it, to threaten the road from Novi to Genoa, while Kray again attacked the left, and Suwarrow himself, with the whole weight of the Russians, pressed the centre. The resistance experienced on the left was so obstinate, that, though he led on the troops with the courage of a grenadier, Kray could not gain a foot of ground; but the Russians, in the centre, after a terrible conflict, succeeded in driving the Republicans into Novi, from the old walls and ruined towers of which they still kept up a murderous fire. But the progress of Melas on the right was much more alarming. While one of his columns ascended the right bank of the Scrivia and reached Serravalle, another by the left bank had already turned the Monte Rotondo, and was rapidly ascending its sides; while the general himself, with a third, was advancing against the eastern flank of the plateau of Novi. To make head against so many dangers, Moreau ordered the division Watrin to move towards the menaced plateau, but finding itself assailed during its march, both in front and rear, by the divisions of Melas, it fell into confusion, and fled in the utmost disorder, with difficulty cutting its way through the enemy on the road in the rear of the French position. It now became indispensable for the

(1) Dum. i. 323. Jom. xii, 109, 110. Th. x, 352. St.-Cyr, i. 248, 250.

(2) Th. x. 353. Jom. xii, 112, 113. Dum. i. 324, 325. St.-Cyr, i. 252, 254.

Republicans to retire; for Lichtenstein, at the head of the Imperial cavalry and three brigades of grenadiers, was already established on the road to Gavi, his triumphant battalions, with loud shouts, were sweeping round the rear of the Republicans, while the glittering helmets of the horsemen appeared on every eminence behind their lines, and no other line of communication remained open but that which led by Pasturana to Ovada. Suwarrow, who saw his advantage, was preparing a last and simultaneous attack on the front and flanks of his opponent, when Moreau anticipated him by a general retreat. It was at first conducted in good order, but the impetuous assaults of the Allies soon converted it into a rout. Novi, stripped of its principal defenders, could no longer withstand the assaults of the Russians, who, confident of victory, and seeing the standards of the Allies in the rear of the French position rushed forward with resistless fury and deafening cheers, over the dead bodies of their comrades, to the charge; Lemoine and Grouchy with difficulty sustained themselves, in retiring, against the impetuous attacks of their unwearied antagonist Kray, when the village of Pasturana, in their rear, was carried by the Russians, whose vehemence increased with their success, and the only road practicable for their artillery cut off. Despair now seized their ranks; infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and fled in tumultuous confusion across the vineyards and orchards which adjoined the line of retreat; Colli, with his whole brigade, were made prisoners; and Pérignon and Grouchy, almost cut to pieces with sabre wounds, fell into the hands of the enemy. The army, in utter confusion, reached Gavi, where it was rallied by the efforts of Moreau, the Allies being too much exhausted with fatigue to continue the pursuit (1).

Great loss on both sides. The battle of Novi was the most bloody and obstinately contested that had yet occurred in the war. The loss of the Allies was 1800 killed, 5200 wounded, and 1200 prisoners; but that of the French was much more considerable, amounting to 1500 killed, 5500 wounded, and 5000 prisoners, besides 57 cannons, 28 caissons, and 4 standards. As the war advanced, and fiercer passions were brought into collision, the carnage became daily greater; the officers were more prodigal of their own blood and that of their soldiers; and the chiefs themselves, regardless of life, at length led them on both sides to the charge, with an enthusiasm which nothing could surpass. Joubert was the victim of this heroic feeling; Grouchy charged with a standard in his hand, and when it was torn from him in the *mêlée*, he raised his helmet on his sabre, and was thrown down and wounded in the shock of the opposing squadrons; and Kray, Bagrathion, and Melas led on their troops to the mouth of the enemy's cannon, as if their duty had been that of merely commanding grenadier battalions (2).

Moreau continues to maintain himself on the Apennines. The consequences of the battle of Novi were not so great as might have been expected from so desperate a shock. On the night of the 15th, Moreau regained in haste the defile of the Apennines, and posted St.-Cyr, with a strong rear-guard, to defend the approaches to the Bocchetta. In the first moments of consternation, he had serious thoughts of evacuating Genoa, and the artillery was already collected at San Pietro d'Arena for that purpose; but finding that he was not seriously disquieted, he again dispersed his troops through the mountains, nearly in the position they held before the battle. St.-Cyr was intrusted with the right, where a serious impression was chiefly apprehended, and an attack which

(1) Jom. xii. 104, 120. Th. x. 351, 354. Dum. i. 328, 330. Jom. xii. 121. St.-Cyr, i. 324, 327. Arch. Ch. ii. 72, 73. St.-Cyr, i. 255, 264. (2) Dum. i. 328, 330. Jom. xii. 121. St.-Cyr, i. 264, 270. Th. x. 355.

Klenau made on that part of the position with five thousand men was repulsed, with the loss of seven hundred men to the Imperialists. Suwarrow himself, informed of the successes of the French in the small cantons of Switzerland, immediately detached Kray, with twelve thousand men, to the Tessino; while he himself, in order to keep an eye on Championnet, whose force was daily accumulating on the Maritime Alps, encamped at Asti, where he covered at once the blockade of Coni and the siege of Tortona (1).

During the concentration of the Allied forces for the battle of Novi, this active commander so ably disposed his little army, which only amounted to sixteen thousand combatants, instead of thirty thousand, as he had been promised by the Directory, that he succeeded in forcing the passage of the Little St.-Bernard, and driving the Imperialists back to Suza. These successes continued even after the Russian commander took post at Asti; and in a variety of affairs of posts in the valleys of the Alps, they succeeded in taking fifteen hundred prisoners and four pieces of cannon. But these advantages were more than counterbalanced by the fall of Tortona, which capitulated on the 25th August, on condition that, if not relieved by the 11th September, the place should be surrendered to the Allies. This conquest was the only trophy which they derived from the bloody battle of Novi. Moreau made an ineffectual attempt to relieve the blockade, and, finding it impossible to effect the object, retired into the fastnesses of the Apennines; while Suwarrow, who had received orders to collect the whole Russians in the Alps, set out, agreeably to the plan fixed on, with seventeen thousand men for the canton of the Tessino (2).

While these great events were passing to the south of the Alps, events of still more decisive importance occurred to the north of those mountains. Immediately after the capture of Zurich and the retreat of Masséna to Mount Albis, the Archduke established the bulk of his forces on the hills which separate the Glatt from the Limmat, and placed a line of posts along the whole line of that river and the Aar, to observe the movements of the Republicans. Each of the opposing armies in Switzerland numbered about seventy-five thousand combatants; but the French had acquired a decided superiority on the Upper Rhine, where they had collected forty thousand men, while the forces of the Imperialists amounted in that quarter only to twenty-two thousand. Both parties were anxiously waiting for reinforcements; but as that expected by the Archduke, under Korsakow, was by much the most important, Masséna resolved to anticipate his adversary, and strike a decisive blow before that dreaded auxiliary arrived. For this purpose he commenced his operations by means of his right wing in the higher Alps, hoping, by the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountainous regions, to dispossess the Imperialists from the important position of the St.-Gothard, and separate their Italian from their German armies by the acquisition of these elevated ridges, which were universally at that period deemed the key to the campaign (3).

At the very time when the French general was making preparations for these important movements, the Aulic Council gave every possible facility to their success, by compelling the Archduke to depart with his experienced troops for the Rhine, and make way for the Russians under Korsakow, equally unskilled in mountain war-

(1) Jom. xii. 127, 128. Dum. i. 334, 335. St.-Cyr, ii. 1, 3.

(2) Jom. xii. 129, 133, 138. Arch. Ch. ii. 74, 77. Dum. i. 336, 337.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 77, 81. Jom. xii. 55, 58. Dum. i. 296.

Aug. 10.
Operations
of Cham-
pionnet in
the Alps
during this
time. Fall
of Tortona.

Aug. 14, 15.

Sept. 11.

Situation of
Masséna and
the Arch-
duke at Zu-
rich.

Insane dis-
location of
the Allied
forces at
this period
by the
Aulic Coun-
cil.

fare, and unacquainted with the French tactics. In vain that able commander represented that the line of the Rhine, with its double barrier of fortresses, was equally formidable to an invading as advantageous to an offensive army; that nothing decisive, therefore, could be expected in that quarter, while the chances of success were much greater from a combined attack of the Russians and Austrians on the frontier of the Jura, where no fortresses existed to impede an invading force; that fifty thousand Russians in Switzerland could not supply the place of seventy thousand Austrians; and the chances, therefore, were that some serious disaster would occur in the most important part of the line of operations; and that nothing could be more hazardous than to make a change of troops and commanders in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy, at the very time that he was meditating offensive operations. These judicious observations produced no sort of effect, and the court of Vienna ordered "the immediate execution of its will, without further objections (1)."

Description
of the
theatre of
war.

To understand the important military operations which followed, it is indispensable to form some idea of the ground on which they took place. The St.-Gothard, though inferior in elevation to many other mountains in Switzerland, is nevertheless the central point of the country, and from its sides the greatest rivers in Europe take their rise. On the east, the Rhine, springing from the glaciers of Disentis and Hinter-Rhine, carries its waters, by a circuitous course, through the vast expanse of the lake of Constance to the German ocean; on the north, the Reuss and the Aar, descending in parallel ravines through rugged mountains, feed the lakes of Lucerne, Thun, and Brienz, and ultimately contribute their waters to the same majestic stream; on the west, a still greater river rises in the blue and glittering glacier of the Rhone, and descending through the long channel of the Valais, expands into the beautiful lake of Geneva; while to the south, the snows of the St.-Gothard nourish the impetuous torrent of the Tessino, which, after foaming through the rocks of Faïdo, and bathing the smiling shores of the Italian bailiwicks, swells out into the sweet expanse of the Lago Maggiore, and loses itself in the classic waves of the Po.

The line of the Limmat, which now separated the hostile armies, is composed of the Linth, which rises in the snowy mountains of Glarus, and, after

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 80, 91. Th. x. 407, 408.

The relative situation and strength of the two armies at this period is thus given by the Archduke Charles :—

FRENCH.		Infantry.	Cavalry.
From Huningen to the mouth of the Aar,	10,991	3,208	
From the mouth of the Aar to Mount Ueth,	23,792	3,239	
From Mount Albis to the lake of Lucerne,	11,761	564	
From the lake of Lucerne to the valley of Oberhasli,	7,732		
In the Valais, from Brig to St.-Maurice,	10,886	554	
In the interior of Switzerland,	2,088	1,126	
	67,250	8,691	
Total,			—75,941

ALLIES.		Infantry.	Cavalry.
Between Weis and Wutach,	4,269	1,329	
From the mouth of the Aar to the lake of Zurich,	37,053	10,458	
Between the lake of Zurich and Lucerne,	8,722	834	
From the lake of Lucerne to the St.-Gothard,	4,184	175	
On the St.-Gothard, the Grimsel, and the Upper Valais,	5,744	150	
In the Grisons,	1,188	355	
Swiss,	3,453		
	64,613	13,301	
Total, ,			—77,914

forming in its course the lake of Zurich, issues from that great sheet of water, under the name of the Limmat, and throws itself into the Aar at Bruick. Hotze guarded the line of the Linth; the Archduke himself that of the Limmat. Korsakow was considerably in the rear, and was not expected at Schaffhausen till the 19th August (1).

One road, practicable for cavalry, but barely so for artillery at that period, crossed the St.-Gothard from Bellinzona to Altdorf (2). Ascending from Bellinzona on the southern side, it passes through a narrow défile close to the Tessino, between immense walls of rock between Faido and Airolo; climbs the steep ascent above Airolo to the inhospitable summit of the St.-Gothard; descends, by a torrent's edge, its northern declivity to the elevated mountain-valley of Urseren, from whence, after traversing the dark and humid gallery of the Unnerloch, it crosses the foaming cascade of the Reuss by the celebrated Devil's Bridge, and descends, through the desolate and rugged valley of Schollenen, to Altdorf on the lake of Lucerne. But there all vestige of a practicable road ceases; the sublime lake of Uri lies before the traveller, the sides of which, formed of gigantic walls of rock, defy all attempt at the formation of a path, and the communication with Lucerne is carried on by water along the beautiful lake of the four cantons. The only way in which it is possible to proceed on land from this point, is either by shepherds' tracks towards Stantz and the canton of Underwalden, or by the rugged and almost impracticable pass of the Schiachenthal, by which the traveller may reach the upper extremity of the canton of Glarus. From the valley of Urseren, in the heart of the St.-Gothard, a difficult and dangerous path leads over the Furca and the Grimsel, across steep and slippery slopes, where the most experienced traveller can with difficulty keep his footing, to Meyringen, in the valley of Oberhasli.

Plan of the Allies The plan of the Allies was, that Hotze, with twenty-five thousand Austrians, should be left on the Linth; and at the end of September a general attack should be made on the French position along the whole line. Korsakow was to lead the attack on the left with his Russian forces; Hotz in the centre with the Austrians; while Suwarrow, with seventeen thousand of his best troops, flushed with the conquest of Italy, was to assail the right flank of the Republicans, and by the St.-Gothard throw himself into the rear of their position on the Limmat. This design might have been attended with success, if it had been undertaken with troops already assembled on the theatre of operations; but when they were to be collected from Novi and Bavaria, and undertaken in presence of a general perfectly master of the ground, and already occupying a central position in the midst of these converging columns, it was evidently attended with the most imminent hazard, as if any of the columns did not arrive at the appointed time, the whole weight of the enemy might be expected to fall on the first which appeared (3).

And of Masséna, Masséna intrusted to Lecourbe, whose skill in mountain warfare had already been amply evinced, the important duty of throwing forward his right wing, and expelling the Imperialists from the higher Alps; while he himself, by a false attack along the whole line, and especially upon Zurich in the centre, distracted the attention of the enemy, and prevented him from perceiving the accumulation of force which was brought to bear on the St.-Gothard. Early on the morning of the 14th August, his troops were every where in motion. On the left, the Allied

(1) Th. x. 409, 410. Arch. Ch. i. 96.

(2) The magnificent chaussée, which now tra-

verses this mountainous and romantic region, was not formed till the year 1819.

(3) Th. x. 411. Arch. Ch. ii. 100, 103.

outposts were driven in along the whole line; and in the centre the attack was so impetuous that the Austrians were forced back almost to Zurich, where the Archduke rapidly collected his forces to resist the inroad. After considerable bloodshed, as the object was gained, the Republicans drew off, and resumed their positions on the Limmat (1).

Commence-
ment of the
attack by
Leeourbe on
the St.-
Gothard.

The real attack of Leeourbe was attended with very different results. The forces at his disposal, including those of Thureau in the Valais, were little short of thirty thousand men, and they were directed with the most consummate ability. General Gudin, with five battalions, was to leave the valley of the Aar, force the ridge of the Grimsel, and forming a junction with General Thureau in the Valais, drive the Austrians from the source of the Rhône and the Furca. A second column of three battalions, commanded by Loison, received orders to cross the ridge of the Steinen between Oberhasli and the valley of Schollenen, and descend upon Wasen; while a third marched from Engelberg upon Erstfeld, on the lake of Lucerne; and a fourth moved direct by the valley of Issi upon Altdorf. Leeourbe himself was to embark from Lucerne on board his flotilla, make himself master of Brunnen and Schwytz on its eastern shore, and combine with the other corps for the capture of Altdorf and all the posts occupied by the enemy in the valley of the Reuss (2).

Aug. 14.
The Impe-
rialists are
forced back
at all points.

These attacks all proved successful. The Republican parties, under Leeourbe and Oudinot, advanced by land and water against Schwytz, and after an obstinate combat, the united Swiss and Imperialists were driven from that canton into the Muttenthal. From Brunnen, the harbour of Schwytz on the lake, Leeourbe conducted his flotilla under the chapel of William Tell, through the sublime scenery of the lake of Uri, beneath precipices fifteen hundred feet high, to Fluellen, where he landed with great difficulty, under a heavy fire from the Austrian troops; and, after a warm engagement, forced General Simbsehn, who defended Altdorf, to retire further up the valley of the Reuss. Meanwhile Loison, after encountering incredible difficulties, had crossed the Steinerberg and the glaciers of Susten, and not only forced the enemy back into the valley of Reuss, but, after five assaults, made himself master of the important elevated post of Wasen, in the middle of its extent, so as to expose the troops who had been driven up from Altdorf to be assailed in rear as well as front. In this extremity they had no resource but to retire by the lateral gorge of Maderaner, from whence they reached by Taviteh the valley of the Rhine (3).

They are
driven from
the Grimsel
and the
Furca.

Meanwhile successes still more decisive were achieved by the Republicans in the other parts of their mountain line. General Thureau at the same hour attacked Prince Rohan, who was stationed in the Valais, near Brig, to guard the northern approach to the Simplon, and defeated him with such loss, that he was constrained to evacuate the valley of the Rhône, and retire by the terrific gorges of the Simplon to Duomo d'Ossolla, on the Italian side of the mountains. This disaster obliged Colonel Strauch, who guarded, amidst snow and granite, the rugged sides of the Grimsel and the Furca with eight battalions, to fly to the relief of the imperialists in the Upper Valais, leaving only fifteen hundred to guard the summit of that mountain. He succeeded in stopping the advance of the Republicans up the Valais, but during his absence the important posts of the Grimsel and Furca were lost, General Gudin, at the head of three thousand men, set out from

(1) Dum. i. 298, 299.

(2) Dum. i. 299, 304, 305. Arch. Ch. ii. 103. i. 305, 307.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 107, 108. Join. xii. 78, 80. Dum.

Join. xii. 77, 78.

Goultanen, in the valley of the Aar, and after climbing up the valley, and surmounting with infinite difficulty the glaciers of Ghelmen, succeeded in assailing the corps who guarded, amidst ice and snow, the rugged summit of the Grimsel from a higher point than that which they occupied. After a desperate conflict, in which a severe loss was experienced on both sides, the Imperialists were driven down the northern side of the mountain into the Valais; and Colonel Strauch, finding himself now exposed on both flanks, had no alternative but to retire by the dangerous pass called the Pas de Nuffenen, over a slippery glacier, to Faudo on the Tessino, from whence he rejoined the scattered detachments of his force, which had made their escape from the Valais by paths known only to chamois hunters through the Val Formazza at Bellinzona (1).

Lecourbe, ignorant of the success of his right wing, on the succeeding day pursued his career of victory in the valley of the Reuss. Following the retiring columns of the Imperialists up the dark and shaggy pass of Schollenen, he at length arrived at the Devil's Bridge, where a chasm thirty feet wide, formed by the blowing up of the arch, and a murderous fire from the rocks on the opposite side of the ravine, arrested his progress. But this obstacle was not of long duration. During the night the Republicans threw beams over the chasm; and the Austrians, finding themselves menaced on their flank by General Gudin, who was descending the valley of Urseren from the Furca by Realp, were obliged to evacuate that almost impregnable post, and retire to the heights of the Crispalt, behind the Oberalp, near the source of the Rhine. There they maintained themselves, with great resolution, against the Republican grenadiers till the evening; but on the following day as they were assailed by the united forces of Lecourbe and Gudin, they were finally broken and driven back to Ilantz, with the loss of a thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. At the same time, a detachment took possession of the summit of the St.-Gothard, and established itself at Airolo, on the southern declivity of the mountain (2).

While Lecourbe was gaining these great successes on the right, his left, between the lakes of Lucerne and Zurich, was equally fortunate. General Chabran, on the extreme left, cleared the whole western bank of the lake of Zurich as far as Weggis, the central columns drove the Imperialists from Schwytz into the Muttenthal, and defeated Jellachich at Ensiedlen; and on the following day, aided by Chabran, who moved against his flank by the Wiggisthal, they totally routed the Austrians, who fell back, with the loss of twelve hundred prisoners, by the lake of Klonthal, into the canton of Glarus. Thus, by a series of operations, as ably executed as they were skilfully conceived, was the whole left wing of the Imperialists routed and driven back in less than forty-eight hours, with the loss of ten pieces of cannon, four thousand prisoners, and two thousand in killed and wounded, and the important post of the St.-Gothard, with all its approaches and lateral valleys, wrested from their hands (3).

These brilliant successes, however, were only gained by Masséna through the great concentration of his forces on the right wing. To accomplish this he was obliged to weaken his left, which, lower down in the plain, guarded the course of the Aar. The Archduke

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 105, 107. Jom. xii. 80, 81. Dum. i. 308, 309. Ebel, *Manuel du Voyageur en Suisse*, 325.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 108, 110. Jom. xii. 81, 82. Dum. i. 308, 309.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 212, 213. Jom. xii. 82, 84. Dum. i. 305.

Many readers will recognise, in the theatre of these operations, the scenes indelibly engraven on their memory by the matchless sublimity of their features.

resolved to avail himself of this circumstance to strike a decisive blow against that weakened extremity; in which he was the more encouraged by the arrival of twenty thousand Russians of Korsakow's corps at Schaffhausen, and the important effect which success in that quarter would have in threatening the communications of the Republican army with the interior of France. For this purpose, thirty thousand men were assembled on the banks of the river, and the point selected for the passage at Gross Dettingen, a little below the junction of the Reuss and the Aar. Hotze was left in Zurich with eight thousand men, which he engaged to defend to the last extremity; while Korsakow promised to arrive at Ober Endingen, in the centre of the line, with twenty-three thousand men. The march of the columns was so well concealed, and the arrangements made with such precision, that this great force reached the destined point without the enemy being aware of their arrival, and every thing promised a favourable issue to the enterprise, when it proved abortive from the difficulties of the passage, and the want of skill and due preparation in the Austrian engineers. The bridges for the crossing of the troops were commenced under such a violent fire of artillery

Aug. 16 and
17.

as speedily cleared the opposite banks, but it was found impossible to anchor the pontoons in the rocky bed of the stream, and the rapidity of the current rendered it hopeless to construct the bridges in any other manner. Thus, from the want of a little foresight and a few precautions on the part of the engineers, did a project fail, as ably conceived as it was accurately executed by the military officers, and which promised to have altered the fate of the campaign, and perhaps of the war. Had the passage been effected, the Archduke, with forty thousand men, would have cleared all the right bank of the Aar, separated the French left wing on the Rhine from their centre and right in Switzerland, compelled Masséna to undertake a disastrous retreat into the canton of Berne, exposed to almost certain destruction the small corps at Basle, and opened to immediate invasion the defenceless frontier of the Jura, from the united troops of the Archduke, Korsakow, and Suwarrow. The want of a few grappling-irons defeated a project on which perhaps the fate of the world depended. Such is frequently the fortune of war (1).

Aug. 19.

Desirous still of achieving something considerable with his veteran troops before leaving the command in Switzerland, the Archduke, after his troops had resumed their position, again concentrated his left under Hotze. But the usual jealousies between the troops and commanders of rival nations prevented this project from being carried into execution; and before the end of the month the Austrians, under their able commander, were in full march for the Upper Rhine, leaving twenty-five thousand men, under Hotze, as an auxiliary force to support Korsakow until the arrival of Suwarrow from the plains of Piedmont (2).

Being foiled,
he marches
to the Upper
Rhine.

Aug. 30.
Austrian
left is de-
feated in
Glarus.

This change of commanders, and weakening of the Allied forces, presented too great chances of success to escape the observation of so able a general as Masséna, whose army was now augmented, by reinforcements from the interior, to above eighty thousand men. The movement commenced with an attack by Soult, with the right wing of the Republicans, upon Hotze, who occupied the canton of Glarus, and, after several sharp skirmishes, a decisive action took place near Naefels, in which the Austrians were defeated, and compelled to fall back to a defensive line in

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 119, 126. Dum. i. 311, 312. (2) Jom. xii. 92, 227. Arch. Ch. ii. 129, 133. Jom. xii. 87, 92.

their rear, extending from the lake of Zurich by Wasen through the Wallenstadter See, by Sargans to Coire, in the Grisons. It was at this critical moment that the Archduke, yielding to the pressing commands of the Aulic Council, was compelled to abandon the army with the great body of his troops, leaving the united force of Korsakow and Hotze, fifty-six thousand strong, scattered over a line forty miles in length, to sustain the weight of Masséna, who could bring sixty-five thousand to bear upon the decisive point around the ramparts of Zurich (1).

The arrival of the Archduke was soon attended with important effects upon Aug. 26. the Upper Rhine. The French had crossed that river at Manheim on the 26th August with twelve thousand men, and driving General Muller, who commanded the Imperialists, before them, laid siege to Philipsburg, on which they had commenced a furious bombardment. But the approach of the Austrian commander speedily changed the state of affairs. The columns of that prince rapidly approaching, threatened to cut off their retreat to the Rhine, and they were obliged hastily to raise the siege and retire to Manheim.

Sept. 6.
Successful
expedition
of the Arch-
duke against
Manheim.
Sept. 14.

The insufficient state of defence of that important place, inspired the Archduke with the design of carrying it by a *coup-de-main*. Its fortifications had, some months before, been levelled by the Republicans; but since that time, they had been indefatigable in their endeavours to restore them, and they were already in a respectable state of defence. On the 17th, the Austrians, in two columns, one of fourteen thousand men, the other of seven thousand, with a reserve of eight thousand, moved towards Manheim, and on the following day gave the assault. A thick fog favoured the enterprise; the Austrians got into the redoubts almost be-

Sept. 18. fore the French were aware of their approach, and drove them over the Rhine, with the loss of eighteen hundred prisoners, and twenty-one pieces of cannon. This success threw a momentary lustre over the expedition, for which the Allies were about to pay dear by the disasters experienced before Zurich (2).

Plan of the
Allies for a
combined
attack, by
Suwarrow
and Korsakow,
on
Masséna.

After the departure of the Archduke, it was concerted between Suwarrow, Korsakow, and Hotze, that the former of these commanders should set out from Bellinzona on the 21st September, and attack the Republican positions near Airolo on the Tessino. On the 25th, he expected to be at Altdorf, after having made himself master of the St.-Gothard. From thence he was to form a junction with Korsakow at Zurich, and with their united forces assail the position of Masséna on the Limmat in front, while Hotze attacked it in flank. By this means they flattered themselves that they would be able to march on the Aar with the mass of their forces, and drive the French back upon the frontier of the Jura and their own resources. This project was well conceived, in so far as the turning the French position by the St.-Gothard was concerned, and if it had all been executed as vigorously and accurately as it was by Suwarrow, the result might have been very different, but it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution, from the rugged nature of the country in which the principal operations were to be conducted, the difficulty of communicating from one valley or one part of the army to another, and the remote distances from which the corps who were to combine in the operation were to assemble. It would have been more prudent with such detached bodies, to have chosen the Misocco and the Bernardine for the field marshal's

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 135, 139. Th. x. 412, 413. Jom. xii. 231, 284.

(2) Jom. xii. 238, 341. Arch. Ch. ii. 149, 161.

march, as that would have brought him down, by roads practicable for artillery, through the Via-Mala into the heart of the Austrian army, under cover of the posts which they still occupied in the Grisons; but it did not promise such brilliant results in the outset as that which he adopted, and it was more suitable to the impetuous character of the Russian veteran to throw himself at once through the narrow ravines of the St.-Gothard upon the flank of his adversary's line (1).

Relative situations of the French and Russian centres at Zurich. Meanwhile Korsakow collected the greater part of his forces in the neighbourhood of Zurich, where they were encamped between the ramparts of the town and the banks of the Sill. The position which they occupied, and the necessity of striking a decisive blow before the arrival of Suwarrow, suggested to Masséna a plan which he conceived and executed with the most consummate ability. He had a superiority, until the arrival of Suwarrow, of ten thousand over the Allies; but the corps which that commander brought with him would turn the balance as far the other way (2). Now, therefore, was the moment, by a decisive blow in the centre, to ruin the Allied army before the junction of that dreaded commander. But the distribution of these troops rendered this superiority still more important; for Masséna could assemble thirty-nine thousand on the decisive line of the Limmat (3), while Korsakow could only collect twenty-five thousand, the bulk of whom were grouped together under the cannon of Zurich, where their numbers were of no avail, and their crowded state in a narrow space only impeded any military movements.

Unfounded confidence of the latter. The temper and feeling of the Russian troops, even more than their defective position, rendered them the ready victims of a skilful and daring adversary. Justly proud of their long series of victories over the Turks, and of the decisive impression which Suwarrow had made in the Italian campaign, they had conceived both an unreasonable confidence in their own strength, and an unfounded contempt for their enemies. This feeling was not the result of a course of successes over an antagonist with whom they had repeatedly measured their strength, but of a blind idea of superiority, unfounded either in reason or experience, and likely to lead to the most disastrous consequences. In presence of the first general then in Europe, at the head of a greatly superior force, Korsakow thought it unnecessary to adopt other measures or take greater precautions than if he had been on the banks of the Dneister, in front of an undisciplined horde of barbarians. Thus every thing, both on the French and Allied side, prepared the great catastrophe which was approaching (4).

Masséna's able plan of attack. Having minutely reconnoitred the position of the enemy, Masséna resolved to make only a feigned attack on Zurich, and to cross with the bulk of his forces further down the river at Closter-Fahr, where it was slenderly guarded; and thus to turn the position under the ramparts of that town, and attack Korsakow, both in front and rear (5), at the same time that the Republicans had cut him off from his right wing further down the river, and the lake of Zurich separated him from his left in the mountains. The execution of this plan was as able as its conception was felicitous on the part of the French commander (6).

(1) Dum. ii. 58, 61. Arch. Ch. ii. 172, 178. Jom. xii. 241, 242.

(2) The French army in the field was 76,000; that of the Allies, without Suwarrow, 70,000; with him, 88,000.—JOMINI, xii. 245.

(3) Jom. xii. 245, 246. Arch. Ch. ii. 183, 185.

(4) Arch. Ch. ii. 181, 182.

(5) Th. x. 414, 415. Jom. xii. 247, 248.

(6) The presumption and arrogance of Korsakow were carried to such a pitch, that, in a conference with the Archduke Charles, shortly before the battle, when that great general was pointing out the positions which should in an especial manner be guarded, and said, pointing to the map, "Here you

Sept. 24.
The passage
is surprised
below Zu-
rich.

By great exertions the French engineers collected, by land-carriage, twelve pontoons and thirty-seven barks at Dietikon, on the evening of the 24th September, where they were concealed behind an eminence and several hedges, and brought down to the margin of the river at daybreak on the following morning. The French masked batteries were then opened, and by the superiority of their fire the opposite bank was speedily cleared of the feeble detachments of the enemy who occupied it, and the passage commenced. Six hundred men, in the first instance, were ferried over, and the French artillery, directed by General Foy, protected this gallant band against the attacks of the increasing force of the enemy, till the boats returned with a fresh detachment. Meanwhile the pontoons arrived, at a quick trot, from Dietikon; the bridge began to be formed, and the troops, ferried over, attacked and carried the height on the opposite side, though defended with the most obstinate valour by three Russian battalions, from whence seven pieces of cannon had hitherto thundered on their crossing columns. By seven o'clock the plateau of Closter-Fahr, which commanded the passage, was carried (1), with the artillery which crowned it, and before nine the bridge was completed, and Oudinot, with fifteen thousand men, firmly established on the right bank of the river.

Feigned
attacks on
Zurich and
the Lower
Limmat.

While this serious attack was going on in the centre, General Ménard on the left had, by a feigned attack, induced the Russian commander, Durassow, to collect all his forces to resist the threatened passage on the lower Limmat, and Mortier, by a vigorous demonstration against Zurich, retained the bulk of the Russian centre in the neighbourhood of that city. His troops were inadequate to produce any serious impression on the dense masses of the Russians who were there assembled; but while he was retiring in confusion, and Korsakow was already congratulating himself on a victory, he was alarmed by the increasing cannonades in his rear, and intelligence soon arrived of the passage at Closter-Fahr, the disaster of Markoff, and the separation of the right wing under Durassow from the centre, now left to its own resources at Zurich. Shortly after, he received the most alarming accounts of the progress of Oudinot: he had made himself master of Hong, and the heights which surround Zurich on the north west; and, in spite of a sally which Korsakow made towards evening, at the head of five thousand men, which compelled the enemy to recede to the foot of the heights to the north of the town, they still maintained themselves in force on that important position, barred the road of Wintherthur, the sole issue to Germany, and all but surrounded the Allied army within the walls of the city. Before nightfall, Masséna, fully sensible of his advantages, summoned the Russian commander to surrender, a proposal to which no answer was returned (2).

Dreadful
confusion in
the town of
Zurich.

During these disasters the confusion in Zurich rose to the highest pitch. The immense confluence of horsemen, artillery, and baggage-waggon, suddenly thrown back upon the city, and by which its streets were soon completely blocked up; the cries of the wounded brought in from all quarters; the trampling of the cavalry and infantry, who forced their way through the dense mass, and mercilessly trode under foot the wounded and the dying to make head against the enemy, threatening to break in from all sides, formed a scene hitherto unexampled in the war, and for

should place a battalion."—"A company you mean," said Korsakow. "No," replied the Archduke, a "battalion."—"I understand you," rejoined the other, "an Austrian battalion, or a Russian company." HARD. vii. 287.

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 190, 193. Th. x. 415, 416. Jom. xii. 250, 252.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 194, 196. Th. x. 416, 418. Jom. xii. 254, 256.

which a parallel can only be found in the horrors of the Moscow retreat. When night came, the extensive watch-fires on all the heights to the north and west of the city, showed the magnitude of the force with which they were threatened in that quarter; while the unruffled expanse of the lake offered no hope of escape on the other side, and the bombs which already began to fall in the streets, gave a melancholy presage of the fate which awaited them if they were not speedily extricated from their perilous situation (1).

Brave resolution of Korsakow to force his way through.

In these desperate circumstances, Korsakow evinced a resolution as worthy of admiration as his former presumptuous confidence had been deserving of censure. Disdaining the proposal to surrender, he spent the night in making arrangements for forcing, sword in hand, a passage on the next morning through the dense masses of the Republicans. Fortunately, considerable reinforcements arrived during the night; two strong battalions, detached by Hotze, and the whole right wing, under Durassow, successively made their appearance. He had been detained till late in the evening by the feigned attacks of Ménard, but having at length learned the real state of affairs (2), he lost no time in rejoining his commander at Zurich, by a long circuit which enabled him to avoid the French outposts. Strengthened by these reinforcements, Korsakow resolved to attempt the passage through the enemy on the following day.

Sept. 28. He cuts his way through the enemy, but loses all his baggage and artillery.

At daybreak, on the 28th, the Russian columns were formed in order of battle, and attacked with the utmost impetuosity the division Lorges and the brigade Bonterns, which had established themselves on the road to Wintherthur, the sole line of retreat which remained to them. The resistance of the French was obstinate and the carnage frightful, but the Russians fought with the courage of despair, and at length succeeded in driving the Republicans before them and opening a passage. The whole army of Korsakow was then arranged for a retreat; but contrary to every rule of common sense, as well as the military art, he placed the infantry in front, the cavalry in the centre, and the *artillery and equipages in the rear*, leaving only a slender rear-guard, to defend the ramparts of Zurich until the immense mass had extricated itself from the city. Masséna, perceiving his intention, collected his forces to prevent or distress his retreat; but the intrepidity of the Russian infantry overthrew all his efforts, and the head of the column cut its way through all the troops which could be collected to oppose its progress. But the efforts of the Republicans against the cavalry in the centre were more successful. The divisions Lorges and Gazan, by reiterated charges on the moving mass, at length succeeded in throwing it into confusion; the disorder soon spread to the rear; all the efforts of the generals to arrest it proved ineffectual; the brave SACKEN, destined to honourable distinction in a more glorious war, was wounded and made prisoner, and amidst a scene of unexampled confusion, a hundred pieces of cannon, all the ammunition waggons and baggage of the army, and the military chest, fell into the hands of the victors. Meanwhile the fire approached Zurich on all sides. Mortier was thundering from the other side of the Limmat, while Oudinot, carrying every thing before him, pressed down from the heights on the north; the garrison defiled after the main army in confusion; soon the gates were seized; a mortal struggle ensued in the streets, in the course of which the illustrious Lavater, seeking to save the life of a soldier threatened with death, was barbarously shot. At length all the troops

(1) Jom. xii. 254, 256. Arch. Ch. ii. 195, 196. (2) Arch. Ch. ii. 197. Th. x. 418, 419. Th. x. 417, 418.

who remained in Zurich laid down their arms; and Korsakow, weakened by the loss of eight thousand killed and wounded, and five thousand prisoners, besides his whole artillery and ammunition, was allowed to retire without further molestation by Eglisau to Shaffhausen (1).

Success of
Soul against
Hotze above
the Lake. While Zurich was immortalized by these astonishing triumphs, the attack of Soul on the Imperial right, on the upper part of the line above the lake, was hardly less successful. Hotze had there retained only two battalions, at his headquarters of Kaltbrun; the remainder were dispersed along the vast line, from the upper end of the lake of Zurich by Sargans, to Coire in the Grisons. Accumulating his forces, Soul skilfully and rapidly passed the Linth, at three in the morning of the 25th. One hundred and fifty volunteers first swam across the river, with their sabres in their teeth, during the darkness of the night, and aided by the artillery from the French side, speedily dispersed the Austrian posts on the right bank, and protected the disembarkation of six companies of grenadiers, who soon after made themselves masters of Schenis. Wakened by the sound of the cannon,

Sept. 26.
Death of
the latter
officer. Hotze ran, with a few officers and a slender escort, to the spot, and fell dead by the first discharge of the Republican videttes. This calamitous event threw the Austrians into such consternation, that they fell back from Schenis to Kaltbrun, from which they were also dislodged before the evening. At the same time, the French had succeeded in crossing a body of troops over the river, a little lower down, at Shemersken, and advanced to the bridge of Grynau, where a desperate conflict ensued. These disasters compelled the Austrians to retreat to their position at Wesen, where they were next day assaulted by Soul, and driven first behind the Thiers, and at length over the Rhine, with the loss of three thousand prisoners, twenty pieces of cannon, all their baggage, and the whole flotilla, constructed at a great expense, on the lake of Wallenstadt (2).

Operations
of Suwar-
row on the
Tessino. While these disasters were accumulating upon the Allied force, which he was advancing to support, Suwarrow was resolutely and faithfully performing his part of the general plan. He arrived at Taverno on the 15th August, and dispatching his artillery and baggage, by Como and Chiavenna, towards the Grisons, set out himself, with twelve thousand veterans, to ascend the Tessino and force the passage of the St.-Gothard, while Rosenberg, with six thousand, was sent round by the Val Blegno, to turn the position by the Crispalt and Disentis, and so descend into the valley of Urseren by its eastern extremity. On the 21st September, the Russian main body arrived at Airola, at the foot of the mountain, where General Gudín was Sept. 23. strongly posted, with four thousand men, covering both the direct road over the St.-Gothard and the path which led diagonally to the Furca. Two days after, the attack was commenced, with the utmost resolution, by the Russian troops; but in spite of all their efforts, they were arrested in the steep zigzag ascent above Airola by the rapid and incessant fire of the French tirailleurs. In vain the Russians, marching boldly up, answered by heavy platoons of musketry; their fire, however sustained, could produce little impression on detached parties of sharpshooters, who, posted behind rocks and scattered fir-trees, caused every shot to tell upon the dense array of their assailants. Irritated at the unexpected obstacles, the old marshal advanced to the front, lay down in a ditch, and declared his resolution "to be buried there, where his children had retreated

(1) Th. x. 419, 420. Arch. Ch. ii. 199, 201. Jom. xii. 257, 258. Hard. vii. 292.

(2) Jom. xii. 259, 263. Arch. Ch. ii. 203, 209. Dum. ii. 61, 63.

for the first time." Joining generalship to resolution, however, he dispatched detachments to the right and left to turn the French position; and when their fire began, putting himself at the head of his grenadiers, at length drove the Republicans from their position, and pursued them, at the point of the bayonet, over the rugged summit of the St.-Gothard to the valley of Urseren. At the same time, Rosenberg had assailed the French detachment on the summit of the Crispalt, and, after destroying the greater part, driven them down in great disorder into the eastern extremity of the same valley; while a detachment, under Auffenberg, dispatched from Disentis, was proceeding through the Maderanthal to Amsteg, to cut off their retreat by the valley of Schollenen (1).

Sept. 24. Dreadful struggle at the Devil's Bridge. Assailed by such superior forces, both in front and flank, Lecourbe had no alternative but a rapid retreat. During the night, therefore, he threw his artillery into the Reuss, and retired down the valley of Schollenen, breaking down the Devil's Bridge to impede the progress of the enemy, while Gudin scaled the Furca by moonlight, and took post on the inhospitable summit of the Grimsel. On the following morning the united Russian forces approached the Devil's Bridge, but they found an impassable gulf, two hundred feet deep, which stopt the leading companies, while a dreadful fire from all the rocks on the opposite side swept off all the brave men who approached the edge of the abyss. Hearing the firing in front, the column of Bagrathion pressed on, in double quick time, through the dark passage of the Unnerloch, and literally, by their pressure, drove the soldiers in front headlong over the rocks into the foaming Reuss. At length, the officers, tired of the fruitless butchery, dispatched a few companies across the Reuss to scale the rocks on the left, by which the post at the bridge was turned, and beams being hastily thrown across, the Russian troops, with loud shouts, passed the terrific defile, and pressing hard upon the retiring column of the Republicans, effected a junction with Auffenberg at Wasen, and drove the enemy beyond Altdorf to take post on the sunny slopes where the Alps of

Sept. 26. Surenen descend into the glassy lake of Lucerne (2).

Arrived at Altdorf, Suwarrow is forced to ascend the Shachenthal. The capture of the St.-Gothard by the Russians, and the expulsion of the French from the whole valley of the Reuss, was totally unexpected by Masséna, and would have been attended with important results upon the general fate of the campaign, if it had not been simultaneous with the disaster of Korsakow at Zurich, and the defeat of Hotze's corps by the Republicans on the Linth. But, coming as it did in the midst of these misfortunes, it only induced another upon the corps whose defeat was about to signalize the Republican arms. Arrived at Altdorf, Suwarrow found his progress in a direct line stopt by the lake of Lucerne, whose perpendicular sides precluded all possibility of a further advance in that direction, while the only outlet to join the Allied forces on his right lay through the horrible defile of the Shachenthal, in which even the audacious Lecourbe had not ventured to engage his troops, however long habituated to mountain warfare. There was now, however, no alternative, and Suwarrow, with troops exhausted with fatigue, and a heart boiling with indignation, was compelled to commence the perilous journey (3).

Difficult passage of that ridge to Mitten. No words can do justice to the difficulties experienced by the Russians in this terrible march, or the heroism of the brave men engaged in it. Obligated to abandon their artillery and baggage, the whole army advanced in single file, dragging the beasts of burden after them,

(1) Th. x. 424, 422. Jom. xii. 265, 266. Dum. i. 51. Arch. Ch. ii. 227, 228.

(3) Jom. x. 269, 270. Dum. ii. 54, 55. Th. x. 422. Arch. Ch. ii. 236.

(2) Jom. xii. 267, 269. Th. x. 422. Dum. ii. 52. 53. Arch. Ch. ii. 229, 235.

up rocky paths, where even an active traveller can with difficulty find a footing. Numbers slipped down the precipices, and perished miserably; others, worn out with fatigue, lay down on the track, and were trodden under foot by the multitude who followed after them, or fell into the hands of Lecourbe, who closely hung upon their rear. So complete was the dispersion of the army, that the leading files had reached Muttén before the last had left

Sept. 28.

Altdorf; the precipices beneath the path were covered with horses, equipages, arms, and soldiers unable to continue the laborious ascent. At length the marshal reached Muttén, where the troops, in a hospitable valley, abounding with cottages and green fields, hoped for some respite from their fatigues; and where, in conformity to the plan agreed on, they were to have met the Austrian corps of Jellachich and Linken, to threaten the right of the Republicans (1).

Sept. 25.

He finds
none of the
expected
reinforce-
ments there.

But it was too late: the disasters of the Imperialists deprived them of all hope of relief from this quarter. Jellachich, faithful to his instructions, had broken up from Coire and the valley of the Rhine on the 25th, with eight battalions made himself master of the village of Mollis, and driven the Republicans back to Naefels, at the bridge of which, however, they resolutely defended themselves. But on the following day, the French, issuing from Wasen, menaced the retreat of the Austrians by the side of the Wallenstadter See; and Jellachich, informed of the disasters at Zurich, the death of Hotze, and the retreat of his corps, made haste to fall back behind the Rhine. On the same day, Linken, who had crossed from the valley of the Rhine by the valley of Sernst and the sources of the Linth, after making prisoners two battalions whom they encountered, appeared in the upper part of the valley of Glarus, so as to put Molitor between two fires. His situation now appeared all but desperate, and by a little more vigour on the part of the Russians might have been rendered so; but the retreat of Jellachich having enabled Molitor to accumulate his forces against this new adversary, he was obliged to retreat, and after remaining inactive for three days at Schwanden, recrossed the mountains, and retired behind the Rhine (2).

And is there
surrounded
on all sides,
and reluc-
tantly forced
to retreat.

Suwarrow thus found himself in the Muttenthal, in the middle of the enemy's forces, having the whole of Masséna's army on one side, and that of Molitor on the other. Soon the masses of the Republicans began to accumulate round the Russian marshal. Molitor occupied Mont Brakel and the Klonthal, the summit of the pass between the Muttenthal and Glarus, while Mortier entered the mouth of the valley towards Schwytz, and Masséna himself arrived at Fluellen, to concert with Lecourbe a general attack on the Russian forces. In this extremity, Suwarrow having, with the utmost difficulty, assembled his weary troops in the Muttenthal, called a council of war, and following only the dictates of his own impetuous courage, proposed an immediate advance to Schwytz, in the rear of the French position at Zurich, and wrote to Korsakow, that he would hold him answerable with his head for one step further that he continued his retreat. The officers, however, perceiving clearly the dangerous situation in which they were placed, strongly urged the necessity of an immediate retreat into Glarus and the Grisons, in order to strengthen themselves by that wing of the Allied army which alone had escaped a total defeat. At length, with the utmost difficulty, the veteran conqueror was persuaded to alter his

(1) *Jom.* xii. 270, 271. *Th.* x. 423. *Arch. Ch.* ii. 37.

(2) *Arch. Ch.* ii. 212, 220. *Jom.* xii. 271, 272*
Dum. ii. 68, 69.

plans, and, for the first time in his life, he ordered a retreat, weeping with indignation at thus finding the reputation of invincibility, which his marvelous successes had won for him, lost in the close of his career by the faults of the generals placed under his command (1).

Sept. 30.

Preceded by the Austrian division under Auffenberg, the Russians ascended Mount Bragel, and chasing before them the detachments of Molitor, great part of whom were made prisoners near the lake Klonthal, threw back that general upon the banks of the Linth. It was now the turn of the French general to feel alarm; but, calm in the midst of dangers which would have overturned the resolution of an ordinary commander, he made the most resolute defence, disputing every inch of ground, and turning

Oct. 1.

every way to face the adversaries who assailed him. Determined to block up the passage to the Russians, he ultimately took post at Naefels, already immortalized in the wars of Swiss independence, where he was furiously attacked, for a whole day, by Prince Bagrathion. Both parties fought with the most heroic courage, regardless of ten days' previous combats and marches, in which they had respectively been engaged; but all the efforts of the Russian grenadiers could not prevail over the steady resistance of the Republicans, and towards evening, having received reinforcements from Wasen, they sallied forth, and drove the assailants back to Glarus. On the same day Masséna, with a large force, attacked the rearguard of the Russians, which was winding, encumbered with wounded, along the Muttenthal; but Rosenberg halting, withstood their attack with such firmness, that the Republicans were compelled to give way, and then breaking suddenly from a courageous defensive to a furious offensive, he routed them entirely, and drove them back as far as Schwytz, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, a thousand prisoners, and as many killed and wounded (2).

He crosses
the moun-
tains into
Glarus.
Desperate
struggle at
Naefels.

Dreadful
passage of
the Alps of
Glarus to
Hantz on
the Rhine.

Unable to force the passage at Naefels, the Russian general, after giving his troops some days' repose at Glarus, which was absolutely indispensable after the desperate fatigues they had undergone, resolved to retreat over the mountains into the Grisons by Engi, Matt, and the valley of Sernst. To effect this in presence of a superior enemy, pressing on his footsteps both from the side of Naefels and the Klonthal, was an enterprise of the utmost hazard, as the path over the arid summits of the Alps of Glarus, was even more rugged than that through the Shachenthal, and the horses and beasts of burden had all perished under the fatigues of the former march. Nothing could exceed the difficulties which presented themselves. Hardships, tenfold greater than those which all but daunted the Carthaginian conqueror in the outset of his career in the Pennine Alps, awaited the Russians, at the close of a bloody and fatiguing campaign, among mountains to which they were entire strangers. On the morning on which the army set out from Glarus, a heavy fall of snow both obliterated all traces of a path, and augmented the natural difficulties of the passage. With incredible difficulty the wearied column wound its painful way amongst inhospitable mountains in single file, without either stores to sustain its strength, or covering to shelter it from the weather. The snow, which, in the upper parts of the mountains, was two feet deep, and perfectly soft from being newly fallen, rendered the ascent so fatiguing, that the strongest men could with difficulty advance a few miles in a day. No cottages were to be found in these

(1) Arch. Ch. ii, 239, 240. Jom, xii, 273, 275. (2) Jom, xii. 276, 277. Arch. Ch. i. 48. Dum. ii. 67, 68.

dreary and sterile mountains, not even trees were to be met with to form the cheerful light of the bivouacs, vast grey rocks starting up amongst the snow alone broke the mournful uniformity of the scene, and under their shelter, or on the open surface of the mountain, without any covering or fire, were the soldiers obliged to lie down, and pass a long and dreary autumnal night. Great numbers perished of cold, or sunk down precipices, or into crevices from which they were unable to extricate themselves, and where they were

Oct. 6. soon choked by the drifting of the snow. With incredible difficulty the head of the column, on the following day, at length reached, amidst colossal rocks, the summit of the ridge; but it was not the smiling plains of Italy which there met their view, but a sea of mountains, wrapped in the snowy mantle which seemed the winding-sheet of the army, interspersed with cold grey clouds which floated round their higher peaks. The Alps of Tyrol and the Grisons, whose summits stretched as far as the eye could reach in every direction, presented a vast wilderness, in the solitudes of which the army appeared about to be lost, while not a fire nor a column of smoke was to be seen in the vast expanse to cheer the spirits of the soldiers. The path, long hardly visible, now totally disappeared, not a shrub or a bush was to be met with; the naked tops of the rocks, buried in the snow, no longer served to indicate the lying of the precipices, or rest the exhausted bodies of the troops. On the southern descent the difficulties were still greater; the snow, hardened by a sharp freezing wind, was so slippery, that it became impossible for the men to keep their footing; whole companies slipped together into the abysses below, and numbers were crushed by the beasts of burden rolling down upon them from the upper parts of the ascent, or the masses of snow which became loosened by the incessant march of the army, and fell down with irresistible force upon those beneath. All the day was passed in struggling with these difficulties, and with the utmost exertions the advanced guards reached the village of Panix, in the Grisons, at night, where headquarters were established. The whole remainder of the columns slept upon the snow, where the darkness enveloped them without either fire or covering. But nothing could overcome the unconquerable spirit of the Russians. With heroic resolution and incredible perseverance they struggled on, through hardships which would have daunted any other soldiers (1); and at length the scattered stragglers were rallied in the valley of the Rhine, and head-quarters established at Ilantz on the 10th, where the troops obtained some rest after the unparalleled difficulties which they had experienced.

Bloody conflicts with Korsakow, near Constance. Meanwhile Korsakow, having reorganized his army, and recovered in some degree from his consternation, halted his columns at Busingen, and turning fiercely on his pursuers, drove them back to Trullikon; but the enemy having there received reinforcements, the combat was renewed with the utmost obstinacy, and continued, without any decisive result on either side, till nightfall. On the same day, a body of Russian and Austrian cavalry, three thousand strong, posted in the vineyards and gardens which form the smiling environs of Constance, were attacked by a superior body of Republicans, under the command of General Cazen; a furious combat commenced, in the course of which the town was three times taken and retaken, barricades were thrown up in the streets, and the unhappy citizens underwent all the horrors of a fortress carried by assault. The Archduke Charles, informed of these circumstances, hastened with all his disposable forces from the environs of Manheim. From the 1st to the 7th of October,

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 249, 251. Jom. xii. 277, 279.

Archduke
hastens to
his aid, and
checks the
further pur-
suit.

twenty-seven battalions and forty-six squadrons arrived in the neighbourhood of Villingen, and the prince himself fixed his headquarters at Donaschingen, in order to be at hand to support the broken remains of Korsakow's army. The Allies were withdrawn from the St.-Gothard, and all the posts they yet occupied in Switzerland, to the Grisons, and the Rhine formed the boundary between the hostile armies, the Russians being charged with its defence from Petershausen to Diefenhosen, and the Austrians with the remainder of the line (1).

Treaty be-
tween Rus-
sia and Eng-
land for an
expedition
to Holland.

While these desperate conflicts were going on in the south of Europe, England, at length rousing its giant strength from the state of inactivity in which it had so long been held by the military inexperience and want of confidence in its prowess on the part of government, was preparing an expedition more commensurate than any it had yet sent forth to the station which it occupied in the war. Holland was the quarter selected for attack, both as being the country in the hands of the enemy nearest the British shores, and most threatening to its maritime superiority, where the most vigorous co-operation might be expected from the inhabitants, and the means of defence within the power of the Republicans were most inconsiderable. By a treaty, concluded on the 22d June, between England and Russia, it was stipulated that the former of these powers was to furnish 13,000, and the latter 17,000 men, towards a descent in Holland, and that L.44,000 a-month should be paid by England for the expenses of the Russian troops, and her whole naval force be employed to support the operations. To re-establish the stadtholder in Holland, and terminate the revolutionary tyranny under which that opulent country groaned; to form the nucleus of an army which might threaten the northern provinces of France, and restore the barrier which had been so insanely destroyed by the Emperor Joseph; to effect a diversion in favour of the great armies now combating on the Rhine and the Alps, and destroy the ascendancy of the Republicans in the maritime provinces and naval arsenals of the Dutch, were the objects proposed in this expedition, and which, by efforts more worthy of the strength of England, might unquestionable have been attained (2).

The preparations for the expedition, both in England and the Baltic, were pushed with the utmost vigour; and the energy and skill with which the naval departments and arrangements for disembarkation were made in the British harbours, were such as to excite the admiration of the French historians (3). In the middle of July, Sir Home Popham sailed for the Baltic to receive on board the Russian contingent; while twelve thousand men, early in August, were assembled on the coast of Kent, and twelve thousand more were preparing for the same destination. All the harbours of England resounded with the noise of preparation; it was openly announced in the newspapers that a descent in Holland was in contemplation; and the numerous British cruisers, by reconnoitring every river and harbour along the Channel, kept the maritime districts in constant alarm from Brest to the Texel. The best defensive measures which their circumstances would admit were adopted by the Directory, and Brune, the French general, was placed at the head of the forces of both nations; but he could only collect fifteen thousand French, and twenty thousand Dutch troops to resist the invasion (4).

Vigorous
preparations
for the ex-
pedition in
England.

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 259, 264. Jom. xii. 283, 286.
(2) Jom. xii. 178, 179. Ann. Reg. 1799, 301, and
State Papers, 216, 217. Dum. ii. 348, 349.

(3) Jom. xii. 180, 181, Dum. ii. 349, 354.

(4) Jom. xii. 182, 183. Ann. Reg. 301. Dum. ii.
351, 352.

The expedition sails, and lands on the Dutch coast.

On the 13th August, the fleet, with the first division of the army, twelve thousand strong, set sail from Deal, and joined Lord Duncan in the North Sea. Tempestuous weather, and a tremendous surf on the coast of Holland prevented the disembarkation from being effected for a fortnight; but at length, on the 26th, the fleet was anchored off the Helder, in north Holland, and preparations were immediately made for a descent on the following morning. At daylight on the 27th the disembarkation began, the troops led with equal skill and resolution by Sir RALPH ABERCROMBY, and the landing covered by the able exertions of the fleet under Admiral Mitchell; and never was the cordial co-operation of the land and sea forces more required than on that trying service. The naval strength of England was proudly evinced on this occasion; fifteen ships of the line, forty-five frigates and brigs, and one hundred and thirty transport vessels covered the sea, as far as the eye could reach, with their sails. General Daendels, who was at the head of a division of twelve thousand men in the neighbourhood, marched rapidly to the menaced point; and when the first detachment of the British, two thousand five hundred strong, was landed, it found itself assailed by a much superior force of Batavian troops; but the fire from the ships carried disorder into their ranks, and they were driven back into the sandhills

Action at the Helder. Defeat of the Dutch.

on the beach, from which, after an obstinate conflict, they were expelled before six in the evening, and the debarkation of the remaining divisions effected without molestation. In the night, the enemy evacuated the fort of the Helder, which was taken possession of next day by the English troops. In this affair the loss of the different parties was singularly at variance with what might have been expected; that of the British did not exceed five hundred, while that of the Dutch was more than thrice that number (1).

Capture of the Dutch fleet at the Texel.

This success was soon followed by another still more important. The position at the Helder having been fortified, and a reinforcement of five thousand fresh troops come up from England, the British fleet entered the Texel, of the batteries defending which they had now the command by the occupation of the Helder, and summoned the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Story, consisting of eight ships of the line, three of fifty-four guns, eight of forty-four, and six smaller frigates, who had retired into the Vlietu canal, to surrender. At the sight of the English flag, symptoms of insubordination manifested themselves in the Dutch fleet; the admiral, unable to escape, and despairing of assistance, surrendered without firing a shot; and immediately the Orange flag was hoisted on all the ships, and on the towers and batteries of the Helder and Texel. By this important success the Dutch fleet was finally extricated from the grasp of the Republicans, a circumstance of no small moment, in after times, when England had to contend, single-handed, with the combined maritime forces of all Europe (2).

The British are attacked by the Republicans, but repulse them with great loss.

The Russian troops not having yet arrived, the British commander, who was only at the head of twelve thousand men, remained on the defensive, which gave the Republicans time to assemble their forces; and having soon collected twenty-four thousand, of whom seven thousand were French, under the orders of VANDAMME, General Brune, who had assumed the command-in-chief, resolved to anticipate the enemy, and resume the offensive. On the 10th of September all the columns were in motion; Vandamme, who commanded the right, was directed to move along

(1) Ann. Reg. 1799, 302. Join. ii. 188, 189.

(2) Dum. ii. 369, 372. Ann. Reg. 1790, 303; Join. xii. 190.

the Langdyke, and make himself master of Ennsinberg; Dumonceau, with the centre, was to march by Schorldam upon Krabbenham, and therefore the key of the position; while the left was charged with the difficult task of chasing the enemy from the Sand-dyke, and penetrating by Kamp to Petten. The contest, like all those which followed, was of the most peculiar kind; restricted to dikes and causeys, intersecting in different directions a low and swampy ground, it consisted of detached conflicts at insulated points rather than any general movements; and, like the struggle between Napoléon and the Austrians in the marshes of Arcola, was to be determined chiefly by the intrepidity of the heads of columns. The Republicans advanced bravely to the attack, but they were every where repulsed. All the efforts of Vandamme were shattered against the intrepidity of the English troops which guarded the Sand-dyke; Dumonceau was defeated at Krabbenham, and Daendels compelled to fall back in disorder from before Petten. Repulsed at all points the Republicans resumed their position at Alkmaer, with a loss of two thousand men, while that of the British did not exceed three hundred (1).

The English
joined by
the Rus-
sians, at
length
advanced.

Instructed by this disaster as to the quality of the troops with which he had to deal, General Brune remained on the defensive at Alkmaer, while the remainder of the expedition rapidly arrived to the support of the British army. Between the 12th and the 15th September, the Russian contingent, seventeen thousand strong, and seven thousand British, arrived, and the Duke of York took the command. The English general, finding himself now at the head of thirty-five thousand men, and being aware that extensive reinforcements were advancing to the support of the Republicans from the Scheldt and the Meuse, resolved to move forward and attack the enemy. As the nature of the ground precluded the employment of large masses, the attacking force was divided into four columns. The first, under the command of General Hermann, composed of eight thousand Russians and a brigade of English, was destined to advance by the Sand-dyke and the Slapperdyke against the left of Brune, resting on the sea; the second, under the orders of General Dundas, consisting of seven thousand men, of whom five thousand were English, was charged with the attack on Schorldam and the French centre; the third, under Sir James Pulteney, which required to advance along the Langdyke, which was defended by powerful intrenchments, was intended rather to effect a diversion than make a serious attack, and was not to push beyond Oude Scarpell, at the head of the Langdyke, unless in the event of unlooked-for success; while the fourth, consisting of ten thousand choice troops, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, was destined to turn the enemy's right on the Zuyder Zee (2).

Disaster of
the Russians
on the right.

The action commenced at daybreak on the 19th September with a furious attack by the Russians, under Hermann, who speedily drove in the advanced guard of the Republicans at Kamp and Groot, and pressing forward along the Sand-dyke, made themselves masters of Sharldam and Bergen, and drove back Vandamme, who commanded in that quarter, to within half a league of Alkmaer. But the assailants fell into disorder in consequence of the rapidity of their advance, and Brune, having speedily moved up the division of Daendels and considerable reinforcements from his centre to the support of his left, Vandamme was enabled to resume the offensive, in consequence of which the Russians were attacked at once in front and both flanks in the village of Bergen, from whence, after a murderous conflict,

(1) Dum. ii. 378, 380. Jom. xii. 192, 195. Ann. Reg. 1799, 303.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1799, 304. Jom. xii. 198, 199. Dum. ii. 384, 385.

they were driven at the point of the bayonet. Their retreat, which at first was conducted in some degree of order, was soon turned into a total rout by the sudden appearance of two French battalions on the flank of their column (1). Hermann himself was taken prisoner, with a considerable part of his division, and General Essen, his second in command, who had advanced towards Schorlham, was obliged to seek shelter, under cover of the English reserve, behind the Allied intrenchments of Zyp.

Success of
the British
in the centre
and left.

While the Russians were undergoing these disasters on the right, the Duke of York was successful in the centre and left. Dundas

carried the villages there, after an obstinate resistance; Dumonceau was driven back from Schorlham, and two of his best battalions were made prisoners. At the same time Sir James Pulteney having been encouraged, by the imprudence of Daendels in pursuing too warmly a trifling advantage, to convert his feigned attack into a real one, not only drove back the Dutch division, but made a thousand prisoners, and forced the whole line, in utter confusion, towards St.-Pancras, under the fire of the English artillery. Abercromby had not yet brought his powerful division into action; but every thing promised decisive success in the centre and left of the Allies, when intelligence was brought to the Duke of York of the disaster on the right, and the rapid advance of the Republicans in pursuit of the flying Russians. He

But the
Russians
continue
their re-
treat, and
the British
are at length
repulsed.

instantly halted his victorious troops in the centre, and marched upon Schorl with two brigades of English and three Russian regiments, which was speedily carried, and if Essen could have rallied his broken troops, decisive success might yet have been attained.

But all the efforts of that brave general could not restore order or rescue the soldiers from the state of discouragement into which they had fallen; and the consequence was, that as they continued their retreat to the intrenchments of Zyp, the Republicans were enabled to accumulate their forces on the Duke of York, who, thus pressed, had no alternative but to evacuate Schorl (2), and draw back his troops to their fortified line. In this battle the Republicans lost 5,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; but the British lost 500 killed and wounded, and as many prisoners, while the Russians were weakened by 5,500 killed and wounded, 26 pieces of cannon, and 7 standards.

Removal of
the Dutch
fleet to
England.

While these events were in progress, the Dutch fleet was conveyed to the British harbours. It is remarkable that this measure gave equal dissatisfaction to the sailors on both sides. The Dutch

loudly complained that their ships, instead of being employed in their own country, under Orange colours, should be taken as prizes to Great Britain; while the English sailors lamented, that a fleet which could not escape had not fallen into their hands as glorious trophies, like those at St.-Vincent's or Camperdown. The officers on both sides were anxious to preserve a good understanding between their respective crews; but the sailors kept up a sullen distrust; so much more easy is it to accommodate differences between rival cabinets than heal the national animosity which centuries of warfare have spread among their subjects (3). Holland, however, had no reason in the end to complain of British generosity; after a decided, though unwilling hostility of twenty years, she obtained a lavish accumulation of gifts in Flanders and Java from her ancient rival, such as rarely rewards even the steadiest fidelity of an Allied power.

(1) *Jom.* xii. 200, 203. *Dum.* ii. 387, 388. *Ann.* Reg. 1799, 304, 305.

(2) *Ann.* Reg. 1799, 305, 306. *Jom.* xii. 199, 205. *Dum.* ii. 387, 389.

(3) *Dum.* ii. 381, 382.

The Duke of York renews the attack, and is successful.

The Duke of York was not discouraged by the issue of the attack on the 19th September. Having been reinforced, a few days after, by a fresh brigade of Russians and some English detachments, he arranged his army, as before, in four columns; and although the heavy rains for long prevented the projected operation from taking place, yet they were enabled to resume the offensive on the 2d October. The recollection of the success which had every where crowned their efforts in the preceding action, animated the English troops, while the Russians burned with anxiety to wash out the stain which their disasters on that occasion had affixed to the Imperial eagles. The Allied army on this occasion was about thirty thousand strong, and the Republicans nearly of equal force. At six in the morning the

Oct. 2. attack was commenced at all points. The Russian division of Essen, anxious to efface its former disgrace, supported by the English division of Dundas, advanced to the attack in the centre with such impetuosity, that the villages of Schorl and Schorldam were quickly carried, and the Republicans driven in confusion to the downs above Bergen. An attack was there projected by the Duke of York; but Essen, who recollected the consequence of the former rashness of the Russians on the same ground, refused to move till the advance of Abercromby on the right was ascertained; a circumstance which paralysed the success of the Allies in that quarter. Meanwhile, Abercromby, who commanded nine thousand men, advanced gallantly at the head of his troops along the Sand-dyke which adjoined the sea; and notwithstanding a hot fire of musketry and grape, by which he had two horses shot under him, succeeded in forcing the French left, and expelling them from the sandhills, and downs on which they rested. On the left, Sir James Pulteney had made little progress, and his measures were confined to demonstrations; but as the English centre and right were victorious, and they had completely turned the French left, Brune retired in the night from the field of battle, and took up a fresh position, abandoning Alkmaer and all his former line. The loss sustained by the Republicans in this contest was above three thousand men and seven pieces of cannon; that of the Allies about fifteen hundred. Already the attention of the French was attracted by the courage and address of the Highland regiments, who bravely fought up to the knees in water, and rapidly overcame the strongest obstacles, in their attack on the flank of the Republicans (1).

His critical situation notwithstanding.

But although they had gained this success, the situation of the Duke of York's army was far from encouraging. The enemy's force was daily increasing, while for his own no further reinforcements could be expected; the autumnal rains, which had set in with more than usual severity, rendered the roads almost unpassable for artillery or chariots; the insalubrity of the climate at that period of the year was already beginning to affect the health of the soldiers; and none of the expected movements of the inhabitants or Batavian troops in favour of the house of Orange had taken place. In these circumstances it was evident that, unless some important place could be captured, it would be impossible for the Allies to retain their footing in North Holland, and Haarlem was pitched on as most likely to furnish the necessary supplies. To achieve the conquest of this important city, the Allied forces were put in motion to attack the French position which occupied the narrow isthmus between Beverwick and the Zuyder Zee, by which it was necessary to pass to approach Haarlem, which was not more than three leagues distant (2).

(1) Dum. ii. 85, 86. Jom. xii. 207, 211. Ann. Reg. 1799, 308.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1799, 308, 309. Dum. ii. 308, 309. Jom. xii. 211, 212.

Oct. 6.
Indecisive
Action.

The action commenced at seven in the morning, and was obstinately contested during the whole day. In the centre the Allies were, in the first instance, successful; Essen bore down all opposition, and Palthod, who commanded the Republicans, was on the point of succumbing, when Brune strengthened him with the greater part of a fresh division, and a vigorous charge threw back the Allies in confusion towards their own position. In their turn, however, the victorious Republicans were charged, when disordered with success, by an English regiment of cavalry, thrown into confusion, and driven back with great loss to Kasticum, where they were with difficulty rallied by Vandamme, who succeeded in checking the advance of the pursuers. The action was less obstinately contested on the right, as Abercromby, who commanded in that quarter, was obliged to detach a considerable part of his troops to reinforce Essen; while on the left the immense inundations which covered the front of the Republican position, prevented Pulteney from reaching the French right under Daendels. The loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about two thousand in killed, wounded, and prisoners. That of the English alone was twelve hundred men (1).

Which leads
to the
retreat of
the British.

The barren honours of this well-contested field belonged to the Allies, who had forced back the French centre to a considerable distance from the field of battle; but it is with an invading army as an insurrection, an indecisive success is equivalent to a defeat. Haarlem was the object of the English general, without the possession of which he could not maintain himself in the country during the inclement weather which was approaching, and Haarlem was still in the hands of the Republicans. The enemy's force was hourly increasing, and, two days after the action, six thousand infantry arrived to strengthen their already formidable position on the isthmus, by which alone access could be obtained to the interior of the country; and the total absence of all the necessary supplies in the corner of land within which the army was confined, rendered it impossible to remain there for any length of time. In these circumstances, the Duke of York, with the unanimous concurrence of a council of war, resolved to fall back to the intrenchments at Zyp, there to await reinforcements or farther commands from the British Cabinet; a resolution which was strengthened by the intelligence which arrived, at the same time, of the disasters which had befallen the Russians at Zurich. On the day after the battle, therefore, the Allies retired to the position they had occupied before the battle of Bergen (2).

The British
first retire,
and at last
capitulate.

Brune lost no time in following up the retreating army. On the 8th the Republicans resumed their position in front of Alkmaar, and several sharp skirmishes ensued between the British rear-guard and the advanced posts of their pursuers. The situation of the Duke of York was now daily becoming more desperate; his forces were reduced by sickness and the sword to twenty thousand men; the number of those in hospital was daily increasing; there remained but eleven days' provision for the troops, and no supplies or assistance could be looked for from the inhabitants for a retreating army. In these circumstances he rightly judged that it was necessary to lose no time in embarking the sick, wounded, and stores, with such of the Dutch as had compromised themselves by their avowal of Orange principles and proposed a suspension of arms to General Brune, preparatory to the evacuation of Holland by the Allied troops. Some difficulty was at first experienced from the French insisting as a *sine*

Oct. 17.

(1) Jom. xii. 212, 216. Ann. Reg. 1799, 309.
Dum. ii. 89.

(2) Jom. xii. 215, 217. Dum. ii. 90, 91. Ann.
Reg. 1799, 310.

qua non that the fleet captured at the Texel should be restored; but this the British commander firmly resisted, and at length the conditions of the evacuation were agreed on. The principal articles were, that the Allies should, without molestation, effect the total evacuation of Holland by the end of November; that eight thousand prisoners, whether French or Dutch, should be restored; and that the works of the Helder should be given up entire, with all their artillery. A separate article stipulated for the surrender of the brave De Winter, made prisoner in the battle of Camperdown. Before the 1st of December all these conditions were fulfilled on both sides: the British troops had regained the shores of England, and the Russians were quartered in Jersey and Guernsey (1).

Reflections
on this dis-
aster on the
nation.

Such was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbours during the war, and the only one at all commensurate to the power or the character of England. Coming, as it did, after the hopes of the nation had been highly excited by its early successes, and when the vast conquests of the Allies in the first part of the campaign had led to a very general expectation of the fall of the jacobinal power in France, it produced the most bitter disappointment, and contributed, in a signal degree, both on the continent and at home, to confirm the general impression that the English soldiers had irrevocably declined from their former renown; that the victors of Cressy and Azincour were never destined to revive; and that it was at sea alone that any hope for resistance remained to Great Britain against the power of the Republic. The Opposition, as usual, magnified the public disasters, and ascribed them all to the rashness and imbecility of the Administration; while the credulous public, incapable of just discrimination, and ever governed by the event, overlooked the important facts that the naval power of republican Holland had been completely destroyed by the expedition; and that in every encounter the English soldiers had asserted their ancient superiority over those of France; and, instead of ascribing the failure of the expedition to its real causes, inadequacy of means and the jealousies incident to an Allied force unaccustomed to act together, joined the general chorus, and loudly proclaimed the utter madness of any attempts, by land at least, to resist the overwhelming power of France (2). The time was not yet arrived when a greater commander, wielding the resources of a more courageous and excited nation, was to wash out these stains on the British arms, and show to the astonished world that England was yet destined to take the lead, even on the continent, in the deliverance of Europe, and that the blood of the victors of Poitiers and Blenheim yet flowed in the veins of their descendants.

Affairs of
Italy after
the battle
of Novi.

While the campaign was thus chequered with disaster to the north of the Alps, the successes of the Allies led to more durable consequences on the Italian plains. The Directory, overwhelmed by the calamitous result of the battle of Novi, gave the command of both the armies of Italy and Savoy to General Championnet, who could only assemble 54,000 men under his banners, exclusive of 6000 conscripts, who guarded the summits of the Alps. On the other hand, General Melas, who, after the departure of Suwarrow, had assumed the chief command, had 68,000 men under his orders, independent of 15,000 in garrisons in his rear, and 7000

(1) Ann. Reg. 1799, 218, 219. Dum. ii. 94, 96. (2) Ann. Reg. 1799, 312. Jom. xii. 221, 222. Jom. xii. 216, 219.

who marched towards the Arno and the Tiber. In despair at the unpromising condition of his troops, occupying the circular ridge of the mountains from the sources of the Trebbia to the great St.-Bernard, the French general at first proposed to repass the Alps, and after leaving such a force in the Maritime Alps as might secure the south of France from insult, proceed, with the bulk of his forces, to join General Thureau in the Valais. But the Directory refused to accede to this wise proposition, and instead, prescribed to the French general to maintain his position, and exert his utmost efforts for the preservation of Coni, which was evidently threatened by the Imperialists (1).

The Imperialists draw round Coni. The cautious and minute directions of the Aulic Council having completely fettered the Austrian general, his operations were confined to the reduction of this fortress, the last bulwark in the plain of Italy still held by the Republicans, and justly regarded as an indispensable preliminary to the conquest of Genoa, from its commanding the chief communications of that city with the plain of Piedmont. With this view, both generals drew their troops towards Coni; the Austrians encircling its walls with a chain of posts in the plain, and the French accumulating their forces Sept. 17. to overlook it. In the desultory warfare which followed, the Imperialists were ultimately successful. Melas, with the centre, twenty thousand Sept. 25. strong, defeated Grenier at Savigliano, while Kray threw back Sept. 29. their left through the valley of Suza to the foot of Mont Cenis. At the same time, the Republicans were equally unsuccessful in the valley of Aosta, where the united forces of Kray and Haddick expelled them successively from Ivrea and Aosta, and forced them to retire over the great St.-Bernard to Martigny (2). Relieved by these successes from all disquietude for his right flank, Melas gradually drew nearer to Coni, and began his preparations for the siege of that place.

Championnet is compelled to attempt its relief. Pressed by the reiterated orders of the Directory, Championnet now resolved to make an effort for the relief of Coni. His disposable force for this enterprise, even including the army of the Alps under Grenier, did not exceed forty-five thousand men; but by a vigorous and concentric effort, there was some reason to hope that the object might be effected. St.-Cyr in vain represented to the Directory that it was the height of temerity to endeavour to maintain themselves in a mountainous region, already exhausted of its resources, and that the wiser course was to fall back, with the army yet entire, to the other side of the Alps, and there assemble it in a central position. How clear soever may have been the justice of this opinion, they had not strength of mind sufficient to admit the loss of Italy in a single campaign; and the French general set himself bravely about the difficult task of maintaining himself, with an inferior and dispirited army, on the Italian side of the mountains (3).

Measures to effect that object. With this view, the divisions of Victor and Lemoine, forming the centre of the army, sixteen thousand strong, were directed to move upon Mondovi; while St.-Cyr, with the right, received orders to descend from the Bocchetta, and effect a diversion on the side of Novi. The movement commenced in the end of September. Vico was taken by a brigade of the Republicans; but, finding the Imperialists too strongly posted at Mondovi to be assailed with success, Championnet contented himself with placing his troops in observation on the adjacent heights; while St.-Cyr

(1) *Jom. xii. 313, 317. Dam. ii. 262, 263. Arch. Ch. ii. 307, 308. St.-Cyr, ii. 10, 11.*

(2) *Arch. Ch. ii. 309, 310. Jom. xii. 318, 322. Dam. ii. 263, 264. St.-Cyr, ii. 12, 15.*

(3) *Dam. ii. 266, 267. St.-Cyr, ii. 15, 19.*

gained a trifling advantage in the neighbourhood of Novi. But intelligence having at this time been received of the decisive victory of Masséna in Switzerland, more vigorous operations were undertaken. St.-Cyr,

abandoning the route of Novi, threw himself towards Bracco on the rear of the Austrians, and attacked them with such celerity, that he made twelve hundred prisoners, and spread consternation through their whole line. Melas, thus threatened, concentrated the forces under his immediate command, consisting of thirty thousand men, in the finest condition,

on the Stura; upon which a variety of affairs of post took place around Coni, with chequered success, which gradually consumed the strength of the Republican forces. There was an essential error in these measures on the part of Championnet; for the Imperialists, grouped around the fortress where they occupied a central position, could at pleasure accumulate masses sufficient to overwhelm any attack made by the Republicans, whose detached columns, issuing from the mountains, and separated by a wide distance, were unable to render any effectual assistance to each other. Nevertheless, the great abilities of St.-Cyr on the right wing obtained some brilliant advantages. On the 23d of October, he put himself in motion, at the head of twelve thousand men, with only a few pieces of cannon and no cavalry, and defeated the Austrians at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and occupied Marengo, taking a thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. Alarmed at these repeated checks on his left, Melas withdrew the division of Haddick from the valley of Aosta, where the possession of the fort of Bard and the fall of snow in the Great St.-Bernard, relieved him from all disquietude, and with that reinforcement strengthened his left wing on the Bormida (1).

Preparations for a decisive battle.

Meanwhile both parties gradually accumulated their forces for the important object which the one strove to effect, the other to prevent, the delivery of Coni. The French had assembled thirty-five thousand

men for that purpose; but the central position of Melas long prevented them from obtaining any advantage; and in an attack of Grenier on the Austrian centre, he was repulsed with the loss of a thousand men. Having at length resolved on a decisive action, Championnet made his dispositions. One column was to descend from Mont-Cenis by the valley of Perouse; another to advance by the left of the Stura; and a third to assail the enemy in front. By this means the French general hoped that, while he engaged the attention of the Austrians in front he would, at the same time, turn both their flanks; forgetting that in such an attempt, with columns converging from such remote and divided quarters, the chances were that the Imperialists, from their central position, would be able to defeat one column before another could arrive to its assistance (2).

Battle of Genola, in which the French are defeated.

Perceiving that the plan of his adversary was to attack him on all sides, Melas wisely resolved to anticipate his movement, and with his concentrated masses assail one of the French divisions before the others could arrive to its assistance. By a rapid accumulation of force he could, in this way, bring above thirty thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry, to bear on the French centre, under Victor, who could not assemble above sixteen thousand to resist them. His dispositions were rapidly and ably made, and, on the morning of the 4th November, the Republicans were attacked at all points. Championnet was so far from anticipating any such event, that his troops were already in march to effect

(1) Dum. ii. 268, 273. Arch. Ch. ii. 312, 313. Jom. xii. 326, 335. St.-Cyr, ii. 25, 28.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 313, 315. Jom. xii. 337, 341. Dum. ii. 273, 275. St.-Cyr, ii. 39, 41.

a junction with the right wing, under St.-Cyr, when they were compelled, by the sudden appearance of the Imperialists in battle array, to halt and look to their own defence. Assailed by greatly superior forces, Victor, notwithstanding, made a gallant defence; and such was the intrepidity of the French infantry, that for long the advantage seemed to lie on their side, until at noon, Melas, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in throwing them into confusion, and drove them back towards Valdigi. Hardly was this success gained when news arrived that General Duhesme, with the Republican left, had carried the village of Savigliano in his rear; but, wisely judging that this was of little importance, provided he followed up the advantage he had gained, the Austrian general merely detached a brigade to check their advance, and continued to press on the retiring centre of the enemy. Having continued the pursuit till it was dark, he resumed it at daybreak on the following morning. The enemy, discouraged by the check on the preceding day, did not make a very vigorous resistance. Grenier and Victor, driven from a post they had taken up near Murazzo, were forced to seek safety in flight; a large part of their rearguard were made prisoners, and great numbers drowned in endeavouring to cross the Stura, and regain their intrenched camp. In this decisive battle the loss of the Republicans was seven thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, while that of the Imperialists did not exceed two thousand; and Championnet, with his army cut into two divisions, one of which retired towards Genoa, and the other to the Col di Tende, was obliged to seek safety in the mountains, leaving Coni to its fate (1).

While Championnet was thus defeated in the centre by the superior skill and combinations of his opponent, the talents of St.-Cyr again gave him an advantage on the Bormida. The Imperialists being there restored to an equality with the Republicans, Kray attacked St.-Cyr near Novi, and drove him back to the plateau in the rear of that city, so lately the theatre of a bloody and desperate conflict; but all the efforts of the Austrians were shattered against the invincible resistance of the French infantry in that strong position, and, after a bloody conflict, they were forced to retire, leaving five pieces of artillery in the hands of the enemy. St.-Cyr upon this resumed his position in front of Novi, and Kray fell back towards Alexandria, to be nearer assistance from the centre of the army. But this success was more than counterbalanced by fresh disasters in the centre and left. On the 10th, the division Ott attacked Richepanse at Borgo San-Dalmazzo, and, after a gallant resistance, drove him into the mountains; while the other division of the Republicans was assailed at Mondovi, and after an obstinate combat, which lasted the whole day, forced to take refuge in the recesses of the Apennines. The French were now thrown back, on the one side, to the foot of the Col di Tende, and in the valley of the Stura to their own frontiers; while on the other, Victor's division was perched on the summits of the Apennines at S.-Giacomo and S.-Bernardo. Nothing remained to interrupt the siege of Coni (2).

The investment of this fortress was completed on the 18th November, and the trenches opened on the 27th. The governor made a brave defence; but the ignorance and inexperience of the garrison were soon conspicuous, and a tremendous fire on the 2d of December having destroyed great part of the town, and seriously injured the works, he at length yielded to the solicitations of the miserable inhabitants, and, to preserve the city

Success of
St.-Cyr near
Novi.

Nov. 10.

Siege and
fall of Coni.

(1) Jom. xii. 340, 348. Dum, ii. 282, 285. Arch. Ch. ii. 314, 317.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 319, 321. Jom. xii. 348, 352. Dum, ii. 285, 287. St.-Cyr, ii. 42, 47.

Dec. 4. from total destruction, agreed to a surrender. The garrison, 3000 strong, with 500 sick and wounded, who had been left in the place, were marched into the interior of Austria (1).

Dec. 6. Meanwhile St.-Cyr maintained himself with extreme difficulty in the Apennines in front of Genoa. The city was in the utmost state of agitation; famine began to be felt within its walls, and the French army, encamped on the higher ridges of the mountains, already suffered extremely from cold, want, and the tempests of autumn. For long their rations had been reduced to a fourth-part of their usual amount; but even this miserable pittance, it was foreseen, could not last many days longer. Encouraged by their pitiable condition, Kray made an attack on their advanced posts at Novi and Acqui, expelled them from those stations, formed the blockade of Gavi, and forced back the Republicans to their old positions on the inhospitable summits of the mountains at the Bocchetta and Campo-Freddo. Such was the panic which then seized the soldiers, that they could not be retained by their officers on that important pass, but, abandoning the intrenchments on its summit,—rushed down in tumultuous crowds to Genoa, exclaiming, “What can we do here? we shall soon perish of cold and famine on these desert mountains; we are abandoned, sacrificed: to France, to France!” In this extremity, St.-Cyr presented himself at the gates of the city alone before the mutinous soldiery. “Whither do you fly, soldiers?”—“To France, to France!” exclaimed a thousand voices.—“Be it so,” exclaimed he, with a calm voice and serene air; “if a sense of duty no longer retains you; if you are deaf to the voice of honour, listen at least to that of reason, and attend to what your own interest requires. Your ruin is certain if you persist in your present course; the enemy who pursues you will destroy you during the confusion of a tumultuous retreat. Have you forgotten that you have made a desert between your present position and France? No, your sole safety is in your bayonets; and if you indeed desire to regain your country, unite with me in repelling far from the gates of this harbour the enemy, who would take advantage of your disorder to drive you from the walls where alone the necessary convoys or security can be found.” Roused by these words to a sense of their duty, the soldiers fell back into their ranks, and loudly demanded to be led against the enemy (2).

It was high time that some steps should be taken to arrest the progress of the Imperialists; for they were now at the gates of Genoa, and threatened the Republicans with immediate destruction. The Austrians, under Klenau, had penetrated by the route of the Corniche as far as St.-Martin d’Albaro and Nervi, within sight of that city, while from the Bocchetta another column threatened to descend upon it. A heavy fall of snow, however, having prevented the Imperialists from crossing the pass when it was deserted by the French, the rebellious troops resumed their positions, and reoccupied the intrenchments; and St.-Cyr, now secure on that side, having turned all his forces against Klenau, the Austrians, assailed at once on front and flank, with difficulty cut their way through by Torriglio, and regained the banks of the Stura, leaving twelve hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy, where they soon after went into winter quarters (3). Returned to Genoa, St.-Cyr had still a difficult task to perform in quieting the discontents of the troops, whom long-continued

(1) Dura. ii. 304, 305. Jom. xii. 354. Arch. Ch. ii. 323.

(2) Dum. ii. 297, 298. St.-Cyr, ii. 68, 74. Hard. vii. 321.

(3) Jom. xii. 355, 356. Arch. Ch. ii. 324, 325.

Dum. ii. 300, 302. St.-Cyr, ii. 76, 84, 99. Hard. vii. 321.

Unsuccessful attempt of the Imperialists upon Genoa, who go into winter quarters.

privation had almost driven to desperation; but at length the long wished-for sails whitened its splendid bay, and the Republicans, as the reward of their heroic exertions, tasted the enjoyment of plenty and repose.

Fall of
Ancona.

While these great events were passing in the basin of Piedmont, operations of minor importance, but still conducive, upon the whole, to the expulsion of the French from the peninsula, took place in the south of Italy. The castle of St.-Angelo surrendered, in the end of October, to the Neapolitan forces, whom the retreat of Macdonald left at liberty to advance to the Eternal City; and the garrison of Ancona, after a gallant defence of six weeks, four of which were with open trenches, capitulated on the 13th November to the Russians, on condition of being sent to France, and not serving till regularly exchanged. By this success the Allies were made masters of 585 pieces of cannon, 7000 muskets, three ships of the line, and seven smaller vessels. The whole peninsula of Italy, with the exception of the intrenched camp at Genoa, and the mountain roads leading to it from France, was now wrested from the Republican arms (1).

Position of
the respec-
tive parties
at the con-
clusion of the
cam-
paign.

The fall of Ancona terminated this campaign in Italy, the most disastrous ever experienced by the French in that country. In the respective positions which they occupied might be seen the immense advantages gained by the Allied arms during its continuance. The Imperialists, whose headquarters were at Turin, occupied the whole plain of Lombardy and Piedmont, from the stream of the Trebbia to the torrent of the Ticino, the left, under Kray, being so cantoned as to cover the valleys of the Bormida and Scrivia; the right, under Haddick and Rohan, occupying the valleys of Domo d'Ossola and Aosta; and the centre, under Kaim, guarding the passes over the Alps and the important position of Mondovi. The Republicans, on the other hand, on the exterior of this immense circle, occupied the snowy summits of the mountains, which stood the native guardians of the plain; the left, consisting of the divisions Grenier and Duhesme, occupying the Little St.-Bernard, the Mont Cenis, and the passes of the higher Alps; the centre, under Lemoine and Victor, the Col de Fenestrelles, and Tende, and the passes of the Maritime Alps: while on the right, Laboisière and Watrin held the Bocchetta and other passes leading into the Genoese states (2).

Contrast
between the
comforts of
the impe-
rialists and
privations
of the
French.

Wider still was the difference between the comforts and resources of the two armies. Cantoned in the rich plains of Italy, on the banks of the Po, the Imperialists were amply supplied with all the comforts and luxuries of life; while its navigable waters incessantly brought up to the army the stores and supplies necessary to restore the losses of so active a campaign. On the side of the Republicans, again, thirty-eight thousand men, without magazines, or stores of provisions, were stationed on the desolate summits of the Alps and the Apennines, shivering with cold, exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of clothing. For five months, they had received hardly any pay; the soldiers were without cloaks; their shoes were worn out, and wood was even wanting to warm their frigid bivouacs. Overwhelmed with the horrors of his situation, Champonnet retired to Nice, where he died of an epidemic disorder, which soon broke out among the troops and swept off great multitudes; and his death dissolved the small remnants of discipline which remained in the army. The soldiers tumultuously broke up their cantonments; crowds of de-

Death of
Champonnet.

(1) Jom. xii. 356, 361. Arch. Ch. ii. 326.

(2) Jom. xii. 363, 365. Arch. Ch. ii. 327, 329. Dum. ii. 307, 311.

serters left their colours and covered the roads to France, and it was only by one of those nervous flights of eloquence which touch, even in the greatest calamities, every generous heart, that St.-Cyr succeeded in stopping the return of a large body which had left Genoa, and was proceeding on the road to Provence. Alarmed at the representations which he drew of the disastrous state of the army, the government, which had now passed from the feeble hands of the Directory into the firm grasp of Napoléon, took the most active steps to administer relief; several convoys reached the troops, and Masséna, sent to assume the supreme command, succeeded, in some degree, in stopping the torrent of desertion and restoring the confidence of the army (1).

Jealousy between the Russians and Austrians.

At the same time, the campaign on the Rhine was drawing to a close. Notwithstanding the brilliant successes of the Republicans at Zurich, their forces in that quarter were not so numerous as to enable them, in the first instance, to derive any considerable fruit from their victory. But no sooner were they relieved, by the failure of the expedition in North Holland, from all apprehension in that quarter, than they resolved to concentrate all their disposable force on the Lower Rhine, of which the command was given to General Lecourbe, who had been so distinguished in the mountain warfare of Switzerland. But that which the strength of the Republicans could not effect, the dissensions of their enemies were not long in producing. The Russians and Austrians mutually threw upon each other the late disasters; the latter alleging that the catastrophe at Zurich was all owing to the want of vigilance and skill in Korsakow; and the former replying, that if Suwarrow had been supported by Hotze, as he had a right to expect, when he descended from the St.-Gothard, all the misfortunes of the centre would have been repaired, and a brilliant victory on his right wing dispossessed Masséna from his defensive position on the line of the Limmat. In this temper of mind on both sides, and with the jealousy unavoidable between cabinets of equal power and rival pretensions, little was wanting to blow up the combustion into a flame. A trivial incident soon produced this effect. Suwarrow, after he had rested and reorganized his army, proposed to the Archduke that they should resume offensive operations against the enemy, who had shown no disposition to follow up the successes at Zurich. His plan was to abandon the Grisons, blow up the works of Fort St.-Lucie, and advance with all his forces to Wintherthur, where he was to form a junction with Korsakow, and attack the enemy in concert with the Imperialists. The Archduke apprehended with too much reason that the assembling of all the Russian troops on the banks of the Thur, in the centre of the enemy's line, which extended from Sargans to the junction of the Aar and Rhine, would be both difficult and perilous; and therefore he proposed instead, that the corps of Korsakow should march by Stockach to join the marshal behind the lake of Constance, and that he himself should detach a strong Austrian column to second the operations of the Russians in Switzerland. Irritated at any alteration of his plans by a younger officer, the old marshal, already soured by the disastrous termination of the campaign in Switzerland, replied in angry terms, on the following day, that his troops were not adapted for any farther operations in the mountains, and that he himself would march to join Korsakow, and concert measures with him for the projected operations in Switzerland (2). On the follow-

(1) Dum. ii. 310, 311. Jom. xii. 363, 365. Arch. Ch. ii. 327, 329. St.-Cyr, ii. 98, 100.

(2) This letter Suwarrow terminated with the following expressions:—"I am a field-marshal as

ing day, however, he changed his resolution; for, declaring that his troops absolutely required repose, and that they could find it only at a distance from the theatre of war, he directed them to winter quarters in Bavaria, between the Lech and the Iller, where they were soon after joined by the artillery which had come round by Verona and the Tyrol (1).

Which leads to a rupture between the cabinets of Vienna and St.-Petersburg. This secession of the Russian force was not produced merely by jealousy of the Austrians, or irritation at the ill success of the Allied arms in Switzerland. It had its origin also in motives of state policy, and as such was rapidly communicated from the field-marshal's headquarters to the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg. The alliance between Russia and Austria, even if it had not been dissolved by the mutual exasperation of their generals, must have speedily yielded to the inherent jealousy of two monarchies, equal in power and discordant in interest. The war was undertaken for objects which, at that time at least, appeared to be foreign to the immediate interests of Russia; the danger to the balance of power by the preponderance of France seemed to be removed by the conquest of Italy, and any further successes of Austria, it was said, were only likely to weaken a power too far removed to be of any serious detriment to its influence, in order to enrich one much nearer, and from whom serious resistance to its ambition might be expected. The efforts for the preceding campaign, moreover, had been extremely costly, and in a great degree, notwithstanding the English subsidies, had exhausted the Imperial treasury. In these circumstances, the exasperation of the generals speedily led to a rupture between the cabinets, and the Russian troops took no further share in the prosecution of the war (2).

Positions assumed by the Austrians when so abandoned. Oct. 10. Left to its own resources, however, the Austrian cabinet was far from being discouraged. The Archduke Charles had collected eighty thousand men between Offenburg and Feldkirch; but great as this force was, it hardly appeared adequate, after the departure of the Russians, to a renewal of active operations in the Alps, and therefore he kept his troops on the defensive. Masséna, on his side in Switzerland, was too much exhausted by his preceding exertions to make any offensive movement. On the other hand, Lecourbe, whose forces on the Lower Rhine had been raised by the efforts of the Directory to twenty thousand men, passed that river in three columns, at Worms, Oppenheim, and Mayence, and moved forward against Prince Schwartzberg, who commanded the advanced guard of the right wing of the Austrians, which occupied the line of the Bergstrass from Frankfort to Darmstadt. As the French forces were greatly superior, the Austrian general was compelled to retire, and after evacuating Heidelberg and Mannheim, to concentrate his troops to cover Philippsburg, which, however, he was soon obliged to abandon to its own resources. The Archduke, though grievously embarrassed at the moment by the rupture with the Russians, turned his eyes to the menaced point, and, by rapidly causing reinforcements to defile in that direction, soon acquired a superiority over his assailant. The Republican advanced-guard was attacked and worsted at Erligheim; in consequence of which the blockade of Philippsburg was raised; but the French having again been reinforced,

well as you; commander, as well as you, of an Imperial army; old, while you are young; it is for you to come and seek me." He was so profoundly mortified with the defeat of the Russians at Zurich, that, when he reached his winter quarters, he took to bed, and became seriously ill; while the Emperor Paul gave vent to his indignation against the Aus-

trians in an angry article published in the Gazette of St.-Petersburg.—HARD, vii 297, 298.

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 272, 274, 284, 285. Jom. xii. 367, 379.

(2) Jom. xii. 370, 371. Arch. Ch. ii. 272, 274. Dum. ii. 317,

it was again invested. The Archduke, however, having at length terminated
 Nov. 7. his correspondence with Suwarrow, turned his undivided attention
 to the menaced quarter, and directed a large part of the Imperial army to
 Dec. 2. reinforce his right. These columns soon overthrew the Republicans,
 and Lecourbe was placed in a situation of such danger, that he had no means
 of extricating himself from it but by proposing an armistice to Starray, who
 commanded the Imperialists, on the ground of negotiations being on foot
 between the two powers for peace. Starray accepted it, under a reservation
 of the approbation of the Archduke; but his refusal to ratify it was of no
 avail; in the interval the stratagem had succeeded; three days had been
 gained, during which the Republicans had leisure to defile without molesta-
 tion over the Rhine (1).

Reflections
 on the vast
 successes
 gained by
 the Allies
 in the cam-
 paign.

This closed the campaign of 1799, one of the most memorable of
 the whole revolutionary war. Notwithstanding the disasters by
 which its latter part had been echequered, it was evident that the
 Allies had gained immensely by the results of their operations.
 Italy had been regained as rapidly as it had been won; Germany, freed from
 the Republican forces, had rolled back to the Rhine the tide of foreign in-
 vasion; and the blood of two hundred thousand French soldiers had expiated
 the ambition and weakness of the Republican government. Not even in the
 glorious efforts of 1796, had the French achieved successes so important, or
 chained victory to their standards in such an unbroken succession of combats.
 The conquest of all Lombardy and Piedmont; the reduction of the great for-
 tresses which it contained; the liberation of Naples, Rome, and Tuscany, were
 the fruits of a single campaign. Instead of a cautious offensive on the Adige,
 the Imperialists now assumed a menacing offensive on the Maritime Alps;
 instead of trembling for the Tyrol and the Hereditary States, they threatened
 Switzerland and Alsace. The Republicans, weakened and disheartened, were
 every where thrown back upon their own frontiers; the oppressive system of
 making war maintain war could no longer be carried on; and a revolutionary
 state, exhausted by the sacrifices of nine years, was about to feel in its own
 territory a portion of the evils which it had so long inflicted upon others.

Deplorable
 internal
 situation of
 the Repub-
 lic.

The internal situation of France was even more discouraging than
 might have been inferred from the external aspect of its affairs. In
 truth, it was there that the true secret of their reverses was to be
 found; the bravery and skill of the armies on the frontier had long concealed,
 but could no longer singly sustain, the internal weakness of the state. The
 prostration of strength which invariably succeeds the first burst of revolu-
 tionary convulsions, had now fallen upon France; and if an extraordinary
 combination of circumstances had not intervened to extricate her from the
 abyss, there can be no doubt she would have sunk for ever. The ardour of
 the Revolution had totally subsided. Distrust and despondency had succeeded
 to the enthusiasm of victory; instead of the patriotism of generous, had
 arisen the cupidity of selfish minds. "The radical vice," says General Mathieu
 Dumas, "of a government without a chief was now apparent; the courage
 and talents of the generals, the valour and intelligence of the soldiers, who,
 during this dreadful campaign, had sustained this monstrous species of
 authority, sapped by every species of abuse and the exhaustion arising from
 the excess of every passion, could no longer repair or conceal the faults of
 those at the head of affairs. Public spirit was extinguished; the resources of
 the interior exhausted; the forced requisitions could no longer furnish sup-

plies to assuage the misery of the soldiers; the veteran ranks had long since perished, and the young conscripts, destined to supply their place, deserted their standards in crowds, or concealed themselves to avoid being drawn; more than half the cavalry was dismounted; the state in greater danger than it had ever been since the commencement of the war (1)." The losses sustained by the French during the campaign had been prodigious; they amounted to above a hundred and seventy thousand men, exclusive of those who had been cut off by sickness and fatigue (2). In these circumstances, nothing was wanting to have enabled the coalition to triumph over the exhausted and discordant population of France, but union, decision, and a leader of paramount authority; nothing could have saved the Republicans from their grasp but their own divisions. These were not slow, however, in breaking out; and, amidst the ruinous jealousies of the Allies, that mighty conqueror arose, who was destined to stifle the democracy and tame the passions of France, and bring upon her guilty people a weight of moral retribution, which could never have been inflicted till the latent energies of Europe had been called forth by his ambition.

Causes of the rupture of the Alliance. "The alliance between Austria and Russia," says the Archduke Charles, "blew up, like most coalitions formed between powers of equal pretensions. The idea of a common interest, the illusion of confidence based on the same general views, prepares the first advances; difference of opinion as to the means of attaining the desired objects, soon sows the seeds of misunderstanding; and that envenomed feeling increases in proportion as the events of the war alter the views of the coalesced powers, derange their plans, and undeceive their hopes. It seldom fails to break out openly when the armies are destined to undertake any operation in concert. The natural desire to obtain the lead in command, as in glory, excites the rival passions both of chiefs and nations. Pride and jealousy, tenacity and presumption, spring from the conflict of opinion and ambition; continual contradictions daily inflame the mutual exasperation, and nothing but a fortunate accident can prevent such a coalition from being dissolved before one of the parties is inclined to turn his arms against the other. In all the varieties of human events, there are but two in which the co-operation of such unwieldy and heterogeneous masses can produce great effects; the one is, when an imperious necessity, and an insupportable state of oppression, induces both sovereigns and their subjects to take up arms to emancipate themselves, and the struggle is not of sufficient duration to allow the ardour of their first enthusiasm to cool; the other, when a state, by an extraordinary increase of power, can arrogate to itself and sustain the right to rule the opinion of its allies, and make their jealousies bend to its determination. Experience has proved that these different kinds of coalitions produce different results: almost all oppressive conquerors have been overthrown by the first; the second has been the chief instrument in the enthralment of nations (3)." In these profound remarks is to be found the secret both of the long disasters attending the coalition against France, of the steady rise and irresistible power of the alliance headed by Napoléon, and of his rapid and irretrievable overthrow. They should never be absent from the contemplation of the statesman in future times, either in estimating the probable result of coalitions of which his own country forms a part, or in calculating on the chances of its resisting those which may be formed for its subjugation (4).

(1) Dum. ii. 335.

(2) See "Etat des Pertes de l'Armée Française en 1799," HARD. vii. 473.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 273.

(4) With regret, the author must now bid adieu to the Memoirs of the Archduke Charles, so long

Comparison
of the pas-
sage of the
St.-Gothard
by Suwar-
row, and the
St.-Bernard
by Napoléon.

The passage of the St.-Bernard by Napoléon, has been the subject of unmeasured eulogium by almost all the French historians; but nevertheless, in the firmness with which it was conducted, the difficulties with which it had to contend, and the resolution displayed in its execution, it must yield to the Alpine campaign of the Russian hero. In crossing from Martigny to Ivrea, the first consul had no enemies to overcome, no lakes to pass, no hostile army to vanquish, after the obstacles of nature had been surmounted; the difficulty of the ascent and the roughness of the road constituted the only serious impediments to the march; but, in passing from Bellinzona to Altdorf by the St.-Gothard, Suwarrow had to encounter not merely a road of greater length and equal difficulty, but to force his way, sword in hand, through columns of the enemy, long trained to mountain warfare, intimately acquainted with the country, under a leader of pre-eminent skill in that species of tactics; and to do this with troops as ignorant of Alpine geography as those of France would have been of the passes of the Caucasus. When he descended, like a mountain torrent, to Altdorf, overthrowing every thing in his course, he found his progress stopped by a lake, without roads on its sides, or a bark on its bosom, and received the intelligence of the total defeat of the army with which he came to co-operate under the walls of Zurich. Obligated to defile by the rugged paths of the Schallenthal to the canton of Glarus, he found himself enveloped by the victorious columns of the enemy, and his front and rear assailed at the same time by superior forces, flushed by recent conquest. It was no ordinary resolution which in such circumstances could disdain to submit, and after fiercely turning on his pursuers, and routing their bravest troops, prepare to surmount the difficulties of a fresh mountain passage, and, amidst the horrors of the Alps of Glarus, brave alike the storms of winter and the pursuit of the enemy. The bulk of men in all ages are governed by the event; and to such persons the passage of the St.-Bernard, followed as it was by the triumph of Marengo, will always be the highest object of interest; but, without detracting from the well-earned fame of the French general, it may safely be affirmed that those who know how to separate just combination from casual disaster, and can appreciate the heroism of valour when struggling with misfortune, will award a still higher place to the Russian hero, and follow the footsteps of Suwarrow over the snows of the St.-Gothard and the valley of Engi with more interest than either the eagles of Napoléon over the St.-Bernard, or the standards of Hannibal from the shores of the Rhone to the banks of the Po.

The expedition to Holland was ably conceived, and failed only from the inadequacy of the force employed, and the inherent weakness incident to

the faithful guide in the German campaigns, as his invaluable annals do not come further down than the close of the campaign of 1799. Military history has few more remarkable works of which to boast. Luminous, sagacious, disinterested, severe in judging of himself, indulgent in criticising the conduct of others; liberal of praise to all but his own great achievements, profoundly skilled in the military art, and gifted with no common powers of narrative and description, his work is a model of candid and able military disquisition. Less vehement and forcible than Napoléon, he is more circumspect and consistent; with far inferior genius, he is distinguished by infinitely greater candour, generosity, and trustworthiness. On a fact stated by the Archduke, whether favourable or adverse to his reputation, or a criticism made by him on others, the most perfect reliance may be placed. To a similar statement in the St. Helena Memoirs implicit credit

cannot be given, unless its veracity is supported by other testimony, or it is borne out, as is often the case, by its own self-evident justice and truth. In the Memoirs of these two great antagonists may be seen, as in a mirror, the opposite principles and talents brought into collision during the revolutionary war; on the one side, methodical judgment, endurance, and honesty, without the energy requisite to command early advantage in the struggle; on the other, genius, vigour, invention, but none of the moral qualities essential to confer lasting success. Or, perhaps, a more profound or fanciful observer may trace in the German chief the fairest specimens of the great and good qualities which, in every age, have been the characteristic of the blue-eyed children of the Gothic race; in the French, the most brilliant assemblage that ever occurred of the mental powers of the dark-haired Celtic family of mankind.

Deplorable insignificance of the part which England took in the continental struggle. an enterprise conducted by allied forces. It was the greatest armament which had been sent from Great Britain during the war, but yet obviously inadequate, both to the magnitude of the enterprise and the resources of the state mainly interested in its success. In truth, the annals of the earlier years of the war incessantly suggest regret at the parsimonious expenditure of British force, and the great results which, to all appearance, would have attended a more vigorous effort at the decisive moment. "Any person," says Mr. Burke, "who was of age to take a part in public affairs forty years ago, if the intermediate space were expunged from his memory, would hardly credit his senses when he should hear, from the highest authority, that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in this island, and that in Ireland there were at least eighty thousand more. But how much greater would be his surprise, if he were told again that this mighty force was kept up for the mere purpose of an inert and passive defence, and that, by its very constitution, the greater part was disabled from defending us against the enemy by one preventive stroke or one operation of active hostility! What must his reflections be on learning further, that a fleet of five hundred men-of-war, the best appointed that this country ever had upon the sea, was for the greater part employed in the same system of unenterprising defence? What must be the feelings of any one who remembers the former energy of England, when he is given to understand that these two islands, with their extensive sea-coast, should be considered as a garrisoned sea-town; that its garrison was so feebly commanded as never to make a sally; and that, contrary to all that has been hitherto seen in war, an inferior army, with the shattered relics of an almost annihilated navy, may with safety besiege this superior garrison, and, without hazarding the life of a man, ruin the place merely by the menaces and false appearances of an attack (1)?"

If this was true in 1797, when the indignant statesman wrote these cutting remarks, how much more was it applicable in 1799, when France was reduced to extremities by the forces of Austria and Russia, and the extraordinary energy of the Revolution had exhausted itself? The Archduke Charles, indeed, has justly observed, that modern history presents few examples of great military operations executed in pursuance of a descent on the sea-coast; and that the difficulties of the passage and the uncertainty of the elements, present the most formidable obstacles in the way of the employment of considerable forces in such an enterprise (2); but experience in all ages has demonstrated that they are not insurmountable, and that from a military force, thus supported, the greatest results may reasonably be expected, if sufficient energy is infused into the undertaking. The examples of the overthrow of Hannibal at Zama, of the English at Hastings, of the French at Cressy and Azincourt, and of Napoléon in Spain and at Waterloo, prove what can be effected, even by a maritime expedition, if followed up with the requisite vigour. And, unquestionably, there never was an occasion when greater results might have been anticipated from such an exertion than in this campaign. Had sixty thousand native English, constantly fed by fresh supplies from the parent state, been sent to Holland, they would have borne down all opposition, hoisted the Orange flag on all the fortresses of the United Provinces, liberated Flanders, prevented the accumulation of force which enabled Masséna to strike his redoubled blows at Zurich, hindered the formation of the army of reserve, and intercepted the thunder of Marengo and Hohenlingen.

(1) Burke on a Regicide Peace, Works, viii. 374.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 165.

Cause of the rapid fall of the French power in 1799. The rapid fall of the French military power in 1799, was the natural result of the sudden extension of the frontiers of the Republic beyond its strength, and affords another example of the truth of the maxim, that the more the ambition of a nation in a state of fermentation leads to its extension, the more does it become difficult for it to preserve its conquests (1). Such a state as France then was, with a military power extending from the mouth of the Ems to the shores of Calabria, and no solid foundation for government but the gratification of ambition, has no chance of safety but in constantly advancing to fresh conquests. The least reverse, by destroying the charm of its invincibility, and compelling the separation of its armies to garrison its numerous fortresses, leaves it weak and powerless in the field, and speedily dissolves the splendid fabric. This truth was experienced by the Directory in 1799; it was evinced on a still greater scale, and after still more splendid triumphs, by Napoléon in 1815. It is power slowly acquired and wisely consolidated, authority which brings the blessings of civilisation and protection with its growth, victories which array the forces of the vanquished states in willing and organized multitudes under the standards of the victor, which alone are durable. Such were the conquests of Rome in the ancient world, such are the conquests of Russia in Europe, and England in India, in modern times. The whirlwinds of an Alexander, a Timour, or a Napoléon, are in general as short-lived as the genius which creates them. The triumphs flowing from the transient ebullition of popular enthusiasm, sink with the decay of the passion from which they spring. Nothing is durable in nature but what has arisen by slow degrees; nothing in the end obtains the mastery of nations but the power which protects and blesses them.

(1) Jom. xii. 386.

CHAPTER XXX.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF NAPOLEON TO THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

NOVEMBER, 1799—MAY, 1800.

ARGUMENT.

Napoleon's Letter, proposing Peace to the British Government—Lord Grenville's Answer—M. Talleyrand's Reply—Debates on this Proposal in Parliament—Arguments of the Opposition for an immediate Peace—And of Mr. Pitt and the Government for refusing to treat—Parliament resolve to continue the Contest—Reflections on this Decision of the Legislature—Supplies voted by the British Parliament—Land and Sea forces employed—Mr. Dundas's India Budget—The Union with Ireland passes the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland—Its leading Provisions—Views of the Leaders on both sides of Parliament on this great Change—Great Prosperity of the British Empire at this period—Vast Change of Prices—Statistical Details—Bad Harvest of 1799, and consequent Scarcity in 1800—Great efforts of Government to relieve it, and noble patience of the people—Measures of England and Austria for the Prosecution of the War—Treaties entered into for that purpose with Austria and Bavaria—Military Preparations of the Imperialists—Discontented state of the French affiliated Republics—Measures of Napoleon to restore Public Credit in France—Pacification of la Vendée—Iniquitous Execution of Count Louis Frotte—Napoleon effects a Reconciliation with the Emperor Paul—His energetic Military Measures—Revival of the Military Spirit in France—His steps to suppress the Revolutionary Fervour of the People—He totally extinguishes the Liberty of the Press—And fixes his Residence at the Tuileries—Commencement of the Etiquette and Splendour of the Court there—Recall of many Exiles banished since the 18th Fructidor—Establishment of the Secret Police—Napoleon's hypocritical *éloge* on Washington—Comparison of his system of government with that established by Constantine in the Byzantine empire—Commencement of his great designs for Architectural Embellishment at Paris—Suppression of the *fête* on 21st January, and elevation of Tronchet—Correspondence between Napoleon and Louis XVIII—General improvement in the Prospects of France.

THE first step of Napoleon, upon arriving at the consular throne, was to make proposals of peace to the British government. The debate on that subject in Parliament is the most important that occurred during the war, and forms the true introduction to the political history of Europe during the nineteenth century.

Dec. 25. The letter of Napoleon to the King of England, couched in his
1799. usual characteristic language, was in these terms: "Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first station in the Republic, I think it proper on entering into office to make a direct communication to your Majesty.

Napoleon's Letter proposing peace to the British government. "The war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the globe, is it destined to be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their independence and safety requires, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the benefits of commerce, prosperity, and domestic happiness? How has it happened that they do not feel that peace is of the first necessity as well as the truest glory?

"These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who reign over a free nation with the sole desire of rendering it happy. You will see in this overture only the effect of a sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a step speedy, implying confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, however neces-

sary to disguise the dependence of feeble states, prove only in those which are strong the mutual desire of deceiving each other.

“France and England may, by the abuse of their strength still for a time, to the misfortune of nations, retard the period of their exhaustion; but I will venture to say, the fate of all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world.”

Lord Grenville's answer.

To this letter the following answer was returned by Lord Grenville, the English minister of foreign affairs :—“The King has given frequent proofs of his sincere desire for the re-establishment of secure and permanent tranquillity in Europe. He neither is, nor has been, engaged in any contest for a vain and false glory. He has had no other view than that of maintaining against all aggression the rights and happiness of his subjects. For these he has contended against an unprovoked attack; and for the same objects he is still obliged to contend: Nor can he hope that this necessity could be removed by entering at the present moment into a negotiation with those whom a fresh revolution has so recently placed in the exercise of power in France; since no real advantage can arise from such negotiation to the great and desirable object of a general peace, until it shall distinctly appear that those causes have ceased to operate which originally produced the war, and by which it has been since protracted, and in more than one instance renewed. The same system, to the prevalence of which France justly ascribes all her present miseries, is that which has also involved the rest of Europe in a long and destructive warfare, of a nature long since unknown to the practice of civilized nations.

“For the extension of this system, and for the extermination of all established governments, the resources of France have, from year to year, and in the midst of the most unparalleled distress, been lavished and exhausted. To this indiscriminate spirit of destruction, the Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Swiss Cantons, his Majesty's ancient allies, have been successively sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged; and Italy, though now rescued from its invaders, has been made the scene of unbounded rapine and anarchy. His Majesty himself has been compelled to maintain an arduous and burdensome contest for the independence and existence of his kingdoms.

“While such a system continues to prevail, and while the blood and treasure of a numerous and powerful nation can be lavished in its support, experience has shown that no defence but that of open and steady hostility can be availing. The most solemn treaties have only prepared the way for fresh aggression; and it is to a determined resistance alone that is now due whatever remains in Europe of security for property, personal liberty, social order, or religious freedom. For the security, therefore, of these essential objects, his Majesty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general professions of pacific dispositions. Such dispositions have been repeatedly held out by all those who have successively directed the resources of France to the destruction of Europe; and whom the present rulers have declared to have been, from the beginning and uniformly, incapable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity.

“Greatly indeed will his Majesty rejoice if it shall appear that the dangers to which his own dominions and those of his allies have so long been exposed have really ceased: whenever he shall be satisfied that the necessity for resistance is at an end; that, after the experience of so many years of crimes and miseries, better principles have ultimately prevailed in France; and that all the gigantic projects of ambition, and all the restless schemes of destruction which have endangered the very existence of civil society, have at length

been finally relinquished. But the conviction of such a change, however agreeable to his Majesty's wishes, can result only from experience and the evidence of facts.

"The best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence would be the restoration of that line of princes, which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home and consideration and respect abroad. Such an event would at once have removed, and will at any time remove, all obstacles in the way of negotiation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient territory; and it would give to all the other nations in Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that security which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But desirable as such an event must be, both to France and the world, it is not to this mode exclusively that his Majesty limits the possibility of secure and solid pacification. His Majesty makes no claim to prescribe to France what shall be the form of her government, or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. He looks only to the security of his own dominions and those of his Allies, and to the general safety of Europe. Whenever he shall judge that such security can in any manner be attained, as resulting either from the internal situation of the country from whose internal situation the danger has arisen, or from such other circumstances, of whatever nature, as may produce the same end, his Majesty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his Allies the means of a general pacification (1). Unhappily no such security hitherto exists; no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability (2)."

These able state papers are not only valuable as exhibiting the arguments

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 1799.

(2) To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand, the French minister for foreign affairs:—"Very far from France having provoked the war, she had, it must be recollected, from the very commencement of the Revolution, solemnly proclaimed her love of peace, her disinclination for conquests, her respect for the independence of all governments; and it is not to be doubted that, occupied at that time entirely with her own internal affairs, she would have avoided taking any part in those of Europe, and would have remained faithful to her declarations.

"But from an opposite disposition, as soon as the French Revolution had broken out, almost all Europe entered into a league for its destruction. The aggression was real, long before it was public; internal resistance was excited, its opponents were favourably received, their extravagant declamations were supported, the French nation was insulted in the person of its agents, and England set, particularly, this example, by the dismissal of the minister accredited by her; finally, France was, in fact, attacked in her independence, and her honour, and in her safety, long before war was declared.

"Thus it is to the projects of dismemberment, subjection, and dissolution, which were prepared against her, and the execution of which was several times attempted and pursued, that France has a right to impute the evils which she has suffered, and those which have afflicted Europe. Such projects for a long time, without example with respect to so powerful a nation, could not fail to bring on the most fatal consequences. Assailed on all sides, the Republic could not but extend universally the efforts of her defence, and it is only for the maintenance of her own independence that she has made use of those means which she possessed in her own strength and the courage of her citizens. As long as she saw that her enemies obstinately refused to

recognise her rights, she counted only upon the energy of her resistance, but as soon as they were obliged to abandon the hope of invasion, she sought for means of conciliation, and manifested pacific intentions; and if these have not always been efficacious; if, in the midst of the critical circumstances of her internal situation, which the Revolution and the war have successively brought on, the former depositaries of the executive power in France have not always shown as much moderation as the nation itself has shown courage, it must, above all, be imputed to the fatal and persevering animosity with which the resources of England have been lavished to accomplish the ruin of France.

"But if the wishes of his Britannic Majesty, in conformity with his assurances, are in unison with those of the French Republic for the re-establishment of peace, why, instead of attempting the apology of the war, should not attention be paid to the means of terminating it? The First Consul of the French Republic cannot doubt that his Britannic Majesty must recognise the right of nations to choose the form of their government, since it is from the exercise of this right that he holds his crown; but he cannot comprehend how, after admitting this fundamental principle, upon which rests the existence of political societies, he could annex insinuations which tend to an interference in the internal affairs of the Republic, and which are not less injurious to the French nation and its government, than it would be to England and his Majesty, if a sort of invitation were held out in favour of that Republican form of government, of which England adopted the forms about the middle of the last century, or an exhortation to recall to the throne that family whom their birth had placed there, and whom a Revolution had compelled to descend from it. [Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 1199, 1202.]

Jan. 14, advanced by the opposite parties in this memorable contest, but
 1800. as containing an explicit and important declaration of the object
 M. Talley- uniformly pursued by Great Britain throughout its continuance.
 rand's reply.

The English ministry never claimed a right to interfere in the internal affairs of France, or dictate to her inhabitants the form of government or race of sovereigns they were to choose; the object of the war is there expressly declared to have been, what it always was, defensive. It was undertaken, not to impose a government upon France, but to prevent its imposing one upon other nations; not to partition, or circumscribe its territory, but oppose a barrier to the inundation of infidel and democratical principles, by which the Republic first shook the opinions of the multitude in all the adjoining states, and then, having divided their inhabitants, overthrew their independence. The restoration of the Bourbons was held forth as the mode most likely to remove these dangers; but by no means as an indispensable preliminary to a general pacification, if adequate security against them could in any other way be obtained. Of the reality of the peril, the existence of the Batavian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, Helvetian, Roman, and Parthenopeian republics, most of whom had been revolutionized in a state of profound peace, afforded ample evidence; and it was one which increased rapidly during any interval of hostilities, because it was then that the point of the wedge was most readily inserted by the revolutionary propagandists into an unsuspecting people.

Debates on
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The debates, however, which followed in both Houses of Parliament on this momentous subject, were still more important, as unfolding the real views of the contending parties, and forming the true key to the grounds on which it was thereafter rested on both sides.

On the part of the Opposition, it was urged by Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine, "that now was the first time when the house were assembled in a new epoch of the war; that, without annexing any epithet to it, or adverting to its unparalleled calamities, it could not be denied that a new era in any possible war, or which led to a nearer prospect of peace, was a most critical and auspicious period. That the real question was, whether the House of Commons could say, in the face of a suffering nation and a desolated world, that a lofty, imperious, declamatory, insulting answer to a proposition professing peace and conciliation, was the answer which should have been sent to France, or to any human government. That though he might not be able to determine what answer, in the circumstances of the country, should have been sent, they could, without the possibility of being mistaken, pronounce that the answer given was odiously and absurdly wrong. As a vindication of the war, it was loose, and in some parts unfounded; but as an answer to a specific proposition, it was dangerous, as a precedent, to the best interests of mankind. It rejected the very idea of peace, as if it were a curse; and held fast to war, as an inseparable adjunct to the prosperity of nations.

Arguments
 of the Oppo-
 sition for an
 immediate
 peace.

"The French Revolution was undoubtedly, in its beginning, a great and awful event, which could not but extend its influence more or less to other nations. So mighty a fabric of despotism and superstition, after having endured for ages, could not fall to the ground without a concussion which the whole earth should feel; but the evil of such a Revolution was only to be averted by cautious internal policy, and not by external war, unless it became impossible, from actual and not speculative aggression, to maintain the relations of peace. The question was not, whether the tendency of the Revolution was beneficial or injurious, but what was our own policy and duty as connected with its existence? In Mr. Burke's words,

applied to the American Revolution, the question is not, whether this condition of human affairs deserves praise or blame, but what, in God's name, are you to do with it?

“When war was first proclaimed by this country, after the death of Louis, it was rested on ‘the late atrocious act perpetrated at Paris.’ Then, as now, it was provoked, and peace rejected upon general and unjustifiable objections—speculative dangers to religion and government, which, supposing them to have existed, with all their possible consequences, were more likely to be increased than diminished by the bitterness of war. At that time, ministers were implored not to invite war upon principles which made peace dependent upon systems and forms of government, instead of the conduct of nations; upon theories which could not be changed, instead of aggressions which might be adjusted. France had then, and for a long time after, a strong interest in peace; she had not then extended her conquests; but Europe combined to extinguish France, and place her without the pale of the social community; and France, in her turn, acted towards Europe on the same principles. She desolated and ravaged whatever countries she occupied, and spread her conquests with unexampled rapidity. Could it be expected that so powerful a nation, so assailed, should act merely on the defensive, or that, in the midst of a revolution which the confederacy of surrounding nations had rendered terrible, the rights of nations would be respected? Ambitious projects, not perhaps originally contemplated, followed their steps; and the world was changed with portentous violence, because the government of Great Britain had resolved, that, if changed at all, it should revert to establishments which had reached their period and expired.

“In 1795, without any pacific proposition from France, when the government of France was not a month old, at a time when the alarm was at its height in England, and the probable contagion of French principles, by the intercourse of peace, was not only the favourite theme of ministers, but made the foundation of a system by which some of our most essential liberties were abridged—even these ministers invited the infant, democratic, Jacobin, regicide republic of France to propose a peace. On what principle, then, could peace now be refused when the danger was so much diminished, because the resistless fury of that popular spirit which had been the uniform topic of declamation had not only subsided, from time and expansion, but was curbed, or rather extinguished, by the forms of the new government which invited us to peace? If Bonaparte found that his interests were served by an arrangement with England, the same interests would lead him to continue it. Surrounded with perils, at the head of an untried government, menaced by a great confederacy, of which England was the head, compelled to press heavily upon the resources of an exhausted people, it was not less his interest to propose than it was ours to accept peace.

“It is impossible to look without the most bitter regret on the enormities which France has committed. In some of the worst of them, however, the Allies have joined her. Did not Austria receive Venice from Bonaparte? and is not the receiver as bad as the thief? Has not Russia attacked France? Did not the Emperor and the King of Prussia subscribe a declaration at Pilnitz which amounted to a hostile aggression? Did they not make a public declaration, that they were to employ their forces, in conjunction with the other kings of Europe, ‘to put the King of France in a situation to establish, in perfect liberty, the foundations of a monarchical government equally agreeable to the rights of sovereigns and the welfare of the French?’ and, whenever the other princes should co-operate with them, did they not ‘then, and in that

case, declare their determination to act promptly, and by mutual consent to obtain the end proposed by all of them?' Can gentlemen lay their hands on their hearts, and not admit that the fair construction of this is, that whenever the other powers should concur, they would attack France, then at peace with them, and occupied only in domestic and internal regulations?

"The decree of 19th November 1792, is alleged as a clear act of aggression, not only against England, but all the sovereigns of Europe. Much weight should not be attached to that silly document, and it has been sufficiently explained by M. Chauvelin, when he declared that it never was meant to proclaim the favour of France for insurrection, but that it applied to those people only who, after having acquired their liberty by conquest, should demand the assistance of the Republic. Should not a magnanimous nation have been satisfied with this explanation; and where will be the end of wars, if idle and intemperate expressions are to be made the groundwork of bitter and never-ending hostilities?

"Where is the war, pregnant with so many horrors, next to be carried? Where is it to stop? Not till you establish the House of Bourbon!—and this you cherish the hope of doing, because you have had a successful campaign. But is the situation of the Allies, with all they have gained, to be compared with what it was after Valenciennes was taken? One campaign is successful to you; another may be so to them; and in this way, animated by the vindictive passions of revenge, hatred, rancour, which are infinitely more flagitious than those of ambition and the thirst of power, you may go on for ever, as, with such black incentives, no end can be foreseen to human misery. And all this without an intelligible motive, merely that you may gain a better peace a year or two hence. Is then peace so dangerous a state, war so enviable, that the latter is to be chosen as a state of probation, the former shunned as a positive evil (1)?"

And of Mr. Pitt and the government for refusing to treat. On the other hand, it was contended by Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt, "that the same necessity which originally existed for the commencement and prosecution, still called for perseverance in the war. The same proneness to aggression, the same disregard to justice, still actuated the conduct of the men who rule in France. Peace with a nation by whom war was made against all order, religion, and morality, would rather be a cessation of resistance to wrong than a suspension of arms in the nature of an ordinary warfare. To negotiate with established governments was formerly not merely easy, but in most circumstances safe; but to negotiate with the government of France now would be to incur all the risks of an uncertain truce, without attaining the benefits even of a temporary peace. France still retains the sentiments, and is constant to the views which characterised the dawn of her Revolution. She was innovating, she is so still; she was Jacobin, she is so still; she declared war against all kings, and she continues to this hour to seek their destruction. Even the distant republic of America could not escape that ravaging power, and next to a state of active and inveterate war were the relations of those two commonwealths for a long time. The Republic, indeed, has frequently published her disinclination to conquest; but has she followed up that declaration by any acts indicating a similar disposition? Have we not seen her armies march to the Rhine, seize the Netherlands, and annex them to her dominions? Have we not witnessed her progress in Italy? Are not the wrongs of Switzerland recent and marked? Even into Asia she has carried her lust for dominion,

severed from the Porte, during a period of profound peace, a vast portion of its empire, and stimulated 'Citizen Tippoo' to engage in that contest which ultimately proved his ruin?

"The Republic has proclaimed her respect for the independence of all governments. How have her actions corresponded with this profession? Did not Jacobin France attempt the overthrow of every government? Did she not, whenever it suited her purpose, arm the governors against the governed, or the governed against the governors? How completely has she succeeded, during a period of profound peace which had been unbroken for centuries, in convulsing the population, and so subduing the independence of Switzerland? In Italy, the whole fabric of civil society has been changed, and the independence of every government violated. The Netherlands, too, exhibit to mankind monuments of the awful veneration with which the Republic has regarded the independence of other states. The memorable decree of November 1792, has not slept a dead letter in their statute-book. No, it has ever since been the active energetic principle of their whole conduct, and every nation is interested in the extinction of that principle for ever.

"Every power with whom the Republic has treated, whether for the purpose of armistice or peace, could furnish melancholy instances of the perfidy of France, and of the ambition, injustice, and cruelty of her rulers. Switzerland concluded a truce with the Republic; her rulers immediately excited insurrections among her cantons, overthrew her institutions, seized her fortresses, robbed her treasures, the accumulation of ages, and, to give permanence to her usurpations, imposed on her a government new alike in form and substance. The Grand Duke of Tuscany was among the earliest sufferers by a treaty of peace with the Republic. In every thing he strove to conform to the views of France; her rulers repeated to him her assurances of attachment and disinclination to conquest; but at the very time that the honour of the Republic was pledged for the security of his states, he saw the troops of his ally enter his capital, and he himself was deposed and a democracy given to the Florentines. The King of Sardinia opened the gates of his capital to the Republican arms, and, confiding in the integrity of the French government, expected to be secured in his dominions by the treaty which guaranteed his title and his rights, and communicated to France equal advantages. He was, however, in a state of peace, invaded in his dominions, forced to fly to his insular possessions, and Turin treacherously taken possession of by the Republican troops. The change in the Papal government was another part of the same system. It was planned by Joseph Bonaparte in his palace. He excited the populace to an insurrection; and effected the revolution in the capital at the head of the Roman mob. To Venice their conduct was still more atrocious. After concluding an armistice with the Archduke Charles, Bonaparte declared that he took the Venetians under his protection, and overturned the old government by the movements excited among the people; but no sooner was the national independence in this way destroyed, than he sold them to the very Imperial government against whose alleged oppression he had prompted them to take up arms. Genoa received the French as friends; and the debt of gratitude was repaid by the government being revolutionized, and, under the authority of a mock constitution, the people plundered, and the public independence subverted.

"It is in vain to allege that these atrocities are the work of former governments, and that Bonaparte had no hand in them. The worst of these acts of perfidy have been perpetrated by himself. If a treaty was concluded and broken with Sardinia, it was concluded and broken by Bonaparte. If peace

was entered into and violated with Tuscany, it was entered into and violated by Bonaparte. If Venice was first seduced into revolutionary revolt; and then betrayed and sold to Austria, it was by Bonaparte that the treachery was consummated. If the Papal government was first terrified into submission, and then overturned by rebellion, it was Bonaparte who accomplished the work. If Genoa was convulsed in a state of profound peace, and then sacrificed, it was by Bonaparte that the perfidious invasion was committed. If Switzerland was first seduced into revolution, and then invaded and plundered, it was by the deceitful promises and arts of Bonaparte that the train was laid. Even the affiliated republics and his own country have not escaped the same perfidious ability. The constitution which he forced on his countrymen, at the cannon's mouth, on the 15th Vendémiaire, he delivered up to the bayonets of Augereau on the 18th Fructidor, and overturned with his grenadiers on the 18th Brumaire. The constitution of the Cisalpine republic, which he himself had established, was overthrown by his lieutenant Berthier. He gained possession of Malta by deceitful promises, and immediately handed it over to the Republic. He declared to the Porte that he had no intention to take possession of Egypt, and yet he avowed to his army that he conquered it for France, and instantly roused the Copts into rebellion against the Mamelukes. He declared to the Mussulmans that he was a believer in Mahomet (1), thus demonstrating that, even on the most sacred subjects, truth was set at nought when any object was to be gained by its violation. Nay, he has, in his official instructions, openly avowed this system; for, in his instructions to Kléber, he declares, 'You may sign a treaty to evacuate Egypt, but do not execute the articles, and you may find a plausible excuse for the delay in the observation, that they must be sent home to be submitted to the Directory.' What reliance can be placed on a power which thus uniformly makes peace or truce a stepping-stone to farther aggressions; and systematically uses perfidy as an allowable weapon for circumventing its enemies? And what is especially worthy of observation, this system is not that of any one man; it has been the principle of all the statesmen, without exception, who have governed France during the Revolution; a clear proof that it arises from the force of the circumstances in which they are placed, and the ruinous ascendancy of irreligious principles in the people; and that the intentions of the present ruler of the country, even if they were widely different from what they are, could afford no sort of security against its continuance.

"France would now derive great advantages from a general peace. Her commerce would revive; her seamen be renewed, her sailors acquire experience; and the power which hitherto has been so victorious at land, would speedily become formidable on another element. What benefit could it bring to Great Britain? Are our harbours blockaded, our commerce interrupted, our dockyards empty? Have we not, on the contrary, acquired an irresistible preponderance on the seas during the war, and is not the trade of the world rapidly passing into the hands of our merchants? Bonaparte would acquire immense popularity by being the means of bringing about an accommodation with this country; if we wish to establish his power, and permanently enlist the energy of the Revolution under the banners of a military chieftain, we have only to fall into the snare which he has so artfully prepared. In turbulent republics, it has ever been an axiom to maintain in-

(1) This was strictly true. "They will say I am a Papist," said Napoleon. "I am no such thing. I was a Mahometan in Egypt. I would become a Catholic here for the good of the people. I am no

believer in any particular religion; but as to the idea of a God, look up to the heavens, and say who made that?"—See THIBAUDEAU *Sur le Consulat*, 153.

ternal tranquillity by external action; it was on that principle that the war was commenced by Brissot and continued by Robespierre, and it is not likely to be forgotten by the military chief who has now succeeded to the helm of affairs.

“It is in vain to pretend that either the Allied powers or Great Britain were the aggressors in the terrible war which has so long desolated Europe. In investigating this subject, the most scrupulous attention to dates is requisite. The attack upon the Papal states, by the seizure of Avignon in August 1791, was attended by a series of the most sanguinary excesses which disgraced the Revolution; and this was followed, in the same year, by an aggression against the whole empire, by the seizure of Porentrui, part of the dominions of the Bishop of Basle. In April 1792, the French government declared war against Austria; and in September of the same year, without any declaration of war, or any cause of hostility, and in direct violation of their promises to abstain from conquest, they seized Savoy and Nice, upon the pretence that nature had destined them to form a part of France. The assertion that this war was rendered necessary by the threatening alliance formed at Pilnitz, is equally devoid of foundation; that celebrated declaration referred only to the state of imprisonment in which Louis XVI was kept, and its immediate object was to effect his deliverance, if a concert among the European powers could be brought about for that purpose, leaving the internal state of France to be decided by the King when restored to his liberty, with the free consent of the states of the kingdom, without one word relative to its dismemberment. This was fully admitted in the official correspondence which took place between this country and Austria; and as long as M. Delessart was minister of foreign affairs in France, there was a great probability that the differences would be terminated amicably; but the war party excited a tumult in order to dispossess him, as they considered, in Brissot’s words, that ‘war was necessary to consolidate the Revolution.’ Upon the King of France’s acceptance of the constitution, the emperor notified to all the courts of Europe that he considered it as his proper act, and thereby the convention of Pilnitz fell to the ground; and the event soon proved the sincerity of that declaration, for when war was declared by the French in 1792, the Austrian Netherlands were almost destitute of troops, and soon fell a prey to the Republicans.

“Great Britain at this time, and for long after, entertained no hostile designs towards France. So far from it, on 29th December 1792, only a month before the commencement of hostilities, a note was sent by Lord Grenville to the British ambassador at St.-Petersburg, imparting to Russia the principles on which we acted, and the terms on which we were willing to mediate for peace, which were, ‘the withdrawing the French arms within the limits of their territory, the abandoning their conquests, the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of other nations, and the giving, in some unequivocal manner, a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles or excite disturbances against other governments. In return for these stipulations, the different powers of Europe might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against France, or interference in its internal affairs.’ Such were the principles on which we acted; and what, then, brought on the war with this country? The insane decrees of 19th November and 15th December 1792, which amounted to a declaration of war against all governments, and the attack on our Allies the Dutch, and the opening of the Scheldt, in open prosecution of the new code of public law then promulgated by the Republic.

“The fundamental principle of the revolutionary party in France always

has been an insatiable love of aggrandisement, an implacable spirit of destruction against all the civil and religious institutions of every other country. Its uniform mode of proceeding was to bribe the poor against the rich, by proposing to transfer into new hands, on the delusive notion of equality, and in breach of every principle of justice, the whole property of the country; the practical application of this principle was to devote the whole of that property to indiscriminate plunder, and make it the foundation of a revolutionary system of finance, productive in proportion to the misery and desolation which it created. It has been accompanied by an unwearied spirit of proselytism, diffusing itself over all the nations of the earth; a spirit which can apply itself to all circumstances and all situations; hold out a promise of redress equally to all nations; which enables the teachers of French liberty to recommend themselves to those who live under the feudal code of the German empire, the various states of Italy, the old republicans of Holland, the new republicans of America, the protestants of Switzerland, the Catholics of Ireland, the Mussulmans of Turkey, and the Hindoos of India; the natives of England, enjoying the perfection of practical freedom, and the Copts of Egypt, groaning under the last severity of Asiatic bondage. The last and distinguishing feature is a perfidy which nothing can bind; which no ties of treaty, no sense of the principles generally received among nations, no obligation, human or divine, can restrain. Thus qualified, thus armed for destruction, the genius of the French Revolution marched forth the terror and dismay of the world. Every nation has in its turn been the witness, many have been the victims, of its principles; and it is left now for us to decide whether we will compromise with such a danger, while we have yet resources to supply the sinews of war, while the heart and spirit of the country is yet unbroken, and while we have the means of calling forth and supporting a powerful co-operation in Europe. *Cur igitur pacem nolo—quia infida est, quia periculosa, quia esse non potest*(1)?”

Feb. 3, 1800. The House, upon a division, supported the measures of Administration by a majority of two hundred and sixty-five to sixty-four.

Reflections on this decision of Parliament. In judging of this decision of the British government, which formed the true commencement of the second period of the war, that in which it was waged with Napoléon, it is of importance to recollect the circumstances in which he was placed, and the nature of the government which he had assumed. France had not ceased to be revolutionary, but its energies were now, under a skilful and enterprising chief, turned to military objects. He was still, however, borne forward upon the movement, and the moment he attempted to stop, he would have been crushed by its wheels. No one was more aware of this than the First Consul. “The French government,” said Napoléon in 1800, “has no resemblance to those which surround it. Hated by all its neighbours, obliged to restrain many different classes of malecontents within its bosom, it stands in need of action, of *éclat*, and, by consequence, of war, to maintain an imposing attitude against so many enemies.”—“Your government,” replied Thibeaudeau, “has no resemblance to one newly established. It assumed the *toga virilis* at Marengo; and, sustained by a powerful head and the arms of thirty millions of inhabitants, its place is already sufficiently prominent among the European powers.”—“Do you really think that sufficient?” replied Napoléon; “*it must be first of all,*

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 1206, 1349.

It is impossible, in this abstract, to give any idea of the splendid and luminous speeches made on this memorable occasion in the British Parliament. They

are reported at large in Hansard, and throw more light on the motives and objects of the war than any other documents in existence.

or it will perish."—"And to obtain such a result, you see no other method than war?"—"None other, citizen (1)."—"His fixed opinion from the commencement," says Bourricne, "was, that if stationary he would fall; that he was sustained only by continually advancing, and that it was not sufficient to advance, but he must advance rapidly and irresistibly."—"My power," said he, "depends on my glory, and my glory on the victories which I gain. My power would instantly fall, if it were not constantly based on fresh glory and victories. Conquest made me what I am: conquest alone can maintain me in it. A government newly established has need to dazzle and astonish; when its *éclat* ceases, it perishes. It is in vain to expect repose from a man who is the concentration of movement (2)."

Such were Napoléon's views; and that they were perfectly just, with reference to his own situation, is evident from the consideration that a revolutionary power, whether in civil or military affairs, has never yet maintained its ascendancy in any other way. But these being his principles, and the independence of England forming the great stumbling-block in his way, it is evident that no permanent peace with him was practicable; that every accommodation could have been only a truce; and that it never would be proposed, unless in circumstances when it was for his interest to gain a short breathing-time for fresh projects of ambition (3). The event completely proved the justice of these views, and forms the best commentary on the prophetic wisdom of Mr. Pitt. Every successive peace on the continent only paved the way for fresh aggressions; and at length he was precipitated upon the snows of Russia, by the same invincible necessity of dazzling his subjects by the lustre of additional victories which was felt in the commencement of his career. "His power, without and within," says Marshal St.-Cyr, "was founded solely on the *éclat* of his victories. By intrusting himself without reserve to fortune, he imposed upon himself the necessity of following it to the utmost verge whither it would lead him. Unheard-of success had attended enterprises, the temerity of which was continually increasing; but thence arose a necessity to keep for ever awake the terror and admiration of Europe, by new enterprises and more dazzling triumphs. The more colossal his power became, the more immeasurable his projects required to be, in order that their unexpected success should keep up the same stupor in the minds of the vulgar. Admiration, enthusiasm, ambition, the emotions on which his dominion was founded, are not durable in their nature; they must be incessantly fed with fresh stimulants; and, to effect that, extraordinary efforts are requisite. These principles were well known to Napoléon; and thence it is that he so often did evil, albeit knowing better than any one that it was evil, overruled by a superior power, from which he felt it was impossible to escape. The rapid movement which he imprinted on the affairs of Europe was of a kind which could not be arrested; a single retrograde step, a policy which indicated a stationary condition, would have been the signal of his fall. Far, therefore, from making it subject of reproach to Napoléon, that he conceived an enterprise so gigantic as the Russian expedition, he is

(1) Thibaudeau, *Consulat*, 393.

(2) Bour. iii. 214.

(3) This accordingly was openly avowed by Napoléon himself. "England," said he in January 1800, "must be overturned. As long as my voice has any influence, it will never enjoy any respite, Yes! yes! war to the death with England for ever—ay, till its destruction." [D'Abr. ii. 179, 180.] He admits, in his own *Memoirs*, that when he made these proposals to Mr. Pitt, he had no serious intention of concluding peace. "I had then," said he,

"need of war: a treaty of peace which would have derogated from that of Campo Formio and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every imagination. Mr. Pitt's answer accordingly was impatiently expected. When it arrived, it filled me with a secret satisfaction. His answer could not have been more favourable. From that moment I foresaw that, with such impassioned antagonists, I would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies." —NAP. in *Moniu*, i. 33, 34.

rather to be pitied for being placed in a situation where he was overruled by necessity; and this furnishes the true answer to those who would ascribe to chance, the rigour of the elements, or an excess of temerity, what was in truth but the inevitable consequence of the false position in which for fifteen years France had been placed (1).” It is this law of the moral world which rendered durable peace with that country, when headed by a revolutionary power, impossible; and which was ultimately destined to inflict an awful retribution on its guilt and its ambition.

Experience, therefore, has now proved that Mr. Pitt’s view of the character of the revolutionary war was well founded; and that the seizure of the consular throne by Napoléon, only gave a new and more dangerous direction to that restless and insatiable spirit which had arisen from the convulsions which the Revolution had produced. Justice requires that it should be declared, that, in espousing the cause of the enemy on this occasion, and uniformly palliating the crimes of the popular party in that country, the English Opposition were led, by the spirit of party, to forget equally the duties of patriotism and the dictates of reason. No hesitation need be felt by an English writer in expressing this opinion, because the ablest of the liberal party in France themselves admit that their partisans in this country fell into this enormous error. “Nothing,” says Madame de Staël, “was more contrary to Bonaparte’s nature, or his interest, than to have made peace in 1800. He could only live in agitation; and if any thing could plead his apology with those who reflect on the influence of external circumstances on the human mind, it is, that he could only breathe freely in a volcanic atmosphere. It was absolutely necessary for him to present, every three months, a new object of ambition to the French, in order to supply, by the grandeur and variety of external events, the vacuum occasioned by the removal of all objects of domestic interest. At that epoch, unhappily for the spirit of freedom in England, the English Opposition, with Mr. Fox at their head, took an entirely false view of Napoléon; and thence it was that that party, previously so estimable, lost its ascendant in the nation. It was already too much to have defended France under the Reign of Terror; but it was, if possible, a still greater fault to have considered Bonaparte as identified with the principles of freedom, when in truth he was their deadliest enemy (2).”—“The eloquent declarations of Mr. Fox,” says General Mathieu Dumas, “cannot invalidate the facts brought forward by Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville as to the origin of the war. The Girondists alone were the cause of its commencement. The names of those impostors who, to overturn the monarchical throne of France, prevailed on the King to declare that fatal war, should be consigned to an execrable celebrity; they alone brought down on Europe and their country a deluge of calamities (5).”

The Parlia-
ment re-
solve on
war.

War being thus resolved on, the most vigorous measures were taken, both by Parliament and the executive, to meet the dangers with which it might be attended. Parliament voted the sum of L.500,000 to the crown, for the purpose of immediately aiding Austria in the armaments which she had in contemplation, and Mr. Pitt stated that a loan of L.2,500,000 to the Emperor would be advanced (4). The budget brought forward by the chancellor of the exchequer exhibited a most flattering picture of the public credit, and proved that, notwithstanding the immense expenditure of the eight preceding campaigns, the national resources were still

(1) St.-Cyr, Hist. Mil. iii. 3, 4.

(2) Mad. de Staël, *Rév. Franc.* ii. 268. 270.

(3) Dumas, iv. 303, 312.

(4) Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 1439.

unimpaired (1). The extraordinary fact which he mentioned, that, in the eighth year of the war, a loan of eighteen millions and a half had been obtained at the rate of four and three-fourths per cent, proved the enduring credit of the government and the almost boundless extent of the wealth of England; but both that great financier and the British public, misled by the fallacious brilliancy of present appearances, overlooked the grievous burden which the contraction of debt in the three *per cents*, in other words, the imposition of a burden of L.100 for every L.60 advanced, was ultimately to produce upon the national resources.

The land forces of Great Britain in this year amounted to 168,000 men, exclusive of 80,000 militia; and for the service of the fleet, 120,000 seamen and marines were voted. The ships in commission were no less than 510, including 124 of the line. From a table laid before Parliament in this year, it appeared that the whole troops, exclusive of militia, which had been raised for the service of the state during the eight years from 1792 to 1800, had been only 208,000; a force not greater than might have been easily levied in a single year, out of a population then amounting to nearly sixteen millions, in the three kingdoms; and which, if ably conducted and thrown into the scale, when nearly balanced, between France and Austria, would unquestionably have terminated the war at the latest in two campaigns (2).

(1) The Budget stood thus:—

Receipt—Ways and Means.

Land and Malt Tax,	L.2,750,000
Lottery,	200,000
Duties on Exports and Imports,	1,250,000
Income Tax,	5,300,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund,	5,512,000
Loan by Exchequer Bills,	3,000,000
Lent by Bank without interest,	3,000,000
Loan for Great Britain,	18,500,000
	<hr/>
	L.39,512,000

Expenditure.

Navy,	L.12,619,000
Army,	11,370,000
Miscellaneous,	750,000
Interest on Exchequer Bills,	816,000
Deficiencies of year 1799,	440,000
Deficiency of Malt Tax and Land do.,	350,000
Exchequer Bills,	2,500,000
Do. for 1798,	1,075,000
Vote of credit,	3,000,000
Subsidies to Germans and Russians,	3,000,000
Annual grant for National Debt,	200,000
Unforeseen emergencies,	1,800,000
	<hr/>
	L.37,920,000

To provide for the interest of this loan, amounting in all to L.21,500,000, Mr. Pitt laid on some trifling taxes on spirits and tea, amounting in all to L.350,000, the interest on the bulk of the debt being laid as a charge on the income tax. The interest paid on the loan was only 4½ per cent; a fact which he justly stated as extraordinary in the eighth year of the war. The interest on the public debt at this time was L.19,700,000, and on Exchequer Bills, etc., L.1,983,000, in all.

	L. 21,683,000
Civil List,	898,000
Civil Expenses,	647,000
Charges of management,	1,779,000
Other charges on consolidated Fund,	239,000
	<hr/>
	25,246,000

Total National Expenditure in 1800. L.63,166,000

—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 1515, and *Ann. Reg. App. to Chronicle* for 1800, pp. 151, 152.

(2) James, ii. App. Nn. 8. *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 160; The number of troops raised yearly from the and 144, App. to Chron. commencement of the war for the regular army, was

Mr Dundas' India budget. Several domestic measures of great importance took place in this session of Parliament. The bank charter was renewed for twenty-one years, there being twelve years of the old charter still to run; in consideration of the advantages of which, the directors agreed to give the public a loan of L.5,000,000 for six years without interest; the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act was continued by a great majority in both houses of Parliament; and Mr. Dundas brought forward a full account of the affairs of India (1). The union of Ireland with Great Britain was, after a stormy debate in both houses of Parliament in Dublin, carried by a large majority, chiefly through the powerful abilities, cool courage, and vigorous efforts of LORD CASTLEREAGH, who then gave the first specimen of that indomitable firmness and steady perseverance which were afterwards destined, on a greater stage, to lead the coalition against France to a glorious issue in the campaign of 1814. This great measure, however, was not carried without the most violent opposition, both in the Irish Peers and Commons; and it left the seeds of an animosity between the two islands, which, fostered by religious rancour and democratic passion, produced melancholy effects in after times upon the tranquillity and strength of the empire (2).

May 24. 1800, Union with Ireland passes the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland. By the treaty of Union, the Peers for the united Imperial Parliament were limited, from Ireland, to twenty-eight temporal and four spiritual peers, the former elected for life by the Irish peerage, the latter by rotation; the commoners fixed at one hundred. The Churches of England and Ireland were united, and provision made for their union, preservation, and the continuance of their discipline, doctrine, and worship for ever. Commercial privileges were fairly communicated; the national debt of each was imposed as a burden on its own finances, and the general expenditure ordered to be defrayed, for twenty years after the Union, in the proportion of fifteen to Great Britain

as follows—a woful picture of the ignorance which then prevailed as to the means of combating a revolutionary power;—

1793,	17,038
1794,	38,561
1795,	40,460
1796,	16,336
1797,	16,096
1798,	21,457
1799,	41,316
1800,	17,124

Total in eight years, . . . 208,388

Whereas, the French, with a population of 28,000,000, raised in 1792, 700,000, and in 1793, 1,500,000 soldiers. Prussia, with a population of

7,000,000, raised in 1813 nearly 200,000 men.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 144, *App. to Chronicle*. The population of Great Britain, according to the census of 1800, was 10,942,000, that of Ireland probably 5,000,000.

(1) From which it appeared that the total revenue in 1798—9 was L.8,610,000, the local charges L.7,807,000, and the interest of debt and other charges L.875,000, leaving a deficiency in territorial revenue of L.71,000; to cover which there were the commercial profits, amounting to L.630,000; leaving a general balance in favour of the company of L.558,000 yearly.

The revenue and expenditure were thus divided:—

	Revenue.	Charges.
Bengal,	L.6,259,600	L.3,952,847
Madras,	2,004,993	2,857,519
Bombay,	346,110	996,699
	<hr/> L.8,610,703	<hr/> L.7,807,065
	7,807,065	
	<hr/>	
Surplus,	L.803,638	
Interest on debt,	L.753,135	} 875,295
Other charges,	117,160	
	<hr/>	
Deficiency,	L.71,657	
Commercial Profits,		L.629,657
Deduct territorial loss,		71,657
		<hr/>
Annual Surplus,		L.558,000

See *Parl. Hist.* xxxv, 15.

(2) *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv, 1471; xxxv, 14, 15. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 112, 116.

and two for Ireland. The laws and courts of both kingdoms were maintained on their present footing, subject to such alterations as the united Parliament might deem expedient. This important step was carried in the British House of Commons by a majority of 308 to 26, and in the Lords by 75 to 7 (1).

The debates on this subject in the British Parliament, which, although highly important in English, are not of sufficient moment for quotation in European history, are chiefly remarkable for the complete blindness of all parties to the real and ultimate consequences of the measure which was adopted. Mr. Pitt was most desirous to show that the influence of the *crown* would not be unduly augmented by the Irish members in the House of Commons (2); while Mr. Grey contended that, "ultimately at least, the Irish members will afford a certain accession of force to the party of every administration, and therefore forty of the most decayed boroughs should be struck off before the Union takes place. He accordingly moved, that it should be an instruction to the House to guard against the increase of the influence of the crown in the approaching Union (3). To us, who know that by the aid of the Irish members, and their aid alone, even after the franchise had been raised from forty shillings to ten pounds by the Duke of Wellington, the great democratic change on the British constitution of 1832 was carried (4), these speculations as to the ultimate consequences of the Union are singular monuments of the difficulty which even the greatest intellects experience in prognosticating the consequences of any considerable change in the frame of government. In truth, the decisive addition which the Irish members furnished to the democratic party of the empire on the first great crisis which occurred, adds another to the numerous examples which history affords of the extreme peril of applying to one country the institutions or government of another, or of supposing that the system of representation which the habits of centuries have moulded to a conformity with the interests of one state, can be adopted without the utmost hazard by another in an inferior stage of civilization, inheriting from its forefathers a more ardent temperament, or under the influence of more vehement passions.

Ever since the great financial crisis of 1797, and the limitation of cash payments by the act of that year, followed by the issue of two and one pound notes by the Bank of England, which immediately ensued, the prosperity of the British empire had been steadily and rapidly increasing. The expenditure of above sixty millions a-year by government, either in the current expenses or the payment of interest on debt, and the increase of the issues by the bank from eleven millions to above fifteen during that period (5), had produced a most extraordinary effect on the national industry. Prices of every species of produce had rapidly and steadily

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxv. 31. 150, 195.

(3) Ibid. 101.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxv. 47.

(4) English and Scotch members for the Reform Bill on its first division, . . . 266

Against it, . . . 251—15

Ireland, against it, . . . 37

For it, . . . 53—16

Thus it was the admission of the Irish members which effected that great alteration in the English constitution.

(5) Bank of England notes in circulation last quarter, of

	Five pounds.	Two and one pounds.	Total.
1797,	L.10,411,700	L.1,230,700	L.11,642,400
1798,	10,711,690	1,730,380	12,442,070
1799,	12,335,920	1,671,040	13,006,960
1800,	13,338,670	2,062,300	15,400,970

—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, p. 148, *App. to Chronicle*.

risen; that of grain in 1800, exclusive of the effects of the scarcity of that year, was double what it had been in 1792, and every other article had advanced in a similar proportion (1). The consequence was, that the industrious classes were, generally speaking, in affluent circumstances; immense fortunes rewarded the efforts of commercial enterprise; the demand for labour, encouraged by the employment of nearly four hundred thousand soldiers and sailors in the public service, was unbounded; and even the increasing weight of taxation, and the alarming magnitude of the debt, were but little felt amidst the general rise of prices and incomes which resulted from the profuse expenditure and lavish issue of paper by government (2).

Bad harvest of 1799, and consequent scarcity in 1800. One class only, that of annuitants, and all others depending on a fixed income, underwent, during those years, a progressive decline of comfort, which was increased in many cases to the most poignant distress by the high prices and severe scarcity which followed the disastrous harvest of 1799. The attention of Parliament was early directed to the means of alleviating the famine of that year. Six reports were made by the Commons and two by the Lords on the dearth of provisions; but the government, although severely pressed by the public suffering, steadily resisted all those harsh or violent measures which procure a present relief at the expense of

- (1) Highest and lowest price of grain in five years, ending respectively
 1790,—from 51s. 11d. to 39s. 2d.
 1795,—from 74s. 2d. — 42s. 11d.
 1800,—from 113s. 7d. — 50s. 3d.

—See MUNDELL'S *Industrial Situation of Great Britain*, 53.

Statistical details. (2) According to Mr. Pitt's statement in 1800, the British exports, imports, shipping, tonnage, and revenue in the under-mentioned years stood as follows:—

Imports.

On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1793,	L.18,685,000
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1801,	25,259,000

Exports.

On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1793,	
Manufactures.	L.14,771,000
Foreign goods.	5,468,000
	<hr/> L.20,239,000
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1801,	
Manufactures.	L.20,085,000
Foreign goods.	12,867,000
	<hr/> L.32,952,000

Shipping, etc.

	Ships.	Tonnage.	Seamen.
Shipping in 1788,	13,827	1,363,000	107,925
1792,	16,079	1,540,145	118,286
1800,	18,877	1,905,438	143,661

Permanent taxes, exclusive of war taxes:—

Year ending 5th Jan. 1793,	L.14,284,000
Do. do. 1794,	13,941,000
Do. do. 1795,	13,838,000
Do. do. 1796,	13,557,000
Do. do. 1797,	14,292,000
Do. do. 1798,	13,332,000
Do. do. 1799,	14,275,000
Do. do. 1800,	15,743,000

Gross receipt from taxes

1797,	23,076,000
1798,	30,175,000
1799,	34,750,000
1800,	33,535,000

—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563.

Great efforts of government to relieve it, and noble patience of the people.

future confidence in the cultivators. An act was passed to lower the quality of all the bread baked in the kingdom; the importation of rice and maize encouraged by liberal bounties; distillation from grain stopped, and by these and other means an additional supply, to the enormous amount of 2,500,000 quarters, was procured for the use of the inhabitants (1). By these generous and patriotic efforts, joined to the admirable patience and forbearance of the people, this trying crisis was surmounted without any of those convulsions which might have been anticipated from so severe a calamity during a period of almost universal war; and in the latter part of the year, England, so far from being overwhelmed by its reverses, was enabled to present an undaunted front to the hostility of combined Europe.

Measures of England and Austria for the prosecution of the war.

Deprived by the secession of Russia of the power from whom they had derived such efficacious assistance in the preceding campaign, Austria and England made the utmost efforts to prosecute the war with vigour. By their united influence, the German empire was

prevailed upon to sign a treaty, binding the states who composed it to furnish a contingent of three hundred thousand men for the common cause; but very few of the electors obeyed the requisition, and the troops of the empire were of hardly any service in the succeeding campaign. To stimulate their languid

dispositions, a vigorous circular was, in the beginning of December, sent by the Archduke Charles to the anterior circles of the empire, in which he strenuously urged the formation of new levies, and pointed out, in energetic terms, the futility of the idea that any durable peace was practicable with a country in such a state of revolutionary excitement as France, and the vanity of supposing that, by concentrating all the powers of government in the hands of a victorious chieftain, it was likely to be either less formidable or more pacific. But although that great general was indefatigable in his endeavours to put the Imperialists on a respectable footing, and make the most active preparations for war, he was far from feeling any confidence in the issue of the approaching contest, now that Russia was withdrawn on the one side and Napoléon was added on the other; and he earnestly counselled the Austrian cabinet to take advantage of the successes of the late campaign, and the recent changes of government in France, by concluding peace with the Republic. The cabinet of Vienna, however, deemed it inadvisable to stop short in the career of success; and not only refused to treat with Napoléon, who had proposed peace on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio, but deprived the Archduke, who had so candidly stated his opinion, of the command of the army in Germany, and conferred it on General Kray. Notwithstanding the great abilities of the latter general, this change proved extremely prejudicial to the Imperial fortunes: the Archduke was adored by the soldiers, and his retirement not only shook their confidence in

(1) The resources obtained in this way are thus detailed in the sixth report of the Commons:—

	Quarters.
Importation of wheat from Jan. 1 to Oct. 1,	170,000
Do. of flour from America,	580,000
Do. of flour from Canada,	30,000
Do. of rice, equal to,	630,000
Stoppage of starch, equal to,	40,000
Do. of distilleries,	360,000
Use of Coarse Meal,	400,000
Retrenchment.	300,000
	<hr/>
	2,510,000

themselves, but cooled the ardour of the circles in the south of Germany, to whom his great achievements in the campaign of 1796 were still the subject of grateful recollection. He retired to his government of Bohemia, from whence he had the melancholy prospect of a series of reverses, which possibly his talents might have prevented, whereby the monarchy was brought to the brink of ruin (1).

March 16, 1800. By a treaty, signed on the 16th March, the Elector of Bavaria agreed to put twelve thousand men in the pay of Great Britain, to be employed in the common cause; and by another treaty with the Elector of Mentz and the Duke of Wirtemberg, each of these petty states agreed to furnish six thousand men, paid by the same power for the same purpose. These troops, however, could not be organized in sufficient time to take a part in the early operations of the campaign, and they formed at best but a poor substitute for the sturdy Russian veterans, who were retiring towards the northern extremity of Germany, equally exasperated at their allies and their enemies. By another and more important treaty, signed at Vienna, on the 28th June, the Emperor agreed to raise his forces, both in Germany and Italy, to the greatest possible amount, and the two powers bound themselves each not to make a separate peace without the consent of the other; in consideration of which England engaged not only to advance a subsidy of L.2,000,000 sterling to the Imperial treasury, but to augment as much as practicable the German and Swiss troops in the British pay in the German campaign (2).

Treaties entered into for this purpose with Austria and Bavaria. Military preparations of the Imperialists. Justly proud of the glorious successes of the preceding campaign, which, in so far as its troops were concerned, had been almost unchequered, and relying with confidence on its superb armies, two hundred thousand strong, in Germany and Italy, the cabinet of Vienna resolved on continuing the contest. But the military preparations which they made were not commensurate to the magnitude of the danger which was to be apprehended, since the First Consul was placed at the head of the French government. Their armies in Germany were raised to ninety-two thousand men, exclusive of the Bavarian and Wirtemberg contingents; but this vast body was scattered over an immense line, from the source of the Rhine to the banks of the Maine, while the centre, in the valley of the Danube, where the decisive blows were to be struck, was so weakened that no respectable force could be collected to make head against the French invasion. The army under Melas in Italy, was, by great exertions, augmented to ninety-six thousand men; the Aulic Council, seduced by the recent conquest of that country, having fallen into the great mistake of supposing that the vital point of the war was to be found in the Maritime Alps or on the banks of the Var, whereas it lay nearer home, on the shores of the Danube and the plains of Bavaria. No levies in the interior were made; few points were fortified, the government sharing in the common delusion that the strength of France was exhausted, and that it would without difficulty be brought to reasonable terms of accommodation in the ensuing campaign. The foresight of the Archduke Charles alone had surrounded Ulm with a formidable intrenched camp, which proved of the most essential service after the first disasters of the campaign, and retarded for six weeks the tide of Republican conquest in the heart of Germany (3).

(1) Dum. iii. 14, 16. Jom. xii. 12, 16. Arch. Ch. ii. 334. Ann. Reg. 1800, 168.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1800, 240, 243. State Papers.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 334. Dum. iii. 14, 16. Jom. xiii. 11, 12. Nap. i. 185.

Discontent-
ed state of
the French
Affiliated
Republics.

The Republics with which France had encircled her frontier had either been conquered by the Allies, or were in such a state of exhaustion and suffering as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid to the parent state. The Dutch groaned in silence under a yoke which was every day becoming more oppressive: the democratic party looked back with unavailing regret to the infatuation, with which they had thrown themselves into the arms of a power which used them only as the instruments of its ambition; while the commercial aristocracy, finding the trade of the United Provinces destroyed, abandoned every species of enterprise, and quietly awaited in retirement the return of more prosperous days. By a treaty, concluded on the 5th January, 1800, Holland agreed to pay six millions to France, and obtained in return only the restitution of the effects of the clergy and emigrants who had possessions in the United States. So violent was the hatred at France among its inhabitants, that a loan of a million sterling, which Napoléon endeavoured to negotiate among the capitalists of Amsterdam, totally failed. Switzerland was in a still more discontented state. Without any regard to the rights of the allied republic, Masséna had imposed a forced loan on Berne, Basle, and Zurich; and as the Swiss magistrates courageously resisted this act of oppression, an intrigue was got up by the democratic party, and the councils were attempted to be dissolved by military force. The conspiracy failed, and Colonel Clavel, who had been appointed to execute it, was compelled to take refuge in France; but the violent party spirit which these proceedings left in Switzerland, deprived it of any weight in the approaching contest, and prepared the way for its total subjugation by Napoléon (1).

Measures of
Napoléon to
restore pub-
lic credit in
France.

To make head with such feeble auxiliaries against the united force of Austria and England, with a defeated army, an exhausted treasury, and a disunited people, was the difficult task which awaited the First Consul; but he soon showed that he was equal to the attempt. The first step which he took to accomplish the gigantic undertaking, was to introduce some degree of order into the finances, which the cupidity and profligacy of the Republican government had reduced to the most deplorable state. A deficit of 600,000,000 francs, or £24,000,000 sterling, existed in the revenue of the preceding year; and recovery of arrears had become impossible from the universal penury and misery which prevailed. The remnant of the public funds, though deprived of two-thirds of their amount, were still at eight per cent, not more than a thirty-eighth part of their value in 1789, at the commencement of the Revolution. The public treasury was empty; sufficient funds were not to be found in it to fit out a courier. Payments of every description were made in bills or paper securities of some sort, which had already largely anticipated all the legal receipts of government. The armies were supported only by forced requisitions of horses, food, and clothing, which had become as oppressive as during the Reign of Terror. To avoid the forced loans and arbitrary taxation of the wealthier classes, expenditure of every sort had altogether ceased among the better description of citizens; and in France, after ten years of revolution, the concealment of treasure had become as common as in the pachalies of Turkey. Amidst the universal dismay, extortion, pillage, and corruption were general among the servants of government. Places, clothing, provisions, stores; every thing, in short, was sold to satisfy their cupidity; and while every office was openly put up to sale, enormous fortunes were amassed both by the elevated and inferior agents of corruption (2).

(1) Jom. xiii. 19, 28.

(2) Jom. xiii. 27, 29, Bour. iii. 241. Nap. i. 106.

The establishment of a firm and powerful government arrested these disorders, and re-established the finances as if by enchantment. The capitalists of Paris, long inaccessible to the demands for loans by the revolutionary government, came forward with 12,000,000 of francs; the sale of the estates of the house of Orange produced 24,000,000 more; national domains to a great extent found purchasers from the increasing confidence in government; and, instead of the forced loans from the opulent classes, which had utterly annihilated credit, and by the flagrant injustice with which they were levied recalled the worst days of the Reign of Terror, a new tax of twenty-five per cent on real property, though a burden that would be deemed intolerable in any state which had tasted of the sweets of real freedom, gave general satisfaction, and soon produced a large increase to the revenue. At the same time the foundations of a sinking fund and a national bank were laid, the public forests put under a new and rigorous direction, monthly remittances from the collectors of taxes established, and the measures commenced which were calculated to revive public credit after a prostration of ten years (1).

Pacification
of la Vendée.

The pacification of la Vendée was the next object of the First Consul. The law of hostages and the forced requisitions had revived the civil war in that country, and sixty thousand men were in the field; but it was a different contest from the terrible burst which, seven years before, had proved so disastrous to the Republican arms. The devastation of the country and destruction of the population by that bloody strife, had annihilated the elements of resistance on any considerable scale; and mere guerilla bands, seldom amounting to two thousand men, traversed the fields in different directions, levying contributions, and held together as much by the love of pillage as indignation at oppression. Through the intervention of Hyde Neuville, an able young man of an ardent disposition, who nevertheless was not misled by the dictates of passion, a negotiation was opened with the leaders of the insurgents; and although they paid but little attention to the first proclamations of Napoléon, yet being soon convinced by the tenor of his administration, that a more equitable system than that of the Revolution was about to commence, they gradually listened to his proposals. At the same time, the approach of formidable forces from all quarters, convinced them that they had now a more difficult antagonist to deal with than the weak though tyrannical Directory. Chatillon and d'Autichamps were the first to give the example of submission; and soon after Suzanet and the Abbé Bernier concluded, at Mount Luçon, a treaty highly honourable to themselves for the termination of hostilities. The able and heroic Count Louis de Frotte was not equally fortunate. He had written a letter to the Republican chief, proposing a general pacification of the Chouans, and was at the place of conference, when the negotiation was protracted beyond the time assigned for the acceptance of terms of peace by the Royalists. He was then perfidiously seized, along with all his followers, on the ground of a letter he had written to an aide-de-camp during the negotiation, and brought before a military tribunal, by which they were imme-

Jan. 17, 1801.

Iniquitous
execution
of Count
Louis
Frotte.

(1) Nap. i. 107, 110. Jom. xiii. 28.
The injustice committed by these forced loans is one of the most striking instances of the monstrous effects of the democratic ascendancy which, by the Revolution of 18th Fructidor, had obtained in France. They were laid indiscriminately on all property, movable and immovable, and were founded—1. On the amount of the direct contribution; and, 2. on an arbitrary base. Every one who paid 500 francs was taxed at four-tenths of his income;

all who paid 4000 francs and upwards, at its whole amount. The arbitrary base was founded on the opinion of a jury, who were entitled to tax the relations of emigrants or any persons of noble birth at any sum they chose. The effects of so iniquitous a system may be conceived. Property disappeared, or was concealed as studiously as in the dynasties of the East. Every branch of the public revenue was drying up from the extinction of credit.—See *Napoléon*, i. 107, note.

diately ordered to be executed. They underwent the sentence next day, and met death with the most heroic courage, standing erect, with their eyes unbandaged. One of the aides-de-camp was only wounded by the first fire; he coolly ordered the men to fire again, and fell pierced to the earth. The unhappy aide-de-camp whose unfortunate discovery of the letter had occasioned this catastrophe, was seized with such despair that he blew out his brains. This murder is a lasting stain on Napoléon's administration. Frotte was not taken in arms, but perfidiously seized by a company of Republicans, when under an escort of the national troops and engaged in a negotiation for a final pacification; but he was deemed too able to be permitted to survive, even in that age of returning clemency; and the intercepted letter, though imprudent, contained nothing which could warrant the captive's execution. It must be added, however, in justice to Napoléon, that it contained expressions extremely hostile to the First Consul, and that, at the earnest solicitation of his secretary Bourrienne, he had actually made out an order for his pardon, which, from some delay in the transmission, unfortunately arrived too late to save the hero's life. About the same time he generously pardoned M. Defeux, a brave emigrant officer taken in arms against the state, and doomed by the cruel laws of the Republic to instant death (1).

Georges, Bourmont, and some others, maintained for a few weeks longer in Brittany a gallant resistance; but, finding that the inhabitants were weary of civil war, and gladly embraced the opportunity of resuming their pacific occupations, they at length came into the measures of government, and were Feb. 23, 1801. treated with equal clemency and good faith by the First Consul, to whom they ever after yielded a willing and useful obedience. In the end of January, General Brune announced by proclamation that the pacification of la Vendée was complete, and on the 23d of the following month a general and unqualified amnesty was published. The Vendean chiefs were received with great distinction by Napoléon at Malmaison, and generally promoted to important situations (2). The curate Bernier was made Bishop of Orléans, and intrusted afterwards with the delicate task of conducting the negotiation concerning the concordat with the Papal government. The rapid and complete pacification of la Vendée by Napoléon, proves how much the long duration of its bloody and disastrous war had been owing to the cruelty and oppressions of the Republican authorities.

The next important step of Napoléon was to detach Russia completely from the alliance of Great Britain; an attempt which was much facilitated by the angry feelings excited in the mind of the Emperor Paul and his generals by the disastrous issue of the preceding campaign, and the rising jealousy of the maritime power of Great Britain, which had sprung up from fortuitous events in the minds of the Northern powers, and in the following year led to the most important results. Aware of the favourable turn which affairs in the Baltic had recently taken, Napoléon lost no opportunity of cultivating a good understanding with the Russian Emperor; and, by a series of adroit acts of courtesy, succeeded at length, not only in obliterating all feelings of hostility, but establishing the most perfect understanding between the two cabinets. Napoléon sent back all the Russian prisoners in France, seven thousand in number, who had been taken at Zurich and in Holland, not only without exchange, but equipped anew in the Russian uniform. This politic proceeding was not lost on

(1) Bour, iv, 3, 10. Beauch, iv, 498, 594.

(2) Nap. i. 129, 133. Jom. xiii. 29, 31. Dum. iii. 19, 24. Ann. Reg. 1800, 166.

the Czar, who had been already dazzled by the lustre of Napoléon's victories in Italy and Egypt; a contest of civilities and courtesies ensued, which soon terminated in the dismissal of Lord Whitworth from St.-Petersburg, and the arrival of Baron Springborton, the Russian ambassador, at Paris (1). The British vessels were soon after laid under embargo in the Russian harbours, and that angry correspondence began, which was shortly terminated by the array of all the powers of the North in open hostility against Great Britain.

His energetic military measures.

The military measures of Napoléon were equally energetic. Upon the refusal of Great Britain to treat, he issued one of his heart-stirring proclamations which were so well calculated to rouse the ardent spirit of the French people. He told them that the English minister had rejected his proposals of peace; that to command it he had need of money, of iron, and soldiers, and that he swore not to combat but for the happiness of France and the peace of the world. This animated address, coupled with the magic that encircled the name of Napoléon, produced an amazing effect. Victory seemed about again to attend the Republican standards, under the auspices of a leader to whom she had never yet proved faithless; the patriotic ardour of 1793 was in part revived, with all the addition which the national strength had since received from the experience of later times. The first class of the conscription for the year 1800 was put in requisition, without any exemption either from rank or fortune; this supply put at the disposal of government one hundred and twenty thousand men. Besides this, a still more efficient force for immediate service, was formed by a summons of all the veterans who had obtained furlough or leave of absence for the eight preceding years, and who, unless furnished with a valid excuse, were required again to serve; a measure which procured a supply of thirty thousand experienced soldiers. At the same time, the *gendarmes* were put on a better footing; and various improvements effected, particularly in the artillery department, which greatly augmented the efficiency of that important arm of the public service. Twenty-five thousand horses, bought in the interior, were distributed among the artillery and cavalry on the frontier, and all the stores and equipments of the armies repaired with a celerity so extraordinary, that it would have appeared incredible, if long experience had not proved, that confidence in the vigour and stability of government operates as rapidly in increasing, as the vacillation and insecurity of democracy does in withering the national resources (2).

Revival of the military spirit in France.

Far from experiencing the difficulty which had been so severely felt by the Directory in retaining the soldiers to their colours, the consular government was powerfully seconded by the patriotic efforts of all classes. Several brilliant corps of volunteers were formed; and the ranks rapidly filled up by veterans hastening to renew their toils under a leader to whom fortune had hitherto proved so propitious. In consequence, the government soon found itself at the head of two hundred and fifty thousand men to commence hostilities in Italy and Germany, while above one hundred thousand conscripts were rapidly learning the rudiments of war at the depôts in the interior, and before six months might be expected to join the armies on the frontier (3).

But it was not merely in such praiseworthy efforts for the security and pacification of France, that the energies of the First Consul were employed. He already meditated the re-establishment of the monarchy, and early

(1) Jom. xiii. 13, 14. Bour. iii. 269, 270. Ann. Reg. 1800, 234.

(2) Dum. iii. 23, 25. Jom. xiii. 33, 35.

(3) Jom. xiii. 35. Dum. iii. 24, 25.

commenced that system of misleading the people by false epithets, and dazzling them by splendid pageants, which was intended to prepare them for the lustre of the throne, and induce them to concur in the reconstruction of all the parts of the social edifice which it had been the object of the Revolution to destroy.

His measures to extinguish the revolutionary fervour of the people. To accomplish this object, he applied himself to what he was well aware is at all times, but especially during the decline of revolutionary fervour, the ruling principle of human nature, viz., self-interest. All the officers of state, all the members of the legislature were endowed with ample salaries; even the tribunate, which professed to be the barrier of the people against the encroachments of government, received above L.50,000 a-year among its eighty members, being at the rate of nearly L.700 a-year to each individual who composed it; a very large allowance in a country where the highest civil functionaries, the heads of the law and church, received only from L.500 to L.600 annually (1). From the very first he commenced the demolition of all those ensigns and expressions which recalled the idea of the liberty and equality, from the strife of which his redoubtable power had arisen. The image of the Republic, seated and holding a spear in her hand, which was at the top of all the official letters at the commencement of the consulship, was suppressed. Some doubt existed in the first instance as to which of the consuls should take the chair, and Sièyes openly asserted his pretensions to it, in virtue as well of his seniority as his great services in the cause of freedom; but Napoléon cut the matter short by stepping into the chair himself, and the jealousy of the elder consul was soon removed by the grant of the large property out of the park of Versailles which has been already mentioned. At the same time, the habiliments and ensigns of authority were changed; the Greek and Roman costumes, which recalled the ideas of equality lately so much in vogue, were abolished and replaced by the military dress; the First Consul appeared on all occasions in uniform, with boots and spurs, and all the inferior military functionaries followed his example. The levees, which he held almost daily, were crowded with officers in full dress; and the court of the first magistrate of the Republic was noways distinguishable from the headquarters of its greatest general. At the same time, the institution of sabres and fusils of merit, as a testimony of reward to military distinction, already shadowed out to the discerning eye the Legion of Honour, and the re-establishment of titles of rank and a hereditary nobility; while the daily reviews with all the pomp and splendour of war, in the Place du Carrousel, accustomed the people to those magnificent pageants which were destined to conceal from their gaze the chains of the empire (2).

Dec. 24,
1799. These measures were all steps, and not unimportant ones, to the re-establishment of monarchical authority. But they were the

(1) The civil list under the First Consul was fixed at the following sums:—

Legislative Body,	2,400,000 francs.
Tribunate,	1,312,000
Archives,	75,000
Three Consuls,	1,800,000
Council of State,	675,000
Their Secretaries,	112,500
Six Ministers,	360,000
Minister of Foreign Affairs,	90,000

6,824,500 francs, or L. 275,000

See BOURNAIENNE, iii. 242.

(2) Thib, 2, 3. Bour. iii. 243, 253, 256. Nap. i. 243.

prelude only to more important changes. In December, 1799, an important *arrêt* was published, which, on the preamble—"That a part of the journals printed at Paris are instruments in the hands of the enemies of the Republic; and that it is the first duty of the government to watch over its security," decreed, "That the minister of police should not *suffer to be printed*, during the continuance of the war, any journals but the following." Then followed a list of thirteen journals, thus invested with the monopoly of Paris; and from it were only excluded "those *exclusively* devoted to science, the arts, literature, commerce, or advertisements." It was decreed, by a separate article, that "any journal among those retained which inserted any thing contrary to the sovereignty of the people, should be immediately suppressed." This clause, inserted to blind the people to the real tendency of the measure, received in the sequel, as was foreseen at the time, the most liberal interpretation, and was applied, contrary to its obvious meaning, to sanction the extinction of all journals contrary to the consular government. Thus early commenced the system of Napoléon for the coercion of the press; a system which received, during the remainder of his reign, such ample developement; and which, as Madame de Staël justly remarks, converted that great engine, generally considered as the palladium of liberty, into the most powerful instrument of bondage, by perpetually exhibiting a series of false and delusive pictures to the human mind, and excluding all others from the view (1).

He fixes his residence at the Tuileries.

The next step of Napoléon was to fix his residence in the Tuileries, and sleep in the ancient apartment of the kings of France. This great change, however, required considerable caution in its accomplishment; it was so palpable an approach towards royalty, that it might shock the feeling of the people, and endanger the newly established authority. Slowly, and with profound dissimulation, therefore, he proceeded in his advances. A fine statue of Brutus was first placed in one of the galleries of the palace; it was thought the most ardent Republicans could apprehend nothing from a change which commenced with honour done to the hero who had slain a tyrant. Orders were next given to repair and put in order the royal apartments in the Tuileries, and under the veil of these words great changes were effected. The *bonnets rouges* were all effaced; the statues which were to adorn the great gallery chosen by Napoléon himself; he selected among the ancients, Démosthènes and Alexander, Brutus and Cæsar; among the moderns, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Condé, Prince Eugène, Marlborough, Marshal Saxe, Frédéric, Washington, Dugommier, Dampierre, and Joubert. At length, the translation of the Consuls from the Luxembourg to the Tuileries took place: the royal apartments were destined for Napoléon, those in the pavilion of Flora for the other Consuls. The *cortége* set out from the Luxembourg, surrounded by a splendid train of officers and three thousand chosen troops, among whom the famous regiment of Guides was peculiarly conspicuous. Napoléon, with the two other Consuls, was drawn in a magnificent chariot by six white horses, the same which the Emperor of Austria had given him after the treaty of Campo Formio; he bore in his hand the splendid sabre presented to him by the same sovereign on that occasion. The cabinet ministers followed in their carriages, the only ones which were to be seen on the occasion, for to transport the council of state they were obliged to have recourse to hackney coaches; such was the miserable destitution in which the Revolution

had left the highest civil functionaries of France (1). The real luxury of that period consisted in the splendour of the troops, whose brilliant uniforms and prancing chargers formed a painful contrast to the meanness and simplicity of the civil authorities—last and sad effect of revolutionary convulsions, to cast to the earth every thing but the ensigns of military prowess.

Feb. 19, 1800. From the opening into the Carrousel, from the quay of the Tuileries to the gate of the palace, the procession passed through a double line of guards: a royal usage, which offered a singular contrast to the inscription on the guard-house by which it passed—"10th August, 1792—Royalty is abolished in France, and will never be re-established." No sooner had he arrived at the foot of the great stair, than Napoléon, allowing the other Consuls to ascend to the presence chamber, mounted on horseback, and, amidst incessant cries of "Vive le Premier Consul!" passed in review above twenty thousand men. Murat was on his right, Lannes on his left; the brilliant staff who surrounded him bore on their visages the marks of the sun of Italy or the sands of Egypt. When the banners of the ninetieth, the forty-third, and thirtieth demi-brigades, which exhibited only bare poles riddled with shot and surmounted by tatters black with powder, were carried past, he bowed with respect to the monuments of military valour. Enthusiastic acclamations rent the skies; and such was the universal transport, that when the review was concluded, and the First Consul ascended to the audience chamber and took his station in the centre of the room, his colleagues were reduced to the rank of pages following his train. On that day royalty was in truth re-established in France, somewhat less than eight years after it had been abolished by the revolt of the 10th August (2).

Commence-
ment of the
etiquette
and splen-
dour of a
court. No sooner was the First Consul established at the Tuileries, than the usages, dress, and ceremonial of a court were at once resumed. The antechambers were filled with chamberlains, pages, and esquires; footmen in brilliant liveries filled the lobbies and staircases; the levees were conducted with as much splendour as the dilapidated state of most fortunes would permit; and a drawing-room, composed chiefly of the wives of the young generals who had been the companions of Napoléon, and presided over by the grace and good-breeding of Josephine, already revived to a certain degree the lustre of a court. Napoléon was indefatigable in his attention to these matters. He deemed the colour of a livery, the cut of a court-dress not beneath his notice, endeavouring in every way to dazzle the eyes of the vulgar, and efface all recollection of the Republic before it was formally abolished by the authority of government (3). For the same reason, he revived the use of silk stockings in dress, and re-established the balls of the opera, an event which was so great an innovation on the manners of the

(1) Bour. iii. 320, 321. Goh. ii. 15, 19. Thib. 2.

(2) 318, 323. Thib. 2, 3.

On the night of his entry into the Tuileries, Napoléon said to his secretary, "Bourrienne, it is not enough to be in the Tuileries, we must take measures to remain there. Who has not inhabited this palace? It has been the abode of robbers, of members of the Convention. Ah! there is your brother's house, from which, eight years ago, [See vol. i. 159] we saw the good Louis XVI besieged in the Tuileries and carried off into captivity. But you need not fear a repetition of the scene. Let them attempt it with me if they dare." [Bour. iv.]

(3) The King of Prussia was among the first to

recognise the consular government, and Napoléon was highly gratified when an aide-de-camp, whom he dispatched to Berlin, was admitted to the honour of dining at the royal table. M. Luechesini, in October, 1800, was charged with a special mission to the court of the Tuileries from the Prussian government. The First Consul received him at St. Cloud, and was at the balcony when he arrived. He was much struck with the decorations which he bore, and the rich livery of the servants who attended him: and he was heard to exclaim, "That is imposing; we must have things of that sort to dazzle the people."—See THIEBAUDEAU, 14—15.

Republic that it created quite a sensation at that period. But Napoléon, in pursuing these measures, knew well the character of the French. "While they are discussing these changes," said he, "they will cease to talk nonsense about my politics, and that is what I want. Let them amuse themselves, let them dance; but let them not thrust their heads into the councils of government. Commerce will revive under the increasing expenditure of the capital. I am not afraid of the Jacobins; I never was so much applauded as at the last parade. It is ridiculous to say that nothing is right but what is new; we have had enough of such novelties. I would rather have the balls of the opera than the saturnalia of the Goddess of Reason (1)."

Recall of
many emi-
grants ex-
iled since
18th Fructi-
dor.

About the same time an *arrêt* was published, which took off the sentence of banishment against a great number of those who had been exiled by the result of the 18th Fructidor. It was only provided that they should be under the surveillance of the police, and reside at the places appointed for each respectively in the decree. Among the persons thus restored against an unjust sentence, were many of the most eminent citizens of the Republic: Carnot, Barthélemy, Boissy-d'Anglas, Portalis, Villoul, Joyeuse, and above forty others. He immediately made use of the most eminent of them in the service of the state: Carnot was appointed minister at war in the absence of Berthier, and contributed in a powerful manner to the glorious issue of the succeeding campaign. Barrère also was recalled, and was so desirous to receive employment, that he wrote a long letter justifying his conduct to the First Consul; but the latter never could be persuaded to take into his service that hardened Republican. Those proscribed by the Directory were thus early admitted into favour; at a subsequent period he received with equally open arms the Royalists and the victims of the Revolution; the only faction against which to the last he was inveterate was the remnant of the Jacobin party, who retained throughout all his reign the resolution of their character and the perversity of their opinion (2).

Establish-
ment of the
secret
police.

At the time when Napoléon was placed on the consular throne he organized his *secret police*, intended to act as a check on the public one of Fouché. Duroc was at first at the head of this establishment, to which Junot, as governor of Paris, soon after succeeded. So early did this great leader avail himself of this miserable engine, unknown in constitutional monarchies, the resource of despots, inconsistent with any thing like freedom, but the sad legacy bequeathed to succeeding ages by the convulsions and devastation of the Revolution. The spies and agents of this police and counter-police soon filled every coffee-house and theatre in Paris; they overheard conversations, mingled in groups, encouraged seditious expressions, were to be found in saloons and palaces, and rendered every man insecure, from the monarch on the throne to the captive in the dungeon. Lately appointed governor of Paris, Junot had a multitude of inferior agents in his pay to watch the motions of Fouché, and he, in his turn, carried corruption into the bosom of the consular family, and, by liberally supplying funds for her extravagance, obtained secret information from Joséphine herself (3). This miserable system had survived all the changes to which it gave birth; the formidable engine, organized in the heart of Paris, with its arms extending over all France, is instantly seized upon by each successive faction which

(1) Bour. iii. 263, 264, 319, 326, 327. Thib. 15.
D'Abr. ii. 265, 280.

(2) Bour. iii. 264, 267.

(3) Bour. iii. 295, 303.

risers to the head of affairs; the herd of informers and spies is perpetrated from generation to generation, and exercises its prostituted talents for behoof of any government which the armed force of the capital has elevated to supreme power; the people, habituated to this unseen authority, regard it as an indispensable part of regular government; and a system, which was the disgrace of Roman servitude in the corrupted days of the empire, is engrafted on a government which boasts of concentrating within itself all the lights of modern civilisation (1).

Napoléon's hypocritical eulogy on Washington. "Augustus knew well," says Gibbon, "that mankind are governed by names; and that they will in general submit to real slavery, if they are told that they are in the enjoyment of freedom." No man understood this principle better than Napoléon. While he was preparing, by fixing his residence in the royal palace, the appointments of the legislature by the executive, the suppression of the liberty of the press, and the establishment of a vigilant police for the overthrow of all the principles of the Revolution, he was careful to publish to the world proclamations which still breathed the spirit of democratic freedom. Shortly before his installation in the Tuileries, intelligence arrived of the death of Washington, the illustrious founder of American independence. He immediately published the following order of the day to the army:—"Washington is dead! That great man has struggled with tyranny; he consolidated the liberty of his country. His memory will be ever dear to the French people, as to all free men in both hemispheres, who, like him and the American soldiers, have fought for liberty and equality. As a mark of respect, the First Consul orders, that for ten days black erape shall be suspended from all the standards and banners of the Republic." Thus, by the skilful use of high-sounding names and heart-stirring recollections, did this

Comparison of his system of government with that established by Constantine in the Byzantine empire. (1) The circumstances of the Roman empire, as remodelled by Constantine, afford a striking analogy to those of France when Napoléon ascended the throne; and it is curious to observe how exactly the previous destruction of the nobility and higher classes in the two countries paved the way, by necessary consequence, for the same despotic institutions. "The Patrician families," says Gibbon, "whose original numbers were never recruited till the end of the commonwealth, either failed in the ordinary course of nature, or were extinguished in so many foreign or domestic wars. Few remained who could derive their genuine origin from the foundation of the city, when Cæsar and Augustus, Claudius and Vespasian, created a competent number of new Patrician families. But these artificial supplies, in which the reigning house was always included, were rapidly swept away by the rage of tyrants, by frequent revolutions, the change of manners, and the intermixture of nations. Little more was left, when Constantine ascended the throne, than a vague and imperfect tradition that the Patricians had once been the first among the Romans. To form a body of nobles whose influence may restrain, while it secures the authority of the monarch, would have been very inconsistent with the character and policy of Constantine; but had he seriously entertained such a design, it might have exceeded the measure of his power to ratify, by an arbitrary edict, an institution which must expect the sanction of time and opinion. He revived, indeed, the title of patricians; but he revived it as a personal, not an hereditary distinction. They yielded only to the transient authority of the annual consuls;

but they enjoyed the pre-eminence over all the great officers of state. This honourable rank was bestowed on them for life, and as they were usually favourites and ministers at the imperial court, the true etymology of the word was perverted by ignorance and flattery, and the patricians of Constantine were revered as the adopted fathers of the emperor and the republic.

"The police insensibly assumed the license of reporting whatever they could observe of the conduct, either of magistrates or private citizens, and were soon considered as the eyes of the monarch and the scourge of the people. Under the warm influence of a feeble reign, they multiplied to the incredible number of 10,000, disdained the mild though frequent admonitions of the laws, and exercised in the profitable management of the posts a rapacious and insolent oppression. These official spies, who corresponded with the palace, were encouraged with reward and favour anxiously to watch the progress of every treasonable design, from the faint and latent symptoms of disaffection, to the actual preparation of open revolt. Their careless or criminal violation of truth and justice was covered by the consecrated mask of zeal; and they might securely aim their poisoned arrows at the breast either of the innocent or the guilty, who had provoked their resentment or refused to purchase their silence. A faithful subject of Syria, perhaps, or Britain, was exposed to the danger, or at least to the dread, of being dragged in chains to the court of Milan or Constantinople, to defend his life and fortune against the malicious charges of these privileged informers." This might pass for a description of the Conservative Senate and police of Napoléon.—See Gibbon, ch. xvii.

great master of the art of dissimulation veil his advances towards absolute power, and engraft an enthusiastie admiration for his despotie government on the turbulent passions which had been nourished by the Revolution (1).

Commence-
ment of his
great designs
for architect-
tural embel-
lishment at
Paris.

The mind of Napoléon was equally great in every thing which it undertook. He had early conceived an admiration for architectural decoration, which his residence among the stately monuments of Egypt had converted into a chastened and elevated passion. His present situation, as chief of the French government, gave him ample room for the indulgence of this truly regal disposition, and he already began to conceive those great designs for the embellishment of Paris and improvement of France, which have thrown such durable lustre over his reign. The inconceivable activity of his mind seemed to take a pleasure in discovering new objects for exertion; and at a time when he was conducting the diplomacy of Europe, and regulating all the armies of France, he was maturing plans for the construction of roads, bridges, and canals through all its wide extent, and setting on foot those great works which have given such splendour to its capital. He early selected M. Fontaine and M. Péricrès as the instruments of his designs, and, aided by the suggestions of these able architects, the embellishment of the metropolis proceeded at an accelerated pace. The formation of a quay on the banks of the Seine, opposite to the Tuileries, near the Quai Voltaire, first removed a deformity which had long been felt in looking from the windows of the palace, and the clearing out of the Place du Carrousel next suggested the idea of uniting the Louvre and Tuileries, and forming a vast square between those two sumptuous edifices. At first it was proposed to construct a building across the vacant area, in order to conceal the oblique position in which they stood to each other; but this idea was soon abandoned, as Napoléon justly observed, that “no building, how majestic soever, could compensate for a vast open space between the Louvre and Tuileries.” The construction of a fourth side, for the great square opposite to the picture gallery, was therefore commenced, and the demolition of the edifices in the interior soon after began; a great undertaking, which the subsequent disasters of his reign prevented him from completing, and which all the efforts of succeeding sovereigns have not been able as yet to bring to a conclusion. The Pont-des-Arts, between the Louvre and the Palace of the Institute, was commenced about the same time, and the demolition of the convents of the Feuillans and Capucines made way for the Rue de Rivoli, which now forms so noble a border to the gardens of the Tuileries. Malmaison at this time was the favourite country residence of the First Consul; but he already meditated the establishment of his court at St.-Cloud, and the apartments of that palace began to be fitted up in that sumptuous style which has rendered them unequalled in all the palaces of France (2).

Suppression
of the fête
on 21st Ja-
nuary, and
elevation of
Tronchet.

The First Consul did not as yet venture openly to break with the Republican party, but he lost no opportunity of showing in what estimation he held their principles. On occasion of the establishment of the Court of Cassation, the supreme tribunal of France, he said to Bourrienne,—“I do not venture as yet to take any decided step against the regicides; but I will show what I think of them. To-morrow I shall be engaged with Abrial in the formation of the Tribunal of Cassation. Target, who is its president, declined to defend Louis XVI: Whom do you

(1) Thib. 2, 3. Bour. iii. 278.

(2) Thib. 2, 3. Bour. iv. 46, 56.

suppose I am about to name in his place? Tronchet, who so nobly discharged that perilous duty. They may say what they choose; my mind is made up." Tronchet accordingly received the appointment so richly deserved by his heroic conduct. The commemoration of the murder of Louis XVI was at the same time suppressed, and concerts of sacred music were permitted on Sundays at the Opera. Thus, though the Republican calendar was still observed, an approach was made to the ancient mode of measuring time in the public amusements (1).

Correspondence between Napoleon and Louis XVIII. Louis XVIII at this time wrote several letters to Napoléon, in which he expressed the high esteem in which he held his character, and offered him any situation which he chose to fix on under the government, if he would aid in re-establishing the throne of the Bourbons. Napoléon replied in firm but courteous terms, declining to have any connexion with the exiled family (2). He clearly foresaw, with admirable sagacity, all the difficulties which would attend the restoration of that unfortunate family, and felt no inclination to make way for such an event. "The partisans of the Bourbons," said he, "are much mistaken if they imagine that I am the man to play the part of Monk. I am not insensible to the hazard to which France may be one day exposed from my decease without issue, as my brothers are evidently unfit for such a throne; but consider the absurdity of the propositions which they have made to me. How could we secure so many new interests and vested rights against the efforts of a family returning with eighty thousand emigrants, and all the prejudices of fanaticism? What would become of the holders of national domains, and all those who had taken an active part in the Revolution? The Bourbons would conceive they had conquered by force; all their professions and promises would give way before the possession of power. My part is taken; no one but a fool would place any reliance upon them (3)."

General improvement in the prospects of France. Thus, on all sides, the prospects of France rapidly brightened under the auspices of Napoléon. To the insecurity, distrust, and terror which had paralysed all the efforts of patriotism under the Direc-

(1) Bour. iv. 68, 70.

(2) The letter of Louis XVIII was in these terms:—
Feb. 4.

"For long, general, you must have known the esteem in which I hold you. If you doubt my gratitude, fix upon the place you desire for yourself; point out the situations which you wish for your friends. As to my principles, they are those of the French character. Clemency on principle accords with the dictates of reason.

"No—the victor of Lodi, Castiglione, and Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and Egypt can never prefer a vain celebrity to true glory. But you are losing the most precious moments. We could secure the happiness of France. I say we, for I require Bonaparte for such an attempt and he could not achieve it without me. General, Europe observes you—glory awaits you; and I am impatient to restore peace to my people."

Napoléon replied:—

Sept. 24. 1800. "I have received, sir, your letter. I thank you for the obliging expressions which it contains regarding myself.

"You should renounce all hope of returning to France. You could not do so, but over the bodies of one hundred thousand Frenchmen. Sacrifice your interest to the repose and happiness of France. History will duly appreciate your conduct in so doing.

"I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your

family, and shall learn with pleasure that you are surrounded with every thing which can secure the tranquillity of your retreat."

This answer was not dispatched for seven months after the receipt of the letter from Louis, and when the Congress of Luneville was about to open.—See BOURRIENNE, iv. 77—79.

Not disconcerted with this repulse, the Bourbon family endeavoured to open a negotiation with Napoléon; through the Duchess of Guiche, a lady of great beauty and abilities, who found no difficulty in penetrating to Joséphine, and conveying to her the propositions of the exiled family, which were, that he should, on restoring them, be made Constable of France and receive the principality of Corsica. Napoléon no sooner heard of it than he ordered the fascinating duchess to leave Paris in twenty-four hours; an order which gave great satisfaction to Joséphine, who already had become somewhat uneasy at the proximity of so charming a personage. It had been proposed that a splendid pillar should be erected on the Place du Carrousel, surmounted by a statue of Napoléon crowning the Bourbons. "Nothing was wanting," said Napoléon, "to such a design except that the pillar should be founded on the dead body of the First Consul."—LAS CAS, i. 289, 290, and CAPEFIGUE, i. 140.

(3) Bour. iv. 72, 83. Capefigue, Hist. de la Restauration, i. 137, 141.

tory, succeeded confidence, energy, and hope; genius emerged from obscurity to take an active part in public affairs; corruption and profligacy ceased to poison every branch of administration. There is nothing more striking in European history than the sudden resurrection of France under the government of this great man, or more descriptive of the natural tendency of human affairs to right themselves after a period of disorder, and the general disposition of all classes, when taught wisdom by suffering, to resume that place in society for which they were destined by nature, and in which alone their exertions can add to the sum of general felicity.

CHAPTER XXXI.

CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN TO THE ARMISTICE OF ALEXANDRIA.

MARCH—JULY, 1800.

ARGUMENT.

Disposition of the French Armies at the Opening of the Campaign—Formation of the French Army of Reserve—Forces of the Imperialists—Plan of the Austrians for the Campaign—And of the First Consul—Position of Kray's Forces in Germany—And of Moreau's Troops—First Movements of the French General—Irresolution of the Austrian Generals in consequence—Moreau advances against their Centre—Battle of Engen—Victory of the French—Its great Results—Retreat of Kray—Battle of Moeskireh—It at length terminates in the Defeat of the Imperialists—Perilous Situation of St.-Cyr on the following day—Affair of Biherach—Kray retreats to the Intrenched Camp at Ulm—Advantages of that Position—Kray keeps the Field with part of his Force—Great Strength of the Intrenched Camp—Measures of Moreau to dislodge him from it—Vigorous stroke of the Austrian General against the Left Wing of the French—Increasing Perplexity of Moreau—He in vain moves round to Augsburg—He next advances on the Left Bank of the Danube—Imminent risk of the French Left—At length Moreau cuts off his Communications—The Passage of the Danube is effected by the French—Severe Action at Hochstedt—Kray is at length obliged to evacuate Ulm and reaches Nordlingen—Moreau occupies Munich—Kray crosses the Danube and descends the right bank to Landshut—And falls back behind the Inn—Operations against the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol—Feldkirch is carried by the Republicans—Armistice of Parsdorf in Germany—Extreme suffering of the French on the Summit of the Maritime Alps—Masséna is appointed to the Command—Napoleon's Proclamation to these Troops—Energetic Measures taken to restore order—Positions of the Austrians—Description of Genoa—Measures taken for its Blockade by Land and Sea—Successful Attack of the Imperialists on the French Position—Suchet is separated from the main body and driven back towards France—Desperate and successful Sortie of Masséna—His disposition for re-opening his Communications with Suchet—Austrian Measures to prevent it, which prove successful—Continued Successes of the Imperialists—Masséna is finally driven into Genoa—Defeat of Suchet by Elnitz—Who is driven over the Var into France—General Attack by Ott on the French Positions round Genoa—Which, at first successful, is finally repulsed by Masséna—Successful Sally of the French—Which leads to another, in which they are defeated and Soult made prisoner—Siege is converted into a Blockade—Extreme want of the Inhabitants—A fresh Sortie is defeated—Agonies endured by the Inhabitants—Masséna at length surrenders—Mélas sets out to meet Napoleon—Allies advance to Nice—Description of Suchet's Position on the Var—Attack by the Austrians on it, which is repulsed—Fresh Attack, and final Repulse of them—Formation of the Army of Reserve by Napoleon—Skillful Measures taken to conceal its Strength—Description of the Passage of the St.-Bernard—Napoleon resolves to hazard the Passage—Measures taken for the crossing of the Artillery—Passage of the Mountains—Comparison of the Passage of the Alps by Hannibal, Napoleon, Suwarrow, and Maedonald—The Army is stopped in the Valley of Aosta by the Fort of Bard—Great Skill with which the Obstacle was evaded by the French Engineers—Passage of the St.-Gothard and Mount Cinis by the Wings of the Army of Reserve—Mélas in haste concentrates his Army—Different Plans which lay open to Napoleon—He resolves to occupy Milan—His Advance into Lombardy, and Capture of that City—He spreads his Forces over Lombardy, and addresses a Proclamation to his Soldiers—Napoleon advances to meet Mélas, who concentrates his forces at Alexandria—The French Vanguard comes up with the Austrians at Montchello—Desperate and Bloody Action there, in which the Austrians are worsted—Position of the French Army in the Pass at Stradella between the Apennines and the Po—Disastrous Retreat of Elnitz from the Var—Gallant Resolution of Mélas to cut his way through Napoleon's Army—Arrival of Desaix from Egypt at Napoleon's Headquarters—Preparatory Movements of both parties—Forces assembled on both sides—Battle of Marengo—Early Success of the Austrians—The French Reserves are brought into action under Desaix—After a gallant Charge he, too, is defeated—Decisive Charge of Kellermann converts a Rout into a Victory—Final Defeat of the Aus-

trians—Loss sustained on both sides—Melas proposes a Suspension of Arms—Armistice of Alexandria—Its immense Results—Is faithfully observed by the Austrians—Napoléon returns to Milan—And then to Paris—Reflections on this Campaign—Great Changes in human affairs are never owing to trivial causes—Extraordinary Resurrection of France on the accession of Napoléon—Causes of the Disasters of the Campaign to the Imperialists—Important Effect of Central Fortifications in a State—Merits of Napoléon in the Campaign—And of the Austrian Commanders—Inexpediency of receiving Battle in the Oblique Order—Inactivity of Abercromby's Corps at this crisis considered.

Disposition of the French armies at the opening of the campaign. THE French forces were disposed, previous to the commencement of hostilities, in the following manner :—The army of Italy, which occupied the crest of the Alps from the neighbourhood of Genoa to Mont-Cenis, was thirty-six thousand strong, of which twenty-eight thousand were assembled in Liguria, from the Trebbia to the Col di Tende, to guard the passes of the Apennines and protect Genoa from the Imperial forces, which were grouped in the plain round the walls of Alexandria. These troops, however, were for the most part in the most miserable condition; their spirits were depressed by a campaign of unprecedented disaster, their clothing was worn out, their feet bare, their artillery broken down, their cavalry dismounted, and it required all the efforts of St.-Cyr and their other officers during the winter to retain them at their colours (1).

Formation of the French army of reserve. The army of Germany, which was afterwards called the army of the Danube, was 128,000 strong, including 16,000 cavalry, of which immense force 105,090 men, including 14,000 horse, could be relied on for active operations. An army of reserve of 50,000 men was at the same time formed, the head-quarters of which were nominally at Dijon, but the bulk of the force was in reality disposed at Geneva, Lausanne, and the other towns which lay between the Jura and the Alps. This reserve was destined either to support the army of Italy or that of Germany, as circumstances required, and it was formed of 20,000 veteran troops, brought from Holland, under Brune, to la Vendée, which the pacification of that district rendered disposable for offensive operations, and 50,000 conscripts, directed to that quarter from the central dépôts. These troops traversed France, with drums beating and colours flying, in the finest order, and their splendid appearance contributed much to revive the martial ardour of the people, which the disasters of the preceding campaigns had so seriously impaired. Berthier received the command of this army, and gave up the portfolio of minister of war to Carnot, whom Napoléon sought out in exile to fill that important situation (2).

Forces of the Imperialists. On the other hand, the Imperialists had collected 96,000 men in Piedmont and at the foot of the Maritime Alps, besides 20,000, who were dispersed in garrisons in the states of Venice, Lombardy, and Tuscany. Their forces in Germany were still more considerable, amounting to 92,000 men, including 18,000 superb cavalry, and they were followed by above 400 pieces of artillery. This was independent of the troops of Bavaria and the minor states in the English pay, which amounted to 20,000 more, making in all 112,000 men. This great force, however, was scattered over an immense line, 200 miles long, from the Alps to the Maine, insomuch that, in the valley of the Danube, which was the decisive point of the whole, as it at once led to the Hereditary States, Kray could only assemble 45,000 men to resist the 75,000 which Moreau could direct against that point. The great error of the Austrians in this campaign consisted in supposing that Italy was the quarter where the decisive attack was to be made, and collecting in consequence the

(1) Jom. xiii. 48. St.-Cyr, Hist. Mil. ii. 84, 102. (2) Jom. xiii. 111. Dum. iii. 25, 27. St.-Cyr, i.

greater part of their reserves in that country; whereas the valley of the Danube was the place where danger was really to be apprehended, and where the principal forces of the Republicans were collected. But they were deceived by the great successes of the preceding campaign; they were ignorant or incredulous of the rapid change produced on the French armies by the seizure of supreme power by Napoléon; and were dreaming of conquests on the Var and in Provence, when their redoubtable adversary was already meditating strokes in the heart of Bavaria (1).

Plan of the Austrians. The plan of the Austrians was to resume the offensive vigorously in Italy, where the great numerical superiority of Melas, as well as the warlike and experienced quality of the troops he commanded, promised the most important results; to throw Masséna back into Genoa, and capture that important city; drive the French over the Maritime Alps, and carry the war into the heart of Provence. To co-operate with this design, an English expedition, having twelve thousand troops on board, was to proceed to the Mediterranean, and aid the Imperialists either in the south of France or the Maritime Alps. This being the quarter where active operations were to be undertaken, the war in Germany was intended to be merely defensive, and rather to occupy a considerable army of the enemy on the Rhine than to make any serious impression on his territories in that quarter (2).

And of the First Consul. On his side, Napoléon determined to prosecute the war vigorously where the Austrians proposed only to pursue defensive measures, and to liberate Italy by the blows struck at the Hereditary States in the heart of Germany. The possession of Switzerland, like a central fortress, gave the French the advantage of being able to take the line of the enemy's operations in rear, either in Italy or Swabia. Napoléon had intrusted the command of the army of Germany to Moreau, a generous proceeding towards so formidable a rival, but which his great military talents, and the unbounded confidence of the soldiers of the army of the Rhine in his capacity, as well as the important services which he had rendered to the First Consul on the 18th Brumaire, rendered indispensable. The plan which he proposed to his great lieutenant was to assemble all his forces in the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen, cross the Rhine by four bridges near that town, move directly in an imposing mass on Ulm, and thus turn the left of the Imperialists, and take in rear all the Austrians placed between the Rhine and the defiles of the Black Forest. By this means he hoped that the army, in a week after the opening of the campaign, would be at Ulm, and such of the Imperialists as escaped would have no alternative but to throw themselves into Bohemia, leaving Vienna and the Hereditary States to their fate. That these brilliant anticipations were not chimerical, is proved by the result of the campaigns of 1805 and 1809; and so strongly was Napoléon impressed with their importance, that he at one time entertained the project of putting himself at the head of the army of the Danube, and directing the army of reserve to its support, which would have brought a force of a hundred and eighty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian line in Germany. But Moreau would not submit to the indignity of acting as second in command to his former rival (3); and the disposition of his troops was too republican, and their attachment to their general too strong, to render it prudent to run the risk of revolt in so powerful an army, even for the sake of the greatest external advantages. An angry

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 334. Nap. i. 185, 161. *Jom.* xiii. 52, 113. *St. Cyr*, ii. 108, 137.

(2) Nap. i. 162. *Jom.* xiii. 41, 42.

(3) He said, "I have no notion of seeing a little

Louis XIV at the head of my army. If the First Consul takes the command, I will send in my resignation."—*St. Cyr*, ii. 103. *Hist. Mil.*

discussion took place between the two generals, which terminated in the retention of the supreme command by Moreau, and the adoption of a modified plan for the campaign in Germany, in lieu of the brilliant but hazardous one projected by the First Consul; and in consequence Napoléon resolved to direct the army of reserve to Italy, and in person renew the struggle on the scene of his former triumphs on the plains of Piedmont (1).

At this period the army of the Rhine was far from cordially supporting the government of the First Consul. Independent of the republican principles with which, in common with all the other French troops, they were more or less imbued, they were in a peculiar manner jealous of the audacious general who had placed himself at the head of affairs, and seized the sceptre which they thought would have been more worthily held by his more disinterested rival. Any attempt to displace Moreau from the command of this great army would probably have led to a collision, which might have proved fatal to the infant authority of Napoléon (2).

Position of Kray's forces in Germany. Field-marshal Kray had his headquarters at Donaueschingen; but his chief magazines were in the rear of his army, at Stockach, Engen, Moeskirch, and Biberach. The right wing, twenty-six thousand strong, under the command of Starray, rested on the Main; its headquarters were at Heidelberg, and it guarded the line of the Rhine from the Renchen to the Main. The left, under the orders of the Prince of Reuss, was in the Tyrol; it consisted of twenty-six thousand men, besides seven thousand militia, and occupied the Rheintal and the shores of the lake of Constance. The centre, forty-three thousand strong, under the command of Kray in person, was stationed behind the Black Forest in the environs of Villingen and Donaueschingen; its advanced posts occupied all the passes of that woody range, and observed the course of the Rhine from the lake of Constance to the neighbourhood of Kehl; while fifteen thousand men, under Keimayer, guarded the passes from the Renchen to the Valley of Hell, and formed the link which connected the centre and right wing (3). Thus, though the Imperialists were nearly one hundred and ten thousand strong, they were stationed at such a distance from each other as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid in case of need; and were rather to be regarded as three separate armies, the largest of which could not bring above forty thousand men into the field at any one point.

Positions of Moreau's troops. The French army, at the opening of the campaign, was also divided in three corps. The right, thirty-two thousand strong, under Lecourbe, occupied the cantons of Switzerland from the St.-Gothard to Basle, won at the expense of so much blood in the preceding campaign, from the Imperialists; the centre, under Gouvion St.-Cyr, who was transferred to that command from the army of Genoa, consisted of twenty-nine thousand men, and occupied the left bank of the Rhine, from New Brisach to Plobsheim; the left, under Sainte-Suzanne, twenty-one thousand strong, extended from Kehl to Haguenau. Independent of these, Moreau himself was at the head of a reserve, consisting of twenty-eight thousand men, which was assembled in the neighbourhood of Basle, and which, if added to either of the divisions of the army, would give it a decided preponderance over that of the enemy to which it was opposed. Thus Moreau could, by uniting the reserve and centre, bring nearly sixty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian force of forty thousand in the same quarter; an immense advantage, which was speedily

(1) Nap. i. 163, 164. St.-Cyr, ii. 103, 104. Jom. xiii. 36, 37. Dum. iii. 84, 85. Bul. Feldzug, Marungo, 17, 18.

(2) St.-Cyr, ii. 102. Dum. i. li. 84, 85, 86.

(3) St.-Cyr, ii. 107, 108. Jom. xiii. 112, 113. Nap. i. 161, 162.

turned to the best account by that able commander. Besides these great forces, the French general had at his disposal the garrisons of the fortresses of Switzerland, Landau, and Spire; the division of Mayence, commanded by Laval, and the troops of the fifth and twenty-sixth military divisions, forming an aggregate of thirty-two thousand men additional, which might be termed the reserves of the army; while the possession of the bridges of Kehl, New Brisach (1), and Basle, gave him the means of crossing the Rhine when, ever he deemed it most advisable.

First move-
ments of the
French
General.

It was part of the plan of Napoléon to detach sixteen thousand men under Moncey, from Lecourbe's wing stationed in Switzerland, in order to take a share in the great operations which he meditated in the Italian plains; and therefore it was of importance that Moreau should early resume the offensive, both in order to take advantage of his numerical superiority before that detachment took place, and operate as a diversion to the army of Italy, which it was foreseen would soon be hard pressed by Melas in the mountains of Genoa. Orders, therefore, were transmitted to him to open the campaign without delay, and every thing was ready for a forward movement by the 24th April. The plan finally arranged between Moreau and the First Consul was to make a feint on the left against the corps of Keimayer and the enemy's right; and having thus drawn their attention to that quarter, accumulate all his disposable forces against the Imperial centre, and overwhelm it by a concentration of the French left wing, centre, and reserve. By this means he hoped to break through the Austrian line of defence with a preponderating force, and, after a single battle, cut off their communication with the Tyrol and Italy, and force them back, after losing their magazines at Moeskirch and Engen, to a disadvantageous defensive on the banks of the Danube (2).

The better to conceal this able design, Moreau, for some days before the army was put in motion, made the greatest demonstrations against the enemy's right. Every thing was prepared for the head-quarters at Colmar, and it was publicly announced that the reserve was to be directed against Keimayer and the Valley of Hell. Meanwhile, the columns moved to the diffe-

April 25. rent points assigned to them, and on the 25th, at daybreak, Sainte-Suzanne crossed the bridge of Kehl, at the head of sixteen thousand men, and drove in the advanced posts of Keimayer towards the entrance of the Black Forest. On the same day, the centre crossed at New Brisach, under the orders of St.-Cyr, and advanced towards Freyburg. Kray upon this moved a consi-

April 27. derable part of his centre and reserves to the support of Keimayer; but Sainte-Suzanne having thus executed his feint, suddenly remeasured his steps, recrossed the Rhine at Kehl, and advanced by forced marches to New Brisach, where he crossed again and formed a second line in the rear of St.-Cyr. On the 25th, Moreau also crossed at Basle with the reserve, and moved in the direction of Lauffenburg (3).

Irresolution
of the Aus-
trian Gene-
rals in con-
sequence.

These different and apparently contradictory movements, threw the Austrian generals into the greatest perplexity. Uncertain where the storm was likely really to burst, they adopted the ruinous resolution of guarding equally every point; and still inclining to the belief that the right and the Valley of Hell were really threatened, they retained thirty thousand men, under Starray and Keimayer, on the right, and twenty-five thousand on the left in the rocks of the Voralberg, while their centre and

(1) Jom. xiii. 110—111. St.-Cyr, ii. 109—110.

(3) St.-Cyr, ii. 120, 129. Dum. iii. 94, 99. Jom.

(2) Nap. i. 165. Jom. xiii. 116, 117. Dum. iii. xiii, 120, 125.

reserve, now reduced to forty thousand men, were menaced by an attack by Sainte-Suzanne, Moreau, and St.-Cyr, at the head of seventy thousand combatants. The two following days were employed in concentrating his forces between Kehland Freyburg; and the better to distract the enemy, Lecourbesoon after crossed the Rhine, with the right wing, at Paradis and Richlingen, and, after throwing a bridge over at Stein, advanced towards Engen and Stockach. On the same day, the inaccessible fort of Hohenstohel

April 28
and 29. capitulated without firing a shot, and the left of Lecourbe entered into communication with Moreau and St.-Cyr. Thus the whole French army, with the exception of two divisions of the left wing which observed Keimayer and Starray, were converging towards the Imperial magazines at Engen and Moeskirch, which it was evident could not be saved but by a battle fought against most unequal odds (1).

Moreau ad-
vances
against their
centre. Ably profiting by the great advantages already gained, Moreau directed Lecourbe to move towards Stockach, in order to turn the centre of the enemy and cut off their communication with the left wing under the Prince of Reuss, while he himself, with the centre, reserve, and part of Sainte Suzanne's corps, moved directly upon the town of Engen,

May 2. which it was anticipated would not be abandoned without a struggle, on account of the valuable magazines which it contained. Kray, on his part, assembled all the disposable force he could command in front of Engen, where he resolved to give battle, to gain time for the evacuation of his magazines upon Moeskirch. But while he was concentrating his forces in that central position, the Prince of Lorraine, who formed the communication between the Austrian centre and left wing, and was retiring with inferior forces before Lecourbe, was suddenly assailed by the French advanced guard, under Molitor, and the cavalry of Nansouty, and entirely routed. Three thousand prisoners and eight pieces of cannon were the immediate results of this brilliant affair; but it became still more important by the capture of Stockach, with all its magazines, directly in rear of the position of Kray in front of Engen (2).

Battle of
Engen. On the same day on which this important success was gained on the right, the French centre, under Moreau in person, encountered the Austrian main body in the vast plain which lies before that town. Kray, with forty thousand men, was there in position, and the cavalry, above nine thousand strong, presented the most imposing spectacle, drawn up in echelon in front of the town. His design was to attack in front himself, at the head of the reserve and part of the centre, while St.-Cyr, with his division, was directed to turn the left of the enemy. But that general being five leagues in the rear, could not come up until a late hour of the day; and Moreau, apprehensive lest, if the attack were delayed, the enemy would retreat, commenced the action himself at the head of thirty-two thousand men. The chief efforts of the French general were directed to gain possession of a plateau on the right of the Imperialists, which would both command their line of retreat and facilitate his own junction with St.-Cyr, but he encountered the most stubborn resistance. Kray had skilfully availed himself of all the advantages which the ground afforded him in that quarter; and for long all the efforts of the Republicans were unable to drive back their opponents from the vineyards and wooded heights, which they had occupied in force, and surmounted with a numerous artillery. At length, the French carried the peak

(1) Nap. i. 166. Jom. xiii. 125, 129. Dum. iii. 98, 101. St.-Cyr, ii. 131, 137.

(2) Nap. i. 167. Jom. xiii. 132, 133. Dum. iii. 107, 109. St.-Cyr, ii. 157, 158.

of Hohenhowen, the most elevated point on the field of battle, and the Imperialists retired to the village of Ehingen. To restore the combat, the Austrian general strongly reinforced that important post, while Moreau brought up his reserve to expel the enemy from it. At first the Republicans were successful, and the village was carried; but Kray having charged in person at the head of the Hungarian grenadiers, they were driven out with great slaughter, and fled to the plain in the greatest confusion. Moreau instantly advancing to the spot, succeeded in restoring a certain degree of order, and in part regained the ground which had been lost, but the Hungarians continued to hold the village, and at nightfall all the avenues to it were still in their possession (1).

Meanwhile the division of Richepanse, which had established itself on the peak of Hohenhowen, was exposed to a furious attack from the Austrian right; the summit of the mountain resembled a volcano, which vomited forth fire in every direction; and it was easy to see, from the intensity of the light, which, as the twilight approached, illuminated the heavens in that direction, that it was only by the greatest efforts that he could maintain his ground. At seven o'clock, however, the vanguard of the corps of St.-Cyr, which had met with the greatest difficulties in the course of its march, and had been compelled to fight his way against Nauendorf's division through strong defiles, arrived in the field, and soon after began to take a part in the action. The combat now became more equal, and though the fire of artillery on both sides continued extremely violent, it was evident that the enemy fought only to gain time to withdraw his stores and ammunition. In fact, at this hour the Austrian general received intelligence of the defeat of the Prince of Lorraine and the capture of Stockach, which threatened his line of communications (2). He therefore drew off his forces in the direction of Liptingen and Moeskirch, where he formed a junction with that prince, who had retreated with the remains of his division in the same direction.

The loss of the Austrians in this battle was above seven thousand men, and that of the French was as great, but the moral consequences of the success with which it terminated to the Republicans, were incalculable. It at once raised the spirit of the army, and produced that confidence in themselves, which is the surest prelude to still greater success. Kray finding that the intentions of the enemy were now fully proclaimed, and that he had on his hands the whole strength of the French army, made the utmost efforts when too late to concentrate his forces. Keimayer was advancing with the greatest expedition by the Valley of Hell, while Starray had received orders to hasten to the decisive point, leaving only six thousand in the neighbourhood of Mannheim to observe the enemy's forces in that quarter. Moreau having received intelligence of this intended concentration of force, resolved to make the most of his present advantages, and attack the Austrians before they received any farther reinforcements. On the 4th, the Imperialists retired to a strong position in front of Moeskirch; the whole front of their line was covered by a great ravine, which descends from Hendorf to Moeskirch, and its left by the Ablach, a rocky stream which flows in a rapid course into the Danube; the cavalry, and a reserve of eight battalions of grenadiers, were stationed on the heights of Rohrdorf. Powerful batteries commanded the chaussée which approached the village, and by their concentric fire seemed to render all access impossible. In this

(1) Dum. iii. 110, 114. Jom. xiii. 134, 139.
St.-Cyr, ii. 156, 161.

(2) Dum. iii. 114, 116. Jom. xiii. 139, 141. St.-Cyr, ii. 158, 179.

formidable position were collected forty thousand foot soldiers, and twelve thousand splendid cavalry, besides above two hundred pieces of cannon (1).

Battle of Moeskirch. Though Moreau had ordered Lecourbe to join him with all his disposable force, in order to take a part in the general action which was approaching, yet he had not contrived matters so as to bring all his forces into the field at the same time. The consequence was, that Lecourbe, with that portion of his corps which had not taken a part in the action of the preceding day, first commenced the attack. He advanced with the greatest intrepidity to the assault of his old antagonist the Prince of Lorraine; but he was received by so tremendous a fire from the cross batteries which Kray had established on the heights, that his artillery was instantly dismounted, and he himself compelled to take refuge in the neighbouring woods to avoid the merciless storm. Moreau, upon this, brought forward the division Lorges, and attacked the position by its left and the village of Hendorf; but the attacking columns having been assailed by the enemy's masses, who suddenly debouched from behind their batteries, were thrown into confusion and entirely routed. Encouraged by this success, Kray made a sally with his right wing, and advanced into the plain; but it was received in so resolute a manner by the French left, that he was not only compelled to retire, but the victorious Republicans recovered all the ground they had lost, and the village was carried by their pursuing columns, who entered pell-mell with the fugitives. At the same time, Vandamme, with the Republican right, advanced against the Imperial left, and attacked the village of Moeskirch; the Austrians defended it with the utmost resolution, and it was taken and retaken several times: at length Lecourbe formed his division into four columns, which advanced simultaneously to the attack (2). Nothing could resist their impetuosity; they rushed down the sides of the ravines, up the opposite banks, and chased the Imperialists from the plateau, while Molitor drove them out of Moeskirch, and their victorious columns met in the centre of the town.

It at length terminates in the defeat of the Imperialists. Kray, seeing his left forced, skilfully executed a change of position in the very middle of the battle. He drew back his left from the plateau which had been so obstinately disputed, and took up a position parallel to the Danube, with his centre still resting on the plateau of Rohrdorf. This new position brought him on the flank of the division of Lorges, who was unsupported on that side. Kray instantly saw his advantage, and charged the exposed division, which was overthrown, and driven back in such confusion that nothing but the opportune arrival of Delmas with six fresh battalions prevented the French line being entirely broken through at that point. Both parties now made the utmost efforts; the Austrians to improve the advantage they had gained, the French to re-establish their line. Moreau executed a change of front, arranging his army parallel to that of the enemy, and during the progress of this new formation, the French division Delmas was furiously assailed, but all the efforts of the Imperialists were unable to break his admirable infantry. Still, however, Kray redoubled his efforts, and charged himself at the head of his reserve against the division of Bastoul; Moreau also brought up reinforcements, and the combat continued for two hours with various success, till at length the arrival of Richepanse with a fresh division induced the Austrian general to retire, which was done before nightfall in the best order to the heights of Bucherni and Rohrdorf (5).

In this action, so obstinately contested on both sides, the loss to the con-

(1) Jom. xiii. 144, 145. Dum. iii. 124, 125.

(3) St.-Cyr, ii. 195, 197. Dum. iii. 129, 131.

(2) Jom. xiii. 146, 150. Dum. iii. 126, 130. St.-Cyr, ii. 190, 191.

Jom. xiii. 150, 155.

tending parties was nearly equal, amounting to each to about six thousand men. The Austrians retained at the close of the day the plateau of Rohrdorf; the French slept on great part of the field of battle. But all the moral advantages of a victory were on their side; and as, on the following day, the Imperialists retired across the Danube—they in reality achieved the object for which they contended. The success was balanced chiefly in consequence of the non-arrival of St.-Cyr with his division, who lingered at Liptingen; had he come up and taken a part in the action, it would probably have terminated in a total defeat, the more disastrous to the Imperialists that they fought with their backs to the Danube. The cause of this inactivity in so able an officer, is to be found in the nature of the first instructions he had received from Moreau, and the intercepting of the couriers which conveyed the second orders to hasten to the decisive point (1).

Pierous situation of St.-Cyr on the following day.

Following out the only orders he had received, St.-Cyr, on the succeeding day, was leisurely moving parallel to the Danube, between that river and the Austrian army, when he came unawares

upon their whole force drawn up in a small but strong position in front of the bridge of Sigmaringen. The ground they occupied would barely have sufficed for the deploying of a single division, being formed by a bend of the Danube, the base of which fronting the enemy, was covered by a formidable array of artillery, behind which the army was posted in seven lines almost forming a close column, and protecting in this manner the passage of their stores over the river. Upon the approach of the French the surprise was equal on both sides; Kray, much alarmed, and apprehending an immediate attack, drew up his rearguard in battle-array, and disposed the artillery which had crossed as well as that which remained in their front, in such a manner as to enfilade all the roads by which the position might be ap-

May 6. proached. St.-Cyr also paused; with the half of his division, which alone had come up, he did not venture to attack the whole Austrian army, but he insulted them by a battery of twelve pieces, which was pushed forward within cannon shot; and so weakened was the spirit of the Imperialists, that they replied to this fire only by a discharge from their numerous batteries, instead of issuing from their lines and sweeping the pieces off by a charge of their powerful cavalry. There can be little doubt that if Moreau, instead of lingering at Moeskirch on the field of battle, had followed the traces of the enemy, joined St.-Cyr, and attacked them when backed by the Danube in this extraordinary position, he would have succeeded in destroying a large part of their army; but that general, with all his great qualities, had not the vigour in following up a success, which formed the leading characteristic of his more enterprising rival (2).

Affairs of Biberach.

At Sigmaringen the Austrian general was joined by Keimayer with his whole division; and with this augmented force he recrossed the Danube and moved towards Biberach. He had resolved to retire to the shelter of the intrenched camp at Ulm; but his object in this movement was to cover the evacuation of the great magazines at Biberach upon that place. Thither he was followed by the French army, and on the morning of the 9th

May 9. May their advanced posts found eighteen thousand Austrians posted at the entrance of the remarkable defile which leads to that town. This rearguard was posted for the most part on a series of formidable heights behind Biberach, which could be approached only by passing through that town, and

(1) Memorial du Depoldi la Guerre, v. 92. St.-Cyr, ii. 199, 201. Dum. iii. 129, 131. Jcin. xliii. 154, 156.

(2) Nap. i. 169, 170. Dum. iii. 131. St.-Cyr, ii. 203, 205.

afterwards traversing a road which ran through a morass. An advanced guard, consisting of ten battalions and as many squadrons, with eight pieces of cannon, was placed in front of Biberach, at the entrance of the defile; this position, apparently so hazardous, was necessary to cover the evacuation of the great magazines which that town contained, preparatory to the concentration of the whole army in the intrenched camp of Ulm. This advanced guard was attacked by St.-Cyr with such superior forces, that they were speedily routed, and driven in the utmost disorder across the morass. Biberach was so rapidly carried that the Austrians had not time to destroy their

Kray retreats
to the in-
trenched camp
at Ulm.

magazines, which fell in great part entire into the hands of the victors. Transported with ardour, the French dragoons and light troops traversed the town and crossed the defile on the other side, notwithstanding a heavy and concentrated fire from the Austrian batteries; such was the intimidation produced by their audacity, that the Imperialists fired by platoons upon the light troops, as they would have done upon a regular line, instead of combating them with the same species of force. In this affair Kray lost fifteen hundred prisoners, besides a thousand killed and wounded, and five pieces of cannon; but he gained time by it for the evacuation of his magazines at Memmingen, which were transported in safety to the intrenched camp at Ulm (1). There his army was all collected in two days afterwards, eighty thousand infantry and twelve thousand horse were assembled; and after a campaign of unexampled activity, though only fifteen days' duration, the Republicans found their victorious columns on the banks of the Danube.

Great ad-
vantage of
that posi-
tion.

In retiring to Ulm, Kray separated himself from his left wing, twenty-five thousand strong, in the Tyrol, and the detached corps on the Maine; but the advantages of that central position were such as amply to counterbalance these circumstances. The intrenched camp occupying both banks of the Danube and the heights of St.-Michel, and connected with the fortress, was of the most formidable description. The town and *tête-de-pont* on the river were armed with a hundred and forty pieces of heavy cannon; the redoubts of the camp were complete, and lined with a proportional quantity of artillery: and not only were the magazines in the place most ample, but the extent of the works rendered all idea of a regular blockade out of the question. By remaining in this defensive position, the Austrian general not only preserved entire his own communications and line of retreat by Donawert and Ratisbon, but threatened those of his adversary; who, if he attempted to pass either on the north or south, exposed himself to the attack of a powerful army in flank. Securely posted in this central point, the Imperialists daily received accessions of strength from Bohemia and the Hereditary States; while the French, weakened by the detachments necessary to preserve their communications, and observe the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol, soon began to lose that superiority which, by the skilful concentration of their force, they had hitherto enjoyed in the campaign (2).

The difficulty of dislodging the Imperialists from this formidable position, was much augmented by the necessity to which Moreau at this period was subjected, of detaching nearly twenty thousand men under Moncey to cross the Alps by the St.-Gothard, and take a share in the projected operations of the First Consul in Italy. This great detachment restored the balance between the contending parties, and the spirit of the Austrians at the same time

(1) St.-Cyr, ii. 222, 228. Journ. xiii. 164, 169.

(2) Nap. i. 171, 172. Journ. xiii. 310, 313. Dum. iii. 138, 142. Nap. i. 171.

iii. 145, 149. St.-Cyr, ii. 224, 235.

Kray keeps
the field
with part of
his force.

was so much revived by the sight of their vast forces within the intrenched camp, and the great resources which they found in the place, that Kray no longer hesitated to keep the field; and detached the corps of Starray and Keimayer, which had suffered least in the preceding operations, to the left bank of the Danube and the confluence of the Iller. Moreau accordingly found himself extremely embarrassed, and six weeks were employed in the vain attempt to dislodge a defeated army from this stronghold; a striking proof of the prophetic wisdom of the Archduke Charles in its formation, and the importance of central fortifications in arresting the progress of an invading enemy (1).

Great
strength of
the in-
trenched
camp.

As the efforts of Austria and Russia during the seven years' war were shattered against the intrenched camp of Frederick at Burtzelwitz, so this important position seemed to be the *ne plus ultra* of the Republican operations in this campaign. It was hopeless to attempt to conquer so strong a position by main force; and it was no easy matter to see by what movement the Austrian general could be compelled to abandon it. For Moreau to pass on, leaving eighty thousand men supported by impregnable fortifications in his rear, was impossible, as it would immediately have led to the intercepting his communications with France; while to attempt the passage of the Danube in presence of such a force, would have been in the highest degree perilous. The Austrians soon reaped the benefits of this admirably chosen stronghold (2); the soldiers, lodged in excellent quarters, rapidly recovered their strength; while the *morale* of the army, which had been extremely weakened by the rapid disasters of the campaign, as quickly rose, when they perceived that a stop was at length put to the progress of the enemy.

Measures of
Moreau to
dislodge him
from it.

With a view to dislodge Kray, Moreau advanced with the right in front; headquarters passed the Gunz on the right bank of the Danube, St.-Cyr followed with his division in echelon, while Sainte-Suzanne received orders to approach Ulm on the left bank. The Republicans were masters of no bridge over the river, so that Sainte-Suzanne, with his single corps was exposed to the attack of the whole Austrian army. Finding that the distance of Moreau with the centre and right wing precluded him from giving any effectual support to his left, Kray resolved to direct all his disposable forces against that general. On the 16th, the Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of the splendid Imperial cavalry, followed by several columns of infantry, suddenly assailed this detached corps near Erbach. The attack was so impetuous, and the surprise so complete, that the Republicans were speedily routed, and the Austrians pressing forward with great vigour, not only drove them back in disorder above two leagues, but interposed their victorious columns between their flying divisions. Nothing

but the intrepidity and presence of mind of the French generals, preserved their left wing from total destruction. But while Sainte-Suzanne did his utmost to retard the advance of the enemy, St.-Cyr, alarmed by the violence and receding sound of the cannonade, which distinctly showed how much the left wing was losing ground, halted his corps, and moved it towards the scene of danger; at the same time rapidly bringing up his artillery, he placed it in batteries on the right bank of the Danube in such a manner as to enfilade the road by which the Archduke Ferdinand had issued from Ulm. Alarmed at this apparition on his left,

Vigorous
stroke of the
Austrian
General
against the
left wing of
the French.

(1) Jom. xiii. 312. St.-Cyr, ii, 235, 236. Nap. i. 172.

(2) Jom. xiii. 314. Dum. iv, 12, 13. St.-Cyr, ii. 241.

which he feared was preparatory to a passage of the river by the French centre, the Archduke drew back his victorious columns to the intrenched camp, and an action was terminated, in which, if properly supported, the Imperialists might have achieved the destruction of the whole Republican left wing, and possibly changed the issue of the campaign (1).

Increasing perplexity of Moreau. He in vain moves round to Augsburg. Confounded by this vigorous stroke on his left, and made sensible, by his firm countenance, that the enemy was resolved to risk a battle rather than hazard the important position of Ulm, Moreau was thrown into a cruel perplexity. For several days he remained in a state of indecision, merely directing Sainte-Suzanne to cross the Danube, to the support of St.-Cyr; so that, of the eleven divisions of which his army was composed, six were on the right bank, and five on the left. At length he resolved to resume his operations on the right bank, and after moving St.-Cyr again across the river, advanced with his centre and right, followed by Sainte-Suzanne with the left, along the right bank towards Bavaria. Kray, upon this, made a sortie with ten thousand men on the moving mass; he attacked Souham's division with great vigour, but after an obstinate conflict,

May 24. the Imperialists retired to Ulm, after inflicting a severe loss on the enemy. Meanwhile, Moreau continued his advance towards Bavaria, and on the 28th occupied Augsburg, directly in the rear of the Austrian army, on the

May 28. high-road between them and Munich. The intelligence of this event, however, had no effect in inducing the Imperial general to quit his stronghold; on the contrary, wisely judging that the advance of Moreau was only to excite alarm, or levy contributions, he wrote to the Aulic Council, that Moreau would never advance into the Hereditary States, leaving his great army in his rear, and that he would merely push forward his parties in all directions to disquiet the enemy in his advance, and intercept his communications. His firmness was completely successful; the French general did not venture to advance farther into Germany, as long as the enemy remained in such force in his rear, while the lengthened stay of such immense masses in one quarter speedily rendered provisions scarce in the French army, and induced such disorders as rendered several severe examples, and a new organization of great part of their army, necessary (2).

He next advances on the left bank of the Danube. Finding that Kray had penetrated his design, and remained firm at Ulm, in such a position as to endanger his communications if he continued his present advance, Moreau conceived a new and more decisive project, which was, to pass the Danube below Ulm, and cut the Austrian army off from its great magazines in Bohemia. With this view, the advanced guard, which had occupied Augsburg, and levied a contribution of 600,000 florins (L.60,000) on that flourishing city, was withdrawn, and the army was preparing to follow in this direction, when their movement was

June 4. interrupted by a sudden irruption of the Austrians on the right bank. In effect, Kray perceiving his adversary's design, collected thirty thousand men in the intrenched camp, with which, during the night, he crossed the bridge of Ulm, and assailed, at break of day, the flank of the French army. The tempest fell on the left wing, under the orders of Richepanse; it was speedily enveloped by superior forces, broken, and placed in a state of the

Imminent risk of the French left. greatest danger. From this almost desperate condition the Republicans were rescued by a seasonable and able attack by Ney, who, having received orders to support the menaced corps, flew to the scene of

(1) St.-Cyr, ii. 245, 251. Jom. xiii. 315, 317. Nap. i. 173, 174. Dum. iv. 16, 18.

(2) Dum. iv. 31, 36. Jom. xiii. 219, 320. St.-Cyr, ii. 258, 290. Nap. i. 174, 175.

danger, and advanced with such vigour against their vanguard, posted on the plateau of Kerchberg, that it was defeated with the loss of a thousand prisoners. Emboldened by this success, Richepanse halted his retiring columns, faced about, and renewed the combat with Kray, who, finding superior forces of the enemy now accumulating, withdrew to his intrenchments. Never did the French army incur greater danger; the Austrians in half an hour would have gained the bridge over the Iller, cut through the middle of the Republicans, and possibly, by opening a communication with the Prince of Reuss in the mountains of Tyrol, retrieved all the disasters of the campaign (4).

June 10. Heavy rains which fell at this time precluded the possibility of active operations for nearly a week to come, but Moreau, encouraged by this last success, was still intent on prosecuting his movement upon the Lower Danube. With this view, he spread his troops along the whole line of the Upper Lech; Lecourbe made himself master of Landeberg, and continuing his march down the course of that river, entered a second time into Augsburg, directly in the rear of the Imperialists.

At the same time, the centre and left descended the Kamlach and Gunz, towards Krumbach; thus accumulating almost all the Republican army between the Austrians and Bavaria. Threatened by such superior forces, Starray, who commanded the detached corps of the Austrians in that quarter, was obliged to cross to the left bank of the Danube. This able movement re-established the Republican affairs in that quarter; Kray, in his turn, now saw his connexions with the interior threatened, and himself reduced to the necessity of either abandoning his intrenchments, or making an effort with his whole disposable force to re-establish his communications (2).

June 12. At length Moreau cuts off his communications. Finding his adversary still immovably fixed at Ulm, Moreau after having concentrated his forces on the southern bank of the Danube, between Gunzburg and Donawerth, resolved to attempt the passage by main force. Far from penetrating his design, Starray, who commanded the Imperial forces on the opposite bank, sent all his troops, except eight battalions and a few squadrons, towards Ulm; where Kray lay inactive, neither attempting any thing against the French under Richepanse, between him and the Tyrol, nor taking any steps to secure his last and most important communications. Moreau ably profited by the supineness of his antagonist. After several unsuccessful attempts, which distracted the enemy's attention, the passage was effected on the 19th at Blindheim, with that romantic gallantry which so often in similar situations has characterised the French arms. The Austrians immediately hastened from all quarters to crush the enemy, before he was firmly established on the left bank; but Lecourbe, pushing on to Schwinningen, which lay between their detachments, prevented their junction; and after a murderous conflict, not only succeeded in maintaining his position, but made prisoners three battalions of the enemy (5).

Severe action at Hochstedt. Both parties now hastened with all their disposable forces to the scene of action. Lecourbe speedily crossed over the remainder of his corps to the left bank, and advanced with fifteen thousand men to Hochstedt, while Kray detached the greater part of his cavalry and light artillery to the support of Starray. The Austrian general, not finding himself in sufficient strength to resist the increasing masses of the enemy, retired

(1) Jom. xiii. 326, 328. Dum. iv. 36, 37. Nap. i. 174, 175.

(2) Jom. xiii. 334, 335. Dum. iv. 40, 44. Nap. i. 176.

(3) Jom. xiii. 334, 338. Dum. iv. 44, 51. Nap. i. 178.

to Dillingen, severely harassed by the French cavalry, which made above a thousand men prisoners. Kray advanced two thousand cuirassiers to extricate his infantry, and a desperate *mêlée* took place between the Republican and Imperial cavalry, in which the Austrian horse maintained their high character, but could not bear up against the great superiority of the enemy. After a bloody conflict in the course of which Moreau and Lecourbe repeatedly charged in person, the Imperialists retired behind the Brentz, leaving the enemy securely established on the left bank of the Danube (1). Thus the Republican cavalry gained a glorious success on the very plains where a century before the presumption of Marshal Tallard had endangered the crown of Louis XIV, and brought an unheard-of disaster on the French arms.

Kray is at length compelled to abandon Ulm, and reaches Nordlingen. June 19.

The consequences of this victory were decisive. Twenty pieces of cannon, and four thousand prisoners, had been made in these continued combats; but what was of far more importance, Kray was cut off from his resources in Bohemia, and obliged to evacuate the intrenched camp of Ulm. Compelled to abandon that important position, he left a garrison of ten thousand men within its walls, and having stationed his cavalry on the Brentz, so as to cover his movement, and dispatched his grand park, consisting of one hundred and sixty pieces and eight hundred caissons, on the road to Neresheim and Nordlingen, he himself followed with the remainder of his army in three divisions, and after undergoing unparalleled fatigues and privations, during a continued forced march of four days, arrived on the 23d, late in the evening, at Nordlingen. This march of the Austrians, in a semicircle, of which the Republicans occupied the base, was performed with the greatest expedition, chiefly during the night, and a degree of military talent, which rescued them from their embarrassments, and reflects the highest honour on the capacity and determination of their commander. The opposing generals seemed to have changed places, during the eventful period from the 14th to the 23d June: the supineness of the Austrian commander during the first four days, when the able Republican movement was in preparation, exposed him to the greatest dangers, from which he was afterwards extricated not less by his own ability, when roused to a sense of the perils which surrounded him, than the tardiness and irresolution which deprived the French general of its fruits, at the very moment when they were within his grasp. Had Moreau, with his victorious and concentrated army, fallen perpendicularly on the flank of the Imperialists, when performing their perilous movement to regain their communications, the vanguard would probably have been separated from the rear, great part of the park taken, and the triumph of Hohenlinden been contemporary with that of Marengo (2).

Moreau occupies Munich.

During the last day's march, before arriving at Nordlingen, the Imperial cavalry were severely pressed by the French, and the exhaustion of the troops was such, that the Austrian general deemed it indispensable to give them a day's rest to recover from their fatigues. Moreau, finding that the enemy had gained several marches upon him, and that he could not hope to force him to a general engagement, resolved to change his direction, and by occupying Munich, and laying Bavaria under contribution, both separate Kray irretrievably from his left wing, under the Prince of Reuss, in the Tyrol, and secure for himself all the consequences of the most brilliant victory. For this purpose he detached general Decaen

(1) Dum. iv. 54, 55. Jom. xiii. 338, 341. Nap. i. 178.

(2) Nap. i. 178, 179. Jom. xiii. 342, 345. Dum. iv. 59, 61.

June 25. with ten thousand men, who set out on the 23th from Dillingen, marched in the three following days forty leagues, and, after defeating the troops of Meerfelt stationed to protect the electoral capital, entered Munich June 28. on the 28th. The elector, taken by surprise, had hardly time to take refuge with his family behind the Iser, under the escort of the Austrian troops. At the same time, Richepanse with his corps invested Ulm on both sides of the Danube, and Kray leisurely continued his retreat towards the upper palatinate, abandoning the whole of Swabia and Franconia to the enemy (1).

June 29. Montrichard, with the Republican vanguard, came up with the Imperial rearguard, posted in front of Neuberg. Carried away by an impetuous courage, he immediately commenced an attack; but Kray, who was at hand with twenty-five thousand men, made him repent his temerity, and suddenly assailing the French with greatly superior forces, threw them into disorder, and drove them back above two leagues in the utmost confusion. The approach of night, and the arrival of Lecourbe with great reinforcements, induced him to draw off his victorious troops after this success;

July 1. and, finding that he could not establish himself on the Lech before the enemy, he continued his march during the night, reached Ingolstadt, repassed the Danube, and descending the right bank of that river, advanced towards Landshut. In this engagement the Republicans had to lament the loss of the brave La Tour-d'Auvergne, deemed the first grenadier of France. A model of every warlike virtue, this soldier, though a captain by rank, had taken a musket on his shoulder as a private grenadier. He perished from the stroke of a lance, while repulsing in the front rank a charge of Imperial cavalry. Such was the esteem in which he was held, that the whole army wore mourning for him for three days, and a monument was erected on the spot where he fell, which, according to the noble expression of General Dessolles in his order of the day on the occasion, "consecrated to virtue and courage, was put under the protection of the brave of every age and country." It was not in vain that this touching appeal was made to German honour. The Archduke Charles, at a subsequent period, when the fortune of war had restored the country where it stood to the power of the Imperialists, took it under his especial protection. It survived all the disasters which overwhelmed the throne of Napoléon, and still remains, in the midst of a foreign land, a monument honourable alike to the French who erected, and the Imperialists who protected it (2).

And falls back behind the Inn. July 7. Notwithstanding all his diligence, Kray could not reach Munich before the French; and he had the mortification, on reaching the neighbourhood of that city, of finding that it was already in the hands of the enemy, and that his communication with his left wing in the Tyrol was irrecoverably cut off. Continuing his retreat, therefore, he left the banks of the Iser for those of the Inn, and arrived in five marches by Wartenberg, Hohenlinden, and Haag, at the camp of Amfing. He was there joined by the corps of Meerfelt, which had retired from Munich; the corps of the Prince of Condé received orders to advance to his support from Salzburg, and as he approached the Hereditary States, the Imperial general began to receive those reinforcements, which the patriotism of their inhabitants never fails to afford to the monarchy when seriously menaced with danger (3).

(1) Dum. iv. 64, 63. Jom. xiii. 350, 355. Nap. i. 178.

(3) Jom. xiii. 355, 357. Dum. iv. 66, 71. Nap. i. 179.

(2) Fain, MS. de 1813, ii. 431. Dum. iv. 63, 66. Jom. xiii. 354, 355.

Operations
against the
Prince of
Reuss in the
Tyrol.
Feldkirch
is carried by
the Repub-
licans.

Both parties, at this period, received intelligence of the battle of Marengo and armistice of Alexandria, which shall immediately be noticed; and, not doubting that it would speedily be followed by a suspension of arms in Germany as well as Italy, Moreau resolved to take advantage of the short period which remained to clear his extreme right of the Prince of Reuss, who from the mountains of Tyrol was now in a situation, from the advance of the French army into the heart of Germany, to threaten its communications. For this purpose Lecourbe was detached, with the right wing of the army, towards Feldkirch, the formidable position which covered the north-west of that rugged district, and against which all the efforts of Masséna and Oudinot had failed in the preceding campaign. The troops who garrisoned their intrenchments, had been in great part drawn away to keep up the communication with the Prince of Condé, and the main body of the Imperialists on the eastern frontier of Tyrol; and those which remained, were so scattered over many different points, as to be incapable of rendering effectual resistance at any. After some trifling successes at Fussen and Immenstadt, Coire and Luciensteg were abandoned to the enemy, whose superiority of force rendered opposition impossible; and, although the Austrians, in the first instance, gained some successes before Feldkirch, they found themselves in the end unable to man sufficiently its extensive works, and on the following day that celebrated stronghold, which had lost much of its importance from the new theatre on which the war was carried on, was abandoned to the enemy (1).

While Lecourbe was thus clearing the right of the Republican position, Sainte Suzanne, who had been dispatched to the Lower Rhine to organize the French forces in that direction, was performing the same service on the banks of the Maine (2). He invested Philipsburg, and advanced to Aschaffenburg, where the Imperialists were repulsed; and the Lower Maine was speedily cleared of their troops.

July 15.
Armistice of
Parsdorf in
Germany.

Matters were in this situation, when the truce which had been concluded at Alexandria between France and Austria a month before, was extended to Germany, under the appellation of the armistice of Parsdorf. By this subsidiary treaty hostilities were terminated at all points in the empire, and were not to be resumed without a notice of twelve days. The French occupied all the country from Balzers in the Grisons, on the right bank of the Rhine, to the sources of the Inn; the whole valley of that river, from it by the reverse of the mountains to the sources of the Lech, and the whole intermediate country occupied by their troops along the Iser to its junction with the Danube; and from thence by Wessinburg and the Rednitz to the Maine. The fortresses included within this line, still in the hands of the Imperialists, particularly Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, were to remain in their possession, on the condition, on the one hand, that their garrisons were not to be augmented, and on the other, that they were to be provisioned every ten days, at the sight of commissioners named by the belligerent powers (3). In the circumstances in which the Austrians then were, threatened with invasion in the Hereditary States in their most vulnerable quarter, the valley of the Danube, this armistice was a most fortunate event, and gave them a breathing-time, of which they stood much in need to repair their shattered forces, and prepare for the farther struggles which awaited the monarchy.

(1) Jom. xiii. 357, 367. Dum. iv. 71, §2. Nap. i. 180.

(2) Jom. xiii. 367.

(3) Dum. iv. §4, 90.

Important as these events were, they were eclipsed by those which at the same period occurred to the south of the Alps.

Designs of Napoléon for the reconquest of Italy. An ordinary general, terrified at the dangers with which the southern departments were threatened, would have hastened with the army of reserve to the Var, in order to protect the menaced frontier of Piedmont. But Napoléon, who was well aware of the difficulties attending a front attack upon the Imperialists in that mountainous region, and appreciated with all the force of his genius the importance of the central position which he occupied in Switzerland, determined upon a more important and decisive operation. This was to cross the Alps by one of the central passes after the Austrians were far advanced in Piedmont, and thus interpose between them and their resources, cut them off from their communication with the Hereditary States, and compel them to fight under the most disadvantageous circumstances, with their front towards Lombardy, and their rear shut in by the Mediterranean sea and the inhospitable ridges of the Apennines (1). Defeat in such circumstances could not be other than ruin, while a disaster to the French would be of comparatively little importance, as their retreat, at least for the infantry and cavalry, was secure over the passes of the St.-Gothard or the Simplon into Switzerland, which was still in their hands, and where experience had proved they could resist the utmost efforts of the Imperialists.

Extreme suffering of the troops on the summits of the Maritime Alps. But before this great blow could be struck, the French had a desperate and hopeless struggle to maintain on the ridges of the Apennines. During the winter months, while the Austrians were reposing from their fatigues, and repairing their losses in men, horses, and equipments, in the fertile plains of Lombardy, the French army, perched on the rugged summits of the mountains, had to contend at once with the hardships incident to those sterile regions, and the contagious maladies which they brought with them from their disastrous campaign in the plains. No words can describe the sufferings they underwent during that afflicting period: a few regiments lost two thousand men in the hospitals of Genoa in four months: the wants of the troops, without shoes, blankets, or winter-clothing, produced universal insubordination, and the authority of the officers being generally lost by the common calamities, vast numbers openly abandoned their colours and returned into France. The French army was rapidly melting away under such accumulated disasters, and every thing announced an easy conquest of Genoa to the Imperialists, when the torrent was arrested by the energetic measures adopted by the First Consul, immediately after he assumed the reins of public affairs (2).

Masséna is appointed to the command. Napoléon's proclamation to these troops. His first care was to appoint Masséna, whose abilities in mountain warfare had been so fully tried, and who was so well acquainted, from the campaigns of 1793 and 1796, with that country, to the direction of the army; and upon assuming the command, that great general issued an energetic proclamation in Napoléon's name to the troops:—"The first quality of a soldier," said he, "is to bear with constancy the privations of war; valour is but a secondary consideration. Many corps have abandoned their colours; they have remained deaf to the voice of their officers. Are, then, the brave men of Castiglione, Rivoli, and Neumarkt no more? Rather than desert their colours, they would have perished at their feet. Your rations, you complain, have not been regularly distributed. What would you have done, if, like the 18th and 52d regiments,

(1) Jom. xiii. 39, 40. Nap. i. 252.

(2) Jom. xiii. 45, 46.

you had found yourselves in the midst of the desert, without either bread or water, having nothing but horse and camel flesh to subsist on?—'Victory will give us bread,' said they. And you desert your standards! Soldiers of Italy! a new general is to take the command of you; he was ever with the advanced guard in the days of your glory; place your confidence in him, he will again chain victory to your standards." These energetic words, and still more the magic of Napoléon's name, had a prodigious effect on the French soldiers, ever liable to pass with rapidity from one extreme to another. The desertion speedily diminished, and some severe examples which Masséna made immediately after his arrival, soon stopt it altogether. At the same time, the vigour of the First Consul provided more substantial additions to the comforts of the men: their rations were augmented, and distributed with regularity; a portion of their arrears was discharged; and by incredible exertions, not only were ample supplies conveyed to their frigid bivouacs, but fresh clothing provided for their shivering limbs. By these means the spirit of the soldiers was in a short time so restored, that an army, which a few weeks before seemed menaced with approaching dissolution, became

Energetic
measures
taken to
restore order.

capable of the most persevering exertions. A new organization was completed by Masséna, and four regiments, which he brought with him, in the highest state of equipment from the north of Switzerland, became the model on which the army was formed. The army, which amounted to twenty-eight thousand men, in Liguria, exclusive of eight thousand on the summits of the Alps, from Argentiere to Mont Cenis, was divided into three corps. The right, under the command of Soult, sixteen thousand strong, occupied Gavi, the Campe-Freddo, the Bocchetta, and the summit of the valleys leading from Piedmont to Genoa; the centre, consisting of twelve thousand, guarded the ridges extending westward, from thence through Cadebone, Vado, Savona, and the Col di Tende, towards France; while the left wing, under Thureau, perched on the summit of the Alps which form the western boundary of the plain of Piedmont, watched the important passes of Mont Cenis, the Little St.-Bernard, and the Col di Genevre (1).

Positions of
the Aus-
trians.

The Austrians, cantoned in the plain below, and at the entrance of the numerous valleys which were occupied by the enemy, were so much scattered, that out of ninety-six thousand men who composed their active force, not more than sixty thousand could be assembled for operations on the Bormida and in the Apennines. This force, however, was amply sufficient for the object in view, which was the expulsion of the French from Italy; and at length the order from Vienna arrived, and active operations commenced on the 6th April (2).

The town of Genoa, against which all the efforts of the Imperialists were now directed, is situated in the centre of the gulf which bears its name; and from a very early period has occupied a distinguished place in the history of

Description
of Genoa.

modern Europe. Placed on the southern slope of the Apennines, where they dip into the Mediterranean sea, it exhibits a succession of lofty buildings, terraces, gardens, and palaces, rising one above another in imposing masses from the water's edge to a very great eminence. The gay and glittering aspect of the buildings, ascending in succession from the harbour to the summit of the hills which screen it from the north; the splendour of the palaces which adorn its higher quarters, the picturesque air of the towers and fortifications by which it is surrounded; the contrast between the dazzling whiteness of the edifices, and the dark green of the firs and olives by

(1) Bot. iii. 455, 456. Nap. i. 201. Join xiii. 45, (2) Join. xiii. 53, 54.
48, 51.

which they are shrouded; and the blue sea which washes the southern ramparts of the city, and reflects its innumerable domes and spires, form a spectacle at once so varied and gorgeous, as to have early captivated the imaginations of the Italians, and secured for it the appellation of *Genova la Superba*. A double circle of fortifications surrounds this splendid city; the outer or exterior walls consist of a triangle of nine thousand toises in circumference. On the south, bounded by the sea, this line extends from the point of the *Lanterne* at the mouth of the rivulet called the *Polcevera* to the mouth of the *Bisagno*; the eastern side runs along the banks of the *Bisagno* to the fort of *Eperon*, which forms the apex of the triangle, and the western descends from that elevated point to the *Lanterne* along the margin of the *Polcevera*. The batteries on the western side command the whole valley of the *Polcevera*, with the long and straggling faubourg of *St.-Pierro d'Arena*, which runs through its centre; those on the east, on the other hand, are themselves commanded by the heights of *Monte Ratti* and *Monte Faccio*, a circumstance which rendered it necessary to occupy them by detached outworks, which are called the forts of *Quizzi*, of *Richelieu*, and of *San Tecla*, on the *Madonne del Monte*. Higher up the *Apennines* than the fort *Eperon*, is the plateau of the *Two Brothers*, which is commanded in rear by the *Diamond Fort*, perched on a summit twelve hundred toises from fort *Eperon*. The peculiar situation of *Genoa*, lying on the rapid declivity where the *Apennines* descend into the sea, rendered it necessary to include these mountains in its rear in the exterior line of its fortifications, and to occupy so many points beyond their wide circuit by detached outworks, which give the ridges by which it is encircled the appearance of an immense castle. The interior line which surrounds the city properly so called, is susceptible of some defence; but the possession of the outer works would render any protracted resistance impossible, as the batteries on the *Lanterne* and the fort of *Eperon* would expose the city to the horrors of a bombardment (1).

Measures taken for its blockade by land and sea. Early in March, Admiral Keith, who commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean, established a close blockade of the harbour of *Genoa* and its dependencies, which promised to augment extremely the difficulties of the besieged; and in the beginning of April, General Mélas having completed his preparations, moved forward in three columns to the attack of the French defensive positions. Ott, with the left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was intrusted with the attack of the right, and the forts on *Monte Faccio*; Mélas with the centre, consisting of twenty-four thousand, was to ascend the valley of the *Bormida*, and separate the centre of the enemy from their left wing; while Elnitz with the right, amounting to eighteen thousand soldiers, was to assail their left, and to facilitate the important and decisive movements of Mélas in the centre. These attacks all proved successful. The Imperialists experienced every where the most vigorous resistance, and the courage and enterprise on both sides seemed exalted to the highest pitch by the great object for which they contended, and the lofty eminences, midway between the plain and the clouds, on which the struggle took place. But the resolution of the Austrians, aided by their great superiority of numbers, and the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountain warfare, at length overcame all the aid which the French derived from the possession of the heights and the fortifications by which they were strengthened. Soult, on the French right, driven from *Montenotte*, the first scene of Napoleon's triumphs, was thrown

Successful attack of the Imperialists on the French position.

(1) Nap. i. 203, 204. Jom. xiii. §8, 92. Dum. iii. 227, 231. Personal observation.

Suchet is separated from the main body, and driven back towards France. April 6.

back towards Genoa, while Savona, Cadebone, and Vado, were occupied by the Imperialists, and their extreme left, under Suchet, altogether detached from the centre, and thrown back towards France. Hohenzollern, who was intrusted with the attack of the Bocchetta, drove the French from the neighbourhood of Gavi far up that important pass, and with some difficulty succeeded in retaining the crest of the mountains; while on the extreme left, Klenau obtained the most important advantages. Breaking up from the valley of the Trebbia, he advanced, in three columns, up the narrow ravines which led to the eastern fortifications of Genoa, carried the summit of the mountains, drove the Republicans from the Monte Faccio and the Monte Ratti, and invested the forts of Quizzi, Richelieu, and San Tecla, within cannon-shot of the walls of Genoa. Its inhabitants were variously agitated with hopes and fears, as the firing of the musketry and cannon came nearer and nearer. At length the smoke was distinctly visible, even from the interior ramparts, and while the broken regiments of Soult were entering the city from the westward, by the gates of the Lanterne, the whole heavens to the north and west were illuminated by the fires of the bivouacs, from the crowded summits of Monte Faccio (1).

Desperate and successful sortie of Masséna.

The situation of Masséna was now highly critical; the more especially as a large and influential part of the inhabitants were strongly attached to the cause of the Imperialists, and ardently desired a deliverance from the democratic tyranny to which for four years they had been subjected. Their ardour, strongly excited by the sight of the Austrian watchfires, and the sound of the tocsin which incessantly rung to rouse the peasants on the neighbouring mountains, was with difficulty restrained even by the presence of a garrison, now increased, by the refluence from all quarters, to twenty thousand men. But Masséna was not a man to be easily daunted; and on this accumulation of force in the central position of Genoa, he founded his hopes of expelling the enemy from the post most threatening to the city. By daybreak on the 7th, he threw open the gates of the town, and attacked the Austrian division on the Monte Faccio with such vigour, that in a short time that important post was carried; the Imperialists were driven from the Monte Cornua, the Torriglio, and all the passes of the Apennines in that direction, and fifteen hundred men made prisoners, who were before nightfall marched through the astonished crowds into the interior of the city (2). On the same day a series of obstinate engagements took place on the Austrian right between Elnitz and Suchet, which though attended with varied success, upon the whole had the effect of establishing the Imperialists in great strength on the heights of St.-Jacques and Vado, and completing the separation of the French left wing from the centre of their army and the city of Genoa.

His dispositions for re-opening the communication with Suchet.

No sooner was the French general informed of this disaster, than he perceived that it was not by any transient success on the Monte Faccio, but a vigorous effort towards Savona, and the re-establishment of his communications with Suchet, that the torrent of disaster was to be arrested. With this view he divided his army into three divisions; the first under Miollis, being intrusted with the defence of the city and environs of Genoa; the second under Gazan, was to advance from Voltri towards Sassello, while the third under Masséna in person, was to move along the sea-coast. Suchet at the same time received orders to suspend his re-

(1) Dum. iii. 47, 51. Nap. i. 206, 207. Join. xiii. 53, 57. Bot. iii. 460, 462. Thib. 70, 85. Siege de Genoa.

(2) Bot. iii. 463. Join. xiii. 56, 57. Nap. i. 207. Dum. iii. 51, 52. Thib. 80, 110.

treat, and co-operate in the general attack which, it was hoped, would lead to the capture of the Austrian division at Montenotte and Savona, and re-establish the important communication with Suchet and France. The execution of the combined attack was fixed for the 9th of April (1).

Austrian
measures to
prevent it,
which prove
successful.

Meanwhile Melas, having so far strengthened Elnitz on the heights of Vado as to enable him to make head against Suchet, resolved to move with the bulk of his force against Masséna at Genoa, wisely judging that the principal efforts of his opponent would be directed to the opening a communication with France and the left wing of his army. With this view he moved forward Hohenzollern, on the evening of the 8th, who, after a sharp resistance, carried the Bocchetta by moonlight, which had been abandoned after the reverse on the Monte Faccio, and drove the French down the southern side to Campo Marone. This success so entirely disconcerted Soult, who directed Gazan's division, that though he had gained considerable advantages, he deemed it prudent to suspend the march of his troops. On the following night, however, he was strongly reinforced by the

April 11. general-in-chief, and on the 11th he assailed with superior forces the division of St-Julien at La Vereira, and after a desperate conflict routed it with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners and seven standards. But this success was more than compensated by the disaster which on the same day befell the left of the French at Cogoletto, who were overwhelmed by Melas, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Masséna in person, and driven back, sword in hand, to the neighbourhood of Voltri. At the same time, Elnitz and Suchet combated with divided success on the Monte Giacomo. At first the Republicans were victorious, and an Austrian brigade commanded by Ge-
April 12. neral Ulm, separated from the main body, was surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms: but this success having led Suchet to attempt on the following day the attack of the Monte Giacomo itself, a lofty ridge of prodigious strength, he was repulsed with great slaughter, and, after leaving the slopes of the mountain and its snowy crest covered with the dead and the dying, driven back in confusion to Melogno and Sette Pani on the sea-coast (2).

Thus though the Republicans combated every where with rare intrepidity, and inflicted fully as great a loss on their adversaries as they received themselves, yet, on the whole, the object of their efforts was frustrated. Gigantic efforts had been made, blood had flowed in torrents, and the rival armies, amidst the rocks and clouds of the Apennines, had struggled with unheard-of obstinacy, but still the Austrians retained their advantage; their columns were still interposed in strength between the French centre and left, and the multitude of killed and wounded was weakening, in an alarming degree, an army now cut off from all external assistance. Both parties now made the utmost efforts to concentrate their forces, and bring this murderous warfare

April 15. to a termination. On the 15th, Melas renewed the attack with the utmost vigour at Ponte Ivrea, and at the same time reinforced Hohenzollern on his left, and directed him to press down from the Bocchetta, and threaten

Continued
successes of
the Impe-
rialists.

April 16. the communication of the French with Genoa. Both armies, though exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of provisions, fought with the utmost obstinacy on the following day; but at length Soult, finding that his rear was threatened by a detachment of Hohenzollern, fell back to Voltri, overthrowing in his course the Austrian brigade who

(1) *Jom.* xiii. 60. *Bot.* iii. 463, 464. *Nap.* i. 208, 209. *Thib.* 110, 135.

(2) *Bot.* iii. 463, 465. *Jom.* xiii. 61. 71. *Dum.* iii. 53, 65. *Nap.* i. 210, 211. *Thib.* 167, 180.

endeavoured to dispute the passage. On the same day, Masséna in person was repulsed by the Imperialists under Latterman, and finding his retreat also menaced by Hohenzollern, he also retreated to Voltri in the night, where the two French divisions were united on the following morning (1).

Masséna
finally
driven into
Genoa.

But the Imperialists, who now approached from all quarters, gave the wearied Republicans no rest in this position. From the heights of Monte Fayole, Melas beheld the confusion which prevailed in the army of his opponents; while the corps of Ott, whose right wing now began to take a part in the hostilities, already threatened Sestri, and the only line of retreat to Genoa which still remained to them. A general attack was immediately commenced. Melas descended the Monte Fayole, while Ott, whose troops were comparatively fresh, assailed it from the eastern side, and by a detachment menaced the important post of Sestri in their rear. Ott forced his way to Voltri, while Soult was still resolutely combating Melas on the heights of Madonna dell'Acqua, at the foot of Monte Fayole, and a scene of matchless horror and confusion immediately ensued. Soult, informed that his communications were threatened, instantly began his retreat; the victorious troops of Ott were assailed at once by the flying columns of that general, who fought with the courage of despair, and the troops they had displaced from Voltri, who rallied and returned to the rescue of their comrades. After a desperate conflict, continued till nightfall, in which the French and Imperialists sustained equal losses, the passage was at length cleared, and the retreating columns, by torchlight, and in the utmost confusion, reached the Polcevera, and found shelter within the walls of Genoa (2).

April 21.

Thus, after a continued combat of fifteen days, maintained with matchless constancy on both sides, and in which the advantages of a fortified central position on the side of the Republicans long compensated their inferiority of force to the Imperialists, Masséna with his heroic troops was shut up in Genoa, and all hope of co-operating with Suchet, or receiving reinforcements from France, finally abandoned. In these desperate conflicts the loss of the French was seven thousand men, fully a third of the force which remained to their general after he was shut up in Genoa; but that of the Austrians was fully as great, and they were bereaved, in addition, of above four thousand prisoners (3), a success dearly purchased by the French in a city where the dearth of provisions already began to be severely felt.

April 20.
Defeat of
Suchet by
Elnitz.

Meanwhile Suchet, having been informed by Oudinot, who had made a perilous passage by sea in the midst of the English cruisers, of the desire of Masséna that he should co-operate in the general attack, instantly made preparations for a fresh assault on the blood-stained ridge of the Monte Giacomo; but in the interval, Melas, now relieved on his left by the retreat of Masséna into Genoa, had reinforced Elnitz by three brigades, and the position of the Imperialists, naturally strong, was thereby rendered impregnable. The consequence was, that the moment the Republicans made their appearance at the foot of the mountain, they were attacked and overthrown so completely, that it was only owing to an excess of caution on the part of the Imperialists that they were not wholly cut off and made prisoners. By this disastrous defeat Suchet lost all hope of regaining his communication with Genoa and was compelled to fall back, for his own security towards the Var and the frontier of Piedmont (4).

(1) Bot. iii. 464, 465. Nap. i. 211. Jom. xiii. 71, 75. Dum. iii. 69, 73. Thib. 180, 200.

(2) Thib. 200. 217. Dum. iii. 74, 76, Jom. xiii. 76, 78. Bot. iii. 467.

(3) Dum. iii. 76, 77. Jom. xiii. 76, 78, 88.

(4) Dum. iii. 79. Jom. xiii. 79, 80.

April 27. On the other hand, Melas, having completed the investment of Genoa, and left Ott with twenty-five thousand men to blockade that fortress, moved himself, with the bulk of his forces, to reinforce Elnitz on the Monte Giacomo, and pursue his successes against Suchet. To aid in the accomplishment of this object, he moved up part of the twenty-five thousand men, who, during this desperate struggle in the Apennines, had lain inactive in Piedmont under Kaim. Threatened by so many forces, Suchet retired with about ten thousand men to Albuega, in the rear of Loano, and took a position at Borghetto, where Kellermann, in 1795, had so successfully arrested the advance of General Divini. There, however, he was attacked a few days after by Melas with superior forces, and driven from the field with great loss : He endeavoured in vain to make a stand on the Monte di Torria and the Col de Tende; the columns of the Austrians turned his flanks and drove him across the frontier and over the Var, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners, and an equal number killed and wounded. Thus the French, after a desperate struggle, were at length driven back into their own territories; and nothing remained to them of their vast conquests in Italy but the ground which was commanded by the cannon of Genoa (1).

May 2. Who is driven over the Var into France.
May 6. had so successfully arrested the advance of General Divini. There, however, he was attacked a few days after by Melas with superior forces, and driven from the field with great loss : He endeavoured in vain to make a stand on the Monte di Torria and the Col de Tende; the columns of the Austrians turned his flanks and drove him across the frontier and over the Var, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners, and an equal number killed and wounded. Thus the French, after a desperate struggle, were at length driven back into their own territories; and nothing remained to them of their vast conquests in Italy but the ground which was commanded by the cannon of Genoa (1).

April 30. General attack on the French positions round Genoa. While Melas was thus chasing the Republican eagles from the Maritime Alps, Ott was preparing a general attack, by which he hoped to drive the French from the exterior line of defence, and render their position untenable in that important fortress. With this view, while the English fleet kept up a severe cannonade upon the town from the entrance of the harbour, a general assault was planned both against the defence of Masséna on the Bisagno, the Polcevera, and the fortified summits of Madonna del Monte and Monte Ratti. These attacks were all in the first instance successful. Bussy, supported by the fire of the English gunboats, made himself master of St.-Pierro d'Arena and the valley of the Polcevera; while Palfi, by a vigorous attack, carried the Monte Ratti, surrounded the fort Richelieu, surprised the fort Quizzi, and made himself master of all the southern slopes of the Monte Faccio and the Madonna del Monte. At the same time Hohenzollern stormed the important plateau of the Two Brothers, and summoned the commander of fort Diamond, now completely insulated (2), to surrender. The Imperialists even went so far as to make preparations for establishing mortar batteries on the commanding heights of Albaro, and bombarding the city over its whole extent, so as to render the French position untenable within its walls.

Which, at first successful, is finally repulsed by Masséna. Had the Austrians possessed a sufficient force to make good the advantages thus gained, they would have speedily brought the siege of Genoa to a conclusion, and by a concentration of all their forces on the Bormida, might have defeated the invasion by Napoléon over the Alps, and changed the fate of the campaign. But General Ott had only twenty-five thousand men at his disposal, while an equal number, under Kaim, lay inactive in the plains of Piedmont, and this imprudent distribution of force proved in the highest degree prejudicial to the Imperial interests through the whole campaign. Availing himself with skill of the immense advantage which the possession of a central position in an intrenched camp afforded, Masséna withdrew four battalions from the eastern side, where he judged the danger less pressing, and despatched them, under Soult, to re-

(1) *Jom.* xiii. 83, 86. *Bot.* iii. 467, 469. *Dum.* iii. 198, 200.

(2) *Nap.* i. 212. *Bot.* iii. 472, 473. *Dum.* iii. 234. *Jom.* xiii. 95, 96. *Thib.* 200, 209.

gain the heights of the Two Brothers, while he himself hastened, with four battalions more, to reinforce Miollis on the Monte Albaro. The Austrians, who had gained time to strengthen their acquisitions, received the attack with great resolution; the fury of the combatants was such that soon fire-arms became useless, and they fought hand to hand with the bayonet; for long the result was doubtful, and even some success was gained by the Imperialists; but at length the Republicans were victorious, and the Monte Ratti, with its forts and four hundred prisoners, fell into their hands. At the same time, Soult glided round by the ravines into the rear of the Two Brothers; and the Austrians, under Hohenzollern, assailed in front by the garrison of fort Diamond, and in the rear by these fresh troops, were thrown into confusion, and escaped in small parties only, by throwing themselves with desperate resolution on the battalions by which they were surrounded. By the result of this day the Austrians lost three thousand men, of whom eighteen hundred were made prisoners, and they were forced to abandon all the ground which they had gained from their opponents, excepting the Monte Faccio, while the spirits of the French were proportionally elevated by the unlooked for and glorious success which they had achieved (1). Taking advantage of the consternation of the besiegers, Masséna, on the following day, attempted a sally, and attacked the fortified heights of Coronata; but after a trifling advantage he was repulsed with great slaughter, and compelled finally to shut himself up in the walls of Genoa (2).

Successful
sally of the
French.

Nothing of moment occurred for the next ten days; but during that time Masséna, finding that famine was likely to prove even a more formidable enemy than the Austrian bayonets, and that it was necessary at all hazards to endeavour to procure a supply of provisions, resolved upon a sally. The Austrians had been celebrating, by a *feu de joie* along their whole lines, the success of Melas on the Var, when Masséna determined, by a vigorous effort, both to prove that the spirits of his own garrison were not sinking, and to facilitate the meditated descent of the First Consul into Piedmont. Miollis was charged with the attack of the Monte Faccio on the front of the Sturla, while Soult, ascending the bed of the torrent Bisagno, was to take it in flank. The attack of Miollis, commenced before Soult was at hand to second it, failed completely. He gained possession in the first instance of the front positions of the enemy on the slopes of the mountain, and was advancing over the ground, drenched with the blood of so many brave men of both nations, when his troops were charged by the Imperialists in close column with such vigour, that they were instantly thrown into confusion, and driven back in the utmost disorder to the glacis of the Roman gate of Genoa, where, by the opportune arrival of the general-in-chief with a reserve, some degree of order was at length restored. The expedition of Soult was more fortunate. The Imperialists, assailed in front by the Republicans whom Masséna had rallied on the Sturla, and in flank by the troops of Soult, were driven from the Monte Faccio, and were only able to force their way

(1) Dum. iii. 236, 241. Jom. xiii. 97, 98. Nap. i. 212. Rot. iii. 472, 473. Thib. 210, 230.

(2) A singular circumstance occurred at this assault of the Monte Faccio. The soldiers of two French regiments, the 25th light infantry and the 24th of the line, had been on the worst possible terms since the opening of the campaign, because during the winter, when insubordination was at its height, the former, which maintained its discipline, had been employed to disarm the latter. They

had, in consequence, been carefully kept asunder from each other; but during the confusion of this bloody conflict, their ranks became intermingled. The same dangers, the same thirst for glory, animated both corps, and these generous sentiments so far obliterated their former jealousies, that the soldiers embraced in the midst of the fire, and fought side by side like brothers during the remainder of the day.—See Dumas, iii. 245, 246.

through their pursuers by leaving thirteen hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy (1).

This brilliant success led to a still more audacious enterprise, which proved the ruin of the able and enterprising French general. This was the attack of the Monte Greto, the most important position occupied by the Austrians on the mountains in the rear of the city, and which, if successful, would have rendered it necessary for them to raise the siege. The Republicans, six thousand strong, issued by the Roman gate, and ascending the olive-clad steep of the Bisagno, attacked the Austrians in this important post, while Gazan, at the head of eighteen hundred men, assailed them on the other side. The intrenched camp on the Monte Greto was fortified with care, and its defence intrusted to Hohenzollern, supported by a powerful reserve. The French advanced with intrepidity to the attack, but as they approached the intrenchments, a violent thunderstorm enveloped the mountain, the air became dark, the rain descended in torrents, and the hostile forces could only discern each other by the flashes of lightning which at intervals illuminated the gloom. In the midst of the tempest the lines met; the shock was terrible, but the Republicans insensibly gained ground; already the first line of intrenchments was carried, and the Austrian barracks were on fire, when Hohenzollern, charging at the head of the reserve in close column, overthrew the assailants. Soult, wounded in the thigh, was made prisoner, and his troops, dispersed in the utmost confusion, fled to Genoa with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. At the same time intelligence was received of the surrender of Savona, and Masséna, now severely weakened, had no alternative but to remain shut up within the walls, exposed to all the horrors of approaching famine (2).

This disaster terminated the military operations of the siege of Genoa. Thenceforward it was a mere blockade; the Austrians, posted on the heights which surround the city, cut off all communication with the land side, while Admiral Keith, with the English fleet, rendered all intercourse impossible with the neighbouring harbour. The horrors of famine were daily more strongly felt, and in that inglorious warfare the army was called upon to make more heroic sacrifices than ever they had made in the tented field. The miserable soldiers, worn down by fatigue, and extenuated by famine, after having consumed all the horses in the city, were reduced to the necessity of feeding on dogs, cats, and vermin, which were eagerly hunted out in the cellars and common sewers. Soon even these wretched resources failed, and they were reduced to the pittance of four of five ounces of black bread, made of cocoa, rye, and other substances ransacked from the shops of the city. Affairs were in these desperate

circumstances, when Captain Fianeschi, who had left Napoléon at the foot of the St.-Bernard, arrived in the roads of Genoa with despatches from the First Consul. In an open boat, with three rowers, he had succeeded, during the night, in steering through the midst of the English fleet; when day dawned, he was discovered, about a mile from the shore, under the guns of their cruisers. They instantly fired, and the seamen were wounded. The brave officer stripped off his clothes, took his sabre in his teeth, and swam towards the harbour. After incredible efforts he reached the shore, and landed, almost exhausted, on the mole, whence he was immediately conducted to the general-in-chief (3).

(1) Jom. xlii. 401, 402. Dum. iii. 243, 247. Bot. iii. 473. Nap. i. 220. Thib. 220, 249.

(2) Jom. xlii. 102, 105. Dum. iii. 247, 252. Nap. i. 220. Bot. iii. 473. Thib. 249, 260.

(3) Dum. iii. 255. Jom. xlii. 105. Bot. iii. 474. Thib. 250, 270.

May 13.
Which leads
to another,
in which
they are de-
feated, and
Soult made
prisoner.

Siege is
converted
into a
blockade.
Extreme
sufferings of
the inhabi-
tants.

May 27.

May 28.
A fresh sor-
tie is de-
feated.

The cheering intelligence of the passage of the Alps by Napoléon, and the first successes of Moreau in Germany, revived the dying hopes of the French garrison. The spectres who wandered along the ramparts were animated with a passing ebullition of joy, and Masséna, taking advantage of this momentary enthusiasm, commenced a general attack on the Monte Ratti and the Monte Faccio. But this effort was beyond the strength of his men. The soldiers marched out with all their wonted enthusiasm, and with a fierce countenance began the ascent of the heights; but the unusual exertion wore out their exhausted strength, and when they arrived at the foot of the redoubts, they were torn to pieces by a tremendous and well-sustained fire of grape and musketry, without the possibility of making any effort to avert their fate. Broken and dispirited, the enfeebled mass was driven back into the city, after having acquired, from sad experience, the mournful conviction that the Imperialists, whatever their reverses might have been in other situations, had abated nothing of their firm countenance in the neighbourhood of Genoa. Two days afterwards, the rolling of distant thunder in the Apennines was mistaken by General Gazan for the welcome note of their approaching deliverers. Masséna himself hastened, with a palpitating heart, to the heights of Tinaille; but he was there witness to the imperturbable aspect of the Austrians in their impregnable intrenchments, and the agitated crowd returned, sad and downcast, to their quarters (1).

Agonies en-
dured by
the inhabi-
tants.

While the French garrison was alternately agitated by these hopes and fears, the wretched inhabitants were a prey to the most unparalleled sufferings. From the commencement of the siege the price of provisions had been extravagantly high, and in its latter days grain of any sort could not be had at any cost. The horrors of this prolonged famine, in a city containing above a hundred thousand souls, cannot be adequately described. All day the cries of the unhappy victims were heard in the streets, while the neighbouring rocks, within the walls, were covered with a famished crowd, seeking, in the vilest animals and the smallest traces of vegetation, the means of assuaging their intolerable pangs. At night, the lamentations of the people were still more dreadful; too agitated to sleep, unable to endure the agony by which they were surrounded, they prayed aloud for death to relieve them from their sufferings. In this extremity, the usual effect of long-endured calamity was conspicuous, in closing the fountains of mercy in the human heart, and rendering men insensible to every thing but their own disasters. Infants deserted in the streets by their parents, women who had sunk down from exhaustion on the public thoroughfares, were abandoned to their fate, and sought, with dying hands, in the sewers and other receptacles of filth, for the means of prolonging for a few hours a miserable existence. In the desperation produced by such prolonged torments, the more ardent and impetuous sought the means of destruction; they rushed out of the gates, and threw themselves on the Austrian bayonets, or precipitated themselves into the harbour, where they perished without either commiseration or assistance. In the general agony, not only leather and skins of every kind were consumed, but the horror at human flesh itself was so much abated, that numbers were supported on the dead bodies of their fellow-citizens. Pestilence, as usual, came in the rear of famine; contagious fevers swept off multitudes, whom the strength of the survivors was unable to inter. Death in every form awaited the crowds whom common suffering had blended together in the hospitals; and the multitude of unburied corpses

(1) Dum., iii., 256, 257; Bot., iii., 474; Jom., xiii., 224; Thib., 251, 260.

which encumbered the streets threatened the city with depopulation (1), almost as certainly as the grim hand of famine under which they were melting away.

Masséna at
length sur-
renders.
May 31.

Such accumulated horrors at length shook the firm spirit of Masséna. The fermentation in the city had risen to an alarming height, and there was every probability that the extenuated French garrison would be overpowered by the multitudes whom despair had armed with unwonted courage. Matters were in this desperate state, when the French general received a letter from Melas, couched in the most flattering terms, in which he invited him, since resistance had now become hopeless, to conclude an arrangement for the evacuation of the city. Masséna at first suspected that this was merely a *ruse* to cover the approaching raising of the siege, and refused to accede to any terms; but a severe bombardment both by land and sea, on the night of the 31st, having convinced him that there was no intention on the part of the Allies of abandoning their enterprise, and provisions, even after the most rigid economy, existing only for two days more, the negotiation was resumed, and at length, on the 4th June, when they were totally exhausted, a capitulation was agreed to, in virtue of which the gates were surrendered to the Allies on the following day at noon. It was stipulated that the garrison should evacuate Genoa, with their arms, artillery, baggage, and ammunition; they were conducted by the Allies, to the number of nine thousand, by land and sea, to Voltri and Antibes. The conditions of the treaty were faithfully observed towards the vanquished, and all the stipulations in favour of the democratic party at Genoa implemented by the Austrians with true German faith (2); a trait as honourable to them, as the opposite conduct of the English admiral at Naples a year before, was derogatory to the well-earned character of British integrity.

When the evacuation took place, the extent of suffering which the besieged had undergone appeared painfully conspicuous. "Upon entering the town," says the faithful annalist of this memorable siege, "all the figures we met bore the appearance of profound grief or sombre despair; the streets resounded with the most heart-rending cries; on all sides death was reaping its victims, and the rival furies of famine and pestilence were multiplying their devastation; in a word, the army and the inhabitants seemed approaching their dissolution (3)." The Allies acted generously to the heroic garrison, with their illustrious chief; while, upon the signal of a gun fired from the ramparts, innumerable barks, laden with provisions, entered the harbour, amidst the transports of the inhabitants. "Your defence," said Lord Keith to Masséna, "has been so heroic, that we can refuse you nothing; yet you alone are worth an army; how can we allow you to depart (4)?"

Melas sets
out to meet
Napoléon.

It was not without reason that the Imperialists urged forward the evacuation, and granted the most favourable terms to the besieged, in order to accelerate their departure. At the very time when the negotiations were going on, a messenger arrived from Melas, with intelligence of the entry of Napoléon into Milan, and an immediate order to raise the siege. The embarrassment of the Austrian general, between his reluctance to relinquish so important a conquest and his apprehensions at disobeying the orders of his superior officer, was extreme; and he deemed himself happy at being able to escape from so serious a dilemma, by granting the most favourable terms of

(1) Bot. iii. 476, 477. Dum. iii. 257. Jom. xiii. 224.

(2) Bot. iii. 478. Jom. xiii. 228, 231. Dum. iii. 260, 263.

(3) Thib. 282.

(4) Jom. xiii. 229. Dum. iii. 263.

capitulation to his enemy. No sooner was the place surrendered, than he detached a division to Tortona, and a brigade to Placentia; and set out on the following day with his remaining forces in the same direction, leaving Hohen-zollern to occupy Genoa with sixteen battalions (1).

May 11.
Advance of
the Allies to
Nice.

Meanwhile Suchet continued his retrograde movement towards the Var; and on the 11th May effected the passage of that river. He was closely followed by the Austrians under Melas, who, on the same day, entered into Nice, and took up their quarters in the territory of the Republic. The enthusiasm of the troops rose to the highest pitch; at length they found themselves on the soil of France, and that ambitious power, which had so long sent forth its armies to devastate and oppress the adjoining states, began now to experience the evils it had inflicted on others (2).

Description
of Suchet's
position on
the Var.

The Var is a mountain river, in general fordable, but which, like all mountain streams in those latitudes, is readily swelled by rains in a few hours into an impetuous torrent. It has always been considered as a weak part of the French frontier, because, to give solidity to its left extremity, it would be necessary to carry the line of defence far into the French Alps, at the distance of ten or twelve leagues from the sea. The portion of this line, however, which was occupied by Suchet, was much more inconsiderable, and did not extend above half a mile in breadth between the sea and the first rugged eminences. It had been fortified with care during the years 1794 and 1795, and the long bridge which traverses the river was covered by a formidable *tête-de-pont*, mounted with a plentiful array of heavy artillery. In this position Suchet hoped to arrest the enemy until the army of reserve, under Napoléon, had descended into Italy and appeared in their rear. In effect, the alarming reports which he received of the appearance of a powerful French force in the valley of Aosta, induced Melas, soon after his arrival at Nice, to detach a large part of his troops in that direction; and at length, when there could no longer be any doubt of the fact, he set out in

May 18.

person for Piedmont, leaving Elnitz, with eighteen thousand men, to make himself master of the bridge of the Var. Suchet had but thirteen thousand, but they were covered by formidable works, and were daily receiving additions of strength from the conscripts and national guard in the interior. The Imperialists having at length got up their heavy artillery from Nice, unmasked their batteries on the 22d, and advanced with great intrepidity

May 22.
Attack by
the Aus-
trians on it,
which is re-
pulsed.

to the attack. But when Suchet evacuated the territory of Nice, he left a garrison in Fort Montauhan, perched on a rock in the rear, from whence every thing which passed in the Austrian lines was visible, and from which he received, by telegraph, hourly intelligence of what was preparing on the enemy's side. Thus warned, the Republicans were on their guard; the Austrian columns, when they arrived within pistol-shot of the works, were received with a tremendous fire of grape and musketry; and after remaining long and bravely at the foot of the intrenchments, a prey to a murderous fire which swept off numbers by every discharge, they were compelled to retire, after sustaining a considerable loss (3).

Fresh at-
tack and
final repulse
of them.

Elnitz, however, was not discouraged. The accounts which he received from his rear rendered it more than ever necessary to carry this important post, in order to secure a barrier against the French, in the event of its being necessary to retire, and make head against

(1) Jom. xiii. 227, 232. Nap. i. 224.

(2) Nap. i. 217. Jom. xiii. 87.

(3) Jom. xiii. 200, 201. Dum. iii. 204, 211.

Nap. i. 218.

the invasion of the First Consul. Already accounts had arrived of the descent of Thureau upon Suza, and the capture of Ivrea by Lannes with the vanguard of Napoléon. Collecting, therefore, all his forces, he made a last effort. Twenty pieces of heavy cannon, placed in position within musket-shot, battered the Republican defences, while the English cruisers thundered on May 27. the right of the position. Under the cover of this imposing fire, the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the assault, and the sappers succeeded in breaking through the first palisades; but the brave men who headed the column almost perished at the foot of the intrenchment, and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon their enterprise. After this check, all thoughts of carrying the *têtes-de-pont* on the Var were laid aside, and the Austrians broke up during the night, and retreated, with seventeen thousand men, in the direction of Piedmont (1).

Formation of the army of reserve by Napoléon. It is now time to resume the operations of Napoléon and the army of reserve, which rendered these retrograde movements of the Imperialists necessary, cut short their brilliant career of victories, and ultimately precipitated them into the most unheard-of reverses. This army, which had been in preparation ever since its formation had been decreed by the Consuls, on 7th January, 1800, had been intrusted, since the commencement of April, to Berthier, whose indefatigable activity was well calculated to create, out of the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, a formidable and efficient force. Thirty thousand conscripts and twenty thousand veteran troops rendered disposable by the conclusion of the war in la Vendée, were directed to different points, between Dijon and the Alps, to form the basis of this armament. Napoléon, whose gigantic mind was equal alike to the most elevated conceptions and the superintendence of the minutest details, was indefatigable in his endeavours to complete the preparations, and from the interior of his cabinet directed the march, provisioning, and equipment of every regiment in the army. He was at first undecided whether to direct the great reserve upon Germany or Italy; but the angry correspondence which had passed between him and Moreau, joined to the reverses experienced by Masséna in the environs of Genoa, at length determined him to cross the Alps and move upon Piedmont. Reports were obtained from skilful engineers, on the state of all the principal passes, from Mount Cenis to the St.-Gothard. After full consideration, he determined to cross the Great St.-Bernard. The advantages of this passage were obvious. It was at once the shortest road across the mountains, being directly in front of Lausanne, Vevay, and Besançon where the greater part of the army was cantoned, and it led him in a few days into the rear of the army of Melas, so as to leave him no alternative but to abandon his magazines and reserves, or fight his way to them, with his face towards Milan and his back to the Maritime Alps. In such a situation, the loss of a considerable battle could hardly fail to be fatal to the Imperial army, and might reasonably be expected to lead to the conquest of all Italy; whereas a reverse to the Republicans, who could fall back upon the St.-Gothard and the Simplon, was not likely to be attended with any similar disaster (2).

Towards the success of this great design, however, it was indispensable that the real strength and destination of the army of reserve should be

(1) Dum, iii. 215, 216. Jom, xiii. 201.

(2) Nap, i. 252, 253. Jom, xiii. 172, 173. Dum, iii. 219.

carefully concealed, as the forces of the Austrians lay in the valley of Aosta, on the southern side of the St.-Bernard, and by occupying in strength the summit of the mountain, they might render the passage difficult, if not impossible. The device fallen upon by the First Consul for this purpose was to proclaim openly the place where the army was collected, and the service to which it was destined, but to assemble such inconsiderable forces there as might render it an object rather of ridicule than alarm to the enemy. With this view it was pompously announced, in various ways, that the army of reserve, destined to raise the siege of Genoa, was assembling at Dijon; and when the Austrians spies repaired thither, they found only a few battalions of conscripts and some companies of troops of the line, not amounting in all to eight thousand men, which entirely dissipated the fears which had been formed by its announcement. The army of reserve at Dijon in consequence became the object of general ridicule throughout Europe; and Melas, relieved of all fears, for his rear, continued to press forward with perseverance his attacks on the Var, and considered the account of this army as a mere feint, to serve as a diversion to the siege of Genoa (1).

Description of the passage of the St.-Bernard. The St.-Bernard, which had been used for above two thousand years as the principal passage between Italy and France, lies between Martigny in the Valais, and Aosta in the beautiful valley of the same name on the southern side of the Alps. Though the direct communication between these countries, however, and perfectly passable for horsemen and foot-soldiers, it presented great difficulties for the transit of artillery and caissons. As far as St.-Pierre, indeed, on the side of the Valais, the passage is practicable for cannon, and from Aosta to the Italian plains the road is excellent; but in the interval between these places the track consists merely of a horse or bridlepath, following the sinuosities of the ravines through which it is conducted, or round the innumerable precipices which overhang the ascent. The summit of the ridge itself, which is little short of 8000 feet above the level of the sea (2), consists of a little plain or valley, shut in by snowy mountains of still greater elevation, about a mile in length, with features of such extraordinary gloom as to be indelibly imprinted in the recollection of every traveller who has witnessed it. At the northern extremity, where the path, emerging from the steep and rugged ascent of the Valley of Desolation, as it is emphatically called, first enters upon the level surface, is situated the convent of St.-Bernard, the highest inhabited ground in Europe, founded a thousand years ago by the humanity of the illustrious saint whose name it bears, and tenanted ever since that time by pious and intrepid monks, the worthy followers of such a leader, who there, amidst ice and granite, have fixed their abode, to rescue from destruction the travellers overwhelmed by snow, amidst the storms to which those elevated regions are at almost every season of the year exposed. At the southern end are still to be seen a few remains of the Temple of Jupiter Penninus, which formerly stood at the summit of the Italian side of the pass, and at its foot the cut in the solid rock through which the Roman Legions defiled for centuries to the tributary provinces of the empire on the north of the Alps. Innumerable votive offerings are found among the ruins of the solitary edifice in which the travellers express in simple but touching language their gratitude to Heaven for having surmounted the dangers of the passage. In the centre of the valley, midway between the remains of heathen

(1) *Jom. xiii. 175. Nap. i. 253, 254. Dum. iii.*(2) 7542, *Saussure and Ebel, i. 178.*

devotion and the monument of Christian charity, spreads out a lake, whose waters, cold and dark even at the height of summer, reflect the bare slopes and snowy crags which shut it in on every side. The descent towards Aosta is much more precipitous than on the north; and in the season when avalanches are common, travellers are often exposed to great danger from the masses of snow which, detached from the overhanging heights, sweep with resistless violence across the path, which there descends for miles down the bare and exposed side of the mountain. The climate in these elevated regions is too severe to permit of vegetation; the care of the monks has reared a few cresses and hardy vegetables in the sheltered corners of the slopes, on the northern side of the lake; but in general the mountains consist only of sterile piles of rock and snow, and not a human being is ever to be seen, except a few travellers, shivering and exhausted, who hasten up the toilsome ascent to partake in the never-failing hospitality of the convent at the summit (1).

Napoléon
resolves to
hazard the
passage.

This scene, so interesting from historical recollections, as well as natural sublimity, was destined to receive additional celebrity from the memorable passage of the French army. None of the difficulties with which it was attended were unknown to their resolute chief, but, aware of the immense results which would attend an irruption into Italy, he resolved to incur their hazard. To all the observations of the engineers on the obstacles which opposed the passage, he replied, "We must surmount ten leagues of rocks covered with snow. Be it so; we will dismount our guns, and place them on sledges adapted to the rugged nature of the ascent. Nothing is to be found in these sterile mountains but a few chestnuts and herds of cattle; we will transport rice and biscuit by the lake of Geneva to Villeneuve; every soldier will carry as much as will suffice him for six days, and the sumpter mules will transport subsistence for six days more. When we arrive in the valley of Aosta, we will hasten to the fertile banks of the Ticino, where abundance and glory will reward our audacious enterprise." In pursuance of this bold design, the most active preparations were made by Marmont to facilitate the passage. Two millions of rations of biscuit were baked at Lyon, and transported by the lake of Geneva to Villeneuve, to await the arrival of the army; trees felled in the forests of the Jura to form sledges for the cannon, and mules and peasants summoned from all quarters to aid in the transport of the stores and ammunition. Napoléon set out from Paris on the 6th May, and arrived at Geneva on the 8th. He instantly sent for Marescot, the chief of engineers. After listening with patience to his enumeration of the difficulties of the attempt, he said, "Is it possible to pass?"—"Yes!" he replied, "but with difficulty."—"Let us then set out," answered the First Consul; words eminently descriptive of the clear conception and immovable resolution which formed the leading features of that great man's character (2).

At Geneva, Napoléon had an interview with M. Necker, who had remained in retirement at his villa of Coppet, near that town, since the period of his banishment by the Constituent Assembly. He professed himself little struck with his conversation, and alleged that he did not disguise his desire to be restored to the direction of the Republican finances; but it is probable the First Consul regarded the Swiss statesman with prejudiced eyes, from his strong sense of the incalculable evils which his concessions to democratic ambition had brought upon the French people (3). On the 15th, he passed in

(1) Personal observation.

(2) *Jom.* xliii. 174, 176. *Nap.* i. 255, 256.

(3) *Nap.* i. 257. *Bour.* vii. 109.

review at Lausanne the vanguard of the real army of reserve, consisting of six regiments of veteran troops newly equipped, and in the finest possible order. Shortly after, he received a visit from Carnot, the minister of war, who brought accounts of the victory of Moeskirch, and the advance of Moreau in Germany; while the stores and artillery arrived from all quarters.

May 9.
Measures
taken for
the crossing
of the artil-
lery.

The preparations were rapidly completed. A hundred large firs were hollowed out so as to receive each a piece of artillery; the carriages were taken to pieces and put on the backs of mules; the ammunition dispersed among the peasants, who arrived from all quarters with their beasts of burden to share in the ample rewards which the French engineers held forth to stimulate their activity. Two companies of artillery workmen were stationed, the one at St.-Pierre, on the north, the other at St.-Remi, on the south of the mountains, to take to pieces the artillery and remount them on their carriages; the ammunition of the army was conveyed in little boxes, so constructed as to go on the backs of mules. With such admirable precision were these arrangements made, that the dismounting and replacing of the guns hardly retarded for an hour the march of the columns; and the soldiers, animated by the novelty and splendour of the enterprise, vied with each other in their efforts to second the activity of their officers. Berthier, when they reached the foot of the mountains, addressed them in the following proclamation: "The soldiers of the Rhine have signalled themselves by glorious triumphs; those of the army of Italy struggle with invincible perseverance against a superior enemy. Emulating their virtues, do you ascend and reconquer beyond the Alps the plains which were the first theatre of French glory. Conscripts! you behold the ensigns of victory; march, and emulate the veterans who have won so many triumphs; learn from them how to bear and overcome the fatigues inseparable from war. Bonaparte is with you; he has come to witness your first triumph. Prove to him that you are the same men whom he formerly led in these regions to immortal renown (1)." These words inflamed to the highest pitch the ardour of the soldiers, and there was but one feeling throughout the army, that of seconding to the uttermost the glorious enterprise in which they were engaged.

Passage of
the moun-
tain.

On the 16th May the First Consul slept at the convent of St.-Maurice, and on the following morning the army commenced the passage of the mountain. During the four following days the march continued, and from eight to ten thousand men passed daily. The first night they slept at St.-Pierre, the second at St.-Remi or Etroubles, the third at Aosta. Napoleon himself remained at St.-Maurice till the 20th, when the whole had crossed. The march, though toilsome, presented no extraordinary difficulties till the leading column arrived at St.-Pierre. But from that village to the summit, the ascent was painful and laborious in the highest degree. To each gun a hundred men were harnessed, and relieved by their comrades every half mile; the soldiers vied with each other in the fatiguing undertaking of dragging it up the toilsome and rugged track, and it soon became a point of honour for each column to prevent their cannon from falling behind the array. To support their efforts, the music of each regiment played at its head, and where the paths were peculiarly steep, the charge sounded to give additional vigour to their exertions. Toiling painfully up the ascent, hardly venturing to halt to draw breath lest the march of the column should be retarded, ready to sink under the weight of their arms and baggage, the

(1) *Bot.* iv. 10, 11, *Nap.* i. 257. *Jom.* xiii. 176, 177. *Dum.* iii. 169, 170.

soldiers animated each other by warlike songs, and the solitudes of the St.-Bernard resounded with the strains of military music. From amidst the snows and the clouds, the glittering bands of armed men appeared; and the distant chamois on the mountains above, startled by the unwonted spectacle, bounded away to the regions of desolation, and paused on the summit of its inaccessible cliffs to gaze on the columns which wound around their feet (1).

After six hours of toilsome ascent, the head of the army reached the hospice at the summit; and the troops, forgetting their fatigues, traversed with joyful steps the snowy vale, or reposing beside the cool waters of the lake, rent the air with acclamations at the approaching termination of their labours. By the provident care of the monks, every soldier received a large ration of bread and cheese, and a draught of wine at the gate; a seasonable supply, which exhausted the ample stores of their establishment, but was fully repaid by the First Consul before the termination of the campaign. After an hour's rest, the columns wound along the margin of the lake, and began the steep and perilous descent to St.-Remi. The difficulties here were still greater than on the northern side. The snow, hard beneath, was beginning to melt on the surface, and great numbers both of men and horses lost their footing, and were precipitated down the rapid declivity. At length, however, they reached a more hospitable region; the sterile rocks and snow gave place to herbage, enamelled with the flowers of spring; a few firs next gave token of the descent into the woody region, gradually a thick forest overshadowed their march, and before they reached Etroubles, the soldiers, who had so recently shivered in the blasts of winter, were melting under the rays of an Italian sun (2).

Napoléon himself crossed on the 28th. He was mounted on a sure-footed mule, which he obtained from the Priory of St.-Maurice, and attended by a young and active guide, who confided to him, without knowing his quality, all his wishes, and was astonished to find them, some time after, all realized by the generous recollection of the First Consul. He rested an hour at the convent, and descended to St.-Remi, over the hard and slippery surface of the snow, chiefly on foot, often sliding down, and with considerable difficulty (3).

(1) Nap. i. 259. Dum. ii. 170. Bot. iv. 13.

(2) Dum. iii. 171, 172. Bot. iv. 14, 15. Nap. i. 261.

"Oh joy! the signs of life appear,
The first and single fir
That on the limits of the living world
Strikes in the ice its roots;
Another and another now,
And now the larch, that flings its arms
Down curving like the falling wave,
And now the aspen's glittering leaves
Grey glitter on the moveless twig,
The poplar's varying verdure now,
And now the birch so beautiful,
Light as a lady's plume."

(3) Nap. i. 261.

Comparison of the passage of the Alps, by Hannibal, Napoléon, Suwarrow, and Macdonald. The passage of the St.-Bernard has been the subject of great exaggeration from those who are unacquainted with the ground. To speak of the French troops traversing paths known only to the smuggler or the chamois hunter, is ridiculous, when the road has been a beaten passage for two thousand years, and is traversed daily in summer by great numbers of travellers. One would suppose from these descriptions, it was ever the Col du Géant between Chamouni and Aosta, or over the summit of the Col du Bonhomme, that the French army had passed. It will bear no comparison with the passage of Hannibal over the Little St.-

Bernard, opposed as it was by the mountain tribes, by paths comparatively unformed, and in the course of which the Carthaginian general lost nearly half his army. Having traversed on foot both the ground over which Napoléon's army passed at the Great St.-Bernard, that traversed by Suwarrow on the St.-Gothard, the Schächental, and the Engiberg, and that surmounted by Macdonald in the passage of the Splügen, the Monte Aprigal, and the Mont Tonal, the author is enabled to speak with perfect confidence as to the comparative merit of these different undertakings. From being commenced in the depth of winter, and over ridges comparatively unfrequented, the march of Macdonald was by far the most hazardous, so far as mere natural difficulties were concerned; that of Suwarrow was upon the whole the most worthy of admiration, from the vigorous resistance he experienced at every step, the total inexperience of his troops in mountain warfare, and the unparalleled hardships, both physical and moral, with which its later stages were involved. That of Napoléon over the St.-Bernard, during a fine season, without any opposition from the enemy, with every aid from the peasantry of the district, and the experience of his own officers, and by a road impracticable only for carriages and cannon, must, with every impartial observer acquainted with the ground, rank as the easiest of these memorable enterprises.

The army is
stopped in
the valley of
Aosta by the
Fort of
Bard.

Lannes, who commanded the advanced guard, descended rapidly the beautiful valley of Aosta, occupied the town of the same name, and overthrew at Chatillon a body of fifteen hundred Croats who endeavoured to dispute his passage. The soldiers, finding themselves in a level and fertile valley, abounding with trees, vines, and pasture, deemed their difficulties past, and joyfully followed the hourly increasing waters of the Dora Baltea, when their advance was suddenly checked by the fort and the cannon of Bard. This inconsiderable fortification had wellnigh proved a more serious obstacle to the army than the whole perils of the St.-Bernard. Situated on a pyramidal rock midway between the opposite cliffs of the valley, which there approach very near to each other, and at the distance of not more than fifty yards from either side, it at once commands the narrow road which is conducted close under its ramparts, and is beyond the reach of any but regular approaches. The cannon of the ramparts, two-and-twenty in number, are so disposed upon its well-constructed bastions, as to command not only the great road which traverses the village at its feet, but every path on either side of the adjacent mountains by which it appears practicable for a single person to pass (1). No sooner was the advanced guard arrested by this formidable obstacle, than Lannes advanced to the front, and ordered an assault on the town, defended only by a single wall. It was quickly carried by the impetuosity of the French grenadiers, but the Austrians retired in good order into the fort on the rock above, and from its secure casements the garrison kept up an incessant fire upon every column that attempted the passage. Marescot, the chief of the engineers, reported, after a reconnoissance, that the fort could not be carried by a *coup-de-main*, while the rocky cliffs of the mountains on either side opposed the greatest difficulties to a regular siege. The advance of the army was instantly checked; cannon, caissons, infantry, and cavalry accumulated in the narrow defile in the upper part of the valley, and the alarm rapidly running from front to rear, the advance of the columns behind was already suspended, from the apprehension that the enterprise was impracticable, and that they must recross the mountains (2).

May 23. Napoléon, deeming all his difficulties surmounted, was advancing with joyful steps down the southern declivity of the St.-Bernard, when he received this alarming intelligence. Instantly advancing to the vanguard, he ascended the Monte Albaredo, which commanded the fort on the left bank of the Dora Baltea, and with his telescope long and minutely surveyed its walls. He soon perceived that it was possible for the infantry to pass by a path along the face of the cliffs of that rugged mountain, above the range of the guns of the fort; but by no exertions was it possible to render it practicable for artillery. In vain the Austrian commandant was summoned, and threatened with an instant assault in case of refusal to surrender; he replied as became a man of courage and honour, well aware of the importance of his position, and the means of defending it which were in his power. A few pieces of artillery were, by great efforts, hoisted up to an eminence on the Monte Albaredo which commanded the fort, but their fire produced little impression on the bomb-proof batteries and vaulted casements which sheltered the garrison; a single piece only, placed on the steeples of the town, answered with effect to the fire of one of the bastions. Time pressed, however, and it was indispensable that the army should without de-

Great skill
with which
the obstacle
was carried
by the
French en-
gineers.

(1) Personal observation.

(2) Nap. i. 261, 262. Jom. xiii. 182, 183. Dum. iii. 176, 177. Bot. iv. 14.

lay continue its advance. Contrary to the advice of Marescot, Napoléon ordered an escalade, and Berthier formed three columns, each of three hundred grenadiers, who advanced with the utmost resolution at midnight to the assault. They climbed in silence up the rock, and reached the works without being discovered. The outer palisades were carried, and the Austrian videttes retired precipitately to the ramparts above, but at its foot all the efforts of the Republicans were frustrated. The garrison was instantly on the alert. A shower of balls spread death through their ranks, while vast numbers of shells and hand grenades thrown down amongst them (1), augmented the confusion and alarm inseparable from a nocturnal attack. After sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon the attempt; the passage seemed hermetically closed; the army could not advance a step further in its progress.

In this extremity, the genius and intrepidity of the French engineers surmounted the difficulty. The infantry and cavalry of Lannes' division traversed one by one the path on the Monte Albaredo, and re-formed lower down the valley, while the artillerymen succeeded in drawing their cannon, in the dark, through the town, close under the guns of the fort, by spreading straw and dung upon the streets, and wrapping the wheels up, so as to prevent the slightest sound being heard. In this manner forty pieces and a hundred caissons were drawn through during the night, while the Austrians, in unconscious security, slumbered above, beside their loaded cannon, directed straight into the street where the passage was going forward. A few grenades and combustibles were merely thrown at random over the ramparts during the gloom, which killed a considerable number of the French engineers, and blew up several of their ammunition waggons, but without arresting for a moment the passage. Before daylight a sufficient number were passed to enable the advanced guard to continue its march, and an obstacle, which might have proved the ruin of the whole enterprise, was effectually overcome. During the succeeding night, the same hazardous operation was repeated, with equal success; and while the Austrian commander was writing to Melas that he had seen thirty-five thousand men and four thousand horse cross the path of the Albaredo, but that not one piece of artillery or caisson should pass beneath the guns of his fortress, the whole cannon and ammunition of the army were safely proceeding on the road to Ivrea. The fort of Bard itself held out till the 5th June; and we have the authority of Napoléon for the assertion, that if the passage of the artillery had been delayed till its fall, all hope of success in the campaign was at an end. The presence of an Austrian division seven thousand strong would have equally sufficed to destroy the French troops as they emerged without cannon from the perilous defile of the Albaredo. On such trivial incidents do the fate and the revolutions of nations in the last result often depend (2).

Meanwhile Lannes, proceeding onward with the advanced guard, emerged from the mountains, and appeared before the walls of Ivrea. This place, once of considerable strength, and which in 1704 had withstood for ten days all the efforts of the Duke of Vendôme with a formidable train of artillery, had of late years fallen into decay, and its ruined walls, but partially armed, hardly offered an obstacle to an enterprising enemy. Lannes ordered an assault at once on the three gates of the city. He advanced himself with the column on the right, and with his

(1) Nap. i. 263, Jom. xiii. 185. Bour. iv. 102. Dum. iii. 176.

(2) Nap. i. 263, 265. Jom. xiii. 185, 188. Dum. iii. 176, 180. Bour. iv. 102, 103.

own hand directed the first strokes of the hatchet at the palisades. The defences were soon broken down, the chains of the drawbridges cut, the gates blown open, and the Republicans rushed, with loud shouts, on all sides into the town. A battalion which defended the walls was forced to fly, leaving three hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy, and the Austrian troops drawn up behind the town retired precipitately towards Turin. They took post behind the Chinsella, spreading themselves out, according to custom, over a long line, to cover every approach to the capital of Piedmont. They were there attacked on the following day by Lannes, and a warm contest ensued. The Imperialists, confident in the numbers and prowess of their cavalry, vigorously charged the Republicans; but, though they led up their

May 26.

horses to the very bayonnets of the infantry, they were in the end repulsed, and the bridge over the river was carried by the assailants. After this check the Austrians retired towards Turin, and Lannes, pursuing his

May 28.

successes, pushed on to the banks of the Po, where he made himself master of a flotilla of boats, of the greater value to the invading army, as they did not possess the smallest bridge equipage. The whole army, thirty-six thousand strong, was assembled at Ivrea, with all its artillery, on the 28th, while the advanced guard pushed its patrols to the gates of Turin (1).

Passage of
the St.-Go-
thard and
Mont Cenis
by the wings
of the army.

While the centre of the army of reserve was thus surmounting the difficulties of the St.-Bernard, the right and left wings performed with equal success the movements assigned to them. Thureau, with five thousand men, descended to Susa and Novalesse, while Moncey, detached with sixteen thousand choice troops from the army of the Rhine, crossed the St.-Gothard, and began to appear in the neighbourhood of the Lago Maggiore. At the same time General Bethencourt, with a brigade of Swiss troops, ascended the Simplon, and forcing the terrific defile of Gondo, appeared at Duomo d'Ossola, and opened up the communication with the left of the army. Thus, above sixty thousand men, converging from so many different quarters, were assembled in the plains of Piedmont, and threatened the rear of the Imperial army engaged in the defiles of the Apennines from Genoa to the mouth of the Var (2).

Melas, in
haste, con-
centrates
the army.

No sooner did Melas receive certain information of the appearance of this formidable enemy in the Italian plains, than he dispatched couriers in all directions to concentrate his troops. He himself, as already mentioned, broke up from the Var with the greater part of his forces, and orders were dispatched to Ott to raise the siege of Genoa; and hasten with all the strength he could collect to the Bormida. The orders arrived at Genoa just at the time when the capitulation was going forward, so that the advance of the army of reserve was too late to raise the siege of that fortress; but still an important and decisive operation awaited the First Consul. To oppose him in the first instance, the Austrians had only the corps of Wukassowich, Laudon, and Haddick, who could hardly muster eighteen thousand men in all, and not above six thousand in any one point; so widely were their immense forces scattered over the countries they had conquered; while the concentration of their troops from the Var and the coast of Genoa would require a considerable time (3).

Different
plans which
lay open to
Napoleon.

In these circumstances the French commander had the choice of three different plans, each of which promised to be attended with important results. The first was to incline to the right, form a

(1) Nap. i. 266, 267. Dum. iii. 185, 187. Jom. xiii. 193, 195.

(2) Jom. xiii. 190, 192. Dum. iii. 187, 192.

(3) Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 134.

junction with Thureau, and, in concert with Suchet, attack the Austrian army under Melas; the second, to cross the Po by means of the barks so opportunely thrown into his power, and advance to the relief of Masséna, who yet held out; the third, to move to the left, pass the Ticino, form a junction with Moncey, and capture Milan with the stores and reserve parks of the Imperialists. Of these different plans the first appeared unadvisable, as the forces of Melas were superior to those of the First Consul without the addition of Moncey, and it was extremely hazardous to run the risk of a defeat while the fort of Bard still held out and interrupted the retreat of the army.

He resolves to occupy Milan. The second was equally perilous, as it plunged the invading army, without any line of communication, into the centre of the Imperial forces, and it was doubtful whether Genoa could hold out till the Republican eagles approached the Bocchetta. The third had the disadvantage of abandoning Masséna to his fate, but to counterbalance that, it offered the most brilliant result. The possession of Milan could not fail to produce a great moral impression, both on the Imperialists and the Italians, and to renew, in general estimation, the halo of glory which was wont to encircle the brows of the First Consul. The junction with Moncey would raise the army to fifty thousand effective men, and secure for it a safe retreat in case of disaster by the St.-Gothard and the Simplon; the magazines and parks of reserve collected by the Austrians, lay exposed to immediate capture in the unprotected towns of Lombardy; while, by intercepting their communications with Germany, and compelling them to fight with their rear towards France and the Maritime Alps, the inestimable advantage was gained of rendering any considerable disaster the forerunner of irreparable ruin (1).

May 31. Advance into Lombardy, and capture of that city. Moved by these considerations, Napoléon directed his troops rapidly towards the Ticino, and arrived on the banks of that river on the 31st May. The arrival of so great a force, in a quarter where they were totally unexpected, threw the Austrians into the utmost embarrassment. All their disposable infantry was occupied at Belinzona to oppose the advance of Moncey, or had retired behind the Lago Maggiore, before Bethencourt. The only troops which they could collect to oppose the passage were the cavalry of Festenberg, with a few regiments of Laudon, a force under five thousand men, and totally inadequate to maintain the line of the Ticino from Sesto-Calende, where it flows out of the Lago Maggiore, to Pavia, where it joins the Po, against an enemy thirty thousand strong. Unable to guard the line of the river, the cavalry of Festenberg was drawn up in front of Turbigo, when Gérard, with the advanced guard, crossed the river under cover of the French artillery, advantageously posted on the heights behind, and instantly made himself master of the bridge of Naviglio, by which the infantry of the division began to defile to his assistance. He was immediately and warmly attacked by the Imperial cavalry, but though they at first had some success, yet the French having retired into a woody position deeply intersected by canals, they succeeded in maintaining their ground, until the Republicans had crossed over in such numbers as to enable them to carry Turbigo with the bayonet, and effectually establish themselves on the left bank of the river. At the same time Murat effected a passage at Buffalora, on the great road from Turin to Milan, with hardly any opposition; the Austrians retired on all sides, and Napoléon, with the advanced guard, made his triumphant entry into Milan on the 2d June, where he was received with transports of joy by the democratic party, and the same applause

(1) Nap. i. 268, 270. Jom. xiii. 190, 196.

by the inconstant populace which they had lavished the year before on Suwarrow (1).

Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the Milanese at this sudden apparition of the republican hero. Some believed he had died near the Red Sea, and that it was one of his brothers who commanded the army; none were aware that he had so recently crossed the Alps, and revisited the scenes of his former glory. He instantly dismissed the Austrian authorities, re-established, with more show than sincerity, the republican magistrates; but, foreseeing that the chances of war might expose his partisans to severe reprisals, wisely forbade any harsh measures against the dethroned party. Taking advantage of the public enthusiasm which his unexpected arrival occasioned, he procured, by contributions and levies, large supplies for his troops, and augmented their numbers by the regiments of Moneey, which slowly made their appearance from the St.-Gothard. On the 6th and 7th June these troops were reviewed, and the French outposts extended in all directions. They were pushed to Placentia and the Po, the principal towns in Lombardy being abandoned, without resistance, by the Austrians. Pavia fell into their hands, with 200 pieces of cannon, 8,000 muskets, and stores in proportion. At the same time the following animated proclamation was addressed to the troops, and electrified all Europe, long accustomed only to the reverses of the Republicans:—
 “Soldiers! when we began our march, one of our departments was in the possession of the enemy: consternation reigned through all the south of France. The greatest part of the Ligurian republic, the most faithful ally of our country, was invaded. The Cisalpine republic, annihilated in the last campaign, groaned under the feudal yoke. You advanced, and already the French territory is delivered: joy and hope have succeeded in our country to consternation and fear. You will restore liberty and independence to the people of Genoa: you already are in the capital of the Cisalpine. The enemy, terror-struck, seeks only to regain his frontiers: you have taken from him his hospitals, his magazines, his reserve parks. The first act of the campaign is finished; millions of men address you in strains of praise. But shall we allow our audacious enemies to violate with impunity the territory of the republic? Will you permit the army to escape which has carried terror into your families? You will not. March, then, to meet him; tear from his brows the laurels he has won; teach the world that a malediction attends those who violate the territory of the great people. The result of our efforts will be unclouded glory and a durable peace (2).”

While these important operations were going forward in Lombardy, Melas conceived the project of threatening his adversary's communications by a movement on Vercelli. But when on the point of executing this design, he received intelligence of the simultaneous disasters which in so many different quarters were accumulating on the Austrian monarchy; the repeated defeats of Kray in Germany, and his concentration in the intrenched camp at Ulm; the arrival of Moneey at Belinzona, and the retreat of Wukassowich towards the Adda. In these circumstances more cautious measures seemed necessary, and he resolved to concentrate his army under the caannon of Alexandria. But while the French soldiers were abandoning themselves to the flattering illusions which this extraordinary and rapid success suggested, they received the disastrous

(1) Nap. i. 271, 272. Dum. iii. 265, 268. Jom. xiii. 208, 210.

(2) Nap. i. 272, 275. Jom. xiii. 209, 210, 214, 216. Dum. iii. 269, 271, 273. Bul. 110, 117.

intelligence of the surrender of Genoa; and Napoléon had the mortification of finding, from the point to which the troops who capitulated were to be conveyed, that they could be of no service to him in the decisive operations that were fast approaching. It was evident, therefore, that he would have the whole Austrian army on his hands at once, and therefore no time was to be lost in striking a decisive blow. The fort of Bard capitulated on the 5th June, which both disengaged the troops of Chabran employed in its reduction, and opened the St.-Bernard as a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. The rapid marches and countermarches of the Republicans through the plain of Lombardy, had made the enemy fall back to Mantua and the line of the Mincio, and the French troops already occupied Lodi and blockaded Pizzighitone, and other fortresses on the Po; but from this dispersion of force, and eccentric direction given to a large portion of the army, arose a most serious inconvenience; it reduced to one-half the mass that could be collected to make head against Melas in Piedmont. In effect, out of the sixty thousand men which he commanded in Lombardy, Napoléon could only collect thirty thousand in one body to meet the main army of the enemy; but, confident in his own abilities and the spirit of his troops, he resolved with this inconsiderable force to cut Melas off from his line of retreat, and for this purpose moved upon Stradella, on the right bank of the Po, which brought him on the great road from Alexandria to Mantua (1).

The French vanguard comes up with the Austrians at Montebello. The French army began its march towards the Po on the 6th June, and Lannes, commanding the advanced guard, crossed that river at St.-Cipriano. At the same time, Murat, who had broken up from Lodi, attacked the *tête-de-pont* at Placentia, and drove the Austrians out of that town on the road towards Tortona, while Duhesme, not less fortunate, assailed Cremona, and expelled the garrison, with the loss of eight hundred men. The line of the Po being thus broken through at three points, the Imperialists every where fell back, and abandoning all hope of maintaining their communication with Mantua and their reserves in the east of Italy, concentrated their forces towards Casteggio and Montebello. Ott there joined them with the forces rendered disposable by the surrender of Genoa, and stationed his troops, on a chain of gentle eminences, in two lines, so disposed as to be able to support one another in case of need. Fifteen thousand chosen troops were there drawn up in the most advantageous position; their right resting on the heights which formed the roots of the Apennines, and commanding the great road to Tortona which wound round their feet; their left extending into the plain, where their splendid cavalry could act with effect. At the sight of such an array, Lannes was a moment startled, but instantly perceiving the disastrous effect which the smallest retrograde movement might have on a corps with its rear resting on the Po, he resolved forthwith to attack the enemy. His forces did not exceed nine thousand men, while those of the enemy were fifteen thousand strong; but the division of Victor, of nearly equal strength, was only two leagues in the rear, and might be expected to take a part in the combat before its termination (2).

Desperate and bloody action there, in which the Austrians are worsted. The French infantry, with great gallantry, advanced in echelon, under a shower of grape-shot and musketry, to storm the hills on the right of the Austrian position, where strong batteries were placed, which commanded the whole field of battle; and succeeded in carrying the heights of Revetta: but they were there assailed, while disor-

(1) Napoléon, i. 275, 277. Dum. iii. 276, 279. Join. xiii. 212, 220. Bul. 124, 127.

(2) Bol. iv. 23. Nap. i. 279. Dum. iii. 288, 290. Join. xiii. 257, 258.

dered by success, by six fresh regiments; and driven with great slaughter down into the plain. In the centre, on the great road, Watrin with difficulty maintained himself against the vehement attacks of the Imperialists; and notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Lannes, defeat appeared inevitable, when the battle was restored by the arrival of a division of Victor's corps, which enabled the Republicans to rally their troops and prepare a fresh attack. New columns were immediately formed to assail the heights on the left, while Watrin commenced a furious onset in the centre; the Austrians were every where driven back, and the triumph of the French appeared certain, when Ott brought up his reserves from the second line, and victory again inclined to the other side. The Republicans, attacked in their turn by fresh troops, gave way, and the loud shouts of the Imperialists announced a total overthrow, when the arrival of the remainder of Victor's corps not only restored the balance, but turned it against the Austrians. Their troops, however, were too experienced, and their confidence in themselves too great, to yield without a desperate struggle; both sides were animated by the most heart-stirring recollections. The French fought to regain the laurels they had won in the first Italian campaign, the Imperialists to preserve those they had reaped in so many later triumphs; and both parties felt that the fate of the war, in a great degree, depended on their exertions; for the Austrians struggled to gain time for the concentration of their forces to meet this new enemy, the Republicans to avoid being driven back with ruinous loss into the Po. The last reserves on both sides were soon engaged, and the contending parties fought long hand to hand with the most heroic resolution. At length the arrival of Napoléon with the division Gardanne, decided the victory (1). Ott, who now saw his right turned, while the centre and left were on the point of giving way, reluctantly gave the signal of retreat, and the Imperialists, in good order, and with measured steps, retired towards S.-Juliano, after throwing a garrison of a thousand men into the fortress of Tortona (2).

Position of
the French
in the Pass
of Stradella,
between the
Apennines
and Po.

In this bloody combat, the Austrians lost three thousand killed and wounded, and fifteen hundred prisoners. The French had to lament nearly an equal number slain or disabled; but the moral effect of the victory was immense, and more than counterbalanced all their losses. It restored at once the spirit of their troops, which the continued disasters of the preceding campaign had severely weakened; and when Napoléon traversed the field of battle, late in the evening, he found the soldiers lying on the ground, and exhausted with fatigue, but animated with all their ancient enthusiasm. He halted his army at Stradella, a strong position, formed by the advance of a lower ridge of the Apennines towards the Po, where the intersected and broken nature of the ground promised to render unserviceable the numerous squadrons of the enemy. In this position he remained the three following days, concentrating and organizing his troops for the combat which was approaching, and covering, by *têtes-de-pont*, the two bridges over the Po in his rear—his sole line of retreat in case of disaster, or means of rejoining the large portion of his army which remained behind (3).

Disastrous
retreat of
Elmütz from
the Var.

While Napoléon, with the army of reserve, was thus threatening Melas in front, and occupied, at Stradella, the sole line by which the Austrian general could re-establish his communications with the plain of Lombardy, disasters of the most formidable kind were accumu-

(1) Nap. i. 278, 280. Bot. iv. 23, 24. Jom. xiii. 256, 260. Dum. iii. 293, 297. Bul. 137, 145.

(2) This was one of the most desperate actions which had yet occurred in the war. "The bones,"

said Lannes, "cracked in my division like glass in a hail-storm."—BOURRIENNE, iv. 112.

(3) Nap. i. 280. Dum. iii. 297, 299. Jom. xiii. 260, 261.

lating in his rear. No sooner did Elnitz commence his retreat, in the night of the 27th May, than Suchet, reinforced by some thousand of the national guard in the vicinity, which raised his corps to fourteen thousand men, instantly

May 28.

resumed the offensive. At noon, on the following day, General Ménard attacked the intrenchments which covered the retreat of the Austrians, forced them, and made three hundred prisoners. Following up his successes, he advanced rapidly on the three succeeding days, and on the 31st, attacked Bellegarde, and drove him from a strong position on the Col di Braus. On the next day, all the French columns were put in motion by sunrise. Garnier moved upon the Col di Tende by the Col di Rauss; Ménard, by the heights of Pietra Cava, directed his steps to the fort of Saorgio, now dismantled, and the camp of Mille Fourches; while Brunet attacked the Col di Brois in front, supported by a lateral column on each flank. These movements, though complicated from the nature of the ground, were attended with complete success. The important positions of the Col di Rauss, and the camp of Mille Fourches, were successively carried; the troops who defended them flying towards the Col di Tende and Fontan, leaving a thousand prisoners in the hands of the Republicans; Ménard descended from the heights in its rear to the romantic fort of Saorgio, which fell without any resistance; at the same time, Garnier and Lesuire established themselves on the Col di Tende, the troops intrusted with the defence of which sought refuge within the walls of Coni. The great road by the Col di Tende being thus carried, and the Austrian line broken through the middle, the usual series of disasters fell upon their scattered detachments. Elnitz, instead of uniting his forces to fall on Ménard, and regain the decisive pass of Saorgio and the great road, moved to the left to Acqua-Dolce to cover the great road to Genoa. The consequence of this was, that Ulm and Bellegarde, with two Austrian brigades, were surrounded at Breglio, and being cut off by the fall of Saorgio from the great road, had no alternative but to sacrifice their artillery, consisting of twelve light pieces, and throw themselves upon the heights of Foscoire, a branch of

June 3.

the Mont Jove. They were there attacked on the following day by Rochambeau, and driven back to Pigna, while Suchet pursued Elnitz towards Acqua-Dolce, and Ménard descended from the sources of the Tanaro towards Pieve. He had hardly arrived at that place when Ulm and Bellegarde, who, after unheard-of fatigues, had surmounted the rugged mountains which overhang Triola, arrived at the same place, exhausted with fatigue and totally

June 4.

unable to make any resistance. They occupied the houses without opposition, but they soon found that the overhanging woods were filled with enemies, and to complete their consternation, intelligence shortly after arrived that Delaunay, with an entire brigade, had cut off their only line of retreat.

June 7.

A panic instantly seized the troops; whole battalions threw down their arms and dispersed, and after wandering for days in the woods, were compelled by the pangs of hunger to surrender to the enemy. Of their whole force, only three hundred men, with the two generals, made their retreat by the Monte Ariolo to Latterman's camp (1). Elnitz at length, with eight thousand men, reached Ceva, having lost nearly nine thousand men in this disastrous retreat; while Suchet, united at Voltri with the garrison of Genoa, landed at that place by the Austrians, and advanced with their combined forces to the heights of Montenotte.

Thus disasters accumulating, one after another, on all sides, rendered the position of Melas highly critical. In his front was Napoléon, with the army

(1) *Jom.* xiii. 234, 243. *Dum.* iii. 219, 227. *Bot.* iv. 22, 24. *Bul.* 187, 195.

Gallant resolution of Melas to cut his way through Napoléon's army. of reserve, amounting in all to sixty thousand men; while in his rear, Suchet occupied all the mountain passes, and was driving before him the scattered Imperialists like chaff before the wind. On his left, the awful barrier of the Alps, leading only into a hostile country, precluded all hopes of retreat; while on his right, the ridges of the Apennines, backed by the sea, rendered it impossible to regain by a circuitous route the Hereditary States. Nothing could be more perilous than his situation; but the Austrian veteran was not discouraged, and concentrating all his disposable forces, he resolved to give battle, and open a communication, sword in hand, with the eastern provinces of the empire. Nor was it without reason that he ventured on this step, albeit hazardous at all times, and doubly so when retreat was impossible and communication with the base of operations cut off. He could collect above thirty thousand veteran troops, animated with the best spirit, and proud of two campaigns of unbroken glory: his artillery was greatly superior to that of the enemy, while the plains of the Bormida, where the decisive battle apparently was to be fought, seemed admirably adapted for his numerous and magnificent cavalry. Having taken his resolution, he dispatched troops in all directions to concentrate his forces; Elnitz, with the broken remains of his corps, was recalled from Ceva, Hohen-zollern from Genoa, the defence of which was intrusted to the extenuated prisoners, liberated from captivity by its fall (1); while a courier was dispatched, in haste, to Admiral Keith, to accelerate the arrival of a corps of twelve thousand English, who at this decisive crisis lay inactive at Minorca.

Arrival of Desaix from Egypt at Napoléon's headquarters. The post of Stradella, where Napoléon awaited the arrival of the enemy, and barred the great road to the eastward, was singularly well adapted to compensate the inferiority in cavalry and artillery of the First Consul. The right rested on impracticable morasses, extending to the Po; the centre was strengthened by several large villages; the left, commanding the great road, extended over heights, the commencement of the Apennines, crowned with a numerous artillery. Napoléon remained there, awaiting the attack, for three days; but the Austrian general had scarcely completed his operations, and he judged it not advisable to abandon the open plain, so favourable for his cavalry, for the broken ground selected by the enemy. On the 11th, Desaix, who had returned from Egypt, and performed quarantine at Toulon, arrived at headquarters with his aides-de-camp, Savary and Rapp. They sat up all night conversing on the changes of France, and the state of Egypt since they had parted on the banks of the Nile; and the First Consul, who really loved his lieutenant, and appreciated his military talents, immediately gave him the command of the division of Boudet. Finding that the Austrians were resolved not to attack him where he was, and remained grouped under the cannon of Alexandria, June 12. and fearful that they might recoil upon Suchet, or incline to the right towards Genoa, or the left to the Ticino, and threaten in turn his own communications, he resolved to give them battle in their own ground, and advanced to Voghera and the plains of MARENGO (2). Ott, at his approach, retired, across the Bormida, the two bridges over which were fortified, and armed with cannon.

Melas learned on the 10th, at Alexandria, the disastrous issue of the combat at Montebello, and the immense extent of the losses sustained by Elnitz. Far from being stunned by so many reverses, he only rose in firmness as the

(1) Dum. iii. 293, 299. Jom. xiii. 244, 248. Bul. 200, 209.

(2) Nap. i. 281, 283. Bot. iv. 24. Dum. iii. 299. Jom. xiii. 260, 263.

danger increased; and after dispatching a courier to Lord Keith, with accounts of his critical situation, and his resolution, in case of disaster to fall back upon Genoa, he addressed a noble proclamation to his troops, in which, without concealing their danger, he exhorted them to emulate their past glory, or fall with honour on the field which lay before them. Napoléon, on his side, fearful that the enemy meditated a retreat, and might retire unbroken to the fastnesses of the Apennines, pushed forward with vigour.

June 13. Lapoype, with his division, who had been left in observation on the north of the Po, received orders instantly to cross that river, and hasten to the scene of action, while Victor was directed to advance straight towards Marengo, and make himself master of the bridges over the Bormida. He successfully performed the task; Marengo, after a slight resistance, was carried, and the victorious French troops were arrested only by the fire of cannon

from the *tête-de-pont* on the Bormida. The facility with which Marengo was abandoned, confirmed Napoléon in his opinion that Melas meditated a retreat; and impressed with this idea, he resolved to return during the night to Ponte Curone, and move in the direction

of the Po; a resolution which would have proved fatal to his army, as it would have been attacked and routed on the following day, while executing its movement, by the Austrian general (1). The rapid swelling of the torrent of the Scrivia rendered that impossible, and induced the First Consul to fix his headquarters at Torre de Garofalo, between Tortona and Alexandria; and during the night intelligence of such a kind was received as rendered it necessary to suspend the lateral movements, and concentrate all his forces to resist the enemy.

In effect, Melas, having collected 51,000 men on the Bormida, of which 7,500 were cavalry, with 200 pieces of cannon, was advancing with rapid strides towards Marengo; having finally determined, in a general council on the preceding day, to risk every thing on the issue of a battle. Napoléon's troops of all arms present on the field, did not exceed 29,000, of which only 5,600 were horse; no less than 50,000 being in observation or garrison in the Milanese States, or on the banks of the Po. The Austrian force had undergone a similar diminution from the same supposed necessity of protecting the rear; 4,000 were left in Coni, and so many in Liguria, that instead of the 50,000 who were disposable at the end of May in that quarter, only 16,000 joined the Imperial headquarters. Their spirits, however, which had been somewhat weakened by the recent reverses, were elevated to the highest degree, when the determination to fight was taken; every one returned in joyful spirits to his quarters; the camp resounded with warlike cries and the note of military preparation, and that mutual confidence between officers and men was observable, which is the surest fore-runner of glorious achievements (2).

By daybreak, on the 14th June, the whole army of Melas was in motion; they rapidly defiled over the three bridges of the Bormida, and when the first rays of the sun appeared above the horizon, they glittered on twenty thousand foot soldiers, seven thousand cavalry, and two hundred pieces of cannon, pressing forward in proud array over the vast field of Marengo, perhaps the only plain in Italy where charges of horse can be made in full career. The First Consul was surprised; he never anticipated an attack from the enemy; his troops were disposed in oblique order by echelon, the

Preparatory movements of both parties.

Forces assembled on both sides.

Battle of Marengo, June 14.

(1) Nap. i. 287, 288. Jom. xiii. 263, 266. Daun, iii. 305, 307. Bul. 210, 220.

(2) Bot. iv. 25. Jom. xiii. 270. Bul. 230, 233.

left in front, and the right at half a day's march in the rear, in marching order; not more than twenty-two thousand men, under Lannes and Victor, could be brought till noon into the field to withstand the shock of the whole Austrian army. The vehemence of the cannonade soon convinced him that a general battle was at hand, and he instantly dispatched orders to Desaix to remeasure his steps, and hasten to the scene of action. But before he could do this, events of the utmost importance had taken place. At eight o'clock, the Austrian infantry, under Haddick and Kaim, preceded by a numerous and splendid array of artillery, which covered the deploying of their columns, commenced the attack. They speedily overthrew Gardanne, who, with six battalions, was stationed in front of Marengo, and drove him back in disorder towards that village. They were there received by the bulk of Victor's corps, which was by this time drawn up, with its centre in the village, and its wings along the hollow of Fontanone, which separated the two armies; that of Lannes was still in the rear. For two hours, Victor withstood all the efforts of Haddick and Kaim with heroic resolution, and at length the corps of Lannes came up, and the forces on both sides became more equal. The battle now raged with the utmost fury; the opposing columns stood, with invincible firmness, within pistol-shot of each other, and all the chasms, produced by the dreadful discharges of artillery, were rapidly filled up by a regular movement to the centre of the brave men who formed the ranks. While this desperate conflict was going on, intelligence was received that the advanced guard of Suchet had reached Acqui in the rear. Melas, uneasy for his communications, detached two thousand five hundred horse to arrest his progress; an unnecessary precaution, as he was too far off to effect any thing on the field of battle, and which, perhaps, decided the fate of the day. At length the perseverance of the Austrians prevailed over the heroic devotion of the French: Marengo was carried, the stream of the Fontanone forced, and the Republicans were driven back to the second line they had formed in the rear.

Great success of the Austrians.

Here they made a desperate stand, and Haddick's division, disordered by success, was repulsed across the stream by Watrin with the right of Lannes' division; but the Republicans could not follow up their advantage, as Victor's corps, exhausted with fatigue, and severely weakened in numerical strength, was in no condition to support any offensive movement. The Austrians, perceiving his weakness, redoubled their efforts; a fresh attack was made on the centre and left, by which Victor's corps, weakened by four hours' incessant fighting, was at length broken. The Imperialists pressed forward with redoubled vigour, when their adversaries gave way; their regiments were rapidly pursued, and frequently surrounded, and no resource remained but to traverse for two leagues the open plain as far as S.-Juliano, where the reserve under Lannes might be expected to arrive for their support. The Imperialists rapidly followed, preceded by fifty pieces of artillery, which spread death through the flying columns. Melas, with the centre, established himself at Marengo, and Lannes, now entirely uncovered on his left, was obliged to commence a retrograde movement, which at first was performed by echelon in squares with admirable discipline. Gradually, however, the retreat became more disorderly; in vain Kellermann and Champeaux, by repeated charges, arrested the Imperial cavalry, which swept round the retreating columns. He could not check the Hungarian infantry, which advanced steadily in pursuit, halting at every fifty yards, and pouring in destructive volleys, while the intervals between the regiments were filled up by a powerful artillery, which incessantly sent a storm of grape-shot through the retreating masses. No firmness could long endure such a trial;

gradually the squares broke; the immense plain of Marengo was covered with fugitives; the alarm spread even to the rear of the army, and the fatal cry, "*Tout est perdu, sauve qui peut*," was already heard in the ranks (1).

Matters were in this disastrous state when Napoléon, at eleven o'clock, arrived on the field of battle with his guard. The sight of his staff, surrounded by two hundred mounted grenadiers, revived the spirits of the fugitives; the well-known plumes recalled to the veterans the hopes of success. The fugitives rallied at S.-Juliano, in the rear of those squares of Lannes which still kept their ranks, and Napoléon detached eight hundred grenadiers of his guard to the right of the army, to make head against Ott, who there threatened to turn its flank. At the same time, he himself advanced with a demi-brigade to the support of Lannes, in the centre, and detached five battalions, under Monnier, the vanguard of Desaix's division, to Castel Ceriolo, on the extreme right, to hold in check the light infantry of the enemy, which was there making serious progress. The grenadiers first advanced in square into the midst of the plain, clearing their way equally through the fugitives and the enemy; from their sides, as from a flaming castle, issued incessant volleys of musketry, and all the efforts of the Imperialists were long unable to force back this intrepid band. At length, however, they were shaken by the steady fire of the Imperial artillery, and being charged in front by the Hungarian infantry, and in flank by the Austrian hussars, were broken and driven back in disorder. Their destruction appeared certain, when the leading battalions of Desaix's division, under Monnier, arrived, disengaged this band of heroes from the numerous enemies by whom they were surrounded, and advancing rapidly forward, made themselves masters of the village of Castel Ceriolo. Here, however, they were charged with fury by Vogelsang with part of Ott's division, who retook Castel Ceriolo, and separated Monnier from the grenadiers of the guard; it was soon, however, retaken by the French, and Cara St.-Cyr, barricading himself in the houses, succeeded in maintaining that important post during the remainder of the day (2).

The French reserve are brought into action under Desaix. While the reserves of Napoléon were thus directed to the French right, with a view to arrest the advance of the Austrians in that quarter, the left was a scene of the most frightful disorder. Then was felt the irreparable loss to the Austrians which the detachment of so large a portion of their cavalry to the rear had occasioned; had the squadrons detached to observe Suchet poured in upon the broken fugitives in that quarter, the defeat of the left and centre would have been complete; and Desaix, assailed both in front and flank, would have come up only in time to share in the general ruin. But nothing of the kind was attempted; Melas, deeming the victory gained, after having had two horses shot under him, and being exhausted with fatigue, retired at two o'clock to Alexandria, leaving to his chief of the staff, Zach, the duty of following up his success; and the broken centre and left of the Republicans retired to S.-Juliano, leisurely followed by the Austrian army. Zach put himself at the head of the advanced guard, and at the distance of half a mile behind him came up Kaim with three brigades, and at an equal distance in his rear the reserve, composed of Hungarian grenadiers. Napoléon on his part had resolved to abandon the great road to Tortona, and effect his retreat by the shorter line of Sale or Castel Nuova (3).

(1) Nap. i. 289, 290. Bot. iv. 27, 28. Dum. iii. iv. 29, 30. Jom. xiii. 279, 282. Sav. i. 176. Bul. 310, 317. Jom. xiii. 272, 279. Sav. i. 174, 175. 249, 260.

(2) Nap. i. 290, 291. Dum. iii. 318, 321. Bot. iv. 29, 30. Dum. iii. 320. Sav. i. 177. Bul. 260, 264.

(3) Nap. i. 291, 292. Jom. xiii. 282, 283. Bot.

Matters were in this desperate state, when, at four o'clock, the main body of Desaix at length made its appearance at S.-Juliano. "What think you of the day?" said Napoléon to his lieutenant, when he arrived with his division. "The battle," said Desaix, "is completely lost. But it is only four o'clock; there is time to gain another one (1)." Napoléon and he alone were of this opinion; all the others counselled a retreat. In pursuance of this resolution, the remains of Victor and Lannes' corps were re-formed, under cover of the cavalry, which was massed in front of S.-Juliano, a masked battery prepared under the direction of Marmont, and Desaix advanced at the head of his corps, consisting of little more than four thousand men, to arrest the progress of the enemy. Napoléon, advancing to the front, rode along the line, exclaiming, "Soldiers! we have retired far enough. You know it is always my custom to sleep on the field of battle." The troops replied by enthusiastic shouts, and immediately advanced to the charge. Zach, little anticipating such an onset, was advancing at the head of his column, five thousand strong, when he was received by a discharge from twelve pieces, suddenly unmasked by Marmont, while at the same time Desaix debouched from the village at the head of his division. The Imperialists, astonished at the appearance of so considerable a body, where they expected to find only fugitives in disorder, and apprehensive of falling into a snare, paused and fell back; but Zach soon succeeded in restoring order in the front, and checked the advance of the enemy. At this moment Desaix was struck by a ball in the breast, and soon after expired. His last words were, "Tell the First Consul that my only regret in dying is, to have perished before having done enough to live in the recollection of posterity." This catastrophe, however, was far from weakening the ardour of his soldiers. The second in command, Boudet, succeeded in inspiring them with the desire of vengeance, and the fire rolled rapidly and sharply along the whole line. But the Imperialists had now recovered from their surprise; the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the charge; the French in their turn hesitated and broke, and victory was more doubtful than ever (2).

At this critical moment, a happy inspiration seized Kellermann, which decided the fate of the day. The advance of Zach's column had, without their being aware of it, brought their flank right before his mass of cavalry, eight hundred strong, which was concealed from their view by a vineyard, where the festoons, conducted from tree to tree, rose above the horses' heads, and effectually intercepted the sight. Kellermann instantly charged, with his whole force, upon the flank of the Austrians, as they advanced in open column, and the result must be given in his own words (3). Zach's grenadiers, cut through the middle by this unexpected charge, and, exposed to a murderous fire in front from Desaix's division, which had rallied upon receiving this unexpected aid, broke and fled. Zach himself, with two thousand men, were made prisoners; the remainder, routed and dispersed, fled in the utmost disorder to the rear, overthrowing in their course the other divisions which were advancing to their support (4).

After a gallant charge, he too is defeated.

Decisive charge of Kellermann converts a defeat into a victory.

(1) Bour. iv. 122. Jom. xiii. 286.
(2) Jom. xiii. 287, 289. Nap. i. 292, 293. Dum. iii. 324, 325. Sav. i. 178. Bul. 260, 271.

(3) "The combat was engaged," says Kellermann; "Desaix soon drove back the enemy's tirailleurs on their main body; but the sight of that formidable column of 6000 Hungarian grenadiers made our troops halt. I was advancing in line on their flank, concealed by the festoons; a frightful discharge took place; our line wavered, broke, and fled; the Austrians rapidly advanced to follow up their

success, in all the disorder and security of victory. I see it; I am in the midst of them; they lay down their arms. The whole did not occupy so much time as it took me to write these six lines."—See DUMAS, v. 361. The Duchess of Abrantes states also that she repeatedly heard the battle of Marengo discussed by Laumes, Victor, and the other generals engaged, at her own table, and that they all ascribed the victory to Kellermann's charge.—D'ABRANTES, iii. 44, 45.

(4) Sav. i. 178, 179. Bul. 271, 275. Nap. i. 292,

Final defeat
of the Aus-
trians.

This great achievement was decisive of the fate of the battle. The remains of Victor and Lannes' corps no sooner beheld this success, than they regained their former spirit, and turned fiercely upon their pursuers. The infantry of Kaim, overwhelmed by the tide of fugitives, gave way; the cavalry, which already inundated the field, was seized with a sudden panic, and, instead of striving to restore the day, galloped off to the rear, trampling down in their progress the unfortunate fugitives who were flying before them. A general cry arose, "To the bridges—to the bridges!" and the whole army disbanding, rushed in confusion towards the Bormida. In the general consternation, Marengo was carried, after a gallant defence, by the Republicans; the cannoniers, finding the bridges choked up by the fugitives plunged with their horses and guns into the stream, where twenty pieces stuck fast, and fell into the hands of the enemy. At length Melas, who hastened to the spot, rallied the rearguard in front of the bridges, and by its heroic resistance, gained time for the army to pass the river; the troops, regaining their ranks, re-formed upon the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the day; and after twelve hours' incessant fighting, the sun set upon this field of carnage (1).

Loss sus-
tained on
both sides.

Such was the memorable battle of Marengo; one of the most obstinately contested which had yet occurred during the war, in which both parties performed prodigies of valour, and which was attended with greater results perhaps than any conflict that had yet occurred in modern Europe. The Imperialists had to lament the loss of seven thousand men killed and wounded, besides three thousand prisoners, eight standards, and twenty pieces of cannon. The French sustained an equal loss in killed and wounded, besides one thousand prisoners taken in the early part of the day. But although the disproportion was not so great in the trophies of victory, the difference was prodigious in the effect it produced on the respective armies, and the ultimate issue of the campaign. The Austrians had fought for life or death, with their faces towards Vienna, to cut their way sword in hand through the French army. Defeat in these circumstances was irreparable ruin. By retiring either to Genoa or the Maritime Alps, they ran the risk of being cooped up in a corner of a hostile territory, without any chance of regaining their own country, and the certainty of depriving the empire of the only army capable of defending its Italian possessions. The French, on the other hand, had now firmly established themselves in the plains of Piedmont; and could, by merely retaining their present position, effectually cut off the Imperialists, and hinder their rendering any assistance to the Hereditary States. In these circumstances, the victory gave the Republicans, as that under the walls of Turin had given the Imperialists a century before, the entire command of Italy. Such a result was in itself of vast importance; but coming as it did, in the outset of Napoléon's career as First Consul, its consequences were incalculable. It fixed him on the throne, revived the

293. Dum. iii. 324, 325. Jom. xiii. 288, 289. Bot. iv. 30, 31. Mém. du Dépôt de la Guerre, iv. 272.

(1) Bul. 275, 280. Sav. i. 179. Nap. i. 293, 294. Jom. xiii. 290, 294. Dum. iii. 325, 326. Bot. iv. 31. Saalfeld, iv. 230, 231. Gaz. Mil. d'Autriche, Ann. 1823.

There is a most extraordinary similarity between the crisis of Marengo and that of Waterloo, with this difference, that the rout of the French was complete before the arrival of Desaix, while not an English square was broken before the final charge of the old guard. But the defeat of the last attacks in both battles was accomplished in the same way.

The rout of Zach's columns, by the fire of Desaix's division in front, aided by the charge of Kellermann in flank, was precisely similar to the defeat of the old guard at Mount St. John by the English guards, aided by the happy flank attack of Major Gawler with the 52d and 71st regiments, and the gallant charge of Sir Hussey Vivian with the 10th and 18th hussars. In both cases the overthrow of the last columns of attack drew after it the total defeat of the army.—See "*Crisis of Waterloo.*" By MAJOR GAWLER AND SIR H. VIVIAN. *United Service Journal*, July, 1833.

military spirit of the French people, and precipitated the nation into that career of conquest which led them to Cadiz and the Kremlin (1).

United with the great qualities of Napoléon's character was a selfish thirst for glory, and consequent jealousy of any one who had either effectually thwarted his designs, or rendered him such services as might diminish the lustre of his own exploits. His undying jealousy of Wellington was an indication of the first weakness; his oblivion of Kellermann's inappreciable service, an instance of the second. When this young officer was brought into the presence of the First Consul after the battle, he coldly said, "You made a good charge this evening;" and immediately turning to Bessieres, added, "The guard has covered itself with glory."—"I am glad you are pleased," replied Kellermann, "for it has placed the crown on your head." He repeated the same expression in a letter, which was opened at the post-office and brought to Napoléon. The obligation was too great to be forgiven. Kellermann was not promoted like the other generals, and never afterwards enjoyed the favour of the chief on whose brow he had placed the diadem (2).

Melas proposes a suspension of arms.

While nothing but congratulation and triumph were heard in the French lines, the Austrian camp exhibited the utmost consternation. The night was spent in re-forming the regiments, repairing the losses of the artillery, and replenishing the exhausted stores of ammunition. A council of war was summoned; the majority, thunderstruck by the magnitude of the disaster and the hopeless nature of their situation, inclined for a treaty to evacuate the Piedmontese territory. "If we cut our way through," said they, "supposing us to be successful, we must sacrifice ten thousand men left in Genoa, and as many in the fortresses of Piedmont, and shall not be the less compelled to take refuge under the cannon of Mantua. It is better to save these twenty thousand men than to preserve towns for the King of Sardinia." In conformity with these views, a flag of truce was dispatched on the following morning to the French headquarters, to propose terms of capitulation. He arrived at their outposts just at the time when an attack on the *têtes-de-pont* on the Bormida was preparing; and, after some difficulty, the terms of the treaty were agreed upon between the two generals (3).

June 15.

Armistice of Alexandria.

By this convention it was provided that "there should be an armistice between the two armies till an answer was obtained from the Court of Vienna. That in the mean time the Imperial army should occupy the country between the Mincio and the Po; that is, Peschiera, Mantua, Borgoforte, and from it the left bank of the Po, and on its right bank, Ferrara, Ancona, and Tuscany; that the French should occupy the district between the Chiesa, the Oglio, and the Po, and the space between the Chiesa and the Mincio should not be occupied by either army. That the fortresses of Tortona, Milan, Turin, Pizzighittone, Arona, Placentia, Ceva, Savona, Urbia, Coni, Alexandria, and Genoa, should be surrendered to the French, with all their

(1) Nap. i. 294. Jom. xiii. 295, 296. Dum. iii. 328, 329. Bot. iv. 32, 34. Austrian Official Account, Gaz. Mil. d'Autriche, 1823. Mémorial du Dépôt de la Guerre, iv. 333. Bul. 280, 281.

In the preceding account of the battle of Marengo, the author has corrected the various French and German accounts of the engagement hitherto published, by some Manuscript Notes by General Kellermann, who had so great a share in achieving the success, written on the margin of the collection of the various accounts of the battle, contained in the "Mémorial du Dépôt de la Guerre," iv. 269, 343. For these valuable manuscript notes, the author is

indebted to the kindness of his esteemed friend, Captain Basil Hall.

(2) Bnur. iv. 125. Bot. iv. 34.

Napoléon, at the same time, was perfectly aware of the immense service rendered by the charge of Kellermann; for he said in the evening to Bourrienne, "That little Kellermann made a happy charge. He struck in at the critical moment; we owe him much. On what trivial events do affairs depend!"—Bourrienne, iv. 124.

(3) Jom. xiii. 296, 391. Nap. i. 294. Bul. 281, 287.

artillery and stores, the Austrians taking with them only their own cannon." The evacuation of all these places, and the final retreat of the Austrian army, were to be completed by the 24th June (1).

Its immense
results.

Thus the complete reconquest of Piedmont and the Milanese, the cession of twelve fortresses, armed with fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, and the advance of the Republican eagles to the Mincio, were the immediate effect of the stubborn resistance of Desaix and the happy charge of Kellermann. A few battalions and eight hundred horse changed the face of the world. But Napoléon must not be deprived of his share in these glorious results. These incidents were but the last steps in a chain of causes which his genius had prepared, and his skill brought to bear upon the final issue of the campaign. He had thrown himself upon his adversary's communications without compromising his own, and thence its astonishing consequences. Defeated at Marengo, Napoléon could still have retired upon an equal force detached in his rear, and, in the worst event, have retired over the St.-Gothard and the Simplon, with no other sacrifice but his artillery. To have achieved such results, at so inconsiderable a risk, is the greatest triumph of genius in the science of war (2).

Is faithfully
observed by
the Aus-
trians.

The convention of Alexandria was religiously observed by the Austrian commanders. The English expedition under Abercromby, with twelve thousand men, arrived in the bay of Genoa just in time to see that important city surrendered to the Republican commanders; but, notwithstanding that important succour, German integrity swerved nothing from its good faith. Had this important reinforcement, instead of lying inactive at Minorca, arrived a fortnight sooner with the troops which so soon afterwards conquered in Egypt, what important effects might it have had upon the fortune of the war! But the English at that period were ignorant of the importance of time in military operations, and but novices in the art of war. The time was yet to come when they were to appear in it as masters (3).

Napoléon
returns to
Milan—

Napoléon, after this great victory, appointed Jourdan regent in the continental dominions of the King of Sardinia until their destiny was determined by a general peace, and returned to Milan to enjoy his triumph. He was received with extraordinary demonstrations of joy by the inconstant populace, and Italian adulation lavished on him those splendid epithets which, during three centuries of servitude, they have learned to bestow upon their rulers. He discoursed there much on peace, religion, literature, and the sciences. The Ligurian republic was immediately re-organized, and regained its nominal independence. He shortly after returned by Mont Cenis and Lyon to Paris. When passing through that town, he laid, with extraordinary pomp, amidst an immense concourse of spectators, the first stone of the new Place Bellecour, erected on the site of that which had been destroyed by the barbarity of the Convention. Napoléon was in high spirits during the remainder of the journey; but his triumphs, great as they were, appeared to him but as nothing in comparison of those which he yet desired to achieve. "Well," said he, "a few more great events like those of this campaign, and I may really descend to posterity: but still it is little enough; I have conquered, it is true, in less than two years, Cairo, Paris, Milan; but were I to die to-morrow, half a page of general history would, after ten centuries, be all that would be devoted to my ex-

(1) Nap. i. 295, 296. Jom. xiii. 300.

(2) Jom. xiii. 301, 302.

(3) Jom. xiii. 304, 305.

ploits." He reached Paris during the night; and nothing could exceed the universal transports on the following day when his arrival was known.

July 2. The people had been kept in a cruel state of suspense during his absence; the first news they received of the battle of Marengo was from a mercantile traveller who left the field at one o'clock, and reported that all was lost (1). Rich and poor now vied with each other in their demonstrations of joy; all business was suspended; nothing but songs of triumph were heard in the streets; and at night a general illumination gave vent to the universal transports.

Such was the memorable campaign of Marengo. Inferences of the most important kind, both in a moral and political view, may be drawn from the events which occurred during its progress.

Reflections on this campaign. I. Great changes in human affairs never take place from trivial causes. The most important effects, indeed, are often apparently owing to inconsiderable springs; but the train has been laid in all such cases by a long course of previous events, and the last only puts the torch to its extremity. A fit of passion in Mrs. Masham arrested the course of Marlborough's victories, and preserved the tottering kingdom of France; a charge of a few squadrons of horse, under Kellermann, at Marengo, fixed Napoléon on the consular throne; and another, with no greater force, against the flank of the old guard at Waterloo, chained him to the rock of St.-Helena. Superficial observers lament the subjection of human affairs to the caprice of fortune or the casualties of chance; but a more enlarged observation teaches us to recognise in these apparently trivial events the operation of general laws; and the last link in a chain of causes which have all conspired to produce the general result. Mrs. Masham's passion was the ultimate cause of Marlborough's overthrow, but that event had been prepared by the accumulating jealousy of the nation during the whole tide of his victories, and her indignation was but the drop which made the cup overflow; Kellermann's charge, indeed, fixed Napoléon on the throne, but it was the sufferings of the Revolution, the glories of the Italian campaigns, the triumphs of the Pyramids, which induced the nation to hail his usurpation with joy; the charge of the 10th and 18th hussars broke the last column of the Imperial array, but the foundation of the triumph of Wellington had been laid by the long series of his peninsular victories and the bloody catastrophe of the Moscow campaign.

Extraordinary resurrection of France on the accession of Napoléon. II. The sudden resurrection of France, when Napoléon assumed the helm, is one of the most extraordinary passages of European history, and singularly descriptive of the irresistible reaction in the favour of a firm government which inevitably arises from a long course of revolutionary convulsions. Let not future ages be deluded by the idea that a period of democratic anarchy is one of national strength; it is, on the contrary, in the end, the certain forerunner of public calamity. The glories of the Revolutionary wars were achieved under the despotic rule of the Convention, wielding ten times the power which was ever enjoyed by Louis XIV; the effects of democratic anarchy appeared upon its dissolution, in the disasters of the Directory. After the fall of the Committee of Public Safety, the triumphs of France centred in Napoléon alone; wherever he did not command in person, the greatest reverses were experienced. In 1795 the Republicans were defeated by Clairfait on the Rhine; in 1796 by the Archduke Charles in Germany. In 1799 their reverses were unexampled both in

(1) Nap. i. 301, 303. Four. iv. 164, 171, 181. Bot. v. 36.

Italy and Germany; from the 9th Thermidor to the 18th Brumaire, a period of above five years, the fortunes of the Republic were singly sustained by the sword of Napoléon and the lustre of his Italian campaigns. When he seized the helm in November, 1799, he found the armies defeated and ruined; the frontier invaded, both on the sides of Italy and Germany, the arsenals empty, the soldiers in despair deserting their colours, the royalists revolting against the government, general anarchy in the interior, the treasury empty, the energies of the Republic apparently exhausted. Instantly, as if by enchantment, every thing was changed; order re-appeared out of chaos, talent emerged from obscurity, vigour arose out of the elements of weakness. The arsenals were filled, the veterans crowded to their eagles, the conscripts joyfully repaired to the frontier, la Vendée was pacified, the exchequer began to overflow. In little more than six months after Napoléon's accession, the Austrians were forced to seek refuge under the cannon of Ulm, Italy was regained, unanimity and enthusiasm prevailed among the people, and the revived energy of the nation was finally launched into the career of conquest. Changes so extraordinary cannot be explained by the influence of any one man. Great as the abilities of Napoléon undoubtedly were, they could not be equal to the Herculean task of reanimating a whole nation. It was the transition from anarchy to order, from the tyranny of demagogues to the ascendant of talent, from the weakness of popular to the vigour of military government, which was the real cause of the change. The virtuous, the able, the brave, felt that they no longer required to remain in obscurity; that democratic jealousy would not now be permitted to extinguish rising ability; financial imbecility crush patriotic exertion; private cupidity exhaust public resources; civil weakness paralyse military valour. The universal conviction that the reign of the multitude was at an end, produced the astonishing burst of talent which led to the glories of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

Causes of the disasters of the campaign to the Imperialists. III. The disastrous issue of the German campaign to the Imperialists, is not to be entirely ascribed either to the genius of Moreau, or the magnitude of the force which the first consul placed at his command. It was chiefly owing to the ruinous dispersion of the Austrian army and their obstinate adherence to the system of a cordon, when, by the concentration of their enemy's troops, it had become indispensably necessary to accumulate adequate forces on the menaced points. Kray, at the opening of the campaign, had nearly one hundred and ten thousand men at his command; but this immense force, irresistible when kept together, was so dispersed over a line above two hundred miles in length, from the Alps to the Maine, that he could not collect forty-five thousand men to resist the shock of the French centre, of nearly double that strength, at Engen or Biberach. The loss of these battles, by piercing the Allied line, compelled the whole body to fall back, and thus seventy thousand men abandoned Swabia and Franconia without firing a shot, while half their number, added to the Austrian centre, would have prevented the Republicans ever crossing the Black Forest. The brief campaign of 1815 afforded another example of the same truth; the Allied forces, quartered over all Flanders, though greatly superior, upon the whole to the army of Napoléon were inferior to their assailants, both at Ligny and Waterloo; and the intrepid daring of Wellington, joined to the devoted heroism of his troops, alone prevented in that struggle the continued disasters of Biberach and Moeskirch. The successful stand, on the other hand, made by the Austrian army when concentrated under the cannon of Ulm, and the effec-

tual covering which, in that confined spot, they gave to the whole Hereditary States, affords the clearest proof of the superior efficacy of such an assembled force to any cordon, however skilfully disposed, in arresting an invading enemy. No army will ever advance into an enemy's country, leaving sixty or eighty thousand men together in their rear; for, in such a case, they are exposed to the danger of losing their communications, and being compelled, as at Marengo, to peril all upon the issue of a single battle; but nothing is easier than to make double that force, dispersed over a long line, abandon a whole frontier, by striking decisive blows with a superior force at a part of its extent. In fifteen days, the Imperial cordon was driven back, by attacks on its centre, from the Rhine to the Danube; for six weeks its concentrated force in position at Ulm, not only arrested the victor, but covered the Imperial frontier, and gained time for the revival of the spirit of the monarchy.

IV. The successful stand which Kray, with a defeated army, made against the vast forces of Moreau for six weeks, under the cannon of Ulm, demonstrates the wisdom and foresight of the Archduke Charles in fortifying, at the close of the preceding campaign, that important central position, and the justice of his remark, that it is in the valley of the Danube that the blows are to be struck which are decisive of the fate of France or Austria (1). The long check which this single fortress gave to the powerful and victorious army of Moreau, suggests a doubt, whether central are not more serviceable than frontier fortifications; or, at least, whether a nation, in contemplation of invasion by a powerful and ambitious enemy, should not always be provided with some strongholds in the interior, to the shelter of which a defeated army may retire, and where it may both recruit its losses and recover its spirit. Certain it is, that it is the want of some such *points d'appui* that the sudden prostration of Austria, after the defeats of Ulm and Eckmühl; of Prussia, after that of Jena; and of France, after the disasters of 1814 and 1815, are mainly to be ascribed. But for the fortifications of Vienna, Austria, before the arrival of John Sobieski, would have been overwhelmed by the arms of Soliman; without those of Genoa, the conquest of Italy would have been complete, and the victorious Austrians grouped in irresistible strength in the plains of Piedmont before the Republican eagles appeared on the St.-Bernard; and but for those of Torres Vedras, the arms of England, instead of striking down the power of France on the field of Waterloo, would have sunk, with lustre for ever tarnished into the waters of the Tagus. A mere fortified position, like that of the Drisa, to which Barclay de Tolly retired in 1812, is not sufficient; it is an intrenched camp, connected with a strong fortress, which forms the real formidable obstacle. The defeat of the Prussians, in the first attack on Warsaw in 1794, and the astonishing stand made by Shrynecki, with forty thousand regular troops, against the whole forces of the Russian empire in 1851, prove the inestimable effect of central fortresses, such as Warsaw and Modlin, in forming a nucleus to the national strength, and enabling an inconsiderable to withstand the forces of a powerful monarchy. The difference between central and frontier fortresses in this respect is great and important. The former constitute so many secure asylums, round which the national strength is agglomerated, in the last struggle for national independence, and the retreating army finds itself strengthened in the heart of the empire by the garrisons of the interior fortresses and the new levies who are disciplined within their

Great effect
of central
fortifications
in a state.

(1) Archduke ii. 264. *Strategie*, 1796.

walls, while their fortifications form an imposing stronghold, to the siege of which the largest armies are hardly adequate : the latter prove an impassable barrier only to armies of inconsiderable magnitude; and if, by an overwhelming force, the protecting army is compelled to retire, it too often finds itself severely weakened by the great detachments doomed thereafter to useless inactivity in the frontier fortresses. When Napoléon was struck to the earth in 1814, he still held the fortresses on the Elbe and the Rhine : above a hundred thousand veteran troops were there immured, when he maintained an unequal conflict with fifty thousand in the plains of Champagne; and that which her boasted triple line of fortresses could not do for France, would have been certainly effected by an intrenched camp, like that at Ulm, on Montmartre and Belleville. The conclusion to be drawn from that is, not that frontier fortresses are totally useless and central ones are alone to be relied on, but that the combination of the two is requisite to lasting security; the former to cover the provinces and impede an inconsiderable enemy, the latter to repel those desperate strokes which are directed by a gigantic foe at the vitals of the state.

Merits of Napoléon in the campaign. V. The march of Napoléon across the St.-Bernard, and his consequent seizure of the Austrian line of communication, is one of the greatest conceptions of military genius, and was deservedly crowned by the triumph of Marengo; but, in the execution of this design, he incurred unnecessary hazard (1), and all but lost his crown by the dispersion of his troops before the final struggle. The forces at his command, after he debouched on the plains of Piedmont, were, including Moncey's division, sixty thousand men; while the Imperialists by no exertions could have brought forty thousand into the field to meet them, so widely were their forces dispersed over the vast theatre of their conquests (2); whereas, when the die came to be cast on the field of Marengo, the Austrians had thirty-one thousand, and the French only twenty-nine thousand in line. This but ill accords with the principle which he himself has laid down, that the essence of good generalship consists, with equal or inferior forces, in being always superior at the point of attack. The march to Milan was the cause of this weakness; while Lannes and Victor, with twenty thousand men, struggled with an overwhelming enemy on the banks of the Bormida, twenty-nine thousand were in position or observation on the Mincio and the Po. So great a dispersion of force to secure the rear was altogether unnecessary; for, in case of disaster, the French army, after the fort of Bard had capitulated on the 1st June, could have retreated as well by the St.-Bernard and Mont Cenis, as the Simplon and St.-Gothard. A forward movement, in conjunction with Thureau, after the army, numbering forty thousand combatants, was concentrated at Ivrea on the 24th May, would have delivered Masséna, who did not capitulate till the 4th June, and added his troops, ten thousand strong, to the invading army, while Moncey, with sixteen thousand would have adequately protected the rear; and the retreat of Melas, then far advanced in the defiles of the Maritime Alps, would have been equally cut off. The astonishing consequences which followed the battle of Marengo, afford no proof that the campaign in this particular was not based on wrong principles; the same results might have been gained without the same risk; and it is not the part of a prudent general to commit to chance what may be gained by combination. Had the torrent of the Scrivia not swollen, and stopped the march of the French army on the evening of June 15; had Desaix advanced an hour

(1) Nap. i. 280.

(2) Rapport Officiel d'Autriche, Gaz. Mil. 1823.

later on the 14th; had Kellermann not opportunely charged an unsuspecting foe when concealed by luxuriant vines; had Melas not detached his cavalry to the rear to observe Suchet, the fate of the action would probably have been reversed, and Marengo been Pavia. No scruple need be felt at making these observations, even in reference to so great a commander. The military art, like every other branch of knowledge, is progressive; the achievements of one age illuminate that which succeeds it, and mediocrity can, in the end, judge of what genius only could at first conceive. A school-boy can now solve a problem, to which the minds of Thales and Archimedes alone were adequate in the commencement of geometry.

And of the Austrian commander. VI. If the conduct of the Austrian commander is examined, it will be found to be not less open to exception, previous to the battle of Marengo, than that of the First Consul. The desire to retain every thing, to guard at once all the points which had been gained, was the cause of a dispersion, on his part so much the more reprehensible than that of Napoléon, as, being in a conquered country, with all the fortresses in his possession, it was the less necessary. Two thousand men would have sufficed for the garrison of Tortona, as many for that of Coni. The surplus troops thus acquired, with the cavalry detached to observe Suchet, would have formed a force considerably superior to the reserve of Desaix, which would have ensured the victory. Of what avail were the four thousand men in either of these fortresses the next morning, when all the strong places of Piedmont were surrendered to the enemy? Thrown into the scale when the beam quivered after the repulse of Desaix, they would have hurled Napoléon from the consular throne (1).

Propriety of the convention of Alexandria considered. VII. The conduct of the Austrian commander, during and after the battle, has been the subject of much severe animadversion from the German writers. Bulow, in particular, has charged him with having unnecessarily surrendered the fortresses of Piedmont on the following day, when he had still at command a force capable of breaking through the enemy, and regaining his communications with Mantua (2). Certain it is that Melas, whose conduct in the outset of the action is worthy of the highest praise, did not follow up his first successes so vigorously as seems to have been possible; that his detachment of cavalry to the rear was unnecessary and eminently hurtful; and it is more than probable that, if Napoléon had been in his place, Marengo would have been the theatre of as great a reverse to the Republicans as Salamanca or Vittoria. But, in agreeing to the armistice on the following day, his conduct appears less liable to exception. He had then only twenty thousand men on whom he could rely in the field, and these, with the garrisons in the Piedmontese fortresses, formed the chief defence of the Austrian possessions in Italy. His chief duty was to preserve this nucleus of veteran troops for the monarchy, and transport them from a situation where they were cut off from their communications and could be of little service to their country, to one in which they were restored to both. Perched on the Apennines, or shut up in the walls of Genoa, they would have been exposed to the whole weight of the army of reserve, which might thus have been raised, by the concentration of its forces from the rear, to forty-five thousand men, besides the victorious troops of Suchet, with the garrison of Genoa, nearly twenty-five thousand more. It is doubtful whether the whole force of Melas, aided as it would have been by the expedition of Abercromby and the English fleet, could have successfully withstood such a

(1) Jom. xiii. 303, 304.

(2) Bul. Feldzug, 1800, 292.

concentration of seventy thousand combatants, flushed with victory, and headed by Napoléon; and if they failed, disasters tenfold greater awaited the monarchy. Thirty thousand men might have been made prisoners at once, and the walls of Genoa witnessed as great a catastrophe as the heights of Ulm (1).

Inexpe-
dience of
receiving
battle in the
oblique or-
der.

VIII. The oblique *attack*, or the attack by column coming up after column by echelon, has frequently achieved the most decisive success in war; and the victories of Leuthen by Frederic, and Salamanca by Wellington, were chiefly owing to the skilful use of that method of action. But to *receive* battle in that position is a very different matter. To do so is to expose the successive columns to be overwhelmed by a superior enemy, who, by the defeat of the first, acquires a superiority which it becomes afterwards a matter of extreme difficulty to counterbalance. The action of Montebello was an instance of the successful application and great effect of an attack in this order; the narrow escape from a catastrophe at Marengo, an example of the peril to which troops themselves attacked in such a situation are exposed. The difference between the two is important and obvious. When the attacking army advances in echelon, if it can overthrow the first column of the enemy, it throws it back upon the one in rear, which soon finds itself overpowered by a torrent of fugitives, or shaken by the sight of its comrades in disorder; while, if it is stubbornly resisted, it is soon supported by fresh troops advancing on its flank, in perfect order, to the attack. But when the troops in echelon stand still, all these advantages are reversed; the disorder created in front speedily spreads to the rear, and the successive columns, instead of coming up to the aid of an advancing, too often find themselves overwhelmed by the confusion of a retreating army (2). Napoléon was perfectly aware of these principles; he never intentionally received an attack in echelon; at Marengo, as at Eylau, he was assailed unawares in that position by the enemy, and his ultimate extrication from destruction in both battles was owing to the opportune arrival of troops, whom his first orders had removed far from the scene of action, or upon events on which no human foresight could have calculated at the commencement of the struggle.

IX. When it is recollected that Abercromby's corps, twelve thousand strong, lay inactive at port Mahon in Minorca during this interesting and important crisis, big as the event proved with the fate not only of the campaign but of the war, it is impossible not to feel the most poignant regret at its absence from the scene of action; or to avoid the reflection, that England at that period partook too much of the tardiness of her Saxon ancestors; and that, like Athelstane the Unready, she was never ready to strike till the period for successful action had passed. What would have been the result if this gallant force had been added to the Imperialists during their desperate strife around Genoa, or thrown into the scale, when victory was so doubtful, to meet the troops of Kellermann and Desaix at Marengo! When it is recollected what these very men accomplished in the following year, when opposed to an equal force of Napoléon's veterans on the sands of Alexandria, it is impossible to doubt that their addition to the Allied forces in Italy at this juncture would in all probability have been attended with decisive effects. But, notwithstanding all this, it is impossible to say that the British government were to blame for this apparently inexcusable inactivity of so important a

(1) Rap. Off. d'Autriche, 1823. Mém. du Dép. de la Guerre, iv, 337, 339.

(2) Jom. xiii. 271, 272.

reserve. The equality of force at Marengo, it must always be recollected, was not only unforeseen, but could not have been calculated upon by any degree of foresight. At the outset of the campaign the Imperialists were not only victorious, but greatly superior to their antagonists in Italy; and even after Napoléon and the formidable army of reserve were thrown into the balance, their advantage was so marked, that, but for a ruinous and unnecessary dispersion of force, they must have crushed him on that well-contested field. In these circumstances, no crisis in which their co-operation was likely to be attended with important consequences was to be anticipated in the north of Italy; there was no apparent call upon them to alter the direction of a force destined for important operations either on the shores of Provence or on the banks of the Nile; and the British historian must therefore absolve the English government from any serious blame in this matter, however much he may lament the absence of a band of veterans stationed so near the scene of action, which was adequate, as the event proved, to have turned the scales of fortune and altered the destinies of the world.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CAMPAIGN OF HOHENLINDEN.

FROM THE ARMISTICE OF ALEXANDRIA TO THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE.

JUNE, 1800—FEB. 1801.

ARGUMENT.

Universal joy in France at the victory of Marengo—Treaty previously signed between Austria and England—Good faith of the Imperial Government in adhering to it—Count St.-Julien arrives at Paris and signs preliminaries, which are disavowed by the Imperial Cabinet—Negotiations with England for an armistice, which fail from the unreasonable demands of France—Conspiracy to assassinate Napoléon—Preparations of France for a renewal of hostilities—And of Austria—But Russia and Prussia keep aloof from the contest—English expedition under Sir James Pulteney fails at Ferrol—And from dread of the plague declines to attack Cadiz—Surrender of Malta to the British blockading squadron—Affairs of Italy—Election of Pope Pius VII at Venice—Hostility of Naples and insurrection of Piedmont against France—The French crush the insurrection in the Tuscan States with great cruelty—Leghorn is seized and the English merchandise confiscated—Last remnant of Swiss independence is destroyed—Capture of Surinam and Demerara by the English squadrons—Permanent incorporation of the Netherlands with France—Description of the line of the Inn—Project of the Imperialists—Hostilities on the Lower Rhine.—The Austrians advance into Bavaria—Movements of Moreau—Great success of the Austrians in the outset—French retire to Hohenlinden—Description of the field of battle—Able plans of Moreau—Battle of Hohenlinden—Dreadful struggle at the entrance of the Forest—Decisive charge of Richepanse—The Austrian line of communication is intercepted—Great victory gained by the French—Its prodigious consequences—Merit of Moreau in gaining it—The Austrians retire behind the Inn—Skillful manœuvre by which the passage of that river was effected by Moreau—Rapid advance of the French towards Salzburg—They are defeated by the Austrian Cavalry in front of that town—But the Imperialists are nevertheless obliged to retire—Moreau pushes on towards Vienna—Great successes gained by his advanced guard—The Archduke joins the army, but cannot arrest the disaster—An armistice is agreed to—Operations of the army on the Maine—And in the Grisons—Designs of Napoléon there—Description of the ridges to be surmounted—Napoléon's design for the passage of that mountain—Preparations of Macdonald for crossing it—Description of the passage of the Splügen—Extreme difficulties experienced by the French troops in the passage—Heroism of Macdonald in persisting notwithstanding—He arrives at Chiavenna, on the Lake of Como—Unworthy jealousy of this passage displayed by Napoléon—He is placed under the orders of Prune—Difficult passage of the Col Apriga—Attack on the Mont Tonol—In which the French are repulsed—Positions and forces of the French and Austrians in Italy—First operations of Brune—Passage of the Mincio—Desperate conflict of the troops who had passed over—Brune at length relieves them, and the passage is completed—Great losses of the Imperialists—Bellegarde retires to Caldiero—Advance of the Republicans in the valley of the Adige—Alarming situation of Laudon on the Upper Adige—Macdonald makes his way into the Italian Tyrol—Laudon is surrounded at Trent—He escapes by a lateral path to Bassano—Bellegarde retires to Bassano and Treviso—Armistice concluded at the latter place—Insurrection breaks out in Piedmont—Neapolitans invade the Roman states, and are totally defeated—Queen of Naples flies to St.-Petersburg to implore the aid of Paul—Napoléon willingly yields to his intercession—Peace between France and Naples at Foligno—Its conditions—French take possession of the whole Neapolitan territories—Siege of Elba—Its gallant defence by the English garrison—Treaty of Lunéville—The Emperor subscribes for the empire as well as Austria—Extravagant joy excited by this peace at Paris—Important consequences of this treaty on the internal situation of Germany—Reflections on this campaign—The real object of the war was already gained by the Allies—Evidence of Napoleon's implacable hostility to England—Increasing and systematic pillage of the people by the Republican armies—Symptoms of patriotic and general resistance spring up.

FRANCE soon experienced the beneficial results of the triumphs in Italy and the successes in Germany. More passionately desirous than any other

Universal
joy in
France at
the victory
of Ma-
rengo.

people in Europe of military glory, its citizens received with the utmost enthusiasm the accounts of their victories; and the angry passions of the Revolution, worn out by suffering, willingly turned into joyful comparison of their present triumphs with the disasters which had preceded the return of the first consul. The battle of Marengo fixed Napoléon on the consular throne. The Jacobins of Paris, the Royalists of the west, were alike overwhelmed by that auspicious event; and two English expeditions, which appeared, as usual too late, on the coast of Brittany and la Vendée, under Sir Edward Pellew and Sir James Pulteney (1), were unable to rouse the inhabitants to resistance against the triumphant authority of the capital.

June 20.
Treaty pre-
viously
signed be-
tween
Austria
and Eng-
land.

Two days before intelligence was received of the battle of Marengo, a treaty for the further prosecution of the war had been signed at Vienna, between Austria and Great Britain. By this convention it was provided, that within three months England was to pay to Austria a loan of L.2,000,000 sterling, to bear no interest during the continuance of the war, and that neither of the high contracting parties should make any separate peace with the enemy, during the period of one year from its date (2).

Good faith
of the Im-
perial go-
vernment
in adhering
to it.

The disastrous intelligence of the defeat at Marengo, and the armistice of Alexandria, followed up as it soon was by similar and still more pressing calamities in Germany, could not shake the firmness or good faith of the Austrian cabinet. The inflexible Thugut, who then presided over its councils, opposed to all the representations with which he was assailed, as to the perils of the monarchy, the treaty recently concluded with Great Britain, and the disgrace which would attach to the Imperial government if, on the first appearance of danger, engagements of such long endurance and so solemnly entered into were to be abandoned. Nor did the situation of affairs justify any such desponding measures. If the battle of Marengo had lost Piedmont to the allied powers, the strength of the Imperial army was still unbroken; it had exchanged a disadvantageous offensive position in the Ligurian mountains for an advantageous defensive one on the frontiers of Lombardy; the cannon of Mantua, so formidable to France in 1796, still remained to arrest the progress of the victor, and the English forces of Abercromby, joined to the Neapolitan troops and the Imperial divisions in Ancona and Tuscany, would prove too formidable a body on the right flank of the Republicans to permit any considerable advance towards the Hereditary States. Nor were affairs by any means desperate in Germany. The advance of Moreau into Bavaria, while Ulm and Ingolstadt were unreduced, was a perilous measure; the line of the Inn furnished a defensive frontier not surpassed by any in Europe, flanked on one side by the mountains of Tyrol, and on the other by the provinces of Bohemia, both in the possession of the Imperial forces; the strength of the monarchy would be more strongly felt, and reinforcements more readily obtained, when the enemy approached its frontiers, and the ancient patriotism of the inhabitants were called forth by the near approach of danger; and the disastrous issue of the campaign of 1796 to the Republican forces proved how easy was the transition from an unsupported advance to a ruinous retreat. Finally, the treaty of Campo Formio had only been signed after a whole campaign of disasters, and when the standards of France were almost within sight of Vienna; and it would be disgraceful to

(1) Ann. Reg. 1800, 212, 213. *Jour.* xiv, 4, 5.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1800, 241. *State Papers.*

subscribe the same conditions when the Imperial banners were still on the Mincio, or lose the fruits of a long series of triumphs in the terror produced by a single misfortune (1).

Count St.-Julien arrives at Paris, and signs preliminaries. Influenced by these considerations, the Austrian cabinet resolved to gain time; and if they could not obtain tolerable terms of peace, run all the hazards of a renewal of the war. Count St.-Julien arrived at Paris on the 21st July, as plenipotentiary on the part of Austria, bearing a letter from the Emperor, in which he stated: "You will give credit to every thing which Count St.-Julien shall say on my part, and I will ratify whatever he shall do." In virtue of these powers, preliminaries of peace were signed at Paris in a few days by the French and Austrian ministers. The "treaty of Campo Formio was taken as the basis of the definitive pacification, unless where changes had become necessary; it was provided that the frontier of the Rhine should belong to France, and the indemnities stipulated for Austria by the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio were to be given in Italy instead of Germany (2)."

Which are disavowed by the Imperial cabinet. As this treaty was signed by Count St.-Julien in virtue of the letter from the Emperor only, and without an exchange of full powers, it was provided that "these preliminary articles shall be ratified, and that they shall not bind their respective governments till after the ratification." The cabinet of Vienna availed themselves of this clause to avoid the ratification of these preliminary articles, in subscribing which their plenipotentiary had not entered into the views of his government. He was accordingly recalled, and the refusal to ratify notified on the 15th August, the appointed time, by Count Lehrbach, accompanied, however, by an intimation of the wish of the Imperial cabinet to make peace, of the treaty which bound them not to do so without the concurrence of Great Britain, and of the readiness of the latter power to enter into negotiations, on authority of a letter from Lord Minto, the British ambassador at Vienna, to Baron Thugut (3).

Negotiations with England for an armistice. Napoléon either was, or affected to be, highly indignant at the refusal by Austria to ratify the preliminaries, and he immediately gave notice of the termination of the armistice on the 10th September, and sent orders for the second army of reserve, which was organizing at Dijon, to enter Switzerland on the 5th of that month, and ordered Augereau, with eighteen thousand men from Holland, to take a position on the Lahn, in order to co-operate with the extreme left of Moreau's army. But he soon returned to more moderate sentiments, and dispatched full powers to M. Otto, who resided at London as agent for the exchange of prisoners, to conclude a *naval armistice* with Great Britain. The object of this proposal, hitherto unknown in European diplomacy, was to obtain the means, during the negotiations, of throwing supplies into Egypt and Malta, the first of which stood greatly in need of assistance, while the latter was at the last extremity from the vigilant blockade maintained for nearly two years by the British cruisers (4).

No sooner was this proposal received by the English government, than they proceeded to signify their anxious desire to be included in the general pacification, and proposed, for this purpose, that passports should be forwarded for Lord Grenville's brother to proceed, in the character of plenipotentiary of Great Britain, to the congress at Lunéville; but they declined

(1) Jom. xiv, 7, 8.

(2) 28th July, 1800. State Papers, Ann. Reg.

180, 278.

(3) Dum. v. 8, 9. Nap. ii. 2, 3.

(4) Parl. His. xxxv. 540, 542. Jom. xiv. 3, 4. Dum. 9, 10. Ann. Reg. 1800, 214.

to agree to a naval armistice, as a thing totally unknown, till the preliminaries of peace had been signed. Napoléon, however, resolutely bent on saving Malta and Egypt, continued to insist on the immediate adoption of a naval armistice as a *sine qua non*, and signified that, unless it was agreed to before the 11th September, he would recommence hostilities both in Italy and Germany (1).

The urgency of the case, and the imminent danger which Austria would run, if the war were renewed on the continent at so early a period, induced the cabinet of London to forego the advantages which a declinature of the proposals of the First Consul promised to afford to the maritime interests of Great Britain. On the 7th September, therefore, they presented to M. Otto a counter project for the general suspension of hostilities between the belligerent powers. By this it was proposed that an armistice should take place by sea and land, during which the ocean was to be open to the navigation of trading vessels of both nations; Malta and the harbours of Egypt were to be put on the same footing as Ulm, Philipsburgh, and Ingolstadt, by the armistice of Parsdorf; that is to say, they were to be provisioned for fourteen days, from time to time, during the dependence of the negotiation. The blockade of Brest and the maritime ports was to be raised, but the British squadrons were to remain on their stations off their mouths, and ships of war were not to be permitted to sail. Nothing could be more equitable towards France, or generous towards Austria, than these propositions. They compensated the recent disasters of the Imperialists by land with concessions by the British at sea, where they had constantly been victorious, and had nothing to fear; they placed the blockaded fortresses which the French retained on the ocean, on the same footing with those which the Imperialists still held in the centre of Germany, and abandoned to the vanquished on one element those advantages of a free navigation, which they could not obtain by force of arms, in consideration of the benefits accruing from a prolongation of the armistice to their allies on another (2).

Napoléon, however, insisted upon a condition which ultimately proved fatal to the negotiation. This was, that the French ships of the line only should be confined to their ports, but that frigates should have free liberty of egress; and that six vessels of that description should be allowed to go from Toulon to Alexandria without being visited by the English cruisers. He has told us in his "Memoirs" what he intended to have done with these frigates. They were to be armed *en flute*, and to have carried out three thousand six hundred troops, besides great military stores, to Alexandria. What rendered this condition peculiarly unreasonable was, that at the moment (20th September) when M. Otto declared to the British Government that the condition as to these frigates was a *sine qua non* for the continuation of the negotiation, he addressed to Moreau a telegraphic despatch, "not to agree to a prolongation of the armistice but on condition that Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg, were placed in the hands of the French as a guarantee." Thus, at the very time when the first consul made a condition for the *preservation* of the maritime blockaded fortresses a *sine qua non* with the British Government, he made the immediate *cession* of the corresponding blockaded ones on the continent an indispensable condition of a continuation of the armistice with the Austrian Cabinet. In these simultaneous propositions is to be seen little of that spirit of moderation

20th Sept.

Which fail,
from the
unreason-
able de-
mands of
France.

(1) Parl. His. xxxv. 544, 550. Dum. v. 10, 11.
Ann. Reg. 1800.

(2) Parl. His. xxxv. p. 551, 555. Dum. v. 11, 12.
Ann. Reg. 1800, 215.

which he so loudly professed, but much of that inflexible desire for aggrandisement, which so long was attended with success, but ultimately occasioned his ruin (1).

The Imperialists, with the dagger at their throats, were in no condition to resist the demands of the victor. A new convention was therefore concluded
28th Sept. at Hohenlinden, on the 28th September, by which the cession of the three German fortresses was agreed to, and the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days. A similar convention, signed at Castiglione a few days afterwards, extended the armistice for the same period to the Italian peninsula (2).

The English Government, however, was under no such necessity; and as Napoléon peremptorily refused to abandon his condition as to despatching six
9th Oct. frigates to Egypt, the negotiation was broken off, the Cabinet of the Tuileries having declared that they would treat only with each of the two courts separately. This was equivalent to its total abandonment, as both the allied powers had intimated to France, that they were bound by the recent convention to treat only in concert with each other (3).

8th Oct. No sooner was it evident that Great Britain would not consent to
Conspiracy the demands of the first consul, than he resolved to prosecute the
to assassinate Napoléon. war with vigour against Austria. On the 8th October, accordingly, the portfolio of the war office was put into the hands of Carnot, with instructions to redouble his exertions to put all the armies immediately on a footing to resume hostilities. On the same day on which this took place, a plot to assassinate Napoléon at the opera was discovered by the police; Ceracchi and Demerville, the leaders of the conspiracy, and both determined Jacobins, were arrested and executed. It originated in the remains of the democratic faction, and served to increase the already formed exasperation of the first consul at that party (4).

Prepara- During the interval of hostilities, both parties made the most in-
tions of defatigable efforts to put their armies on a respectable footing, and
France for prepare for a vigorous prosecution of the war. A corps of fifteen
a renewal of hostilities. thousand men was formed at Dijon, under the name of the second army of reserve, the command of which was intrusted to General Macdonald, already well known by his campaigns in Naples, and the battle of the Trebbia. The official reports gave out that it was to consist of thirty thousand, and even Macdonald himself was led to believe it amounted to that force; the object in spreading this delusion was to augment the troops, which the Austrians, recollecting what the first army of reserve had effected, would deem it necessary to watch his operations. It was destined to penetrate through the Grisons into the Tyrol, and threaten the flank of the Imperialists either in Italy or Germany, as circumstances might render advisable. Another army, 20,000 strong, was assembled, under Augereau, on the Maine; it was intended to advance along the course of that river to Wurtzburg, and threaten Bohemia, so as to prevent the troops in that province from undertaking any thing against the flanks or rear of the grand army under Moreau in Bavaria. That army was raised to above 110,000 men, all in the highest state of discipline and equipment; the soldiers were all newly clothed, the artillery and cavalry remounted, and all the *matériel* in the finest possible state; the Republic had never, since the commencement of the war, had on foot an army so perfect in its composition, so admirably organized, and so completely furnished with all the appointments requisite for carrying on a campaign. The army of Italy

(1) Parl. His. xxxv. 566, 583. Nap. ii. 8, 9. Dum.

v. 12, 14. Ann. Reg. 1800, 215.

(2) Jom. xiv. 15.

(3) Dum. v. 13, 14. Nap. ii. 9.

(4) Jom. xiv. 21.

was reinforced to 80,000 men; its cavalry and artillery were in an especial manner augmented; and, besides these great forces, a reserve of 10,000 chosen troops was formed at Amiens, to watch the movements of the English expeditions; and which, as soon as they proceeded to the coast of Spain, was moved to the south to support the army of Italy or the Grisons. In all, the Republic had 240,000 men in the field, ready for active operations (1); and besides this, there was nearly an equal force in Egypt, Malta, in the dépôts of the interior, or stationed along the coasts.

And of Austria. Austria on her part had made good use, during the four months of the armistice, of the resources of the monarchy, and the subsidies of England. Never on any former occasion had the patriotic spirit of her inhabitants shone forth with more lustre, nor all ranks co-operated with more enthusiastic zeal, in the measures for the common defence. No sooner was it announced, by the refusal of Napoléon to treat with either court separately, that peace was no longer to be hoped for, than the generous flame, like an electric shock, burst forth at once in every part of the monarchy. The Archduke Palatine repaired to Hungary, decreed the formation of a levy *en masse*, and threw himself on those generous feelings which, in the days of Maria Theresa, had saved the throne. The Emperor announced his resolution to put himself at the head of the army, and actually repaired to the Inn for that purpose. His presence excited to the highest degree the spirit of the people and the soldiers. The Archduke Charles, in his government of Bohemia, pressed the organization of twelve thousand men, destined to co-operate with the army on the Inn in resisting the menaced invasion; and the Empress sent to that accomplished prince a helmet set with magnificent jewels. These warlike measures excited the utmost enthusiasm among all classes; the peasantry every where flew to arms; the nobles vied with each other in the equipment of regiments of horse, or the contribution of large sums of money; every town and village resounded with the note of military preparation. But unfortunately the jealousy, or erroneous views of the Aulic Council, were but ill calculated to turn to the best account this general burst of patriotic spirit; the Archduke Charles, indeed, in accordance with the unanimous wishes of the army, was declared generalissimo, but instead of being sent to head the forces on the Inn, he was retained in his subordinate situation of the government of Bohemia. Kray, whose talents at Ulm had so long arrested the progress of disaster, was dismissed to his estates in Hungary, while the command of his army was given to the Archduke John, a young man of great promise and thorough military education, but whose inexperience, even though aided by the councils of Lauer, the grand-master of artillery, was but ill calculated to contend with the scientific abilities of Moreau (2).

Before the renewal of hostilities, Austria had greatly augmented her forces in all quarters. Five thousand additional troops in the English pay had been obtained from Bavaria; the cession of Philipsburgh, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, had rendered disposable 18,000 more; and the recruits from the interior amounted to 15,000 men. These additions had so far counterbalanced the heavy losses sustained during the campaign by sickness, fatigue, and the sword, that the Imperialists could reckon upon 110,000 effective men on the Inn, to defend the frontiers of the Hereditary States. But this great force, after the usual system of the Austrians, was weakened by the vast extent of country over which it was spread. The right, 27,000 strong, occupied Ratisbon and the

(1) Nap. ii. 20, 21. Dum. v. 16, 17. Jom. xiv. (2) Dum. v. 21, 27, 30, 31. Jom. xiv. 13, 14.
63, 65.

Palatinate; the left, consisting of 48,000 men, under Hiller, was stationed in the German Tyrol: so that not more than 60,000 combatants could be relied on to maintain the important line of the Inn. In Italy, Field-marshal Bellegarde had 100,000 under his command, but they too were weakened by the immense line they had to defend; 45,000 were in the Italian Tyrol, under Davidowich; 10,000 in Ancona and Tuscany; 20,000 were formed of the Neapolitan troops, who could be little relied on: so that, for the decisive shock on the Mincio, not more than 60,000 effective men could be assembled (1).

But Russia and Prussia keep aloof. Nor was the Imperial Cabinet less active in its endeavours to awaken the northern powers to a sense of the dangers which menaced them, from the great abilities and evident ambition of the first consul. Special envoys were despatched to St.-Petersburg and Berlin to endeavour to rouse the Russian and Prussian cabinets into activity, but in vain. Frederick William persisted in the system of neutrality which he had so long pursued, and was destined so bitterly to expiate; and the Emperor Paul, intent upon his newly-acquired ideas of the freedom of the seas, refused to embroil himself with France, and in the pursuit of the imaginary vision of maritime independence, fixed upon Europe the real evils of territorial slavery. He retained a hundred and twenty thousand men inactive, under Kutusoff and Count Pahlen, on the frontiers of Lithuania, who, if thrown into the scale at this critical moment, might have righted the balance when it was beginning to decline, and saved Russia from the rout of Austerlitz and the conflagration of Moscow (2).

It is painful to be obliged to add, that the military efforts of England, though intended to follow out the true spirit of the alliance, were not better calculated to aid the common cause. On the 4th June an attack was made on the forts in Quiberon bay, by the squadron under the command of Sir Edward Pellew; but after gaining a trifling success, and dismantling the fortifications, they embarked without making any permanent impression.

English expedition of Sir James Pulteney fails at Ferrol. July 8. Early in July a secret expedition, under the command of Sir James Pulteney, consisting of eight thousand men, sailed for the coast of France. It first appeared off Belle-Isle; but as the strong works on that island rendered any attack a difficult enterprise, it shortly made sail from the coast of France, and landed in the neighbourhood of Ferrol. After two skirmishes, in which the Spaniards were defeated, the British took possession of the heights which overlook the harbour, and every thing promised the immediate reduction of that important fortress, with the fleet within its walls, when the English commander, intimidated by the rumour of reinforcements having reached the town, withdrew his forces, and made sail for Gibraltar, where Abercromby, with the expedition which had so long lain inactive at Port Mahon, awaited his arrival (3).

And from dread of the plague, declines to attack Cadiz. The union of two squadrons, having on board above twenty thousand English troops, in the straits of Gibraltar, excited the utmost alarm through the whole Peninsula. This armament, the greatest which had yet sailed from the British shores during the whole war, menaced alike Carthage, Seville and Cadiz. Reinforcements from all quarters were hastily directed to the lines of St.-Roch in front of Gibraltar; vessels were sunk at the entrance of the harbour of Cadiz, and all the means adopted which could be thought of to repel the threatened attack. The British com-

(1) Nap. ii. 19, 20. Join. xiv. 72, 73. Dum. v. 20, 21.

(2) Dum. v. 21, 22. Join. xiv. 23, 24.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1800, 212, 213. Join. xiv. 46, 47. Dum. v. 42.

manders, instead of making sail, the moment they arrived, for the isle of St.-Leon, lay above a fortnight inactive in the straits of Gibraltar, and at Oct. 5. length appeared off Cadiz on the 5th October. Never was a more formidable armament assembled; the naval forces consisted of twenty sail of the line, twenty-seven frigates, and eighty-four transports, having on board above twenty thousand foot soldiers. As far as the eye could reach, the ocean was covered by the innumerable sails of the British armada, which seemed destined to revenge upon Spain the terrors of the celebrated armament which had been baffled by the firmness of Elizabeth. Noways intimidated by the formidable spectacle, the Spanish governor wrote a touching letter to the British commanders, in which he adjured them not to add to the calamities which already overwhelmed the inhabitants from an epidemic which carried off several hundreds of persons daily. They replied, that the town would not be attacked if the ships of war were delivered up; and as this was not acceded to, preparations were made for landing the troops; but before they could debark, the accounts, received of the yellow fever within its walls were so serious, that the British commanders apprehended that if the city were taken, the ulterior objects of the expedition might be frustrated by the effect of the contagion among the troops, and withdrew from the infected isle to the straits of Gibraltar (1).

Surrender of Malta to the British blockading squadron. But while the honour of the British arms was tarnished by the failure of such mighty forces on the western coast of Europe, an event of the utmost importance to the future progress of the maritime war occurred in the Mediterranean. Malta, which for above two years had been closely blockaded by the British forces by land and sea, began, in the course of this summer, to experience the pangs of hunger. Two frigates sailed from the harbour in the end of August with part of the garrison, one of which was speedily taken by the British cruisers. At length, all their means of subsistence having been exhausted, a capitulation was entered into in the middle of September, in virtue of which the French were to be conveyed as prisoners of war, not to serve till regularly exchanged, to Marseille; and this noble fortress, embracing the finest harbour in the world within its impregnable walls, long the bulwark of Christendom against the Turks, and now the undisputed mistress of the Mediterranean, was permanently annexed to the British dominions (2).

Affairs of Italy. Election of Pius VII at Venice. The hopes of the Imperial cabinet, in the event of a renewal of the war, were not a little founded on the hostile attitude of the south of Italy, to which, it was hoped, the arrival of the English expedition under Abercromby would give a certain degree of consistency. Pope Pius VI had sunk under the hardships of his captivity in France, and died in March of this year. The choice of the Roman Conclave, assembled, under the Imperial influence, at Venice, fell on the Cardinal Chiaramonte, who assumed the tiara, under the title of Pius VII. At the same time when he ascended the Papal throne the inhabitants of Rome were suffering severely under the exactions of the Neapolitans, and he wisely resolved to do his utmost to alleviate their misfortunes. Without, therefore, engaging openly in the war, he lent a willing ear to the propositions which the first consul, who was extremely desirous of the support of the supreme pontiff, instantly made to him. But the other parts of Italy were in the most hostile state. A body of ten thousand Neapolitans had taken a position on the Tronto between the Upper

(1) Ann. Reg. 1800, 216. Jom. xiv, 47, 48. Duin. iv. 342, 347.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1800, 215. Jom. xiv. 13, 14. Pot. iv. 49, 50.

Hostility of
Naples, and
insurrections
in Piedmont
against
France.

Abruzzes and the march of Ancona; a Neapolitan division, under Count Roger de Damas, was in the Roman states; Piedmont, in consternation at the recent annexation of the Novarese territory to the Cisalpine republic, and the innumerable oppressions of the French armies, was in so agitated a state, that a spark might blow it into open combustion; while the peasants of Tuscany, in open insurrection to support the Imperial cause, presented a tumultuary array of seven or eight thousand men. These bands, it is true, were little formidable to regular troops in the field; but as long as they continued in arms, they required to be watched by detachments, which diminished the strength of the army; and it was one of the motives which induced Napoléon to accede to the prolongation of the armistice with Austria, that it would give him time, during its continuance, to clear his flank of these troublesome irregulars (1).

The French
crush the
Tuscan
states with
great
cruelty.

As the armistice, by a strange oversight, did not extend to the Italian powers, and the English expedition was detained in useless demonstrations on the coast of Spain, it was no difficult matter for the French troops to effect this object. General Sommariva, to whom

the Grand Duke of Tuscany had intrusted the military forces of his states, was rapidly proceeding with the organization of the peasants in the Apennines, when Dupont, early in October, intimated to him, that unless the insurrection was forthwith disbanded, he would move against Tuscany with a formidable force. As these summonses met with no attention, the French troops advanced in great force, in three columns. After a vain attempt to defend the Apennines, Florence was occupied on the 15th. The Austrians, under Som-
Oct. 15. mariva, retired towards Ancona, and the greater part of the insurgents retired to Arezzo, where they resolved to defend themselves to the last
Oct. 18. extremity. An attempt to force open the gates having failed, the French General Meunier made preparations for a general assault, which took place on the following morning at five o'clock. Nothing could resist the im-
Oct. 19. petuosity of the French columns; the grenadiers mounted the scaling ladders amidst a shower of balls; quickly they made themselves masters of the rampart, and chasing the unhappy peasants from house to house, and street to street, soon filled the town with conflagration and carnage. The slaughter was dreadful; a few escaped by subterraneous passages, and made good their flight into the country; others retired into the citadel, which was soon obliged to surrender at discretion, and was razed to the ground; but by far the greater number perished in the town, under the sword of an irritated and relentless victor (2).

Leghorn is
seized, and
the English
merchan-
dise confiscated.

This bloody stroke proved fatal to the Tuscan insurrection. The fugitives who escaped the carnage, spread far and wide the most dismal accounts of the fate of their unhappy comrades, and the peasants, thunderstruck with the rapidity and severity of the blow, lost no time in deprecating the wrath of an enemy who appeared irresistible. Sommariva, fettered by the armistice with Austria, retired entirely from the Tuscan states, and the inhabitants, left to their own means of defence, had no resource but in immediate submission. A strong division was immediately despatched to Leghorn, which entered the place without opposition, and after the barbarous method of carrying on war now adopted by the first consul, instantly confiscated the whole English property in the harbour and town. Forty-six vessels, with their cargoes, besides 750,000 quintals of wheat

(1) Rot. iv. 40, 50. Dum. v. 62, 63. Nap. ii. 11.
Jom. xiv. 141, 142.

(2) Rot. iv. 50, 55. Dum. v. 67, 68. Jom. xiv.
144, 145. Nap. ii. 18, 19.

and barley, and 90,000 quintals of dried vegetables, were thus obtained for the use of the army, an acquisition of great importance to its future operations (1); but which, like all other ill-gotten gains, in the end recoiled upon the heads of those who acquired them, and contributed to form that deep and universal hatred at the French dominion, which at length precipitated Napoléon from the throne.

Oct 16. At the same period the Swiss, whose divisions and democratic transports had exposed their country to the severities of Republican conquest, were doomed to drain to the dregs the cup of misery and humiliation. The shadow even of their independence vanished before the armed intervention of the first consul. The numerous insurrections of the peasants against the enormous requisitions of the Republican agents; the obstinate resistance of the partizans of the ancient constitutions; the general anarchy and dissolution of government which prevailed, loudly called for a remedy. Napoléon applied it, by causing his minister Reinhard to declare to the democratic despots who ruled the country, that he would recognise no authority but that of the executive commission to whom he transmitted his orders; a declaration which at once brought the whole country under the immediate sway of the central government at the Tuileries (2).

Capture of Surinam and Demerara. Permanent incorporation of the Netherlands with France. The English in the course of this year made themselves masters of Surinam, Berbice, St.-Eustache, and Demerara, Dutch settlements on the mainland and in the islands of the West Indies. At the same time Napoléon published an edict, permanently incorporating the provinces acquired by the Republic on the left bank of the Rhine, and extending the French laws and institutions to these valuable acquisitions. Thus, while England was extending its mighty arms over both hemispheres (3), France was laying its iron grasp on the richest and most important provinces of Europe. The strife could not be other than desperate between two such powers.

28th Nov. Such was the state of Europe when the armistice of Hohenlinden was denounced by the first consul, and hostilities recommenced at all points in the end of November.

Description of the line of the Inn. Had the Aulic Council determined to remain on the defensive, no line was more capable of opposing an obstinate resistance to the invader than that of the Inn. That river, which does not yield to the Rhine either in the impetuosity or the volume of waters which it rolls towards the Danube, meanders in the Tyrol, as far as Kufstein, between inaccessible ridges of mountains, whose sides, darkened with pine forests, are surmounted by bare peaks, occasionally streaked, even in the height of summer, with snow. From thence to Muhlendorf it flows in a deep bed, cut by the vehemence of the torrent through solid rock, whose sides present a series of perpendicular precipices on either bank, excepting only in a few well-known points, which were strongly guarded, and armed with cannon. This powerful line, supported on the left by the fortress of Kufstein, and on the right by that of Braunau, both of which were in a formidable state of defence, was flanked on either side by two immense bastions, equally menacing to an invading enemy, the one formed by the Tyrol, with its warlike and devoted population and inaccessible mountains, the other by Bohemia and the chain of the Bohmerwald, which skirts the Danube from Lintz to Straubing, where the Archduke Charles was organizing a numerous body of forces (4).

(1) Dum. v. 69. Nap. ii. 18. Jom. xiv. 145, 146.

(2) Dum. v. 71.

(3) Dum. v. 24, 25.

(4) Personal observations. Jom. xiv. 73, 74.

Dum. v. 82. Nap. ii. 27.

Had the Austrians, headed by the Archduke Charles, remained on the defensive in this strong position, it is probable that all the disasters of the campaign would have been avoided. It was next to impossible to force such a central line, defended by eighty thousand men, under the direction of that great commander; while to attempt to turn it, either by the Tyrol or Bohemia, would have been equally perilous. To detach thirty thousand men into the defiles leading into Bohemia would have been imminently hazardous, when so large a force threatened the centre of the invader; while a similar movement into the Tyrol, besides being attended with the same danger, would have incurred the hazard of being defeated by the Prince of Reuss, who occupied the impregnable passes and fortresses which guarded the entrance into that difficult country. But from these difficulties the French were relieved by the resolution of the Imperialists to cross the Inn, and carry the war vigorously into the heart of Bavaria, a project which might have led to victory if conducted by the experience and ability of the Archduke Charles, but terminated in nothing but disaster in the hands of his brave but inexperienced successor (1).

Project of
the Impe-
rialists.

Although the offensive movement of the Imperialists led to such calamitous results, it was skilfully combined, and promised in the outset the most brilliant success. The Republican right, under Lecourbe, stretched through the Voralberg mountains to Feldkirch in the Tyrol; the centre, under Moreau in person, was in position at Ebersberg, on the high road leading from Munich to Haag; the left, commanded by Grenier, was stationed at Hohenlinden, on the road to Muhldorf. The project of the Imperialists was to detach Klenau from Ratisbon towards Landshut, where he was to be joined by Keimmayor with twenty thousand men (2); meanwhile the centre was to advance by echellons towards Hohenlinden, and bear the weight of their forces on the Republican left, where the least resistance might be expected.

24th Nov.

Hostilities were commenced by Augereau, who was at the head of the Gallo-Batavian army. He denounced the armistice four days before his colleagues, and advanced, at the head of twenty thousand men, from Frankfort by the course of the Maine towards Wurtzburg. Though the Imperial forces in that quarter were nearly equal to his own, they opposed but a feeble resistance, from being composed chiefly of the troops recently levied in Bohemia and the states of Mayence, little calculated to resist the French

Operations
on the Lower
Rhine.

veterans. After a slight combat, the Imperialists were repulsed at all points; the Baron Albin, after an ephemeral success at Aschaffembourg, was driven with loss out of that town and forced back to Schweinfurth, while Dumonceau pushed on to Wurtzburg, and summoned the garrison, which shut itself in the citadel. The first effect of these disasters was to dissolve the insurrectionary troops of Mayence under Albin, who never appeared again during the campaign. The Austrian general Simbschen, reduced by this defection to thirteen thousand men, took a position at 3d Dec. Bourg-Eberach to cover Bamberg; he was there attacked on the following day by Augereau, and after an obstinate conflict driven back to Pommersfeld. Satisfied with this success, the French general established his troops behind the Regnitz to await the fall of the citadel of Wurtzburg, which Dumonceau was beginning to besiege in regular form (5). These advantages were much more important upon the issue of the campaign than might have

(1) Jom. xiv. 76.

(2) Jom. xiv. 79. Dum. v. 96, 97.

(3) Dum. v. 86, 95. Nap. ii. 23, 24. Jom. xiv. 84, 85.

been supposed from the quality and numbers of the troops engaged; for by clearing the extreme left of Moreau they permitted him to draw his left wing, under Sainte Suzanne, nearer to his centre, and reinforce the grand army on the Inn, in the precise quarter where it was menaced by the Imperialists.

27th Nov.
The Aus-
trians ad-
vance into
Bavaria.

Meanwhile, operations of the most decisive importance had taken place on the Inn. On the 27th November the Imperialists broke up to execute their intended concentration on the right towards Landshut; but the heavy rains which fell at that time retarded considerably the march of their columns; and it was not till the 29th that their advanced guard reached that place. At the same time Moreau concentrated his forces in the centre, and advanced by Haag towards Ampfing and Muhldorf. Fearful of continuing his flank movement in presence of a powerful enemy, who threatened to fall perpendicularly on his line of march, the archduke arrested his columns, and ran the hazard of a general battle on the direct road to Munich. They accordingly, on the 30th, retraced their steps, and moved through cross roads towards Ampfing and Dorfen. This lateral movement performed amidst torrents of rain, and in dreadful roads, completed the exhaustion of the Austrian troops, but it led, in the first instance to the most promising results (1).

Move-
ments of
Moreau.

By a singular accident, Moreau had heard nothing of the advance of the Imperialists towards Landshut, far less of their cross movement to Ampfing; but some confused accounts had merely reached the Republican head-quarters of considerable assemblages of the enemy towards Muhldorf, and the French general, desirous to explore his way, pushed forward strong reconnoitring parties in that direction. His right occupied Rosenheim, his left and centre were gradually approaching the Austrian columns by Haag and Wasserbouurg. The effect of this movement was to bring the Imperial army, sixty thousand strong, and massed together, perpendicularly against the left of the French, who, ignorant of their danger, were advancing in straggling and detached columns to discover where they were (2).

The effect of this state of things, and of the able manœuvre of the archduke, speedily shewed itself. The French army, turned and out-generated, was exposed to be cut up in detail, while separated in a line of march by an enemy

Dec. 1.

drawn up in battle array on one of its flanks. Grenier, who was the first in advance, was leisurely approaching Ampfing, when he was suddenly assailed by vast masses of the enemy, in admirable order and battle array; he was speedily thrown into confusion, and put to the rout. In vain

Great suc-
cess of the
Austrians
in the out-
set.

Ney displayed all his talent and resolution to sustain the weight of the Imperial columns; his troops, after a brave resistance, were broken and driven back upon the division of Grandjean, while that of Hardy, which advanced to its support, shared the same fate. At the same time Legrand, after a sharp conflict in the valley of the Issen, was constrained to fall back to the neighbourhood of Dorfen. The Imperialists were every where successful. They had attacked, in compact and regular masses, the enemy's divisions while in march and separated, and spread alarm and discouragement from the general's tent to the sentinels' outposts (3).

French re-
treat to Ho-
henlinden.

So far the most brilliant success had attended the Austrian advance, and if it had been vigorously followed up by a general capable of appreciating the immense advantages which it offered, and forcing back the enemy's retreating columns without intermission upon those which

(1) Jom. xiv. 85, 87. Dum. v. 100, 105.

(3) Jom. xiv. 90, 91. Nap. ii. 30, 31. Dum. v.

(2) Nap. ii. 30. Jom. xiv. 88, 90. Dum. v. 104, 104, 109.

came up to their support, it might have led to the total defeat of the French army, and changed the whole fortune of the campaign. But the Archduke John, satisfied with this first advantage, allowed the enemy to recover from Dec. 2. their consternation. On the following day no forward movement was made, and Moreau, skilfully availing himself of that respite, retired through the forest of HOHENLINDEN to the ground which he had originally occupied, and carefully studied as the probable theatre of a decisive conflict (1).

Description of the field of battle. The space which lies between the Inn and the Iser, which is from twelve to fifteen leagues in breadth, is intersected in its centre by this forest, now celebrated not less in history than poetry (2). Parallel to the course of the two rivers its woods form a natural barrier or stockade, six or seven leagues long, and from a league to a league and a half broad. Two great roads only, that from Munich to Wasserbourg, and from Munich to Muhlendorf, traverse that thick and gloomy forest, where the pine-trees approach each other so closely, as in most places to render the passage of cavalry or artillery, excepting on the great roads, impossible. The village of Hohenlinden is at the entrance on the Munich side of the one defile, that of Matenpot at the mouth of that leading to Muhlendorf. The village of Ebersberg forms the entrance of the other defile leading to Wasserbourg. Between these two roads the broken and uneven surface of the forest is traversed only by country paths, almost impracticable during the storms of winter even to foot soldiers (3).

Able plan of Moreau. Moreau with his staff had carefully reconnoitred this ground; and as soon as it became evident that the archduke was to advance through its dangerous defiles, he prepared, with the art of a consummate general, to turn it to the best account. Rapidly concentrating his forces in the plain at the entrance of the defiles on the Munich side, he at the same time gave orders to Richepanse, with his division, to advance across the forest, so as to fall, early on the morning of the 5d, perpendicularly on the line of the great road from Hohenlinden to Muhlendorf. He naturally anticipated that this movement would bring him on the flank of the Austrian centre, when entangled in the defile, with its long train of artillery and chariots; and that if the Republican force at the entrance of the pass could only maintain its ground till this side attack took place, the ruin of the whole column, or at least the capture of all its cannon, would be the result. To effect this object, he concentrated all the forces he could command at the mouth of the defile; but so unforeseen was the attack, that not above two-thirds of his army could take a part in the action; neither the right-wing under Lecourbe, nor the half of the left, under Sainte Suzanne, could be expected to arrive so as to render any assistance (4).

Battle of Hohenlinden, Dec. 3. The Imperialists had committed the great error of allowing the surprised Republicans all the 2d to concentrate their scattered forces, but they did not on the following day repeat their mistake. Early on the morning of the 5d, a day ever memorable in the military annals of France, all their troops were in motion, and they plunged, in three great columns, into the forest to approach the enemy. The centre, forty thousand strong, advanced by the great road from Muhlendorf to Munich, the only road which was practicable, in the dreadful state of the weather, for artillery; above a hundred pieces of cannon and five hundred chariots encumbered its

(1) Nap. ii. 31. Dum. v. 107, 108. Jom. xiv. 91, 92.

(3) Dum. v. 109, 110. Personal observation.

(2) The reader will recollect Mr. Campbell's noble Ode to Hohenlinden.

(4) Nap. ii. 31, 32. Jom. xiv. 94, 96. Dum. v. 111, 112. Mém. du Dépôt de la Guerre, v. 242.

movements. The infantry marched first; then came the long train of artillery and caissons; the cavalry closed the procession. The right wing, under the command of general Latour, consisting of twenty-five thousand men, followed the inferior road leading from Wasserbourg to Munich; Keimayer moved on the flank of that column, with his light troops, through the forest; while the left wing, under Riesch, was directed to proceed by a cross path by Albichen to St.-Christophe. The Imperial columns, animated by their success on the preceding days, joyfully commenced their march over the yet unstained snow two hours before it was daylight, deeming the enemy in full retreat, and little anticipating any resistance before their forces were united and disposed in battle array, in the open plain, on the Munich side of the forest (1).

From the outset, however, the most sinister presages attended their steps. During the night the wind had changed; the heavy rain of the preceding days turned into snow, which fell, as at Eyleau, in such thick flakes as to render it impossible to see twenty yards before the head of the column, while the dreary expanse of the forest presented, under the trees, a uniform white surface, on which it was impossible to distinguish the beaten track (2). The cross-paths between the roads which the troops followed, bad at any time, were almost impassable in such a storm; and each body, isolated in the snowy wilderness, was left to its own resources, without either receiving intelligence or deriving assistance from the other. The central column, which advanced along the only good road, outstripped the others; and its head had traversed the forest, and approached Hohenlinden about nine o'clock. It was there met by the division of Grouchy, and a furious conflict immediately commenced; the Austrians endeavouring to debouche from the defile and extend themselves along the front of the wood, the French to coerce their movements and drive them back into the forest. Both parties made the most incredible efforts; the snow which fell without interruption, prevented the opposing lines from seeing each other; but they aimed at the flash which appeared through the gloom, and rushed forward with blind fury to the deadly charge of the bayonet. Insensibly, however, the Austrians gained ground; their ranks were gradually extending in front of the wood, when Generals Grouchy and Grandjean put themselves at the head of fresh battalions, and by a decisive charge drove them back into the forest. The imperial ranks were broken by the trees, but still they resisted bravely in the entangled thickets; posted behind the trunks, they kept up a murderous fire on the enemy; and the contending armies, broken into single file, fought, man to man, with invincible resolution (3).

While this desperate conflict was going on in front of Hohenlinden, the leading ranks of the Austrian right began to appear at the entrance of the forest on the other road. Ney instantly repaired with his division to the scene of danger, and by a vigorous charge on the flank of the enemy's column, which was in the act of deploying, not only drove it back into the wood, but captured eight pieces of cannon, and a thousand prisoners (4).

The effect of these vigorous efforts on the part of Moreau, in preventing the

(1) Nap. ii. 33. Mém. v. 251. Dum. v. 114, 116. Jom. xiv. 93, 97.

(3) Dum. v. 117, 118. Jom. xiv. 96, 97. Mém. v. 260, 267. Nap. ii. 32, 33.

(2) "On Linden, when the sun was low,
All bloodless lay the untrodden snow,
And dark as winter was the flow
Of Isar rolling rapidly."

"'Tis morn, but scarce yon level sun
Can pierce the war clouds rolling dun
Where furious Frank and fiery Hun,
Shout in their sulphurous canopy."

(4) Ney's Mém. ii. 48, 57. Nap. ii. 34. Dum. v. 118.

deploying of the heads of the Imperial columns from the forest, was to introduce vacillation and confusion into the long train in their centre, which, unable to advance from the combat in its front, and pressed on by the crowd in its rear, soon began to fall into confusion. They were in this state, jammed up amidst long files of cannon and waggons, when the division of Richepanse, which had broken up early in the morning from Ebersberg, on the Munich side of the one defile, and struggled on with invincible resolution through dreadful roads across the forest, arrived in the neighbourhood of Matenpot, on the Muhldorf side of the other, directly in the rear of the centre of the Austrian army, and at the close of its protracted array. But just as it was approaching this decisive point, and slowly advancing in open column through the forest, this division was itself pierced through the centre, near St.-Christophe, by the Austrian left wing, under Riesch, which, moving up by the valley of Albichen, to gain the chaussée of Wasserbourg, by which it was destined to pierce through the forest, fell perpendicularly on its line of march. Thus Richepanse, with half his division, found himself irretrievably separated from the remainder; the manœuvre which he was destined to have performed on the centre of the Imperialists was turned against himself, and with a single brigade he was placed between that immense body and their left wing. An ordinary general, in such alarming circumstances, would have sought safety in flight, and thus, by allowing the Imperial centre to continue its advance, endangered the victory; but Richepanse, whose able mind was penetrated with the importance of his mission, bravely resolved to push on with the single brigade which remained under his command, and fall on the rear of the grand column of the enemy. He sent orders, therefore, to his separated brigade to maintain itself to the last extremity at St.-Christophe, and advanced with the utmost intrepidity towards Matenpot and the line of march of the grand Austrian column (1).

The Austrian line of communication is intercepted. When the troops approached the great road, they came upon the cuirassiers of Lichtenstein who formed part of that vast body, who had dismounted, and were reposing leisurely under the trees until the great park of artillery and the reserves of Kollowrath had passed the defile. It may easily be imagined with what astonishment they beheld this new enemy on their flank, who was the more unexpected, as they knew that their left wing, under Riesch, had passed through the forest, and they deemed themselves perfectly secure on that side. They made, in consequence, little resistance, and were speedily driven off the chaussée. Not content with this success, Richepanse left to his cavalry the charge of keeping off the Imperial cuirassiers, and advanced himself with the two remaining regiments of infantry to attack the rear of the Imperial centre in the forest of Hohenlinden. The appearance of this force, amounting to nearly three thousand men, behind them, excited the utmost alarm in the Austrian column. The troops of that nation are proverbially more sensitive than any in Europe to the danger of being turned when in a line of march. A brigade of the Bavarian reserve was speedily directed to the menaced point, but it was overwhelmed in its advance by the crowds of fugitives, and thrown into such disorder by the overturned cannon and caissons which blocked up the road, that it never reached the enemy. Three Hungarian battalions were next brought up, but after resisting bravely, amidst the general consternation around them, they too at length were broken and fled. This little action

(1) Nap. ii. 34, 35. Jom. xiv. 97, 99. Dum. v. 119, 120. Mém. v. 270, 274.

decided the victory; the whole Austrian artillery lay exposed to the attacks of the victor in a situation where it was incapable of making any resistance (1).

Moreau, at the entrance of the defile in front of Hohenlinden, was still maintaining an anxious conflict, when the sound of cannon in the direction of Matenpot, and the appearance of hesitation and confusion in the enemy's columns, announced that the decisive attack in the chaussée behind them, by Richepanse, had taken place. He instantly directed Grouchy and Ney to make a combined charge in front on the enemy. The French battalions, which had so long maintained an obstinate defence, now commenced a furious onset, and the Austrian centre, shaken by the alarm in its rear, was violently assailed in front. The combined effort was irresistible. Ney, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, pressed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, along the chaussée, until the loud shouts of the troops announced that they had joined the victorious Richepanse, who was advancing along the same road to meet him, as fast as its innumerable incumbrances would permit. No words can paint the confusion which now ensued in the Austrian column. The artillery-drivers cut their traces, and galloped in all directions into the forest; the infantry disbanded and fled; the cavalry rushed in tumultuous squadrons to the rear, trampling under foot whatever opposed their passage; the waggons were abandoned to their fate, and amidst the universal wreck, 97 pieces of cannon, 500 caissons, and 7000 prisoners fell into the enemy's hands (2).

Great victory gained by the French. While this decisive success was gained in the centre, the columns of Latour and Keimayer, who had succeeded in debouching from the forest and united in the plain on its other side, violently assailed the Republican left, where Grenier, with inferior forces, defended the other road to Munich. Notwithstanding all his efforts, and the assistance of a part of the division of Ney, he was sensibly losing ground, when the intelligence of the defeat of the centre compelled the enemy to abandon his advantages, and retire precipitately into the forest. Grenier instantly resumed the offensive, and by a general charge of all his forces, succeeded in overwhelming the Austrians while struggling through the defile, and taking six pieces of cannon and fifteen hundred prisoners. At the same time, General Decaen, with a fresh brigade, disengaged the half of Richepanse's division, cut off during his advance, which was hard pressed between General Riesch's corps and the retiring columns of the centre, who still preserved their ranks. Before night, the Republicans, at all points, had passed the forest. Four of their divisions were assembled at Matenpot, and the head-quarters were advanced to Haag, while the Imperialists, weakened by the loss of above 400 pieces of cannon, and 14,000 soldiers, took advantage of the night to withdraw their shattered forces across the Inn (3).

Such was the great and memorable battle of Hohenlinden, the most decisive, with the exception of that of Rivoli, which had yet been gained by either party during the war, and superior even to that renowned conflict in the trophies by which it was graced, and the immense consequences by which it was followed. The loss of the French on that and the preceding days was 9000 men, but that of the Imperialists was nearly twice as great, when the deserters and missing were taken into account; they lost two-thirds of their artillery, and the moral consequences of the defeat were fatal to the campaign. The victory of Marengo itself was less moment-

(1) Nap. ii. 35, 36. Jom. xiv. 99, 100. Dum. v. 121, 122.

(2) Jom. xiv. 99, 101. Mém. v. 272, 284. Dum. v. 121, 124. Nap. ii. 36, 37.

(3) Nap. ii. 36, 37. Dum. v. 127, 128. Jom. xiv. 101, 105. Mém. v. 280, 285.

ous in its military consequences. It merely gave the Republicans possession of the Sardinian fortresses and the Cisalpine republic; but the disaster of Hohenlinden threw the army of Germany without resource on the Hereditary States, and at once prostrated the strength of the monarchy (1).

Merit of Moreau in gaining it. Common justice must award to Moreau the merit of skilful combination, and admirable use of the advantages of ground in this great victory; but it is at the same time manifest that he owed much to chance, and that fortune crowned a well-conceived plan of defence by a decisive offensive movement. The whole arrangements of the French general were defensive; he merely wished to gain time, in order to enable his right and left wings, under Lecourbe and Sainte-Suzanne, to arrive and take a part in the action. By the movements on previous days, he was so far out-generaled, that, though his army on the whole was greatly superior to that of his opponents, he was obliged to fight at Ampfing with an inferiority of one to two, and at Hohenlinden on equal terms. The movement of General Richepanse, however well conceived to retard or prevent the passage of the forest by the Austrian army, could not have been reckoned upon as likely to produce decisive success; for if he had advanced half an hour later, or if Riesch's column, which it should have done, according to the Austrian disposition, had arrived half an hour sooner, he would have fallen into the midst of superior forces, and both his division and that of Decaen, which followed his footsteps, would probably have perished. The imprudence of the Austrians in engaging in these perilous defiles in presence of the enemy's army, and not arranging matters so that all their columns might reach the enemy at the same time, undoubtedly was the principal cause of the disaster which followed; but although Moreau's arrangements were such as would probably at all events have secured for him the victory, it was the fortunate accidents which occurred during the action which occasioned its decisive result (2).

The Austrians retire behind the Inn. Thunderstruck by this great disaster, the whole Imperial army retired behind the Inn, and made a show of maintaining itself on that formidable line of defence. But it was but a show. From the first the disposition of its columns, disposed in part in echelon along the road to Salzburg, indicated an intention of retreating in that direction. After maturely weighing all the circumstances of the case, Moreau resolved to force the passage of the Upper Inn, on the road to Salzburg; but in order to deceive the enemy, he caused all the boats of the Iser to be assembled at Munich, collected the bulk of his forces in that direction, and gave out that he was about to cross the lower part of the river. By adopting this line of advance, the French general had the prospect of cutting off the Imperialists from their left wing, hitherto untouched, in the Tyrol; menacing Upper Austria and Vienna, and endangering the retreat of Bellegarde from the plains of Italy. These advantages were so important, that they overbalanced the obvious difficulties of the advance in that direction, arising from the necessity of crossing three mountain streams, the Inn, the Alza, and the Salza, and the obstacles that might be thrown in their way from the strength of the mountain ridges in the neighbourhood of Salzburg (3).

(1) Jom. xiv. 107. Nap. ii. 131. Dum. v. 129.

(2) Jom. xiv. 106, 107. Nap. ii. 52, 54.

Napoléon's observations on this battle, and the whole campaign of Moreau, have been here adopted only in so far as they appear to be consonant to reason and justice. They are distinguished by his usual ability, but strongly tinged by that envenomed feeling towards his great rival, which

formed so powerful a feature in his character. Jealousy towards every one who had either essentially injured or rivalled his reputation, and a total disregard of truth when recounting their operations, are two of the defects in so great a man, upon which it is at once the most necessary and the most painful duty of the historian to dwell.

(3) Jom. xiv. 111, 112. Dum. v. 133, 134, 135.

Skilful
manœuvre,
by which
the passage
of that
river was
effected by
Moreau.

While the boats of the Iser were publicly conducted, with the utmost possible *éclat*, to the lower Inn, Lecourbe caused a bridge equipage to be secretly transported in the night to Rosenheim, on the road to Salzburg, and having collected thirty-five thousand men in the neighbourhood, established a battery of twenty-eight pieces during the night of the 8th December at Neuperen, where the Inn flows in a narrow channel, and which is the only point in that quarter where the right bank is commanded by the left. At six o'clock on the following morning, while it was still pitch-dark, the French cannon, whose arrival was wholly unknown to the Austrian videttes, opened a furious fire, so well directed that the Imperialists were obliged to retire; and the Republicans instantly constructed a bridge, and threw across so strong a body of troops as gave them a solid footing on the left bank. At the same time a battery was placed in front of the bridge at Rosenheim, in order to prevent the burning of the remaining arches of that wooden structure, of which one only had been destroyed; but the corps of the Prince of Condé, which was stationed on the opposite bank, faithfully discharged its duty, and the whole bridge was soon consumed. In consequence of this circumstance, Lecourbe's troops were obliged to make a circuit by the passage at Neuperen, but so dilatory were the movements of the Imperialists, that no sufficient force could be collected to oppose their progress; a second bridge of boats was constructed near Rosenheim, by which Richepanse's division was passed over, and the Austrians, abandoning the whole line of the Upper Inn, retired behind the Salza. Thus was one of the most formidable military lines in Europe broken through in the space of a few hours, without the loss of a single man (1).

This extraordinary success was chiefly owing to the Imperialists having been led, by the demonstrations of Moreau against the Lower Inn, to concentrate the right wing of their army, which had suffered least in the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden, in that quarter, which removed it three or four marches from the scene where the real attack was made. No sooner did they receive intelligence of the passage of Lecourbe over the Upper Inn, than they hastily moved all their disposable troops towards the menaced point; but finding that the enemy were established on the right bank in too great force to be dislodged, they fell back on all sides, and abandoning the whole line of the Inn, concentrated their army behind the Alza, between Altenmarkt and the lake of Sine, to cover the roads to Salzburg and Vienna (2).

Rapid advance of
the French
towards
Salzburg.

Moreau, conceiving with reason that the spirit of the Austrian army must be severely weakened by such a succession of disasters, resolved to push his advantages to the utmost. The Austrians now experienced the ruinous consequences attending the system of extending themselves over a vast line in equal force throughout, which, since the commencement of the war, they had so obstinately followed; they found themselves unable to arrest the march of the victor at any point, and by the rapid advance of Lecourbe were irrecoverably separated from their left wing in the Tyrol. Moreau having resolved not to allow them to establish themselves in a solid manner behind the Salza, pushed rapidly forward across the Achen
Dec. 12. and the Traun to Salzburg. He experienced no considerable opposition till he reached the neighbourhood of that town, but when Lecourbe, with the advanced guard, approached the Saal, he found the bulk of the Austrian army, thirty thousand strong, including ten thousand cavalry, posted in a strong position covering the approach to Salzburg. Its front was

(1) Dum. v. 134, 140. Jom. xiv. 112, 115. Nap. (2) Jom. xiv. 114, 116. Dum. v. 141, 143.
ii. 38, 39.

covered by the Saal, the rapid course of which offered no inconsiderable obstacle to an attacking force; its right rested on inaccessible rocks, and its left was protected by the confluence of the Saal and the Salza. But this position, how strong soever, had its dangers; it was liable to be turned by a passage of the Salza, effected below the town between Lauffen and Salzbouurg, in which case the army ran the risk of being cut off from Vienna, or thrown back in disorder upon the two bridges of boats which preserved its communication with the right bank of the river (1).

Lecourbe commenced the attack with his accustomed vigour; Gudin carried the village of Salzbourghoffen, and made six hundred prisoners; but Montrichard was so rudely handled by the Imperial cavalry, that he was driven back in disorder, with the loss of five hundred men. But this success was of little avail, for Moreau ordered Decaen to cross the Salza at Lauffen, an operation which was most successfully performed. While the attention of the Imperialists was drawn to the broken arches of the bridge by a violent cannonade, this able general directed four hundred chosen troops to a point a little lower down, who, undeterred by the violence and cold of the winter torrent, threw themselves into the stream; swam across, and made themselves masters of some boats on the opposite side, by which the passage was speedily effected. Moreau was no sooner informed of this success, than he pushed Richepanse, with two fresh divisions, across at this place, and advanced against Salzbouurg by the right bank. Encouraged by this sup-

port, Lecourbe, on the day following, renewed his attack on the Austrian rear-guard, commanded by the Archduke John in person, posted in front of Salzbouurg. His troops advanced in two columns, one by the road of Reichenthal, the other formed in front of Vaal; a thick fog covered the ground, and the French tirailleurs advanced inconsiderately to the attack, deeming the Austrians in full retreat, and desirous of having the honour of first reaching Salzbouurg. They were received by the fire of thirty pieces of cannon, whose discharges soon dissipated the mist, and discovered two formidable lines of cavalry drawn up in battle array. Lecourbe brought up his horse, but they were overwhelmed by the first line of the Imperial cavalry, which broke into a splendid charge when the Republicans approached their position. Lecourbe finding himself unequal to the task of opposing such formidable forces, drew back his wings behind the Saal, and posted his infantry in the rear of the village of Vaal. He there maintained himself with difficulty till the approach of night, glad to purchase his safety by the loss of two thousand men left on the field of battle (2).

Had it not been for the passage of the river at Lauffen, this brilliant achievement might have been attended with important consequences; but that disastrous circumstance rendered the position at Salzbouurg no longer tenable. Moreau, at the head of twenty thousand men, was rapidly advancing up the right bank, and the Archduke John, unable to oppose such superior forces, was compelled to retire during the night, leaving that important town to its fate. Decaen, with the advanced guard of Moreau, took possession of Salzbouurg, without opposition, on the following morning, and the Republican standards for the first time waved on the picturesque towers of that romantic city (3).

The occupation of Salzbouurg, and the abandonment of the line of the Salza, decided the fate of the monarchy. The shattered remains of the grand army,

(1) *Jom.* xiv. 115, 116. *Dum.* v. 195, 197. *Nap.* ii. 39, 40.

(2) *Nap.* ii. 40, 41. *Jom.* xiv. 116, 120. *Dum.* v. 198, 206.

(3) *Nap.* ii. 40. *Dum.* 200, 207.

which had been unable to maintain the formidable lines of two such rivers, broken in numbers, subdued in spirit, were unable thereafter to make any head against a numerous enemy, flushed with victory, and conducted with consummate military skill. Emboldened by the unexpected facility with which he had passed these considerable rivers, Moreau resolved to give the enemy no time to recover from his consternation, but to push on at once towards Vienna, and decide the war in the centre of the Hereditary States, before the other French armies had begun seriously to skirmish on the frontier. He disquieted himself little about the forces in the Tyrol, deeming the troops in that province sufficiently occupied with the invasion of Lombardy by Brune, and the march of Macdonald through the Grisons, which shall immediately be noticed. Satisfied with the precautions, therefore, of leaving on the right small bodies as he advanced, to mark the principal passes into that mountainous region, and on the left of detaching Sainte-Suzanne with his wing to watch the motions of Klenau, who was threatening the Gallo-Batavian army at Wurtzburg, he himself pushed on with his whole centre and right wing in pursuit of the enemy (1).

Richepanse, who conducted his advanced guard, marched with so much expedition, that he came up with the Austrian rear at Herdorf. Notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, who the day before had marched twelve leagues, he attacked the enemy at daybreak, routed them, and made a thousand prisoners. The two following days was a continued running fight; the Austrians retired, combating all the way, to Schwanstadt. This indefatigable leader was closely followed by Decaen and Grouchy, who came up to his support the moment that any serious resistance arrested his columns; while Lecourbe, at the head of the other wing of the invading army, advanced by the mountain road, in order to turn the streams where they were easily fordable, and constantly menace the left flank of the enemy. In front of Schwanstadt the Imperialists made an effort to arrest this terrible advanced guard. Three thousand cavalry, supported by rocky thickets, lined with tirailleurs on either flank, stood firm, and awaited the onset of the Republicans; but they were now in a state of exultation which nothing could resist. The infantry advanced to within three hundred paces of that formidable mass of cavalry, without noticing the tirailleurs, who rattled incessantly on either flank, and then breaking into a charge, approached the horse with levelled bayonets with so much resolution, that the Austrians broke and fled, and nearly a thousand men were killed or made prisoners. On the following day, a scene of dreadful confusion ensued, when the Austrian rear-guard crossed the Traun. A column of twelve hundred, under Prince Lichtenstein, stationed in front of the town of Lambach, where the passage was going forward, made such a heroic resistance as gave time to the greater part of the cannon and baggage to defile over the bridge; but at length it fell a victim to its devotion, and was almost all slain or made prisoners. Immediately the whole remaining Imperialists who had not passed fled towards the defile: they were rapidly followed by the Republicans. A scene of indescribable horror ensued; in the *mêlée* of fugitives, carriages, and trampling squadrons, the arches were fired, and multitudes threw themselves into the stream; but such was the resolution of the French grenadiers, that, regardless alike of the flames and the discharges of grape from the opposite bank, they rushed across; by their exertions the

Dec. 16.
Dec. 17.
and 18.

Great suc-
cesses gain-
ed by his
advanced
guard.

Dec. 19.

bridge was preserved from destruction, and was speedily passed by the triumphant French battalions (1).

Dec. 20. The Archduke joins the army, but cannot arrest the disaster. Affairs were in this disastrous state when the Archduke Charles, whom the unanimous cries of the nation had called to the post of danger, as the only means left of saving the monarchy, arrived, and took the command of the army. The arrival of that distinguished leader, who brought with him a few battalions, for a moment revived the spirits of the soldiers; but that gleam was of short duration. He had flattered himself that he would be able to arrest the progress of the enemy in upper Austria, while Klenau made a diversion on the side of Bohemia, and Hiller on that of Tyrol, so as to menace his communications in Bavaria and Swabia. But the appearance of the army as it crossed the Traun rendered it evident to his experienced eye that it was too late to calculate on the success of these movements. Instead of the proud battalions whom he had led to victory at Stockach and Zurich, the archduke beheld only a confused mass of infantry, cavalry, and artillery covering the roads; the bands of discipline were broken; the soldiers neither grouped around their colours nor listened to the voice of their officers; dejection and despair were painted in every countenance. Even the sight of their beloved chief, the saviour of Germany, could hardly induce the extenuated veterans to lift their eyes from the ground. He saw that it was too late to remedy the disorder, but still he bravely resolved to do his utmost to arrest it, and rather give battle under the walls of Vienna, than purchase, by an ignominious peace, the retreat of the conqueror (2).

An armistice is agreed to. The spirits of the troops, revived for a moment by the arrival of their favourite leader, were irretrievably damped by the order to continue the retreat, after the passage of the Traun, to Steyer. The archduke gave the most pressing orders to hasten the advance of the Hungarian insurrection, and urge forward the armaments in the capital; but in the midst of these energetic measures, the rout of the rear-guard under Prince Schwartzemberg, who was overwhelmed at Kremsmunster on the Steyer, with the loss of twelve hundred men, gave him melancholy proof that the troops were so completely dejected, that no reliance could be placed on their exertions. Penetrated with grief at this disaster, he despatched a messenger to Moreau, soliciting an armistice, which, after some hesitation, was signed on the 25th by the French general, and repose given to the troops, worn out by a month's incessant marching and misfortunes (3).

Dec. 21. Operations of the army on the Maine. To complete the picture of the memorable campaign of 1800 in Germany, it only remains to notice the concluding operations of the Gallo-Batavian army on the Maine. After the action at Bourgeberach and the investment of the citadel of Wurtzburg. Augereau endeavoured to put himself in communication with the grand army under Moreau. His situation soon became critical when the advance of that army after the battle of Hohenlinden left him entirely to his own resources; and it was rendered doubly so by the approach of Klenau with ten thousand regular Austrian troops on his right flank, while Simbschen with twelve thousand troops menaced his left. The danger soon became pressing; a division of his troops was attacked on the 18th in front of Nuremberg by Klenau, and after a gallant resistance, forced to retreat; while his left with difficulty maintained itself against Simbschen. Disconcerted by these simultaneous attacks, the French general on the two following days retired behind the

(1) Nap. ii. 40, 41. Dum. v. 208, 214. Jom. xiv. 125, 128.

(3) Dum. v. 221, 222. Nap. ii. 41, 42. Jom. xiv. 130, 131.

(2) Jom. xiv. 129. Dum. v. 217, 218.

Dec. 21. Rednitz. On the 21st he was again attacked and defeated at Neukirchen by the united Imperial generals; but they were unable to follow up their advantages, from having received orders on the night of their victory to retire to Bohemia, in order to succour the heart of the monarchy, now violently assailed by the enemy (1). They were in the course of executing these orders, when the armistice of Steyer put a period to their operations.

Thus the Republican army, in a short campaign of little more than three weeks, in the middle of winter, and in the most severe weather, marched ninety leagues; crossed three considerable rivers in presence of the enemy; made twenty thousand prisoners; killed, wounded, or dispersed as many; captured 150 pieces of cannon, 400 caissons, and 4000 carriages; and never halted till its advanced guard, arrested by an armistice, was within twenty leagues of Vienna. Such results require no eulogium; the annals of war have few such triumphs to recount, and they deservedly placed Moreau in the very highest rank of the captains of the eighteenth century (2).

While these great events were in progress in Germany, operations in the Grisons. Designs of Napoléon there. inferior indeed in magnitude, but equal in the heroism with which they were conducted, and superior in the romantic interest with which they were attended, took place in the snowy amphitheatre of the Alps. It has been already noticed, that the second army of reserve, consisting of fifteen thousand men, was moved forward in October to the valley of the Rhine, in the Grisons; and that it was destined to menace the rear of the Imperial army on the Mincio, while Brune attacked it in front. This auxiliary corps would probably have rendered more essential service if it had been directed to the grand army of Moreau, which was destined to operate in the valley of the Danube, the true avenue to the Austrian states; but such a disposition would ill have accorded with the views of the first consul, who was little anxious to put a preponderating force, so near their frontier, into the hands of a dreaded rival, and destined for himself the principal part in the campaign, with the troops which he was to lead by the Noric Alps to Vienna. Independently of this secret feeling, which undoubtedly had its weight, Napoléon was misled by the great results of the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, and the paralysing effect of the march of the army of reserve across the St.-Bernard in the present year. He conceived that Italy was the theatre where the decisive events were to take place, and had yet to learn the superior importance of the valley of the Danube, in which he himself on future occasions was destined to strike such redoubtable blows (3). It is fortunate for the historian, that this destination of Macdonald's corps took place, as it brought to light the intrepidity and heroism of that gallant officer, of whose descent Scotland has so much reason to be proud; while it led to the interesting episode of the passage of the Splügen, perhaps the most wonderful achievement of modern war, and which has been portrayed by one of its ablest leaders, with the fidelity of Xenophon, and the pencil of Livy (4).

The army of Macdonald, which was announced to consist of forty thousand men, and was furnished with staff and other appointments adequate to that number, in reality amounted only to fifteen thousand troops. Macdonald no sooner discovered this great deficiency than he made the most urgent representations to the first consul, and requested that the chosen reserve of ten

(1) Nap. ii. 25, 26. Dum. v. 229, 241. Jom. xiv. 131, 137.

(2) Jom. xiv. 137, 139.

(3) Jom. xiv. 64. Arch. i. 264. Nap. ii. 61.

(4) Couat Mathieu Dumas.

thousand men, which Murat was leading from the camp at Amiens to the plains of Italy, should be put under his orders. But Napoléon, who intended this corps in the Alps to operate on the campaign, more by the apprehensions it excited among the Imperialists than its actual achievements in the field, refused to change the destination of Murat's division, and it continued its route for the banks of the Mincio. He still believed that the frontier of the Inn would sufficiently cover the Hereditary States on that side, and that it was by accumulating ninety thousand men in the southern Tyrol and Italy, that the decisive blow against the Austrian power was to be struck. The command of this great army, destined to dictate peace under the walls of Vienna, he ultimately designed for himself (1).

Descrip-
tion of the
road over
the Splu-
gen. Of all the passages from Switzerland to Italy, there was none which presented more serious natural obstacles, and was more carefully guarded by the enemy, than that which leads over the Splügen into the Italian Tyrol. It is first necessary to pass from the valley of the Rhine, near its source, over the Splügen into that of the Adda, which descends in a rapid course from the Julian Alps to Chiavenna and the lake of Como; from thence, if an advance to the eastward is required, the Col Apriga, a steep ridge entangled with wood and lofty chesnuts, must be surmounted, which brings the traveller into the valley of the Oglio; between which and the stream of the Adige there is interposed the rugged ridge of the Monte Tonal, whose snowy summit was occupied and had been carefully fortified by the Austrian troops (2). Macdonald no sooner was made acquainted with these obstacles than he despatched his chief of the staff, General Mathieu Dumas, to lay before the first consul an account of the almost insuperable difficulties which opposed his progress. No man could be better qualified than the officer whose graphic pencil has so well described the passage to discharge this delicate mission; for he was equally competent to appreciate the military projects of the general-in-chief, and to portray the physical obstructions which opposed their execution. Napoléon's
designs for
the passage
of that
mountain. Napoléon listened attentively to his statement; interrogated him minutely on the force and positions of Hiller's corps, and the divisions of Laudon, Davidowich, and Wukassowich, which were stationed near the head of the valleys which in that part of the Alps separate Italy from Germany; and then replied, "We will wrest from them without a combat that immense fortress of the Tyrol; we must manœuvre on their flanks; menace their last line of retreat, and they will immediately evacuate all the upper valleys. I will make no change on my dispositions. Return quickly; tell Macdonald that an army can always pass, in every season, where two men can place their feet. It is indispensable that, in fifteen days after the commencement of hostilities, the army of the Grisons should have seen the sources of the Adda, the Oglio, and the Adige; that it should have opened its fire on the Monte Tonal which separates them; and that, having descended to Trent, it should form the left wing of the army of Italy, and threaten, in concert with the troops on the Mincio, the rear of Bellegarde's army. I shall take care to forward to it the necessary reinforcements; it is not by the numerical force of an army, but by its destination and the importance of its operations, that I estimate the merit due to its commander (3)."

Having received these verbal instructions, Macdonald prepared, with the devotion of a good soldier, to obey his commands. His troops advanced the

(1) Dum. v. 148, 149. Nap. ii. 61.

(2) Personal observation.

(3) Dum. v. 153, 154.

Preparations of Macdonald for crossing the Splügen. moment the armistice was denounced, into the upper Rheinthal, and concentrated between Coire and Tüsis, at the entrance of the celebrated defile of the Via Mala, which is the commencement of the ascent of the Splügen, while, at the same time, to distract the enemy, and conceal his real designs, demonstrations were made towards Feldkirch, as if it was intended to break into the Tyrol in that quarter. A few days were spent at Tüsis in organizing the army, and making the necessary preparations for the formidable undertaking which awaited them, of crossing in the depth of winter the snowy summits of the mountains. All the artillery was dismounted, and placed on sledges constructed in the country, to which oxen were harnessed; the artillery ammunition was divided, and placed on the backs of mules, and in addition to his ordinary arms, ball cartridge and knapsack, every soldier received five days' provisions, and five packets of cartridges to bear on his shoulders over the rugged ascent. Had he lived to see the French infantry preparing, in the middle of December, under the weight of these enormous burdens, to cross the snow-clad ridges of the Rhetian Alps, by paths hardly accessible at that season to the mountaineers of the country, the eloquent historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire would have expunged from his immortal work the reflection on the comparative hardihood of ancient and modern times (1).

Description of the passage of the Splügen. Tüsis is situated at the confluence of the Albula and the Rhine, at the foot of a range of pine-clad cliffs of great elevation, which run across the valley, and in former times had formed a barrier, creating a lake in the valley of Schams, a few miles farther up its course. Through this enormous mass, three or four miles broad, the Rhine has, in the course of ages, found its way in a narrow bed, seldom more than thirty or forty, sometimes not more than eight or ten yards broad, shut in on either side by stupendous cliffs which rise to the height of two or three thousand feet above its rocky channel. The road, conducted along the sides of these perpendicular precipices, repeatedly crosses the stream by stone bridges, of a single arch, thrown from one cliff to the other, at the height of three or four hundred feet above the raging torrent. Innumerable cascades descend from these lofty precipices, and are conducted in subterranean channels under the road, or lost in the sable forests of pine which clothe their feet. Impetuous as the Rhine is in this extraordinary channel, the roar of its waters is scarcely heard at the immense elevation above it at which the bridges are placed. The darkness of the road, overshadowed by primeval pines of gigantic stature, conducted through galleries cut out of the solid rock, or on arches thrown over the awful abyss; the solitude and solemnity of the impenetrable forests around, the stupendous precipices above and beneath, which make the passenger feel as if he were suspended in middle air, conspire to render this pass the most extraordinary and sublime in the whole amphitheatre of the central Alps (2).

Emerging from this gloomy defile, the road traverses for two leagues the open and smiling valley of Schams; it next ascends by a winding course the pine-clad cliffs of La Rofla, and at length reaches in a narrow and desolate

(1) Dum. v. 154, 161. See Gibbon, chap. i. Jom. xiv. 146, 147.

(2) Personal observations. Dum. v. 151. Ebel. Art. Via. Mala.

The defile of the Via Mala is not so celebrated as its matchless features deserve; but the admirable road which is now conducted through its romantic cliffs, and over the Splügen, must ultimately bring it into more general notice. It exceeds in sublimity

and horror any scene in the Alps. There is no single pass in the Simplon, Mont Cenis, the Great St. Bernard, the Little St. Bernard, the St. Gothard, the Bernhardin, the Brenner, or the Col de Tende, which can stand in comparison. It approaches more nearly to the savage character of the Breach of Rofland, or the Circle of Gabarnie in the Pyrenees, but exceeds in stupendous features either of these extraordinary scenes.

pastoral valley the village of Splügen, situated at the foot of the ascent of the mountain of the same name. Here the road, leaving the waters of the Rhine, which descend cold and clear from the glaciers of Hinter Rhin, turns sharp to the left hand, and ascends a lateral valley as far as its upper extremity, when it emerges upon the bare face of the mountain above the region of wood, and by a painful ascent, often of forty-five degrees elevation, reaches the summit in an hour and a half. This description applies to the old road as it stood in 1800. The new road, over the same ground, is wound gradually up the ascent, with that admirable skill which has rendered the works of the French and Italian engineers in the Alps the object of deserved admiration to the whole civilized world. The wearied traveller then beholds with joy the waters flowing towards the Italian streams, in a narrow plain about four hundred yards broad; situated between two glaciers at the base of overhanging mountains of snow. From thence to Isola, on the Italian side of the declivity, is a descent of two leagues, conducted in many places down zig-zag slopes, attended with great danger. On the right, for several miles, is a continued precipice, or rocky descent, in many places three or four hundred feet deep, while, on the left, the road is cut out of the solid rock, on the bare face of the mountain, exposing the traveller to be overwhelmed by the avalanches, which, loosened on the heights above by the warmth of the southern sun, often sweep with irresistible violence to the bottom of the declivity (1).

In summer, when the road is well cleared, it is possible to go in three hours from the village of Splügen to the hospice on the summit; but when the newly fallen snow has effaced all traces of the path in those elevated regions, above the zone of the arbutus and rhododendron; when the avalanches or the violence of the winds have carried off the black poles which mark the course of the road, it is not possible to ascend with safety to the higher parts of the mountain. The traveller must advance with cautious steps, sounding, as he proceeds, as in an unknown sea beset with shoals; the most experienced guides hesitate as to the direction which they should take; for in that snowy wilderness the horizon is bounded by icy peaks, affording few landmarks to direct their steps, even if they should be perceived for a few minutes from amidst the mantle of clouds which usually envelope their summits (2).

It may easily be conceived, from this description, what labours are requisite during the winter season to open this passage. It is necessary for an extent of five leagues, from the village of Splügen, to that of Isola, either to clear away the snow, so as to come to the earth, or to form a passable road over its top; and the most indefatigable efforts cannot always secure success in such an enterprise. The frequent variations of the atmosphere, the clouds which suddenly rise up from the valleys beneath, the terrible storms of wind which arise in these elevated regions, the avalanches which descend with irresistible force from the overhanging glaciers, in an instant destroy the labour of weeks, and obliterate, by a colossus of snow, the greatest efforts of human industry (3).

Such were the difficulties which awaited Macdonald in the first mountain ridge which lay before him in the passage of the Alps. He arrived with the
Nov. 26. advanced guard, on the evening of the 26th, at the village of Splügen, the point where the mountain passage, properly speaking, begins, with a company of sappers, and the first sledges conveying the artillery.

(1) Dum. v. 164, 165. Personal observation.

(2) Dum. v. 164.

(3) Ibid. v. 165.

Extreme difficulties experienced by the French troops in the passage.

Nov. 27.

The country guides placed poles along the ascent; the labourers followed and cleared away the snow; the strongest dragoons next marched to beat down the road by their horses' feet; they had already, after incredible fatigue, nearly reached the summit, when the wind suddenly rose, an avalanche fell from the mountain, and sweeping across the road, precipitated thirty dragoons at the head of the column into the gulph beneath, where they were dashed to pieces between the ice and the rocks. General La Riboissière, who led the van, was a-head of the cataract of snow, and reached the hospice; but the remainder of the column, thunderstruck by the catastrophe, returned to Splugen; and the wind, which continued for the three succeeding days to blow with great violence, detached so many avalanches, that the road was entirely blocked up in the upper regions, and the guides declared that no possible efforts could render it passable in less than fifteen days (1).

Macdonald, however, was not to be daunted by any such obstacles. Independently of his anxiety to fulfil his destined part in the campaign, necessity forced him on, for the unwonted accumulation of men and horses in those elevated Alpine regions promised very soon to consume the whole

Dec. 1.

subsistence of the country, and expose the troops to the greatest dangers from actual want. He instantly made the best arrangement which circumstances would admit for re-opening the passage. First marched four of the strongest oxen that could be found in the Grisons, led by the most experienced guides; they were followed by forty robust peasants, who cleared or beat down the snow; two companies of sappers followed and improved the track; behind them marched the remnant of the squadron of dragoons, which had suffered so much on the first ascent, and who bravely demanded the post of danger in renewing the attempt. After them came a convoy of artillery and a hundred beasts of burden, and a strong rear-guard closed the party. By incredible efforts the head of the column, before night, reached the hospice, and although many men and horses were swallowed up in the ascent, the order and discipline so necessary to the success of the enterprise were maintained throughout. They here joined general La Riboissière, who continued the same efforts on the Italian side; and led this adventurous advanced guard in safety to the sunny fields of Campo Dolcino at the southern base of the mountain. Two other columns, arrayed in the same order, followed on the 2d and 3d December, in clear frosty weather, with much less difficulty, because the road was beaten down by the footsteps of those who had preceded them; but several men died of the excessive cold on the higher parts of the mountain (2).

Heroism of Macdonald in persisting, notwithstanding.

Encouraged by this success, Macdonald advanced with the remainder of his army to Splugen on the 4th December, and leaving only a slight rear-guard on the northern side of the mountain, commenced his march on the morning of the 5th, at the head of seven thousand men. Though no tempest had been felt in the deep valley of the Rhine, the snow had fallen during the night in such quantities, that from the very outset the traces of the track were lost, and the road required to be made anew, as at the commencement of the ascent. The guides refused to proceed; but Macdonald insisted upon making the attempt, and after six hours of unheard-of fatigues, the head of his column succeeded in reaching the summit. In the narrow plain between the glaciers, however, they

(1) Jom. xiv. 154, 155. Dum. v. 168, 169.

(2) Dum. v. 170, 171. Jom. xiv. 156. Bot. iv. 58, 59.

found the road blocked up by an immense mass of snow, formed by an avalanche newly fallen, upon which the guides refused to enter, and in consequence the soldiers returned, unanimously exclaiming that the passage was closed. Maedonald instantly hastened to the front, revived the sinking spirits of his men, encouraged the faltering courage of the guides, and advancing himself at the head of the column, plunged into the perilous mass, sounding every step as he advanced with a long staff, which often sunk deep into the abyss. "Soldiers," said he, "the army of reserve has surmounted the St.-Bernard; you must overcome the Splugen; your glory requires that you should rise victorious over difficulties to appearance insuperable. Your destinies call you into Italy? advance and conquer, first the mountains and the snow, then the plains and the armies (1)." Put to shame by such an example, the troops and the peasants redoubled their efforts; the vast walls of ice and snow were cut through, and although the hurricane increased with frightful rapidity, and repeatedly filled up their excavations, they at length succeeded in rendering the passage practicable. The tempest continued to blow with dreadful violence during the passage to the hospice and the descent of the Cardinal; the columns were repeatedly cut through by avalanches, which fell across the road (2), and more than one regiment was entirely dispersed in the icy wilderness. At length, by the heroic exertions of the officers, whom the example of their general had inspired with extraordinary ardour, the head-quarters reached Isola, and rested there during the two succeeding days, to rally the regiments, which the hardships of the passage had broken into a confused mass of insulated men, but above one hundred soldiers, and as many horses and mules, were swallowed up in the abysses of the mountains, and never more heard of (3).

(1) A parallel incident occurred in ancient times, and what is very extraordinary, during the decay of Roman virtue. "The Emperor Majorian," says Gibbon, "led his troops over the Alps in a severe winter. The Emperor led the way on foot, and in complete armour, sounding with his long staff the depth of the ice or snow, and encouraging the Scythians, who complained of the extreme cold, by the cheerful assurance that they should be satisfied with the heat of Africa."—*Decline and Fall*, c. xxxvi.

(2) Bot. iv. 59. Jom. xiv. 156, 157. Dum. v. 171.

(3) Bot. iv. 59. Jom. xiv. 156, 157. Dum. v. 171, 174.

Unworthy of the passage of the Splugen by Maedonald is the most memorable and this passage extraordinary undertaking of the kind displayed by recorded in modern war, so far as the obstacles of nature are concerned. It yields only to the march of Suwarrow over the St.-Gothard, the Shachenthal, and the Engiberg, where, in addition to similar natural difficulties, the efforts of an able and indefatigable enemy were to be overcome. The passage of the St.-Bernard by Napoléon in fine weather, and without opposition, will bear no comparison with either the one or the other. That he himself was conscious of this, is obvious from the striking terms of disparagement in which he speaks of Maedonald's exertions in this passage; an instance of that jealousy of every rival in any of his great achievements, which is almost inconceivable in so great a man. "The passage of the Splugen," says he, "presented, without doubt, some difficulties; but winter is by no means the season of the year in which such operations are conducted with most difficulty; the snow is then firm, the weather settled, and there is nothing to fear from the avalanches, which constitute the true and only danger to be ap-

prehended in the Alps. In December, you often meet with the finest weather, on these elevated mountains, or dry frost, during which the air is perfectly calm."—Napoléon, ii. 61, 62. Recollecting that this was written after the first consul had received the full details from Maedonald of the extraordinary difficulties of the passage, it is inexcusable, and clearly betrays a consciousness of the inferiority of his own passage over the St.-Bernard. In his official despatch, by orders of the first consul, to Maedonald, Berthier says, "I have received the relation which the chief of your staff has transmitted to me relative to the passage of the Splugen by the army which you command. I have communicated the details to the consuls, and they have enjoined me to make known to you their high satisfaction at the intrepidity and heroic constancy which the officers, and soldiers, and generals, have evinced in this passage, which will form a memorable epoch in our military annals. The consuls, confident in your talents, behold with interest the new position of the army of the Grisons. I impatiently expect the details of the celebrated passage of the Splugen, and the losses which it occasioned, to enable them to appreciate the admiration and gratitude which is due to the chiefs and soldiers of your army." [14th Dec. 1800. See Dum. vi. 255. *Pièces Just.*]

It was equally unworthy of Napoléon to say in his Memoirs:—"The march of Maedonald produced no good effect, and contributed in no respect to the success of the campaign; for the corps of Baraguay d'Hilliers, detached into the Upper Engadine, was too weak to effect anything of importance. Maedonald arrived at Trieste on the 7th January, when the enemy was already chased from it by the left of the army of Italy, by the corps under the orders of Monecy and Rochambeau." [Nap. ii. 62, 63.] Had

Dec. 7.
He arrives
at Chiavenna on
the lake of
Como.

Late on the evening of the 6th December, the greater part of the troops and a large part of the artillery had passed the mountain, and head-quarters were advanced to Chiavenna, at the upper extremity of the lake of Como. No sooner did Hilliers hear of this advance, than he moved forward his columns towards the head of the valley of the Inn to assail him; but the intelligence of the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden arrived that very day, and by rendering it evident that all the forces of the monarchy would be required to defend the capital, precluded the possibility of following up any distant enterprises. The Austrians therefore took post on the summits of the Albula, the Julierberg, and the Broglio, the three ridges which separate the Italian from the German side of the mountains in that quarter, and strongly reinforced the division on the Tonal, the only pass between the valley of the Oglio, to which Macdonald was hastening, and that of the Adige, which was the ultimate object of his efforts (1).

He is
placed un-
der the
orders of
Brune.

While still on the banks of the Adda, the French general had the misfortune to receive intelligence of the capture of a battalion of dismounted hussars, which negligently lay in the elevated valley at its upper extremity, by a well-concerted surprise from the Imperial forces in the Engadine. At the same time, he received orders from the first consul to place himself under the command of General Brune, of whose army he was to form the left wing; a mortifying circumstance to a general who had just achieved so important a service in a separate command as the passage of the Splügen, but which abated nothing of his zeal in the public cause. He suggested to Brune that two divisions should be detached from the army of Italy to reinforce his corps, and thus with a body of twenty-four thousand men he would advance across the mountains to Trieste, and effect a decisive operation on the rear of the Imperial army. But the general-in-chief refused to comply with this request, which was evidently hazardous, as exposing to overwhelming attacks in detail two separate armies, too far severed from each other to be able to render any effectual assistance in case of need (2).

Difficult
passage of
the Col
Apriga.

Napoléon's orders had directed Macdonald to penetrate as soon as possible into the valley of the Adige, in order to threaten the flank and rear of the Imperialists on the Mincio. For this purpose it was necessary to cross the Col Apriga, which lay between the valley of the Adda and that of the Oglio, and afterwards surmount the icy summit of Mont Tonal, between the latter stream and that of the Adige. The passage of the Monte Apriga, though considerably less elevated than the Splügen, was even more difficult by reason of the extreme steepness of the ascents, the entangled wood which encumbered its lower region, and the dreadful nature of the road, which in many places is little better than the bed of a torrent. In seven hours, however, all these difficulties were overcome; the army found itself on the banks of the Oglio, and extended its outposts as far as Bornio at the upper extremity of the valley (3).

Attack on
the Mont
Tonal.

There still remained, however, the Herculean task of surmounting the Tonal, a mountain ridge of great elevation, which could be reached at that rude season only by a path through the snow, in which the

Napoléon forgotten that Macdonald's advance, by paralysing Laudon and Wukassowich, enabled Brune to achieve the passage of the Mincio; and that, if it had not been for the credulity of Moutcy, he would have compelled the surrender of the former at La Pietro with 7000 men? The great truth, "Magna est veritas et praevalabit," does not seem ever to have crossed Napoléon's mind; he never contemplated the minute examination to which his

account of transactions would be exposed by posterity, and thought he could deceive future ages, as he did his own, by means of sycophantish writers and an enslaved press.

- (1) Jom. xiv. 158, 159. Dum. v. 174, 175.
(2) Jom. xiv. 159, 161. Dum. v. 176, 178, 184, 185.
(3) Jom. xiv. 158, 159. Dum. v. 180, 182. Bot. iv. 61.

troops were confined to single files. The summit, as usual in these elevated regions, consisted of a small plain three hundred yards broad, situated between two enormous and inaccessible glaciers. Across this narrow space the Austrians had drawn a triple line of intrenchments, faced for the most part by enormous blocks of ice, cut in the form of regular masonry, and even more difficult to scale than walls of granite. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the French grenadiers, after a painful ascent by the narrow and slippery path, reached the front of the intrenchments. Though received by a shower of balls, they succeeded in forcing the external palisades; but all their efforts were ineffectual against the walls of ice which formed the inner strength of the works. They were in consequence obliged to retreat, and brought back the disheartening report that this important position was impregnable (1).

Dec. 31.
In which
the French
are re-
pulsed. Sensible, however, of the vital importance of forcing this passage, Macdonald resolved to make another attempt. Eight days afterwards, another column was formed, under the command of Vandamme, and approached the terrible intrenchments. The Austrians had in the interval added much to the strength of the works; but they were assaulted with so much vigour, that two external forts were carried; still, however, when they approached the principal intrenchment, the fire from its summit, and from a block-house on an elevated position in its rear, was so violent, that all the efforts of the Republicans were again ineffectual, and they were forced to retire, after staining with their bravest blood the cold and icy summit of the mountain. Macdonald was in some degree consoled for this disaster by the success of his left wing, which spread itself into the Engadine, driving the Imperialists before it, and made itself master of the well-known stations of Glurens and Martinsbruck, on the Tyrolean side of the mountains (2).

The importance of these operations, and the obstinacy with which the attack and defence of the inhospitable Alpine ridges were conducted at this inclement season, will be best understood by casting a glance over the positions and movements of the contending armies in the Italian plains at this period.

Positions
and forces
of the
French and
Austrians
in Italy. When hostilities were recommenced to the south of the Alps by the denunciation of the armistice, the Imperial army, sixty-five thousand strong, of which fifteen thousand were cavalry, occupied the formidable line of the Mincio, covered by a hundred pieces of cannon, flanked on the one extremity by the Po, on the other by the lake of Garda, and strengthened by the strong fortress of Mantua, and the inferior fortifications of Peschiera and Borghetto, which gave them the immense advantage of being able to debouche at pleasure on either side of the river (3). The Imperialists had received orders to remain on the defensive in this excellent position until their flanks were secured, and the prospect of an advantageous attack was afforded by the advance of the Neapolitan troops over the hills of Tuscany, and the descent of Laudon and Wukassowich from the mountains of Tyrol.

The French forces in Italy were immense. In the peninsula altogether there were 95,000 men, besides 27,000 who encumbered the hospitals. Of this great body, 61,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry, and 178 pieces of cannon, were ready for active operations on the Mincio, while the remainder occupied

(1) Jom. xiv. 161, 162. Dum. v. 186, 188. Bot. iv. 61. Personal observation.

(2) Jom. xiv. 162, 163. Dum. v. 188, 191. Bot. iv. 61.

(3) Dum. v. 243, 244. Jom. xiv. 166, 167. Bot. iv. 63.

Tuscany, Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria. During the five months that these troops had occupied the fertile plains of the Po, they had profited to an extraordinary degree by the resources of the country. The soldiers had been completely new clothed, the artillery horses renewed, the cavalry was admirably mounted, the magazines were full, the troops in the highest state of discipline, spirits, and equipment. But these vast supplies, wrung by the terrors of military execution from an unhappy and impoverished people, had excited the utmost discontent in the peninsula. The inhabitants compared the high-sounding proclamations of the invaders with the sad consequences which had followed their footsteps, and, rendered more sullen by the disappointment of their hopes than even the serious injuries they had undergone, were ready upon any reverse to have risen unanimously upon their oppressors. This state of things was well known to the French commanders, and to secure their flanks and rear they were obliged to detach twenty-five thousand from the grand army on the Mincio, how well soever they were aware that it was there the fate of Italy was to be decided (1).

Dec. 16.
First operations of
Brune.

Hostilities were first commenced by Brune, who found the spirit of his troops so much elevated by the intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, and the passage of the Splugen by Macdonald, that their ardour could no longer be restrained. The firing commenced on the 16th, but nothing except inconsiderable skirmishes ensued before the 28th. The Mincio, in its course of twenty miles from the lake of Guarda to Mantua, though fordable in many places in summer, was absolutely impassable in winter; and the five bridges which were thrown over its current at Peschiera, Saleconzo, Valleggio, Volta, and Goito were either within the walls of fortifications, or strongly intrenched and barricaded. The left bank, in the hands of the Austrians, was generally more elevated than the right, in the possession of the Republicans; but at Mozambano and Molino, near Pozzuolo, the right had the advantage, which evidently pointed out these stations as the most advantageous for forcing a passage. For these reasons they had been fortified with care by the Austrian engineers, who had pushed their intrenchments, which were occupied by twenty thousand combatants under Hohenzollern, to a considerable distance from the right bank of the river; and against these advanced works it first behoved Brune to direct his efforts (2).

Passage of
the Mincio.
Dec. 20.

On the 20th the whole French army approached the Mincio in four columns. The right, under Dupont, moved towards the shores of the Mantuan lake: the centre, under Suchet, advanced direct upon Volta; the third column, destined to mask Peschiera, was ordered to take post near Ponti; the left and the reserve were directed against Mozambano. The French general had intended to have made feigned attacks only on the centre and right, and to have attempted to force the passage in good earnest near the lake of Guarda, and at the foot of the mountains; but the course of events fell out otherwise. As the Republicans approached the Mincio, the Imperialists, who had orders not to engage in any serious affair on the right bank, seeing they had the whole French army on their hands, successively abandoned all the positions they had fortified with so much care, and withdrew to the other side, leaving only detachments to occupy Valleggio and the *tête-de-pont* of Borghetto, on the Republican side. The French patrols, in consequence, every where approached the river; and Dupont, ignorant that the attack on his side was intended only to be a feint, and that the left was the real point

(1) Pot. iv. 62, 63. Jom. xiv. 164, 166. Nap. ii. 64, 65.

(2) Nap. ii. 66, 67. Bot. iv. 62, 63. Jom. xiv. 174, 175. Dum. v. 243, 244.

of attack, made the most active preparations for effecting a passage. He succeeded so well, that, early on the morning of the 25th, he had thrown a battalion over, near Molino, which speedily established a bridge, and soon enabled a whole division to obtain a firm footing on the left bank. Hardly was the passage completed, when orders arrived from the commander-in-chief to cover, by a fire of cannon, merely the bridge which had been established, and allow no troops to pass over to the other side. But this despatch arrived too late; the division of Watrin was already over; the enemy's troops opposed to it were hourly and rapidly increasing, and any attempt to fall back to the bridge would have exposed it to certain and irremediable ruin. In these trying circumstances Dupont conceived that the execution of his orders had become impossible, and resolved to retain the advantage he had gained, by aiding Watrin with his remaining troops. In this resolution he was confirmed by Suchet, who was no sooner informed that the passage was irrevocably engaged on the right, than he resolved to support it with all his forces, and hastening to the bridge at Molino, crossed over with his whole corps. On their side, the Imperialists, who had judiciously placed the bulk of their army in mass, a little in the rear of the centre of the line, no sooner

Desperate
conflict of
the troops
who had
crossed
over.

heard of the passage at Molino than they directed an overwhelming force to assail the advanced guard of the enemy. But for the timely assistance afforded by Suchet, Dupont's troops would have been totally destroyed; as it was, a furious combat ensued, which continued with various success till night, in which the Republicans only maintained their ground by the sacrifice of the bravest of their men. For long the French infantry repulsed with invincible firmness the repeated and vehement charges of the Austrian cavalry; but at length they were driven, by a desperate effort of the Hungarian grenadiers, out of the village of Pozzuolo, and forced in disorder to the water's edge. All seemed lost; when the Imperialists, checked by a terrible discharge of grape from the batteries on the French side, hesitated in their advance; and Dupont took advantage of their irresolution to animate his men, and lead them back to the charge, which was executed with such vigour, that Pozzuolo was regained, and the Imperialists repulsed with the loss of seven hundred prisoners and five pieces of cannon. The Austrians, however, brought up fresh troops; Pozzuolo was again carried at the point of the bayonet; Suchet advanced with his division and retook it; it was again carried by the Imperialists, and continued to be alternately conquered and reconquered till nightfall, when it finally remained in the hands of the Austrians (1). Even the darkness of a winter night could not suspend this terrible combat: between eleven and twelve the fitful gleams of the moon, through a tempestuous and cloudy sky, enabled the Republicans to perceive two deep masses of grenadiers who silently approached their intrenchments. They were received with a general discharge of fire-arms of all sorts; the batteries thundered from the opposite bank; for a few minutes a volcano seemed to have burst forth on the shore of the Mincio, but all the efforts of the Imperialists were unavailing; and after a gallant struggle they were obliged to retire, leaving the French in possession of their blood-stained intrenchments (2).

Brune, during this bloody conflict, remained in a state of the greatest irresolution, hesitating between his original design of effecting a passage at Mo-

(1) Bellegarde says it remained in the hands of the Austrians: Oudinot affirms it was ultimately carried by the French. The well-known veracity of

the German character makes it probable the former was the true account.

(2) Nap. ii. 67, 75. Bot. iv. 63, 64. Dum. v. 251, 266. Jom. xiv. 175, 185.

zambano, and the new project to which he was urged, of supporting the ground, won at so dear a price, in the lower part of the stream. He thus ran the risk of losing his whole right wing, which was in truth only saved by the desperate valour of the troops of whom it was composed (1). At length he resolved to pursue his original design, and form a passage at Mozambano.

Dec. 26. For this purpose, Marmont, at daybreak, on the 26th December, established a battery of forty pieces of cannon on the heights above that place, which commanded the left bank, and despatched orders to Dupont and Suchet to keep themselves within their intrenchments until they heard the firing warmly engaged on their left. Under cover of a thick fog, the passage was speedily effected, and the French advanced guard soon after came to blows with the enemy. It was evident, however, that they fought only to cover their retreat; Oudinot, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, bravely resisted till sufficient reinforcements passed over, to enable them to resume the offensive, which they did with such vigour, that the Imperialists were driven back to Valleggio, from whence they continued their retreat in the night, leaving Borghetto to its fate, which, next day, after repulsing an assault with great loss, surrendered with the garrison of eight hundred men. In effect, Bellegarde, conceiving the passage of the river effected by the bridge established at Molino, had resolved upon a general retreat; his troops fell back in all quarters towards the Adige, leaving garrisons in Mantua, Verona, Legnago, and Peschiera, which reduced his effective force to forty thousand combatants (2).

Brune at length relieves them, and the passage is completed.

Great losses of the Imperialists.

In the passage of the Mincio, the Austrians lost above seven thousand men, of whom one-half were prisoners, and forty pieces of cannon, but its moral consequences, as is generally the case with a first decisive success, determined the fate of the campaign. The French resumed the career of victory with their wonted alacrity; the Imperialists fell into the despondency which is the sure prelude to defeat; and the disastrous intelligence they received from the Bavarian frontier contributed to spread the disheartening impression that the Republicans were invincible under their new leader, and that no chance of safety remained to the monarchy, but in a speedy submission to the conqueror (3).

Bellegarde retires to Caldiero.

Brûne, however, advanced cautiously after his victory. Leaving detachments to mask Mantua, Verona, and Peschiera, he approached the Adige in the end of December. To effect the passage of that river, the French general made use of the same stratagem which had been attempted for the passage of the Mincio, viz., to make demonstrations both against the lower and upper part of the stream; and while the enemy were distracted in their attention by a multiplicity of attacks, the artillery and bridge equipage were secretly conducted to Bassolengo. Sixty pieces of cannon were established there in battery, on the heights of the right bank, on the morning of the 1st January, which opened their fire at daybreak, under cover of which a bridge was speedily constructed without opposition from the enemy. The troops passed over, and established themselves on the left bank without firing a shot; the Imperialists were much less solicitous about interrupting their operations than effecting a junction with the corps of Wukassowich and Laudon, which were hastening by the defiles of the Brenta towards the plain of Bassano. Bellegarde withdrew his forces on all

(1) For this he incurred the just and merited censure of the first consul.—See Napoleon, ii. 75, 76.

(2) *Jour.* xiv. 188, 192. *Dum.* v. 268, 275. *Nap.* ii. 76, 78. *Bot.* iv. 64, 65.

(3) *Dum.* v. 275, 276. *Jour.* xiv. 192, 193. *Nap.* ii. 80.

sides, and concentrated them in the strong position of Caldiero, already signalized by a victory over Napoléon, while the Republicans closely followed his footsteps, and extending their left up the rocky gorge of the Adige, made themselves masters, after severe combats, of the narrow defile of Corona and the immortal plateau of Rivoli (1).

Advance of the Republicans in the valley of the Adige. The Republicans, under Moncey, pursued their advantages; the Imperialists, under Laudon, long and obstinately defended the town of Alta, in the valley of the Adige, but were driven from it with the loss of five hundred prisoners; they again held firm in the intrenchments of S.-Marco, but were at length forced to retreat, and took refuge in the defile of Calliano, already celebrated by so many combats. At the same time, the Italian division of Count Theodore Lecchi ascended the valley of the Oglio, and entered into communication with Macdonald's corps immediately after its repulse from the icy ramparts of Mont Tonal; while detachments in the rear formed the blockade of Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago. Laudon retired with six thousand men to Roveredo, from whence he was soon after driven, and fell back, disputing every inch of ground, to the foot of the fort of Pietra, overhanging the deep and rapid stream of the Adige between that town and Trent (2).

Bellegarde, finding his force so materially weakened by the garrisons which he was obliged to throw into the fortified towns on the Mincio, and the losses sustained in the passage of that river, had given orders to Wukassowich and Laudon, whose united forces exceeded twenty thousand men, to fall back from the Italian Tyrol, through the defiles of the Brenta, and join him in the plains of Bassano, in the rear of Calliano; and it was to give them time to accomplish this junction that he took post on the almost impregnable heights of Calliano.

Alarming situation of Laudon on the Upper Adige. Laudon was commencing this movement when he was rudely assailed by the division of Moncey, and harassed in his retreat up the valley of the Adige in the manner which has been mentioned. But a greater danger awaited him. On the very day on which he retired to the castellated defile of La Pietra, he received the alarming intelligence that Trent, directly in his rear, and by which he required to pass to gain the upper extremity of the Brenta, was occupied by Macdonald, at the head of nine thousand men! To understand how this happened, it is necessary to resume the narrative of the army of the Grisons, after its repulse from the glaciers of Mont Tonal (3).

Macdonald makes his way into the Italian Tyrol. After that check, Macdonald had collected in the Val Camonica, including the Italian division of Lecchi, above nine thousand men; and with them he eagerly sought for some defile or mountain-path by which to penetrate across the rocky chain which separates that valley from that of the Sarca, from whence he could reach Trent and the banks of the Adige. But these rugged cliffs, which push out, with hardly any declivity, almost to Brescia, in the plain of Lombardy, defeated all his efforts; and it became necessary to turn their southern extremity by Pisogno, at the head of the lake of Iseo, from thence cross the Col di San Zeno, into the valley of Sabia, and again surmount another ridge into the Val Trompia, in order to ascend by the beautiful sides of the Chiesa into the valley of Sarca. This long circuit, which would have been completely avoided by forcing the passage of Mont Tonal, irritated to the highest degree the French troops, who had expected at once, after surmounting the Splugen, to take a part in the glories

(1) *Jom.* xiv. 196, 197. *Dum.* v. 276, 290. *Nap.* 78, 79. *Bot.* iv. 66.

(2) *Jom.* xiv. 198, 199. *Dum.* v. 288, 290.

(3) *Bot.* iv. 66, 67. *Jom.* xiv. 198, 199. *Dum.* v. 284, 285.

of the campaign. Their impatience increased when, at their arrival at Pisono, Macdonald received and published the account of the passage of the Minicio, and the retreat of the Imperial army towards the Adige. He was there joined by General Rochambeau with three thousand men from Brune's army, who had at length become sensible of the importance of the operations in the Alps on the flanks and rear of the retreating army, and received the most pressing invitation to accelerate his march so as to cut off some of its detached columns. The difficulties of the ridge of San Zeno, however, had almost arrested the soldiers whom the snows of the Splügen had been unable to overcome; a few horses only could be got over by cutting through blocks of ice as hard as rock on the summit, and the greater part of the cavalry and artillery required to descend by the smiling shores of the lago Iseo to Brescia, and ascend again the vine-clad banks of the Chiesa. Such, however, was the vigour of the Republican troops, that they overcame all these obstacles; on the 6th January they arrived at Storo in the Italian Tyrol; while the left wing, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, surmounted the higher ridges at the sources of the Adige, and following the retreating Austrian columns, descended by Glurens and Schlanders upon Meran on the banks of the Upper Adige (1). Thus, after surmounting incredible difficulties, the object of the first consul was at length gained; the whole mountain ridges were crossed, and the Imperialists turned by the upper extremity of all the valleys where their forces in the Italian Tyrol were situated.

Laudon is
surrounded
at Trent.

The approach of these different columns, amounted in all to twenty-five thousand men, and conducted with equal skill and vigour, from the north, south, and west, convinced the Austrian generals that they had not a moment to lose in concentrating their troops at Trent, and regaining, by the defile of the Brenta, the army of Bellegarde at Bassano. If Wukassowich ascended towards Bolzano to aid in repelling Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was descending the Adige, he ran the risk of leaving Laudon to be overwhelmed by Moncey; if he moved towards Roveredo to the support of the latter general, he abandoned the avenues of Trent and the line of communication in his rear to Macdonald. In these critical circumstances he rapidly withdrew his right to Trent, ordered the troops who covered La Sarca to defend that city against Macdonald as long as possible, and enjoined Laudon to maintain himself till the last extremity in the important defile of La Pietra. But Macdonald, who was now fully aware of the situation of Laudon, made incredible exertions; in one day he marched forty miles; crossed the Col Vezzano; forced the passage of the Adige, and entered Trent. Wukassowich hastily retired by the great road to the defiles of the Brenta; but Laudon, with seven thousand men, who was still posted at La Pietra, was left to his fate, with a superior enemy in his front, and the army of the Grisons in his rear, occupying the only road by which he could retreat (2).

Jan. 7.

He escapes
by a lateral
path to
Bassano.

The only remaining chance of safety to Laudon was by a rugged path, which leads over the mountains from Pietra to Levico on the Brenta. It was impossible that his corps could retire by this defile, passable only by single file, if they were attacked either by Moncey or Macdonald, and Laudon was well aware that the former, with fifteen thousand men, was preparing to assail him on the following morning, and that the latter, notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, had already pushed a patrol beyond Trent, on the road to Roveredo, and would advance to the sup-

(1) *Dunn*, v. 235, 287. *Jom.* xiv. 198, 199. *Bot.* iv. 67.

(2) *Dunn*, v. 235, 292. *Jom.* xiv. 201, 202. *Bot.* iv. 67.

port of his comrade the moment that the combat was seriously engaged. In this extremity he made use of a *ruse de guerre*, if that name can properly be applied to a fabrication inconsistent with the proverbial German faith. He sent an officer of his staff to Moncey, announcing the conclusion of an armistice between Brune and Bellegarde, similar to that already concluded in Germany, and proposing a suspension of arms. Moncey suspecting no deceit, fell into the snare; he agreed to the proposal, upon condition that the pass of La Pietra and the town of Trent should be placed in his hands, which being agreed to, and its execution prepared for the following day, Laudon in the meantime, in the night, withdrew his troops, man by man, through the narrow straits of Caldonazzo by paths among the rocks, where two file could not pass abreast, to Levico on the shores of the Brenta in the Val Sugana, and the French advanced guard, proceeding next day to take possession of Trent, was astonished to find it already in the hands of Macdonald, and discover the extent of the danger from which their unsuspecting honesty had delivered the Imperial general (1).

Jan. 10.
Bellegarde
retreats to
Treviso.

Bellegarde, finding that Wukassowich and Laudon had effected their junction in the valley of the Brenta, deemed it no longer necessary to retain his position on the heights of Caldiero, but retired leisurely, and facing about at every halt, to Bassano, where he effected his junction with the divisions which had descended from the Tyrol. This great reinforcement gave him a marked superiority over his adversary: and though he fell back to the neighbourhood of Treviso, he was making preparations to give battle in front of that town, when operations on both sides were concluded by the armistice of Treviso, which at length put a period to this murderous contest.

By this convention, the Austrians agreed to give up Peschiera, Verona, Legnago, Ancona, and Ferrara, which gave Brune an excellent base for future operations; but they retained possession of Mantua, the key of Lombardy, and the great object of the first consul's desires. This was the more irritating to Napoléon, as Murat's corps, twelve thousand strong, had already reached the Italian plains, and Brune himself had written to Government only three days before, that he would agree to no armistice, unless Mantua, as well as the other fortresses, were put into his hands. The truth is, that in the interval circumstances had changed; the Imperialists were concentrated in the immense plains of Treviso, where their cavalry could act with peculiar effect; the divisions from Tyrol had joined their ranks; while Brune, whose army was severely weakened by the numerous blockading divisions left in his rear, could not oppose to them an equal force. But Napoléon, whose impatient spirit, fed by repeated victories, could brook no obstacle, was indignant at this concession to the Imperialists; he manifested his high displeasure at Brune, whom he never again employed in an important command, and announced to his ministers at Lunéville that he would instantly resume hostilities, both in Germany and Italy, unless Mantua were abandoned. The disastrous state of affairs in the former country had taken away from the Austrians all power of resistance; they yielded to his desirés, and a few days afterwards the peace of LUNÉVILLE put an end to the disastrous war of the second coalition (2).

Before proceeding to the conditions of this celebrated treaty, it is necessary to resume the thread of the events in the southern part of the Italian peninsula previous to the general pacification.

(1) Bot. iv. 67. Dum. v. 292, 295. Jom. xiv. 202, 203.

(2) Nap. ii. 80, 82. Bot. iv. 68, 69. Jom. xiv. 203, 210. Dum. v. 300, 303.

Insurrec-
tion breaks
out in
Piedmont,
Jan. 15,
1801.

At the moment when this double armistice consolidated the French power in Italy and Germany, a dangerous insurrection broke out in Piedmont. The people of that country were exasperated to the highest degree at the endless and vexatious requisitions of the French troops; the most ardent democrats were thunderstruck by the annexation of the territory of Vercelli to the Cisalpine republic, and the clergy and nobles justly apprehensive of the extinction of their rights and properties, from the continued ascendant of France. Fed by so many sources, the flame of discontent, though long smothered, at length broke out; the peasants of the Valley of Aosta took up arms, expelled the French detachments, and shut up their dépôt of conscripts in the fortress of Ivrea, while symptoms of insurrection appeared at Turin (1). But the vigour of Soult overcame the danger; he speedily surrounded and disarmed the insurgent quarter of the capital, and the appearance of Murat, who at that moment descended from the mountains in their rear, extinguished the revolt in the Alpine valleys. The revolutionary party of Piedmont found themselves inextricably enveloped in a despotic net from which it was impossible to escape.

Neapolitans
invade the
Roman
states, and
are totally
defeated.

The cannon of Marengo had shaken the throne of the Two Sicilies; the court of Naples was conscious that the sanguinary executions which had disgraced its return to the shores of Campania, had exposed it to the utmost danger from the vengeance of the popular party; and that it had little to hope from the mercy of the first consul, if the Imperial standards were finally chased from Italy. Feeling its very existence thus endangered, the Cabinet of Ferdinand IV had made exertions disproportioned to the strength of the kingdom. An army, sixteen thousand strong, splendid in appearance, and formidable, if numerical strength only were considered, under the command of Count Roger de Damas, had advanced through the Roman states, and taken post on the confines of Tuscany, ready to foment the discontent of its inhabitants, which the enormous requisitions of the French authorities had exasperated to the greatest degree, and act in conjunction with the Imperialists at Sommariva, whose head-quarters were

Jan. 10.

at Ancona. The weakness of Miollis, the French commander in Tuscany, whose forces had been reduced, by the garrisons left in Lucca, Leghorn, and Florence, to four thousand men, encouraged them to attempt an offensive movement. They advanced to Sienna, which rose in insurrection against the French, while Arezzo, supported by detachments from Ancona, again displayed the standard of revolt. But on this, as on every other occasion during the war, the utter loss of military character by the Neapolitans was painfully conspicuous. Miollis collected six thousand veterans from the neighbouring garrisons, and advanced against the invaders. The vanguard of Ferdinand fled at the bare sight of the enemy. In vain the infantry were formed into squares and encouraged to stand; they broke at the first charge of the Piedmontese columns, supported by a single squadron and three companies of French grenadiers: the superb hussars fled in confusion, trampling under foot their own flying regiments; and the whole army soon became a useless crowd of fugitives, which hastened, like a flock of sheep, towards the Roman frontier, without having sustained any serious loss. On this occasion the French hardly fired a shot, and the Neapolitans were discomfited by the mere sight of the Piedmontese levies; a striking proof how much more rapidly military virtue had declined in the south than the north of the peninsula (2).

(1) *Jom.* xiv. 210, 211. *Bot.* iv. 69. *Dum.* v. 321, 322.

(2) *Bot.* iv. 70. *Dum.* v. 314, 329. *Jom.* xiv. 214, 215. *Nap.* ii. 84, 85.

Even, however, if the Neapolitan troops had combated with the valour of the ancient Samnites, the result would have been the same. Sommariva no sooner heard of this disaster at Sienna than he retraced his steps towards Ancona; the insurgents at Arezzo made haste to offer their submission to the conqueror; Murat's corps, ten thousand strong, was approaching Parma;

Jan. 26. and the armistice of Treviso, a few days after, put a final period to the co-operation of the Imperialists. Ancona was delivered up agreeably to the convention; Ferras passed into the hands of the Republicans; southern Italy lay open to the invader; and the unwarlike Neapolitans were left alone

Jan. 20. to combat a power before which the veteran bands of Austria and Russia had fallen (1). Napoléon openly expressed his determination to overturn the throne of the Two Sicilies, and Murat, at the head of an army of twenty-eight thousand men, composed of his own corps, that of Miollis, and two divisions of veterans from the Mineio, soon after crossed the Apennines, to carry into execution the mandates of Republican vengeance.

Queen of Naples flies to St.-Petersburg to implore the aid of Paul. But the Court of Naples had not trusted merely to its military preparations; the address of the queen extricated the throne from the imminent danger to which it was exposed, and gave it a few years longer of a precarious existence. No sooner had the battle of Marengo and the armistice of Alexandria opened the eyes of this able and enterprising, though vehement and impassioned woman to the imminence of the danger which threatened the Neapolitan throne, if it were left alone to resist the redoubtable forces of France, than she adopted the only resolution which could ward off the impending calamities. Setting off in person from Palermo, shortly before the winter campaign commenced, she undertook a journey to St.-Petersburg to implore the powerful intercession of the Czar, should events prove adverse, to appease the wrath of the conqueror. It soon appeared how prophetic had been her anticipations. The Emperor Paul, whose chivalrous character and early hostility to the principles of the Revolution had been by no means extinguished by his admiration for Napoléon, was highly flattered by this adventurous step. The prospect of a queen setting out in the depth of winter to undertake the arduous journey from Palermo to St.-Petersburg to implore his aid, was as flattering to his vanity as the renown of upholding a tottering throne was agreeable to his romantic ideas of government (2). He warmly espoused the cause of the unfortunate princess, and not only promised to intercede with all his influence in her favour with the first consul, but forthwith despatched M. Lowascheff, an officer high in his household, and who enjoyed his intimate confidence, to give additional weight to his mediation with the Cabinet of the Tuileries.

Napoléon willingly yields to his interest-oldest throne in Europe, was naturally desirous to appear on confidential terms with its greatest potentate; and the sovereign who had just placed himself at the head of the northern maritime coalition against England could hardly be expected to intercede in vain at the court of its inveterate enemy. For these reasons, M. Lowascheff was received with extraordinary distinction at Paris. On the road to Italy he was treated with the honours usually reserved for crowned heads; and the Italians, who recollected the desperate strife between the Russians and Republicans, beheld with astonishment the new-born harmony which had risen up between their envoys. He arrived at Florence at the same time that General Murat made his entry. The

(1) Nap. ii. 84, 85. Dum. v. 328, 331. Jom. xiv. 215, 217. Bot. iv. 70, 71.

(2) Bot. iv. 71. Dum. v. 317, 319. Jom. xiv. 211, 212.

city was brilliantly illuminated in the evening; every where in public they appeared together, overshadowed by a tri-colour and a Russian standard; and the Russian envoy declared to the bewildered Florentines, "that two great nations should for ever be united for the repose of mankind (1)."

Peace be-
tween
France and
Naples at
Foligno.
Feb. 9.

Backed by such powerful influence, and the terrors of thirty thousand French soldiers on the Tiber, the negotiation was not long of being brought to a termination. Napoléon had directed that the affairs of Naples should be altogether excluded from the articles of the armistice at Treviso, in order that he might alone regulate the destinies of a kingdom, the old ally of England, and the impassioned enemy of the Revolution. The terms prescribed to Murat, and embodied in the armistice of Foligno, were less distinguished by severity towards the Neapolitans than hostility to the English; and this treaty is remarkable as containing the first official enunciation of the *CÔNTINENTAL SYSTEM*, to which, through the whole remainder of his career, he so inflexibly adhered, and which had so large a share, through the misery which it occasioned, in bringing about his ultimate overthrow (2).

Its condi-
tions.

By the armistice of Foligno it was provided that the Neapolitan troops should forthwith evacuate the Roman states, but that, even after their retreat, the Republicans should continue to occupy Narni and the line of the Nera, to its junction with the Tiber; that "all the ports of Naples and Sicily should instantly be closed against English vessels of merchandise as well as war, and remain shut till the conclusion of a general peace; that all prosecutions on account of political offences should cease, and the scientific men, unworthily detained at Naples on their return from Egypt, should be instantly set at liberty (3)."

March 28,
1801.
French
take pos-
session of
the whole
Neapolitan
territories.

By the treaty of Foligno, which was signed soon afterwards, the ambitious projects of the first consul were more completely developed, and the first indications were manifested of that resolution to envelope the continent in an iron net, which was afterwards so completely carried into effect. By this treaty it was provided, that "all the harbours of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily should be closed to all English or Turkish vessels until the conclusion of a general peace; that Porto Longone in the island of Elba, Piombino in Tuscany, and a small territory on the sea-coast of that duchy, should be ceded to France; that all political prosecutions should cease, and the sum of 50,000 francs be paid by the Neapolitan Government to the victims of former disorders on the return of the court of Sicily; that the statues and paintings taken from Rome by the Neapolitan troops should be restored; and that, in case of a menaced attack from the troops of Turkey or England, a French corps, equal to what should be sent by the Emperor of Russia, should be placed at his disposal." Under these last words was veiled the most important article in the treaty, which was speedily carried into effect, and revealed the resolution of the French Government to take military possession of the whole peninsula. On the 1st April, only three days after the signature of this treaty, and before either any requisition had been made by the Neapolitan Government or any danger menaced their dominions, a corps of twelve thousand men, under the command of General Soult, set out from the French lines, and before the end of the same month took possession of the fortresses of Tarentum, Otranto, Brindisi, and all the harbours in the extremity of Calabria. By a secret article

(1) *Jom.* xiv. 217, 218. *Dum.* v. 333. 334. *Bot.* iv. 71.

(2) *Jom.* xiv. 219, 220. *Dum.* v. 341. 342. *Bot.* iv. 72, 73.

(3) *Dum.* v. 341.

in the treaty, the Neapolitan Government were to pay 500,000 francs (L.20,000) a-month for the pay and equipment of this corps, besides furnishing gratis all the provisions it might require (1). The object of this occupation was to facilitate the establishment of a communication with the army in Egypt, and it excited the utmost solicitude in the breast of Napoléon. His instructions to Soult are extremely curious, as proving how early he had embraced the new political principles on which his government was thereafter founded. Among other things, he directed that the general "should engage in no revolution, but, on the contrary, severely repress any appearance of it which might break out; that he should communicate to all his officers that the French Government had no desire to revolutionize Naples; that with all his staff he should go to mass on every festival with military music, and always endeavour to conciliate the priests and Neapolitan authorities; that he should maintain his army at the expense of Tuscany and Naples, as the Republic was so overwhelmed by the return of its armies to the territory of France, that he could not send them a single farthing." Finally, he gave minute directions for the reduction of porto Ferraio and the island of Elba, little anticipating that he was seeking to acquire for the Republic his own future place of exile (2).

Siege of Elba, July, 1801. This little island, which has since acquired such interest from the residence of Napoléon in 1814, was at first deemed an easy conquest by the French general. But he soon found that he had a very different enemy to deal with from the pusillanimous troops of Naples. The English garrison of porto Ferraio consisted merely of three hundred British soldiers, of eight hundred Tuscan troops, and four hundred Corsicans in the pay of Great Britain; but into this motley assemblage the governor, Colonel Airley, had infused his own undaunted resolution. At first the French commenced the siege with fifteen hundred men only; but finding that number totally inadequate, they gradually augmented their force to six thousand men, while three frigates maintained a strict blockade, which soon reduced the garrison to great straits from want of provisions. But in the end of July, Sir John Borlase Warren hove in sight with an English squadron; the French cruizers instantly took refuge in the harbour of Leghorn; and the Republicans, in their turn, began to experience the hardships of a blockade. Three French frigates were captured in endeavouring to convey supplies across the straits of Piombino to the besiegers, but as in spite of these disasters the labours of the siege advanced, a general effort was made on the 15th September to destroy the works. Two thousand men, consisting of the Swiss-regiment of Watteville and detachments from the marines of the fleet, were landed, and Its gallant defence by the English garrison. attacked the Republicans in rear, while Airley, by a vigorous sortie, assailed them in front. The attack was at first successful, and some of the batteries which commanded the entrance of the harbour were taken and spiked; but the Republicans having returned in greater force, the besieged were obliged to retire, and the troops who had landed were again embarked. Notwithstanding this, however, the most vigorous defence was made; the terrors of a bombardment were tried in vain to shake the resolution of the garrison; and after a siege of five months, the governor had the glory of surrendering the fortress intrusted to his charge only in consequence of an express condition in the treaty of Amiens (3). This successful resistance by a handful of men to the troops who had vanquished the greatest military monarchies of Europe, excited a great sensation both in England and on the continent, and served as a presage of that desperate struggle which

(1) Dum. vi. 268. Pièces Just.

(2) Dum. vi. 270. 280. Pièces Just. Nap. ii. 89.

(3) Article 7, Treaty of Amiens.

awaited them, when, after trampling under foot the southern hosts, they encountered the stubborn valour of northern freedom. "It was," says the impartial French historian, "an extraordinary spectacle in the midst of the triumphal songs, and in the bosom of a continental peace, so long desired, so painfully acquired, to behold an island, of easy access and almost touching the continent, the scene of a long-continued and doubtful strife (1); and Europe beheld with amazement, in that island, a single fortress arrest the arms which the forces of the coalition had been unable to subdue."

Feb. 9,
1801.
Treaty of
Lunéville.

By the treaty of Lunéville, which the Emperor Francis was obliged to subscribe, "not only as Emperor of Austria, but in the name of the German empire," Belgium and all the left bank of the Rhine were again formally ceded to France; Lombardy was erected into an independent state, and the Adige declared the boundary betwixt it and the dominions of Austria; Venice, with all its territorial possessions as far as the Adige, was guaranteed to Austria; the Duke of Modena received the Brisgau in exchange for his duchy, which was annexed to the Cisalpine republic; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the emperor's brother, gave up his dominions to the infant Duke of Parma, a branch of the Spanish family, on the promise of an indemnity in Germany; France abandoned Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitzen, on condition that these forts should remain in the situation in which they were when given up; the princes dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine were promised an indemnity in the bosom of the Empire; the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics was guaranteed, and their inhabitants declared "to have the power of choosing whatever form of government they preferred (2)."

These conditions did not differ materially from those contained in the treaty of Campo Formio, or from those offered by Napoléon previous to the renewal of the war; a remarkable circumstance, when it is recollected how vast an addition the victories of Marengo, Hohenlinden, and the Mincio had since made to the preponderance of the French arms.

Emperor
subscribes
for the em-
pire as well
as Austria.

The article which compelled the Emperor to subscribe this treaty, as head of the empire as well as Emperor of Austria, gave rise in the sequel, as shall be shown, to the most painful internal divisions in Germany. By a fundamental law of the empire, the Emperor could not bind the electors and states of which he was the head, without either their concurrence or express powers to that effect previously conferred. The want of such powers had rendered inextricable the separate interests referred to the Congress at Rastadt; but Napoléon, whose impatient disposition could not brook such formalities, cut the matter short at Lunéville, by throwing his sword into the scale, and insisting that the emperor should sign for the empire as well as himself; leaving him to vindicate such a step as he best could to the princes and states of the Imperial Confederacy. The Emperor hesitated long before he subscribed such a condition, which left the seeds of interminable discord in the Germanic body; but the conqueror was inexorable, and no means of evasion could be found. He vindicated himself to the electors in a dignified letter, dated 8th February, 1801, the day before that when the treaty was signed, in which, after premising that his Imperial authority was restrained by the Germanic constitutions on that point in a precise manner, and therefore that he had been compelled to sign, as head of the empire, without any title so to do, he added, "But, on the other hand, the consideration of the melancholy situation in which, at that period,

(1) Dum. v. 353, 359. Ann. Reg. 1801, p. 179. *Jom. xiv. 371, 374.*

(2) See the Treaty in Dumas, vi. 282, et seq. *Pièces Just.*

a large part of Germany was placed, the prospect of the still more calamitous fate with which the superiority of the French menaced the empire if the peace was any longer deferred (1); in fine, the general wish, which was loudly expressed, in favour of an instant accommodation, were so many powerful motives which forbade me to refuse the concurrence of my minister to this demand of the French plenipotentiary." The electors and princes of the empire felt the force of this touching appeal; they commiserated the situation of the first monarch in Christendom, compelled to throw himself on his subjects for forgiveness of a step which he could not avoid; and one of the first steps of the Diet of the empire, assembled after the treaty of Lunéville was signed, was to give it their solemn ratification, grounded on the extraordinary situation in which the Emperor was then placed. But the question of indemnities to the dispossessed princes was long and warmly agitated. It continued for above two years to distract the Germanic body; the intervention both of France and Russia was required to prevent the sword being drawn in these internal disputes; and by the magnitude of the changes which were ultimately made, and the habit of looking to foreign protection which was acquired, the foundation was laid of that league to support separate interests which afterwards, under the name of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RUINE, so well served the purposes of French ambition, and dissolved the venerable fabric of the German empire (2)."

Reflections on this campaign. The winter campaign of 1800 demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the justice of the observation by the Archduke Charles, that the valley of the Danube is the quarter where vital blows against the Austrian monarchy are to be struck, and the importance of frontier or central fortifications to arrest the march of a victorious invader. The disaster of Marengo was soon repaired, and did not prevent the Austrians again taking the field at the head of an army which almost balanced the Republican forces; but the battle of Hohenlinden at once laid open the vitals of the monarchy. The reason is to be found in the numerous fortresses which covered the Imperial frontiers in Lombardy, and the total want of any such barrier between Austria and Bavaria. After the passage of the Mincio, the army of Brune was so severely weakened, by the detachments left in the rear to blockade the fortresses on that river, that he was unequal to any farther offen-

(1) See the original, Dum. vi. 298. Pièces Just.
(2) Dum. vi. 29, 30. Hard. viii. 52.

March 20, 1801. Extra- This glorious peace excited, as might well have been expected, the most extravagant joy, well have been expected, the most enthusiastic joy in Paris. It was announced in these terms to the inhabitants by Napoléon:—"A glorious peace has terminated the continental war. Your frontiers are extended to the limits assigned to them by nature; nations long separated from you rejoin their brethren, and increase by a sixth your numbers, your territory, and your resources. This success you owe chiefly to the courage of your soldiers, to their patience in fatigue, their passion for liberty and glory; but you owe it not less to the happy restoration of concord, and that union of feelings and interests, which has more than once saved France from ruin. As long as you were divided, your enemies never lost the hope of subjugating you; they hoped that you would be vanquished by yourselves, and that the power which had triumphed over all their efforts would crumble away in the convulsions of discord and anarchy. Their hope has been disappointed; may it never revive. Remain for ever united by the recollection of your domestic misfortunes, by the sentiment of your present grandeur and force. Beware of lowering by

base passions a name which so many exploits have consecrated to glory and immortality.

"Let a generous emulation second our arts and our industry; let useful labours embellish that France which external nations will never mention but with admiration and respect; let the stranger who hastens to visit it, find among you the gentle and hospitable virtues which distinguished your ancestors. Let all professions raise themselves to the dignity of the French name; let commerce, while it reforms its relations with other people, acquire the consistency which fixes its enterprises, not on hazardous speculations, but constant relations. Thus our commerce will resume the rank which is due to it; thus will be fortified the bonds which unite us to the most enlightened people of the continent; thus will that nation, even, which has armed itself against France, be taught to abjure its excessive pretensions, and at length learn the great truth, that, for people as individuals, there can be no security for real prosperity but in the happiness of all." [Dum. vi. 296. Pièces Just.] It is curious to observe how early, amidst his continental triumphs, the ambition of the first consul was directed to commercial and maritime greatness, in the effort to attain which he was led to indulge in such implacable hostility to this country

sive movements, and if the war had continued, he would probably have been compelled to retreat; but, after the battle of Hohenlinden, the undiminished battalions of Moreau poured in resistless strength into the undefended Hereditary States. The Archduke Charles had long before foreseen this; by the fortifications of Ulm he enabled Kray for six weeks to arrest the victor in the middle of his career; and so sensible was Napoléon of their importance, that his first measure, when they fell into his hands, was to level them with the ground.

The peace of Lunéville was the first considerable pause in the continental strife; and already it had become manifest that the objects of the war had been changed, and that hostilities were now to be carried on, for the subjugation of a different power from that which was at first contemplated.

The real
object of
the war
was already
gained by
the Allies.

The extinction of the revolutionary spirit, the stoppage of the insidious system of propagandism, by which the French democracy were shaking all the thrones, and endangering all the institutions and liberties of Europe, was the real object of the war. The restoration of the Bourbons was never considered of importance, farther than as affording a guarantee, and what at first appeared the best guarantee, against that tremendous danger. By the result of a struggle of nine years' duration, this object had been gained, not indeed in the way which at first would have been deemed most likely to effect it, but in a manner which experience soon proved was far more efficacious. The restoration of a brave and honourable, but weak and unwarlike race of monarchs, would have been but a feeble barrier against the turbulent spirit of French democracy; but the elevation of an energetic and resolute conqueror to the throne, who guided the army by his authority and dazzled the people by his victories, proved perfectly sufficient to coerce its excesses. Napoléon said truly, "that he was the best friend which the cause of order in Europe ever had, and that he did more for its sovereigns, by the spirit which he repressed in France, than evil by the victories which he gained in Germany." The conquests which he achieved affected only the external power or present liberty of nations; they did not change the internal frame of government, or prevent the future resurrection of freedom; and when his military despotism was subverted, the face of European society reappeared from under the mask of slavery without any material alteration; but the innovations of the National Assembly totally subverted the fabric of a constitutional monarchy, and by destroying all the intermediate classes between the throne and the peasantry, left to the people of France no alternative for the remainder of their history but American equality or Asiatic despotism. The cause of order and freedom, therefore, gained immensely by the accession of Napoléon to the throne. Great as were the dangers to the independence of the surrounding states from the military power which he wielded, they were trifling in comparison of the perils to the very existence of liberty, which arose from the democratic innovations of his predecessors.

Evidence
of Napoléon's
in-
placeable
hostility to
England.

But though the cause of liberty was thus relieved from its most pressing dangers, the moment that the first consul seized the helm, the peril to the independence of the surrounding states, and of England in particular, became extreme. His conduct soon shewed what his memoirs have since confessed, that he had formed, from the very commencement, a resolution to make France the first of European powers, and turn all the energies of their combined forces against the existence of Great Britain. Already his measures were all directed to this end; he made it the first condition of peace to all the vanquished nations, that they should

exclude English ships from their harbours, and he had contrived, by flattering the vanity of the Emperor of Russia, and skilfully fomenting the jealousy of the neutral states, to combine a formidable maritime league against England in the north of Europe. Thus, as time rolled on, the war totally altered its object; and the danger of subjugation changed sides. Commenced to stop the revolutionary propagandism of France, it terminated by being directed against the maritime preponderance of Great Britain; and England, which set out with heading the confederacy, ended by finding herself compelled to combat for her existence against the power of combined Europe.

In the progress of the conflict also, a change not less important in the mode of carrying on the war had arisen; and the Revolutionary armies, compelled by the penury of their domestic resources, had adopted a system of extorting supplies from the vanquished states, hitherto unknown in modern warfare. It is the boast of the philosophic historian that civilisation had softened even the rude features of war in modern Europe; that industry securely reaped its harvest amidst hostile squadrons, and the invaded territory felt the enemy's presence rather by the quickened sale for its produce than the ruthless hand of the spoiler (1). But though this was true when Gibbon wrote, the French Revolution had introduced a very different system, and made war retrograde to the rapine and spoliation of barbarous times. The Revolutionary armies issued from the Republic as the Goths from the regions of the north, powerful in numbers, destitute of resources, starving from want, but determined to seek for plenty, at the sword's point, from the countries through which they passed; the principle on which they uniformly acted was to make war maintain war, and levy in its theatre, whether a hostile or neutral territory, the means of carrying on the contest. They formed no magazines; brought with them no money; paid for nothing; but by the terrors of military execution wrung from the wretched inhabitants the most ample supplies. "The army of Moreau," says General Mathieu-Dumas, "ransacked the country between the Rhine and the Inn, devoured its subsistence, and reduced the inhabitants to despair, while it maintained the strictest discipline. The devastation of war for centuries before, even that of the Thirty Years, was nothing in comparison. Since the period when regular armies had been formed, the losses occasioned by the marches and combats of armies were passing evils; the conquest of a country did not draw after it its ruin. If a few districts or some towns carried by assault were abandoned to the fury of the soldiers, the inexorable pen of history loaded with reproaches the captains who permitted, or the sovereigns who did not punish such outrages. But Moreau's army levied, in a few months, above twenty millions in requisitions; enormous contributions were unceasingly exacted; the people were overwhelmed; the governments of the oppressed states entirely exhausted. It was reserved for our age to witness, in the midst of the rapid progress of civilization, and after so many eloquent declamations in favour of humanity, the scourge of war immeasurably extended; the art of government become in the hands of the conqueror an instrument of extortion, and systematic robbery be styled, by the leaders of regeneration, the right of conquest (2)."

Even in this gloomy state of the political horizon, however, the streaks of light were becoming visible which were destined to expand into all the lustre of day. The invasion of the French troops, their continued residence in other states, had already gone far to

Increasing and systematic pillage by the Republican armies.

Symptoms of patriotic and general resistance springing up.

(1) Gibbon.

(2) DUNN. v. 72, 73.

dispel those illusions in their favour, to which, even more than the terror of their arms, their astonishing successes had been owing. Their standards were no longer hailed with enthusiasm by the people who had experienced their presence; the declaration of war to the palace and peace to the cottage had ceased to deceive mankind. The consequences of their conquests had been felt; requisitions and taxes—merciless requisitions, grievous taxes—had been found to follow rapidly in the footsteps of these alluring expressions; penury, want, and starvation were seen to stalk in the rear of the tri-color flag. Already the symptoms of POPULAR RESISTANCE were to be seen; the peasantry even of the unwarlike Italian peninsula had repeatedly and spontaneously flown to arms; the patriotic efforts of Austria had recalled the glorious days of Maria Theresa, and the heroic sacrifices of the Forest Cantons had emulated the virtues, if not the triumphs, of Sempach and Morgarten. Unmarked as it was amidst the blaze of military glory, the sacred flame was beginning to spread which was destined to set free mankind; banished from the court and the castle, the stern resolution to resist was gathering strength among the cottages of the poor. It is in such reflections that the philosophic mind best derives consolation for the many evils arising from the ambition of the rulers, and the wickedness of the agitators of mankind; and by observing how uniformly, when oppression becomes intolerable, an under current begins to flow, destined ultimately to correct it, that the surest foundation is laid for confidence in the final arrangements of Supreme Wisdom, amidst the misfortunes or the vices of the world.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

FROM THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NORTHERN MARITIME CONFEDERACY.

NOVEMBER 1799—MAY, 1801.

ARGUMENT.

Origin of the difference between the laws of war at sea and land—Early usages of war on both elements—Gradual change at land—Original customs still kept up at sea—Common maritime law of Europe as to neutral vessels—Principles of that law—It was universal in Europe prior to 1780—But these rights were sometimes abated by special treaty—Origin of resistance to them—Armed neutrality—Subsequently abandoned by the Northern Powers in their own case—Treaties with Russia, Sweden, and America since 1780, recognising this right to England—But neutrals suffered severely in the close of the war—Excessive violence of the Directory against America—Napoléon terminates the differences of France with that power—Maritime treaty between France and America—Revival of the principles of the armed neutrality—Lord Whitworth is sent to Copenhagen—And enters into an accommodation—Growing irritation of the Emperor Paul at the Allies—Politie conduct of Napoléon—Difference about Malta—Violent Proceedings of Paul against England—He is joined by Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia—His warm advances to Napoléon—General maritime confederacy signed on 16th December—Its threatening consequences to England—Measures of retaliation by Mr. Pitt—Diplomatic debate with the neutral powers—Hanover is invaded by Prussia—Meeting of Parliament—Perilous situation of England—Debates on the neutral question—Mr. Pitt resigns in consequence of the Catholic claims—But this was only the ostensible ground—Vigorous measures of his successors for the prosecution of the war—Prosperous state of Great Britain at this period—Its income, expenditure, exports and imports—Naval forces of the confederacy—Energetic measures of the British Government—Nelson appointed second in command of the fleet destined for the Baltic—British fleet sails from the Downs—And approaches the Sound—Splendid appearance of that strait—Undaunted spirit of the Danes—Passage of the English fleet—Preparations of the Danes—Nelson's plan of attack—Great difficulty experienced by the pilots in conducting the fleet to the enemy—Battle of Copenhagen—Heroic deeds on both sides—Nelson's proposal for an armistice—Melancholy appearance of the Danes after the battle—Armistice agreed on for fourteen weeks—Hanover overrun by Prussia—Designs of Paul and Napoléon against British India—Death of the Emperor Paul—Causes of that catastrophe—General irritation at the Czar—Symptoms of insanity in his conduct—Conspiracy among the nobles for his dethronement—Particulars of his assassination—Accession of Alexander—Immediate approach to an accommodation with England—His character and early pacific and popular measures—Nelson sails for Cronstadt—His conciliatory steps there—Peace with Russia, and abandonment of the principles of the armed neutrality—Napoléon's indignation at it—Dissolution of the naval confederacy—Reflections on these events.

Origin of the difference of the laws of war at sea and land.

THERE arises, from the very nature of the elements on which they are respectively exercised, an essential difference between the laws of war at sea and at land. Territorial conquests are attended by immediate and important advantages to the victorious power; it gains possession of a fruitful country, of opulent cities, of spacious harbours, and costly fortresses; it steps at once into the authority of the ruling government over the subject state, and all its resources in money, provisions, men, and implements of war are at its command. But the victor at sea finds himself in a very different situation. The most decisive sea-fights draw after them no acquisition of inhabitants, wealth, or resources; the ocean is unproductive alike of taxes or tribute, and among the solitary recesses of the deep you will search in vain for the populous cities or fertile fields which reward the valour

of terrestrial ambition. The more a power extends itself at land, the more formidable does it become, because it unites to its own the forces of the vanquished state; the more it extends itself at sea, the more is it weakened, because the surface which it must protect is augmented, without any proportional addition to the means by which its empire is to be maintained.

In the infancy of mankind the usages of war are the same on both elements. Alike at sea as on shore the persons and property of the vanquished are at the disposal of the conquerors; and from the sack of cities and the sale of captives the vast sums are obtained which constitute the object and the reward of such inhuman hostility. The liberty for which the Greeks and Romans contended was not mere national independence or civil privileges, but liberation from domestic or predal servitude, from the degradation of helots, or the lash of patricians. Such is to this day the custom in all the uncivilized portions of the globe, in Asia, Africa, and among the savages of America, and such, till comparatively recent times, was the practice even among the Christian monarchies and chivalrous nobility of modern Europe. But with the growth of opulence, and the extension of more humane ideas, these rigid usages have been universally softened among the European nations. As agriculture and commerce improved, it was found to be as impossible as it was inhuman to carry off all the property of the vanquished people, the growth, perhaps, of centuries of industry. The revenue and public possessions of the state furnished an ample fund to reward the conquering power, while the regular pay and fixed maintenance at the public expense of the soldiers took away the pretext for private pillage as a measure of necessity. All nations, subject in their turn to the vicissitudes of fortune, found it for their interest to adopt this lenient system, which so materially diminished the horrors of war; and hence the practice became general, excepting in the storming of towns, and other extreme cases, where the vehemence of passion bid defiance to the restraints of discipline, to respect private property in the course of hostilities, and look for remuneration only to the public revenue, or property of the state. It is the disgrace of the leaders of the French Revolution, amidst all their declamation in favour of humanity, to have departed from these beneficent usages, and, under the specious names of contributions, and of making war support war, to have restored at the opening of the nineteenth the rapacious oppression of the ninth century.

Humanity would have just reason to rejoice, if it were practicable to establish a similar system of restrained hostility at sea; if the principle of confining the right of capture to public property could be introduced on the one element as well as the other, and the private merchant were in safety to navigate the deep amidst hostile fleets in the same manner as the carrier at land securely traverses opposing armies. But it has never been found practicable to introduce such a limitation, nor has it ever been attempted, even by the most civilized nations, as a restraint upon their own hostilities, however loudly they may sometimes have demanded it as a bridle upon those of their enemies. And when the utter sterility of the ocean, except as forming a highway for the intercourse of mankind, is considered, it does not appear probable, that until the human heart is essentially changed, such an alteration, how desirable soever by the weaker states, ever will be adopted. It may become general when ambition and national rivalry cease to sway the human heart, but not till then. Certain it is, that of all nations upon earth, revolutionary France had the least title to contend for such a change; she having not only introduced new usages of

Early
usages of
war on both
elements.

Gradual
change at
land.

Original
usages still
kept up at
sea.

unprecedented rigour in modern times, at least in her warfare at land, but issued and acted upon edicts for her maritime hostility on principles worthy only of Turkish barbarity (1).

Common
maritime
law of Eu-
rope as to
neutral
vessels.

But it is not merely with the subjects of nations in a state of hostility that belligerents are brought in contact during modern warfare; they find themselves continually in collision also with NEUTRAL VESSELS trading with their enemies, and endeavouring, from the prospect of high profits, to furnish them with those articles which they are prevented from receiving directly from the trade of their own subjects. Here new and important interests arise, and some limitation of the rigour of maritime usage evidently becomes indispensable. If the superior power at sea can at pleasure declare any enemy's territory in a state of blockade, and make prize of all neutral vessels navigating to any of its harbours, it will not only speedily find itself involved in hostilities with all maritime states, but engaged in a species of warfare from which itself at some future period may derive essential injury. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to maintain that the vessels of other states are to be entirely exempted from restraint in such cases; or that a belligerent power, whose warlike operations are dependent perhaps upon intercepting the supplies in progress towards its antagonist, is patiently to see all its enterprises defeated, merely because they are conveyed under the cover of a neutral flag instead of its enemy's bottoms. Such a pretension would render maritime success of no avail, and wars interminable, by enabling the weaker power, under fictitious cover, securely to repair all its losses. These considerations are so obvious, and are brought so frequently into collision in maritime warfare, that they early introduced a system of international law, which for centuries has been recognised in all the states of Europe, and is summed up in the following propositions by the greatest masters of that important branch of jurisprudence that ever appeared in this or any other country.

Principles
of that law.

1. That it is not lawful for neutral nations to carry on, in time of war, for the advantage or on the behalf of one of the belligerent powers, those branches of their commerce from which they are excluded in time of peace.

2. That every belligerent power may capture the property of its enemies wherever it shall meet with it on the high seas, and may for that purpose detain and bring into port neutral vessels laden wholly or in part with any such property.

3. That under the description of contraband of war, which neutrals are prohibited from carrying to the belligerent powers, the law of nations, if not restrained by special treaty, includes all naval as well as military stores, and generally all articles serving principally to afford to one belligerent power the instrument and means of annoyance to be used against the other.

4. That it is lawful for naval powers, when engaged in war, to blockade the ports of their enemies by cruising squadrons *bona fide* allotted to that service, and duly competent to its execution. That such blockade is valid and legitimate, although there be no design to attack or reduce by force the port, fort, or arsenal to which it is applied; and that the fact of the blockade,

(1) The decree of the Directory, 18th January, 1798, declares, that all *vessels* found on the high seas with any English goods whatever on board, *to whomsoever belonging*, shall be good prize; that neutral sailors found on board English vessels shall be *put to death*, and that the harbours of France shall be

shut against all vessels which had touched at an English harbour; and it requires certificates of origin, under the hands of French consuls, exactly as the Berlin and Milan decrees afterwards did.—*ROBINSON'S Admiralty Reports*, i. 311.

with due notice given thereof to neutral powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with, and shall be found to have been destined to such port, under the circumstances of the fact and notice of the blockade.

5. That the right of visiting and searching neutral vessels is a necessary consequence of these principles; and that, by the law of nations (when unrestrained by particular treaty), this right is not in any manner affected by the presence of a neutral ship of war, having under its convoy merchant ships, either of its own nation or of any other country (1).

In these propositions are contained the general principles of the maritime code of the whole European nations, as it has been exercised by all states towards each other, and laid down by all authorities on the subject from the dawn of civilisation. The special application of these principles to the question immediately at issue between the contending powers in 1801 is contained in the following propositions, laid down as incontestable law by that great master of maritime and international law, Sir William Scott:—

Sir William Scott's exposition of the maritime law. 1. "That the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be the destinations, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation (2).

2. "That the authority of the sovereign of the neutral country being interposed in any matter of mere force cannot legally vary the rights of a legally commissioned belligerent cruiser, or deprive him of his right to search at common law (3).

3. "That the penalty for the violent contravention of this right, is the confiscation of the property so withheld from visitation and search (4).

4. "That nothing farther is necessary to constitute blockade, than that there should be a force stationed to prevent communication, and a due notice or prohibition given to the party (5).

5. "That articles tending probably to aid the hostilities of one of the belligerents, as arms, ammunition, stores, and, in some cases, provisions, are contraband of war, and as such liable to seizure by the vessels of the other party, with the vessel in which they are conveyed (6).

(1) Lord Grenville's speech, 13th Nov. 1801, on the convention with Russia. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 211, 212.

(2) "This right of search," says Sir William Scott, "is clear in practice, which is uniform and universal upon the subject. The many European treaties which refer to this right refer to it as pre-existing, and merely regulate the exercise of it. All writers upon the law of nations unanimously acknowledge it, without the exception even of Hubner himself, the great champion of neutral privileges. In short, no man, in the least conversant in subjects of this kind, has ever, that I know of, breathed a doubt upon it."—*Robinson's Admiralty Reports*, i. 60.—*The Maria*.

(3) Two sovereigns may agree, as in some instances they have agreed by special covenant, that the presence of one of their armed ships along with their merchant ships, is to be held as a sufficient guarantee that nothing is to be found in that convoy of merchant ships inconsistent with amity or neutrality; but no sovereign can, by the common law of nations, legally compel the acceptance of such a security by mere force, or compel the belligerent to forego the only security known in the law of nations upon this subject, independent of special covenant, the right of personal visitation.

(4) Sir William Scott in the *Maria Robinson's Admiralty Reports*, i. 359, 363.

(5) *Ibid.* i. 86.

(6) *The Jonge Margareta*, *Ibid.* i. 190, 191.

The judgments of Sir William Scott are here referred to with perfect confidence, as explaining not merely the English understanding of the maritime law, but that which for centuries has been recognised and admitted by all the European states. "In forming my judgments," says that great authority, "I trust it has not for one moment escaped my anxious recollection that the duty of my station calls me to consider myself not as stationed here to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out, without distinction, to independent states—some happening to be neutral and some belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine the question exactly as he would determine it if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretension on the part of Great Britain, which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to impose no duties on

This law universal in Europe prior to 1780.

These rights had never formed any peculiar or exclusive privilege, which the English claimed alone of all other nations. On the contrary, under the equitable modifications introduced by the common maritime law, they had, from the dawn of European civilisation, been universally acknowledged and maintained equally by the courts and the lawyers of Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and England (1). Authors there were indeed who contended in their studies for a different principle, and strenuously asserted that the flag should cover the merchandise; but these innovations never received any sanction from the maritime law or practice of Europe, or the practice, independent of express treaty, of belligerent states; and, accordingly, various treaties were entered into among different powers, restraining or limiting the right of search between their respective subjects (2), precisely because they knew that but for that special stipulation the common maritime law would admit it. So strongly was this felt by the English lawyers, who, in the House of Commons, espoused the cause of the neutral powers previous to the maritime confederacy in 1800, that they admitted the right of Great Britain to search neutral ships for the goods of an enemy, and that the northern confederacy contended for a principle which militated against the established law of nations, as laid down with universal assent by that great master of the maritime law, Lord Mansfield; and maintained merely that it would be prudent to abate somewhat of former pretensions in the present disastrous crisis of public affairs (3).

Sweden as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character." [Robinson's Reports, i. 350.] And of the impartiality with which this great duty at this period was exercised by this distinguished judge, we have the best evidence in the testimony of another eminent statesman, the warm advocate of neutral rights, and certainly no conceder of undeserved praise to his political opponents. "Nothing," says Lord Chancellor Brougham, "can be more instructive than the decisions of our prize courts on this point (the right of search), and nothing can give us more gratifying views of the purity with which those tribunals administer the law of nations, and their impartiality in trying the delicate questions which come before them, between their own sovereign or their own countrymen, and the rulers or the people of other states. It is with pleasure, therefore, that we have to consider how anxiously and rigorously at this period (1799—1800) the principles for which we are contending have been enforced in the High Court of Admiralty under the presidency of Sir William Scott."—*Edin. Review*, vol. xix. 298, 299.

(1) Sir William Scott, Robinson, i. 360. Lord Eldon. *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 886.

(2) Per Sir W. Grant. *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 922.

(3) See Sir William Grant, *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 922; and Dr. Lawrence, 919, 920.

The hardihood with which it is constantly asserted by the foreign diplomatists and historians, that the principles of maritime law for which England contends, are a usurpation on her part, founded on mere power, and unsanctioned, either by the usage of other states, or the principles of maritime jurisprudence, renders it important to lay before the reader a few of the authorities of foreign legal writers on the subject.

Emecius says "Idem statuendum arbitramus, si res hostiles, in navibus amicorum reperiantur. *Illas capi posse nemo dubitat, quia hosti in res hostiles omnia licent, eatenus ut eas ubicunque reperiatis sibi possit vindicari.*"—*De Navibus* ob. vict. c. ii. sec. 9.

"I believe it cannot be doubted," says President

Jefferson, "that by the general law of nations, the goods of a friend found in the vessels of an enemy, are free; and the goods of an enemy found in the vessels of a friend are good prize."—JEFFERSON'S *Letter to GENET*, 24th July, 1797.

"The ordinances of the old French marine, under the monarchy, direct that not only shall the enemy's property, found on board a neutral vessel, be confiscated, but the neutral ship itself be declared lawful prize." The practice of England has always been to release all neutral property found on board an enemy's ship; but France always considered it as lawful prize.—*Ordonnance de Marine*. Art. 7. *Valin*. 284.

"Les choses qui sont d'un usage particulier pour la guerre, et dont on empêche le transport chez un ennemi, s'appellent marchandises de contrebande. Telles sont les armes, les munitions de guerres, les bois, et tout ce qui sert à la construction, et à l'armement des vaisseaux de guerre."—VATTELL, c. 7, sect. 112.

In their letter to M. Pinckney, January 16, 1797, the American Government expressly declare that, "by the law of nations, timber and other naval stores are contraband of war."—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 213, note.

"On ne peut empêcher le transport des effets de contrebande. Si l'on ne visite pas les vaisseaux neutres que l'on rencontre en mer, on est donc en droit de les visiter."—VATTELL, c. 3, sec. 114.

"Tout vaisseau qui refusera d'amener ses voiles après la sommation qui lui en aura été faite par nos vaisseaux ou ceux de nos sujets, armés en guerre, pourra y être contraint par artillerie ou autrement; et en cas de résistance et de combat, il sera de bonne prise."—*Ordonnance de la Marine de France*.—Tit. Procès, Art. 12. The Spanish ordinance of 1718, has an article to the same effect.

"Other nations," says Heeren, "advanced similar claims in maritime affairs to the English; but as they had not the same naval power to support them, this was of little consequence."—*European Staats System*, ii. 41.

The claims of neutrals for the security of their commerce are stated by Bynkershoek, as limited to

From motives of policy, indeed, England had repeatedly waived or abated this right of search in favour of particular states by special agreement. This Dec. 11, 1671. was done towards Holland in 1674, to detach that power from France, and in the belief that the United States would never be neutral when England was at war; and to France, by the commercial treaty of 1787, under the influence of the same idea that she would never be neutral when Great Britain was in a state of hostility. But in the absence of such express stipulation, these rights were invariably exercised both by England towards other nations, and other nations towards England; particularly by Lord Chatham during the whole course of the seven years, and the ministers of Anne during the long war of the succession, without any complaint whatever from neutral states (1). And of the disposition of England to submit in her turn to the maritime law which she requires from others, no better instance can be desired than occurred during the Duke of Wellington's administration, when the English Government declined to interfere in the capture of a British merchantman trying to elude the blockade of Terceira, though a few English frigates would have sent the whole Portuguese navy to the bottom.

But these rights were sometimes abated by special treaty.

Origin of resistance to these rights.

The obvious disadvantage, however, to which such a maritime code must occasionally expose neutral states, by sometimes depriving them of a trade at the very time when it is likely to be most lucrative; and the natural jealousy at the exercise of so invidious a right as that of search, especially when put in force by the stronger against the weaker power, had long led to complaints against belligerent states. In 1740, the King of Prussia disputed the right of England to search neutral vessels, though without following up his protest with actual resistance; and in 1762 the Dutch contended, that it could not be admitted by their vessels when sailing under convoy. But nothing serious was done to support these novel pretensions till the year 1780, when the Northern Powers, seeing England hard pressed by the fleets of France and Spain at the close of the American war, deemed the opportunity favourable to establish by force of arms a new code of maritime laws; and, accordingly, entered into the famous confederacy, known by the name of the ARMED NEUTRALITY, which was the first open declaration of war by neutral powers against Great Britain and the old system of maritime rights. By this treaty, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark proclaimed the principles, that free ships make free goods, that the flag covers the merchandise, and that a blockaded port is to be understood only when such a force is stationed at its entrance as renders it dangerous to enter (2).

Armed Neutrality.

this, that they may continue to trade in war as they did in peace. But this claim, he adds, is limited by the rights of a belligerent. "*Quæritur quid facere aut non facere possunt inter duos hostes; omnia forte inquires quæ potuerunt anni pax esset inter eos, quos inter nunc est bellum.*"—BYNKERSHOEK, *Quæst. Juris*. Pub. i. 9.

These principles were fully recognised in various treaties between England and other maritime states. In article 12 of the treaty, 1661, between Sweden and England, it was provided, "But lest such freedom of navigation and passage of the one confederate should be of detriment to the other while engaged in war, by sea or land, with other nations, and lest the goods or merchandises of the enemy should be concealed under the name of a friend and ally, for the avoiding all suspicion and fraud of such sort, it is agreed, that all ships, carriages, wares, and men, belonging to either of the confederates, shall be furnished in their voyages with certificates, specifying

ing the names of the ships, carriages, goods, and masters of the vessels, together with such other descriptions as are expressed in the following form, etc., and if the goods of an enemy are found in such ship of the confederate, that part only which belongs to the enemy shall be made prize, and what belongs to the confederate shall be immediately restored." There is a similar clause in article 20 of the treaty between England and Denmark in 1760. See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 226.

(1) Per Sir W. Grant. *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 922.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1780, 205, 348.

The words of the proclamation are. 1. That all neutral ships may freely navigate from port to port, and on the coasts of nations at war. 2. That the effects belonging to the subjects of the said warring powers shall be free in all neutral vessels, except contraband merchandise. 3. That the articles are to be deemed contraband which are mentioned in the 10th and 11th articles of her treaty of com-

So undisguised an attack upon the ancient code of European law, which England had so decided an interest to maintain, because its abandonment placed the defeated in as advantageous circumstances as the victorious power, in fact amounted to a declaration of war against Great Britain; but her Cabinet were compelled to dissemble their resentment at that time, in consequence of the disastrous state of public affairs at the close of the American contest. They contented themselves, therefore, with protesting against these novel doctrines at the northern capitals, and had influence enough at the court of the Hague, soon after (1), to procure their abandonment by the United States.

The Baltic Powers, however, during the continuance of the American war, adhered to the principles of the armed neutrality, although no allusion was made to it in the peace which followed; but they soon found that it introduced principles so much at variance with the practice of European warfare, that they were immediately obliged, when they in their turn became belligerents, to revert to the old system.

In particular, when Sweden went to war with Russia in 1787, she totally abandoned the principles of the armed neutrality, and acted invariably upon the old maritime code. Russia, in the same year, reverted to the old principles, in her war with the Turks, and in 1793 entered into a maritime treaty with Great Britain, in which she expressly gave up the principles of the year 1780, and engaged to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the high seas, or in the harbours of that country. Both Denmark and Sweden were bound, by the treaties of 1661 and 1670, with England, to admit the right of search, and give up the pretension to carry enemy's property; and by a convention entered into between these two powers in 1794, which was communicated by them

to the British Government, they bound themselves "to claim no advantage, which is not clearly and unexceptionably founded on their respective treaties with the powers at war, and not to claim, in cases not specified in their treaties, any advantage which is not founded on the universal law of nations, hitherto acknowledged and respected by all the powers and all the sovereigns of Europe, and from which they can as little suppose that any of them will depart, as they are incapable of departing from it themselves (2)." Farther, both Russia (3) and Denmark had issued

merce with Great Britain. 4. That to determine what is meant by a blockaded port, this only is to be understood of one, which is so well kept in by the ships of the power which attacks it, and which keep their places, that it is dangerous to enter into it. See *Declaration of Russia*, 23d April 1780. *Ann. Reg.* xxxv. 348. *State Papers*. It is worthy of observation, as Sir William Scott observes, that even in this manifesto no denial of the right of search is to be found, at least to the effect of determining whether or not the neutral has contraband articles on board.—See Robinson's *Reports*, i. 360.—*The Maria*.

(1) *Ibid.* 206, 207.

(2) Convention, 27th March, 1794. *Ann. Reg.* 1794, 238.

(3) In 1793, the Empress of Russia herself proposed and concluded a treaty with Great Britain in which she expressly engaged to unite with his Britannic Majesty "all her efforts to prevent other powers not implicated in this war from giving any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, in consequence of their neutrality, to the commerce and property of the French on the sea, or in the ports of France;" and, in execution of this treaty, she sent a fleet into the Baltic and North seas, with express orders "to seize and capture all the ships

bearing the pretended French flag, or any other flags which they may dare to hoist; and to stop also and to compel all neutral vessels bound to or freighted for France, according as they shall deem it most expedient either to sail back or enter some neutral harbour."—*Nate*, 30th July, 1793, by the Russian Ambassador to the High Chancellor of Sweden, *Ann. Reg.* 1793, p. 175, *State Papers*. A similar note was presented to the Court of Denmark at the same date, and both Denmark and Sweden, in their treaty with each other, on July 6, 1794, Prussia in her treaty with America in 1797, Russia in her war with the Turks in 1787, and Sweden in her war with Russia in 1789, promulgated and acted upon these principles, diametrically opposite to the doctrines of the armed neutrality. [*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 203.] With such ardour was this system acted upon by the Emperor Paul, that he threatened the Danes with immediate hostilities in 1799, on account "of their supplying assistance and protection to the trade of France, under the neutral colours of the Danish flag;" and he was only prevented from carrying these threats into immediate execution by the amicable interference of Great Britain: A seasonable interposition, which Denmark repeatedly acknowledged with becoming gratitude.—*Ann. Reg.* 1800, p. 91. In the following year the same

edicts, at the commencement of the war, in which they prohibited their subjects from taking on board contraband articles (1); while America, in the same year, had entered into a maritime treaty with England, in which the right of search was expressly admitted (2). Both by the common maritime law, and by the force of recent and subsisting treaties, therefore the right of search, claimed by Great Britain, was founded on an unquestionable basis.

But this pacific state of matters was totally altered by the result of the maritime war, and especially the decisive battle of the Nile. But neutrals suffered severely in the close of the war. These great events, by entirely sweeping the French flag from the ocean, left them dependent on other powers for the supplies necessary for their navy; and the Republican Government saw the necessity of relaxing the rigour of their former proceedings against neutrals, in order, through their intervention, to acquire the means of restoring their marine. The intemperate conduct of the Directory, and the arbitrary doctrines which they enforced in regard to neutrals, had all but involved the Republic in open hostilities with America, Denmark, and Sweden; and on the accession of the first consul, he found an embargo laid on all the ships of these powers in the French harbours (3). The *arrêts* of the Directory of 18th January, and 29th October, 1798, were, to the last degree, injurious to neutral commerce, for they deemed every vessel good prize which had on board any quantity, however small, of British merchandise; and in virtue of that law, numbers of American vessels were seized and condemned in the French harbours. Adding insult to injury, the Directory, in the midst of these piratical proceedings, gravely proposed to the Americans that they should lend them 48,000,000 francs; insinuating at the same time, that the loan should be accompanied with the sum of 1,200,000 francs (L.48,000), to be divided between Barras and Talleyrand. These extravagances so irritated the Americans, that, by an act of the Legislature, they declared the United States “liberated from the stipulations in the treaty 1778 with France, and authorized the president to arm vessels of war to defend their commerce against the French cruisers;” grounding these extreme measures upon the narrative that the French had confiscated the cargoes of great numbers of American vessels having enemy’s property on board, while it was expressly stipulated, by the treaty 1778, that the flag should cover the cargo; had equipped privateers in the ports of the Union contrary to the rights of neutrality, and treated American seamen found on board enemy’s ships, as pirates. This led, in its turn, to an embargo in the French harbour, on all American vessels (4), and nothing but the Atlantic which rolled between

July 7, 1798.
Excessive
violence of
the Directory
against
America.

system was farther acted on. In 1794 the Empress notified to the Swedish Court, that “the Empress of Russia has thought proper to fit out a fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, with frigates proportional, to cruise in the North Seas, for the purpose (in conjunction with the English maritime forces) of preventing the sending of any provisions or ammunition to France; the Empress therefore requests the King of Sweden not to permit his ships of war to take any Swedish merchantmen laden with any such commodities under their convoy. Her Imperial Majesty farther orders all merchant ships which her squadron may meet in those seas to be searched, to see if their cargoes consist of any such goods.” A similar declaration was made by the Court of Russia to that of Denmark, both dated August 6, 1794.—*Ann. Reg.* 1794, p. 241, *State Papers*.

(1) We, Christian VII, King of Denmark, order, that “should any vessel bound to a neutral harbour take in such goods or merchandise as, if they were consigned to any harbour of the belligerent powers,

would be contraband, and as such stipulated in the treaties between those powers and us, and mentioned in our orders and proclamations of 22d and 25th February, 1793, besides the oath of the master and freighter of the ships, there shall be made a special declaration conformable to the invoice and bills of lading,” to shew the destination of the said ship.—*Ibid.* p. 240–241.

(2) “In the event of vessels being captured, or detained on suspicion of having enemy’s property on board, such property alone is to be taken out, and the vessels are to be permitted to proceed to sea with the remainder of their cargo.”—Art. 17, *Treaty between Great Britain and America*, 19th May, 1795.—Art. 18, specifies what articles are to be deemed contraband.—*Ann. Reg.* 1795, p. 296—297, *State Papers*.

(3) Bignon’s *Hist. de France*, i. 260.

(4) *Nap. i.* 109, ii. 110, 111, iii. 112. *Biga. i.* 275, 276.

them, and the British cruisers which prevented them reaching each other, prevented these two democratic states from engaging in fierce hostility with each other.

But this state of mutual hostility was soon terminated after the accession of the first consul to the helm. He at once perceived the extreme impolicy of irritating, by additional acts of spoliation, a power recently at war with Great Britain, and still labouring under a strong feeling of hostility towards that state; the firm ally in better times of France, and one of the most important in the maritime league which he already contemplated Feb. 9, 1800. against the English naval power. He received therefore with distinguished honour the American envoys who were despatched from New York, in the end of 1799, to make a last effort to adjust the difference between the two countries; and published a warm eulogium on the great Washington, when intelligence arrived in France, early in the spring following, of the death of that spotless patriot. At the same time the embargo on American

Napoléon terminates the differences of France with America.

vessels was taken off in the French harbours, and every possible facility given to the commencement of negotiations between the two powers. Prospective arrangements were readily agreed on, both parties having an equal interest to establish the new maritime

code of the armed neutrality; but it was not found so easy a matter to adjust the injuries that were past, or reconcile the consular Government to those indemnities which the Americans so loudly demanded for the acts of piracy long exercised upon their commerce. At length it was agreed to leave these difficult points to ulterior arrangement in a separate convention, and conclude a treaty for the regulation of neutral rights in future times. By this

Sept. 30, 1800. Maritime treaty with America.

treaty, signed at Morfontaine on the 30th September, 1800, the new code was fully established. It was stipulated, 1st, That the flag should cover the merchandise. 2d, That contraband of war should

be understood only of warlike stores, cannon, muskets, and other arms. 3d, That the right of search to ascertain the flag and examine whether there were any contraband articles on board should be carried into effect, out of cannon-shot of the visiting vessel, by a boat containing two or three men only; that every neutral ship should have on board a certificate, setting forth to what country it belonged, and that that certificate should be held as good evidence of its contents; that if contraband articles were found on board they only should be confiscated, and not the ship or remainder of the cargo; that no vessels under convoy should be subject to search, but the declaration of the commander of the convoy be received instead; that those harbours only should be understood to be blockaded where a sufficient force was stationed at their mouth to render it evidently dangerous to attempt to enter; and that enemy's property on board neutral vessels should be covered by their flag, in the same manner as neutral goods found on board enemy's vessels. So far the French influence prevailed in this convention; but they failed in their attempt to get the Americans openly to renounce the treaty concluded in 1794 with Great Britain, which could not have been done without at once embroiling them with the British Cabinet (1). A similar convention had previously been entered into on the same principles between the United States and the Prussian Government (2).

Circumstances at this period were singularly favourable to the revival of the principles of the armed neutrality. A recurrence of the same political

(1) Treaty Articles 18, 19. Ann. Reg. 1800, 288, 289. Nap. ii. 122, 123. Big. i. 277, 278. Dum. vi. 96.

(2) On July 11, 1799. See State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1800, 294, 295. Articles 13, 14, 15.

Revival of
the principles of the
armed neu-
trality.

relations had restored both the grievances and the ambition which, at the close of the American war, had led to that formidable confederacy. Neutral vessels, endeavouring to slide into the lucrative trade which the destruction of the French marine opened up with that country, found themselves perpetually exposed to inquisition from the British cruisers; and numerous condemnations had taken place in the English courts, which, though perfectly agreeable to the law of nations and existing treaties, were naturally felt as exceedingly hard by the sufferers under them, and renewed the ancient and inextinguishable jealousy of their respective governments at the British naval power. In December, 1799, an altercation took place in the straits of Gibraltar between some English frigates and a Danish ship, the *Hausenan*, in which the Dane refused to submit to a search of the convoy under his command; but the conduct of the captain in this instance was formally disavowed by his government, and the amicable relations of the two countries continued unchanged. But the next collision of the same kind which took place occasioned more serious consequences. On 25th July, 1800, the commander of the Danish frigate, *Freya*, refused to allow his convoy to be searched, but, agreeably to the recent stipulations in the treaties between France and America, offered to show his certificates to the British officer; intimating, at the same time, that if a boat was sent to make a search it would be fired upon. The British captain upon this laid his vessel alongside the Dane, and resistance being still persisted in, gave her a broadside, and, after a short action, brought her into the Downs (1).

Lord Whit-
worth is
sent to Co-
penhagen
Aug. 23.
1800.

The English Cabinet at this time had received intelligence of the hostile negotiations which were going on in the northern courts relative to neutral rights, and deeming it probable that this event would be made the signal for openly declaring their intentions, they wisely resolved to anticipate an attack. For this purpose, Lord Whitworth was sent on a special message to Copenhagen; and to give the greater weight to his representations, a squadron of nine sail of the line, four bombs, and five frigates, was despatched to the Sound, under the command of Admiral Dickson. They found four Danish line-of-battle ships moored across that strait, from Cronberg castle to the Swedish shore; but the English fleet passed without any hostilities being committed on either side, and cast anchor off the

And enters
into an ac-
commoda-
tion.

harbour of Copenhagen. The Danes were busily employed in strengthening their fortifications; batteries were erected on advantageous situations near the coast, and three floating bulwarks moored across the mouth of the harbour; but their preparations were not yet complete, and the strength of the British squadron precluded the hope of successful resistance. An accommodation was therefore entered into, the principal conditions of which were, "that the frigate and convoy carried into the Downs should be repaired at the expense of the British Government; the question as to the right of search was to be adjourned for farther consideration to London. Until this point was settled, the Danish ships were to sail with convoy only in the Mediterranean, for the purpose of protection from the Barbary cruisers, and in the mean time their other vessels were to be liable to be searched as heretofore (2)."

Situated as Great Britain was, this treaty was a real triumph to her arms, and reflected no small credit on the vigour and ability of the Government by which this delicate matter had been brought to so favourable a conclusion.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1800, 94, 95. Nap. ii. 117, 118. Big. i. 292. Hard. vii. 444, 445.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1800, 93, 97. Nap. ii. 117, 119. Big. i. 292.

It might have been adjusted without any further effusion of blood, had it not been for a train of circumstances which, about the same time, alienated the vehement and capricious Emperor of Russia from the British alliance. The northern autocrat had been exceedingly irritated at the ill success of the combined operations both in Switzerland and Holland; the first of which he ascribed to the ill conduct of the German, the latter of the British auxiliaries. This feeling was increased by the impolitic refusal of the British Government

Growing
irritation of
the Empe-
ror Paul at
the Allies.

to include Russian prisoners with English in the exchange with French; a proposal which, considering that they had fought side

by side in the Dutch campaign, in which English interests were mainly involved, it was perhaps imprudent to have declined, although the dubious conduct of Paul, in having withdrawn his troops from the German alliance, and broken with Austria, gave him no title to demand such an act of

Politic con-
duct of Na-
poléon.

generosity. Napoléon, as already observed, instantly and adroitly availed himself of this circumstance to appease the Czar. He pro-

fessed the utmost indignation that the gallant Russians should remain in captivity from the refusal of the British Government to agree to their liberation for French prisoners; set them at liberty without exchange, and not only sent them back to their own country, but restored to them the arms and standards which they had lost, and clothed them anew from head to foot in the uniform of their respective regiments. These courteous proceedings produced the greatest impression on the Czar, the more so as they were contrasted with the imprudent refusal of the English Government to include them in their exchange; they led to an interchange of good offices between the two courts, which was soon ripened into an alliance of the strictest kind, in consequence of the impetuous character of the Emperor, and the unbounded admiration which he had conceived for the first consul (1).

Differences
about
Malta.

Another circumstance at the same time occurred, which contri-

buted not a little to widen the breach between the Cabinets of St.-Petersburg and London. Disengaged from his war with France, and ardently desirous of warlike renown, the Emperor had revived the idea of the armed neutrality of 1780, and made proposals, in May and June, 1800, to the Cabinets of Stockholm and Copenhagen to that effect, which had produced the sudden change in the Danish instructions to their armed vessels to resist the search of the British cruisers. The island of Malta, it was foreseen, would soon surrender to the British squadron, and it was easy to anticipate that the English Cabinet would not readily part with that important fortress; while the Emperor conceived that, as Grand Master of the order of St.-John of Jerusalem, to which it had formerly belonged, he was bound to stipulate its restoration to that celebrated order (2).

Aug. 28,
1800.

Violent
proceed-
ings of Paul
against
England.
Nov. 5.
1800.

Matters were in this uncertain state at the court of St.-Petersburg, when the arrival of the British squadron in the Sound brought them

to a crisis. The Czar, with that vehemence which formed the leading feature of his character, instantly ordered an embargo on all the British ships in the Russian harbours; and in consequence

nearly three hundred vessels, most of them with valuable cargoes on board, were forcibly detained till the frost had set in, and the Baltic had become impassable. Nor was this all. Their crews were, with Asiatic barbarity, in defiance of all the usages of civilized states, marched off into prisons in the interior, many of them above a thousand miles from the coast; while the

(1) Bign. i. 287, 289. Jom. xiv. 234. Nap. ii. (2) Bign. i. 287, 290. Hard. vi. 446.

whole English property on shore was put under sequestration. Several British vessels at Narva weighed anchor and escaped the embargo; this so enraged the autocrat, that he ordered the remaining ships in the harbour to be burnt; and in the official gazette, published a declaration that the embargo

Nov. 21. should not be taken off till Malta was given up to Russia. This demand was rested on the allegation, that the restitution of that island to the Order of Jerusalem was agreed upon in the convention, December, 1798, between Great Britain and Russia, whereas that treaty contained no such stipulation. These proceedings on the part of the Emperor Paul were in a peculiar manner arbitrary and oppressive, not merely as contrary to the general practice of civilized states, which never authorizes such severity against the crews of merchant ships or goods on shore, but as directly in the face of an express article in the existing treaty, 1793, between Great Britain and Russia, in which it was stipulated that, "in the event of a rupture between the two powers, there should be no embargo laid on vessels in the harbours of either, but the merchants on both sides have a year to convey away or dispose of their effects (1).

Nothing more than the support of Russia was necessary to make the northern powers, who derived such benefits from the lucrative neutral trade which had recently fallen into their hands, combine for the purpose of enforcing a new maritime code, which might extend its advantages to the whole commerce of the belligerent states. The King of Sweden, young and high-spirited, entered, from the very first, warmly and readily into the views of the Emperor; but Denmark, which, during the long continuance of the war, had obtained a large share of the carrying trade, and whose capital lay exposed to the first strokes of the English navy, was more reserved in her movements. The arrogance with which an immediate accession to their views was urged upon the Court of Copenhagen by the Cabinets of St.-Petersburg and Stockholm, for some time defeated its own object, and Denmark even hesitated whether she should not throw herself into the arms of England, to resist the dictation of her imperious neighbours, and preserve the lucrative trade from which her subjects were deriving such immense advantages. But the Russians soon found means to assail her in the most vulnerable quarter. Prussia had lately become a considerable maritime power, and from the effect of the same interests, she had warmly embraced the views of the northern confederacy. Her influence with Denmark was paramount, for the most valuable continental possessions of that power lay exposed, without defence, to the Prussian troops. In the beginning of October,

Oct. 4. a Prussian vessel, the Triton, belonging to Emden, laden with naval stores, and bound for the Texel, was taken and carried into Cuxhaven, a port belonging to Hamburg, by a British cruiser. The Prussian Government eagerly took advantage of that circumstance to manifest their resolution; they marched a body of two thousand men into the neutral territory, and took possession of Cuxhaven; and although the senate of Hamburg purchased the vessel from the English captain and restored it to the owners, and Lord Carysfort, the British ambassador at Berlin, warmly protested against the occupation of the neutral territory after that restitution, the Prussian troops were not withdrawn. A month before, a more unjustifiable act had been committed by the British cruisers off Barcelona, who took possession of Sept. 4. a Swedish brig, and under its neutral colours sailed into the har-

(1) Big. i. 296, 297. Ann. Reg. 1801, 237, 99. State papers. Dum. vi. 127.

bour of that town, and captured by that means two frigates which the King of Spain had built for the Batavian republic (1).

His warm advances to Napoleon. Though every thing was thus conspiring to forward the views of France, and augment the jealousy of the maritime powers of Great Britain, the course of events by no means kept pace with the impatient disposition of the Czar. He suspected Prussia of insincerity, and openly charged Denmark with irresolution, because they did not embark headlong in the projects which he himself had so recently adopted. Impatient of delay, he wrote in person to the first consul in these terms:—"Citizen first consul—I do not write to you to open any discussion on the rights of men or of citizens; every country chooses what form of government it thinks fit. Wherever I see at the head of affairs a man who knows how to conquer and rule mankind, my heart warms towards him. I write to you to let you know the displeasure which I feel towards England, which violates the law of nations, and is never governed but by selfish considerations. I wish to unite with you to put bounds to the injustice of that government (2)." At the same time, with that candour and vehemence which distinguished his character, he published a declaration in the St.-Petersburg Gazette, in which he stated:—"Being disappointed in his expectations of the protection of commerce by the perfidious enterprises of a great power which had sought to enchain the liberty of the seas by capturing Danish convoys, the independence of the northern powers appeared to him to be openly menaced: he consequently considered it to be a measure of necessity to have recourse to an armed neutrality, the success of which was acknowledged in the time of the American war." And Oct. 29, 1800. shortly after he published a ukase, in which he directed, that all the English effects seized in his states, either by the sequestration of goods on land or the embargo on goods afloat, should be *sold*, and their produce divided among all Russians having claims on English subjects! Napoleon was not slow in turning to the best account such an unlooked-for turn of fortune in his favour, and redoubled his efforts with the neutral powers to induce them to join the maritime confederacy against Great Britain. To give the greater *éclat* to the union of France and Russia, an ambassador, Count Kalitcheff, was despatched from St.-Petersburg to Paris, and received there with a degree of magnificence well calculated to captivate the Oriental ideas of the Scythian autocrat (3).

General maritime confederacy signed on Dec. 16, 1800. Pressed by Russia on the one side and France on the other, and sufficiently disposed already to regard with a jealous eye the maritime preponderance of Great Britain, the fears and irresolution of the northern powers at length gave way. On the 16th December a maritime confederacy was signed by Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, and on the 19th of the same month by Prussia as an acceding party. The principles of this league were in substance the same as those of the armed neutrality in 1780, with a slight variation in favour of belligerent powers. A minute specification was given of what should be deemed contraband articles, which included only arms of all sorts, with saddles and bridles, "all other articles not herein enumerated shall not be considered as war or naval stores, and shall not be subject to confiscation, but shall pass free and without restraint." It was stipulated, "that the effects which belong to the subjects of belligerent powers in neutral ships, with the exception of contraband goods, shall be free;" that no harbour shall be deemed blockaded unless the

(1) Dum. vi. 88. Bign. i. 298.

(2) Nap. ii. 129.

(3) Dum. vi. 121, 123. Ann. Reg. 1801, 98, and 1800, 260. State papers.

disposition and number of ships of the power by which it is invested shall be such as to render it apparently hazardous to enter; that the declaration of the captains of ships of war having convoy, that the convoy has no contraband goods, shall be deemed sufficient; that "the contracting parties, if disquieted or attacked for this convention, shall make common cause to defend each other," and that "these principles shall apply to every maritime war by which Europe may unhappily be disquieted (1)."

its threatening consequences to England. This convention was naturally regarded with the utmost jealousy by the British Government. Under cover of a regard for the rights of humanity and the principles of justice, it evidently went to introduce a system hitherto unheard of in naval warfare, eminently favourable to the weaker maritime power, and calculated to render naval success to any state of little avail, by enabling the vanquished party, under neutral colours, securely to repair all its losses. It was evident that, if this new code of maritime law were introduced, all the victories of the British navy would go for nothing; France, in neutral vessels, would securely regain her whole commerce; under neutral flags she would import all the materials for the construction of a navy, and in neutral ships safely exercise the seamen requisite to navigate them. At the close of a long and bloody war, waged for her very existence, and attended with unexampled naval success, England would see all the fruits of her exertions torn from her, and witness the restoration of her antagonist's maritime strength, by the intervention of the powers for whose behoof, as well as her own, she had taken up arms.

Measures of retaliation of Mr. Pitt. England at this period was not, as at the close of the American war, obliged to dissemble her indignation at a proceeding which was evidently prejudicial to her national interests, and the first stroke levelled by continental jealousy at her national independence. The statesman who still held the helm was a man who disdained all temporary shifts or momentary expedients; who, fully appreciating the measure of national danger, boldly looked it in the face; who knew that from humiliation to subjugation in nations is but a step; and that the more perilous a struggle is, the more necessary is it to engage in it while yet the public resources are undiminished, and the popular spirit is not depressed by the appearances of vacillation on the part of government. On these prudent not less than resolute principles, Mr. Pitt was no sooner informed of the signature of the armed neutrality, than he took the most decisive steps for letting the northern powers feel the disposition of the nation they had Jan. 14, 1801. thought fit to provoke. On the 14th January, 1801, the British Government issued an order for a general embargo on all vessels belonging to any of the confederated powers, Prussia alone excepted, of whose accession to the league intelligence had not as yet been received. Letters of marque were at the same time issued for the capture of the numerous vessels belonging to these states who were working to the Baltic; and with such vigour were these proceedings followed up, that nearly the one-half of the merchant-ships belonging to the northern powers at sea found their way into the British harbours (2).

These hostile proceedings led to a warm debate between the British ambassadors and those of the neutral powers, which was conducted with great ability on both sides. That between Lord Carysfort, the English ambassador at Berlin, and Count Haugwitz, the minister for foreign affairs at that capital, embraced the principal arguments urged in this important controversy.

(1) Convention, Dec. 16, 1800. Ann. Reg. 1800, 266, 270. State papers.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 103.

Diplomatic
debates
with the
neutral
powers.

It was stated by the British Government, "That a solemn treaty had been entered into between Russia and Great Britain calculated completely to secure their trade, in which it was stipulated that, in case of a rupture, not only no embargo should be laid on, but the subjects on both sides should have a year to carry away their effects; that in violation of these sacred stipulations the ships of British merchants had been seized, their crews sent to prison in the interior, and their property sequestered and sold by Russia; that these acts of violence, as well as the conclusion of a hostile confederacy, which the Emperor of Russia has formed for the express and avowed purpose of introducing those innovations into the maritime code which England has ever opposed, have led to an open war between Great Britain and Russia; that these measures openly disclose an intention to prescribe to the British empire, on a subject of the greatest importance, a new code of laws, to which she never will submit, that the confederacy recently signed by the Baltic powers, had for its object the establishment of these novel principles of maritime law, which never had been recognised by the tribunals of Europe, which the Russian Court, since 1780, had not only abandoned, but, by a treaty still in force, she had become bound to oppose, and which were equally repugnant to the express stipulations of the treaties which subsist between the courts of Stockholm and Denmark and the British empire; that in addition to this, the parties to the confederacy were pursuing warlike preparations with the utmost activity, and one of them had engaged in actual hostilities with Great Britain. In these circumstances, nothing remained to the British Government but to secure some pledge against the hostile attacks which were meditated against their rights, and therefore they had laid an embargo on the vessels of the Baltic powers, but under such restraints as would guard to the utmost against loss and injury to individuals; that the King of Great Britain would never submit to pretensions which were irreconcilable to the true principles of maritime law, and strike at the foundation of the greatness and maritime power of his kingdoms; and that being perfectly convinced that his conduct towards neutral states was conformable to the recognised principles of law and justice, and the decisions of the admiralty courts of all the powers of Europe, he would allow of no measures which had for their object to introduce innovations on the maritime law now in force, but defend that system in every event, and maintain its entire execution as it subsisted in all the courts of Europe before the confederacy of 1780(1)."

On the other hand it was answered by Prussia and the neutral powers,—
"The British Government has in the present, more than any former war, usurped the sovereignty of the seas, and by arbitrarily framing a naval code, which it would be difficult to unite with the true principles of the law of nations, it exercises over the other friendly and neutral powers a usurped jurisdiction, the legality of which it maintains, and which it considers as an imprescriptible right, sanctioned by all the tribunals of Europe. The neutral sovereigns have never conceded to England the privilege of calling their subjects before its tribunals, and of subjecting them to its laws, but in cases in which the abuse of power has got the better of equity, which, alas! are but too frequent. The neutral powers have always taken the precaution to address to its cabinet the most energetic remonstrances and protests; but experience has ever proved them to be entirely fruitless; and it is not surprising if, after so many repeated acts of oppression, they have resolved to find a remedy

(1) Lord Carysfort's notes, Jan. 27 and Feb. 1, 1801. *Anu. Reg.* 1801, 229, 237. State papers.

against it, and for that purpose to establish a well-arranged convention, which fixes their rights, and places them on a proper level with the powers at war. The naval alliance, in the manner in which it has just been consolidated, was intended to lead to this salutary end; and the King hesitates not to declare, that he recognises in its own principles; that he is fully convinced of its necessity and utility; that he has formally acceded to the convention of the 16th December, and has bound himself not only to take a direct share in all the events which interest the cause of the neutral powers, but, in virtue of his engagements, to maintain that connexion by such powerful measures as the impulse of circumstances may require. It is not true that the confederated powers have for their object to introduce a new code of maritime rights hostile to the interests of Great Britain; the measures of the Danish Government are purely defensive, and it cannot be considered as surprising that they should have adopted them, when it is recollected what menacing demonstrations that court had experienced from Great Britain, on occasion of the affair of the Freya frigate (1).” The Prussian Government concluded by urging the English Government to take off the embargo on the Danish and Swedish vessels, as the first and necessary step to an amicable settlement of the difficult question, without making any such stipulation in regard to that laid on Russian ships, and thereby in effect admitting the justice of the measure of retaliation adopted in regard to the latter power (2).

Hanover is
invaded by
Prussia.

These hostile declarations were soon followed up by measures which demonstrated that Prussia was not inclined to be merely a passive spectator of this great debate. On the 50th March a declaration was issued by the King of Prussia to the Government of Hanover, in which he stated that he was to take possession provisionally of the English dominions in Germany; and the Hanoverian States being in no condition to resist such an invasion, they submitted, and the Prussian troops entered the country, laid an embargo on British shipping, and closed the Elbe and the Weser against the English flag. At the same time a body of Danish troops took possession of Hamburgh, and extended the embargo to that great commercial emporium, while Denmark and Sweden had a short time before also laid an embargo on all the ports of their dominions. Thus the British flag was excluded from every harbour, from the North Cape to the straits of Gibraltar; and England, which a year before led on the coalition against France, found herself compelled to make head against the hostility of combined Europe (3), with an exhausted treasury and a population suffering under the accumulated pressure of famine and pestilence (4).

Meeting of
Parliament.
Perilous
situation of
England.

Never did a British Parliament meet under more depressing circumstances than that which commenced its sittings in February 1801. After ten years of a war, costly and burdensome beyond example, the power of France was so far from being weakened,

(1) Baron Haugwitz's answer. Ann. Reg. 1801, 241. State papers.

(2) Baron Haugwitz's answer. Ann. Reg. 1801, 241. State papers. Nap. ii. 133.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1800, 107.

(4) It deserves to be recorded to the credit of Prussia in this transaction, that being well aware how severely Great Britain was suffering at this time under an uncommon scarcity of provisions, she permitted the vessels having grain on board to proceed to the places of their destination, notwithstanding the embargo—a humane indulgence, which forms a striking contrast to the violent and cruel

proceedings of the Emperor Paul on the same occasion. The conduct of the neutrals, with the exception of Russia, in this distressing contest, was distinguished by a moderation and firmness worthy of states contending for the introduction of a great general principle. That of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was widely different; but it would be unjust to visit upon that gallant people the sins of their chief, who about that period began to give symptoms of that irritability of disposition and mental alienation, which so soon brought about the bloody catastrophe which terminated his reign. [Dum. vi. 167. Ann. Reg. 1800, 107.]

that she had extended her sway over all the south of Europe. The strength of Austria was, to appearance at least, irrecoverably broken; Italy and Switzerland crouched beneath her yoke, Spain openly followed her banners, and Holland was indissolubly united with her fortunes. Great Britain, it is true, had been uniformly, and to an unparalleled extent, victorious at sea, and the naval forces of her adversary were almost destroyed; but the northern confederation had suddenly and alarmingly altered this auspicious state of things, and not only were all the harbours of Europe closed against her merchant vessels, but a fleet of above a hundred ships of the line in the Baltic was preparing to assert principles subversive of her naval power. To crown the whole, the excessive rains of the two preceding autumns had essentially injured two successive crops; the price of all sorts of grain had reached an unprecedented height (1), and the people, at the time when their industry was checked by the cessation of commercial intercourse with all Europe, were compelled to struggle with famine of unusual severity (2).

Arguments
on the sub-
ject in Par-
liament.

This subject of the northern coalition was fully discussed in the parliamentary debates which took place on the King's speech at the opening of the session. It was urged by Mr. Grey and the Opposition, "That although without doubt the Emperor of Russia had been guilty of the grossest violence and injustice towards Great Britain in the confiscation of the property of its merchants, yet it did not follow that ministers were free of blame. He accuses them of having violated a convention in regard to the surrender of Malta to him as a reward for his co-operation against France: did such a convention exist? The northern powers have, along with Russia, subscribed a covenant, the professed object of which is to secure their commerce against the vexations to which they have hitherto been subject; and it is impossible to discover any thing either in the law of nations or practice of states, any law or practice universally acknowledged, the denial of which is tantamount to a declaration of war against this country. It is a mistake to assert that the principles of the armed neutrality were never heard of till they were advanced in the American war. In 1740 the King of Prussia disputed the pretensions of this country on the same grounds as the armed neutrality; and in 1762 the Dutch resisted the claim of right to search vessels under convoy. In 1780 these objections assumed a greater degree of consistency, from their principles being publicly announced by all the powers in Europe.

"There is one principle which should ever be considered as the leading rule by which all questions of this sort should be determined, and that is the maxim of *justice*. Can, then, the pretensions of Great Britain bear the test of this criterion? Our naval ascendancy, indeed, should ever be carefully preserved, as the source of our glory and the bulwark of our safety; but sorry should I be, if, to preserve the rights and interests of the British nation, we should be compelled to abandon the rules and maxims of justice, in which alone are to be found true and permanent greatness, true and permanent security.

"Even supposing the pretensions of England to be just, are they expedient? Its maritime superiority is of inestimable value, but is this claim, so odious to our neighbours, essential to its existence? Let the advantage, nay, the necessity, of the privilege be clearly demonstrated before we engage in a uni-

(1) In the winter 1800-1801, wheat rose to L. 1, 4s. the bushel; being more than quadruple what it had been at the commencement of the war; and all other species of food were high in proportion. Large

quantities of maize and rice were imported, and contributed essentially to relieve the public distress.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 117.

versal war for its defence and purchase it at the price of blood. Admitting even that the right was just and useful, circumstances may occur which justify and warrant a relaxation in its rigour. Supposing even the concession of the claim of the northern powers would have enabled them to supply France with many articles necessary for their navy, what would have been the inconvenience thence arising? France, destitute of seamen, her fleets without discipline, what the better would she be of all the naval stores of the north of Europe? What, on the other hand, is the consequence of our dispute with the northern powers? Do we not in a moment double her marine, and supply her with experienced sailors? Do not the navies of Europe now outflank us on every side; and has not France, therefore, gained the inestimable advantage of acquiring the seamen from the Baltic, which could not otherwise be obtained, and is not that the real object which she requires? And if our commerce is excluded from every harbour in Europe, if every market is shut against us, what is to become of the invaluable sources of our splendour and security? Independently of naval stores can we forget how important it is, in the present distressed and starving situation of the country, that the supply from the Baltic should not be lost. A little moderation in the instructions to our naval officers would have avoided all these dangers. Lord North was never arraigned as a traitor to his country, because he did not drive matters to extremities in 1780; and in the peace of 1785 the questions of the armed neutrality was wholly omitted. In subsequent commercial treaties with different countries, the question of neutral rights has been settled on the principles of the armed neutrality; and there is at least as much reason for moderation now as there was at the close of the American war."

To these arguments Mr. Pitt and Sir William Grant replied: "It has only been stated as doubtful whether the marine code contended for by Great Britain is founded in justice; but can there be the smallest hesitation on a subject which has been acknowledged and acted upon by the whole courts, not only of this country, but of Europe, and on which all the wars, not of this island merely, but of every belligerent state in Europe, have been constantly conducted? The advocates for the neutral powers constantly fall into the error of supposing that every exception from the general law by a particular treaty proves the law to be as stated in that treaty; whereas the very circumstance of making an exception by treaty, proves that the general law of nations would be the reverse but for that exception. We made a concession of this description to France, in the commercial treaty of 1787, because it was supposed that that power would never be neutral when we were at war; but was it ever for one moment imagined, that by so doing, we could be understood to have relinquished our maritime rights with reference to other states?

"With respect to the Baltic powers, the case of the neutral advocates is peculiarly untenable. Nobody here has to learn, that the treaties of 1661 and 1670 are in full force with respect to Sweden and Denmark, and in those treaties the right of carrying enemy's property is expressly given up. With respect to Russia, the right of search was never abandoned. On the contrary, in the convention signed between this country and that power, at the commencement of the present war, the latter bound herself not merely to observe this principle herself, but to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the seas or in its harbours. Even, therefore, if the general principles of the maritime law were as adverse, as in reality they are favourable to Great Britain, still the treaties with the Baltic powers are in full force, and how can they now contend for a code of laws against England, in opposition to that to which they are expressly bound with her?

“Denmark, in August last, with her fleets and her arsenals at our mercy, entered into a solemn pledge, not again to send vessels with convoy until the principle was settled; and yet she has recently bound herself by another treaty, founded upon the principles of 1780, one of the engagements of which treaty is, that its stipulations are to be maintained by force of arms. Is this, or is it not, war? When all these circumstances are accompanied by armaments, prepared at a period of the year when they think they have time for preparation without being exposed to our navy, can there be the slightest doubt, that in justice we are bound to take up arms in our own defence?

“As to the question of expenditure, the matter is if possible, still less doubtful. The question is, whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to be supplied and recruited; whether we are to suffer blockaded forts to be furnished with warlike stores and provisions; whether we are to allow neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing-boat, to convey the treasures of South America to the harbours of Spain, or the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest or Toulon? The honourable gentleman talks of the destruction of the naval power of France; but does he imagine that her marine would have decreased to the degree which it actually has, if, during the whole of the war, this very principle had not been acted upon? And if the commerce of France had not been destroyed, does he believe, that if the fraudulent system of neutrals had not been prevented, her navy would not now have been in a very different situation from what it actually is? Does he not know, that the naval preponderance which we have by this means acquired, has since given security to this country amidst the wreck of all our hopes on the Continent? If it were once gone, the spirit of the country would go with it. If in 1780, we were not in a condition to assert the right of this country to a code of maritime law, which for centuries has been acted upon indiscriminately by all the European states, we have not now, happily, the same reason for not persisting in our rights; and the question now is, whether, with increased proofs of the necessity of acting upon that principle, and increased means of supporting it, we are for ever to give it up (1)?”

The House of Commons supported ministers, by a majority of 245 to 65 (2).

Mr. Pitt
resigns in
conse-
quence of
the Catho-
lic claims.

The union of Ireland with England, from which such important results were anticipated, proved a source of weakness rather than strength to the empire at this important crisis. By a series of concessions, which commenced soon after, and continued through

the whole reign of George III, the Irish Catholics had been nearly placed on a level with their Protestant fellow subjects, and they were now excluded only from sitting in Parliament, and holding about thirty of the principal offices in the state. When Mr. Pitt, however, carried through the great measure of the Union, he gave the Catholics reason to expect that a complete removal of all disabilities would follow the Union, not indeed as a matter of right, but of grace and favour. This understood pledge, when the time arrived, he found himself unable to redeem. The complete removal of Catholic disabilities, it was soon found, involved many fundamental questions in the constitution; in particular, the Bill of Rights, the Test and Corporation Acts, and, in general, the stability of the whole Protestant Church establishment; and for that reason it might be expected to meet with a formidable opposition from the aristocratic party in both houses; and in addition to this, it was discovered, when the measure was brought forward in the Cabinet, that the King entertained scruples of conscience on the subject, in conse-

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxv. 895, 915.

(2) Ibid. 931.

quence of his oath at the coronation "to maintain the Protestant religion established by law," which the known firmness and integrity of his character rendered it extremely improbable he would ever be brought to abandon. In these circumstances, Mr. Pitt stated that he had no alternative but to resign Feb. 10. his official situations. On the 10th February, it was announced in Parliament that ministers only held the seals till their successors were appointed, and shortly after Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, Earl Spenser, Mr. Dundas, and Mr. Windham resigned, and were succeeded by Mr. Addington, then Speaker of the House of Commons, as First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Hawkesbury, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a new Ministry, taken, however, entirely from the Tory party (1).

But this
was only
the ostensi-
ble ground.

It has long been the practice of the Administration of Great Britain, not to resign upon the real question which occasions their retirement, but select some minor point, which is held forth to the public as the ostensible ground of the change; and this custom is attended with the great advantage of not implicating the Crown or the Government openly in a collision with either House of Parliament. From the circumstance of Mr. Pitt having so prominently held forth the Catholic question as the reason for his retirement, it is more than probable that this was not the real ground of the change; or, that if it was, he readily caught at the impossibility of carrying through any farther concessions to the Catholics of Ireland as a motive for resignation, to prevent the approach to other and more important questions which remained behind. There was no necessity for bringing forward the Catholic claims at that moment, nor any reason for breaking up an Administration at a period of unparalleled public difficulty, merely because the scruples in the Royal breast prevented them from being at that time conceded. But the question of peace or war stood in a very different situation. Mr. Pitt could not disguise from himself that the country was now involved in a contest, apparently endless, if the principles on which it had so long been conducted were rigidly adhered to; that the dissolution of the continental coalition, and the formation of the northern confederacy had immensely diminished the chances, not merely of success, but of salvation during its future continuance. As it was possible, therefore, perhaps probable, that England might be driven to an accommodation at no distant period, and the principles he had so long maintained might prove an obstacle to such a necessary measure, Mr. Pitt took the part of retiring with the leading members of his Cabinet, and was succeeded by other inferior adherents of his party, who, without departing from his principles altogether, might feel themselves more at liberty to mould them according to the pressure of external circumstances. In doing this, the English minister acted the part of

(1) *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 966. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 117, 121.

In a paper circulated at this period, in Mr. Pitt's name, it was stated, "The leading part of his Majesty's ministers finding innumerable obstacles to the bringing forward measures of concession to the Catholic body while in office, have felt it impossible to continue in office under their inability to propose it, with the circumstances necessary to carry the measure with all its advantages; and they have retired from his Majesty's service, considering this line of conduct as most likely to contribute to its ultimate success. The Catholic body may with confidence rely on the zealous support of all those who retire, and of many who remain in office, where it can be given with a prospect of success. They may be assured that Mr. Pitt will do his utmost to establish their cause in the public

favour, and prepare the way for their finally attaining their objects." In his place in the House of Commons on February 16, Mr. Pitt said, "With respect to the resignation of myself and some of my friends, I have no wish to disguise from the House that we did feel it an incumbent duty upon us to propose a measure on the part of Government, which, under the circumstances of the Union so happily effected between the two countries, we thought of great public importance, and necessary to complete the benefits likely to result from that measure; we felt this opinion so strongly, that when we met with circumstances which rendered it impossible for us to propose it as a measure of Government, we equally felt it inconsistent with our duty and our honour any longer to remain a part of that Government."—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 966, 970.

a true patriot. "He sacrificed himself," says the chosen historian of Napoleon, "to the good of his country and a general peace. He showed himself more than a great statesman, a good citizen (1)."

But though Mr. Pitt retired, he left his mantle to his successors; neither timidity nor vacillation appeared in the measures of Government towards foreign states. For both the land and sea-forces a larger allowance was provided than in any previous year since the commencement of the war. For the navy there was voted 139,000 seamen and marines, and 120 ships of the line were put in commission. The land-troops altogether amounted to 500,000 men (2); and the navy, in service and ordinary, amounted to the prodigious force of above 200 ships of the line and 250 frigates (5). Mr. Pitt, on February 18th, brought forward the budget immediately before he surrendered the seals to his successors. The charges of the army and navy were each of them above L.13,000,000; and the total expenditure to be provided for by the United Kingdom amounted to L.42,000,000, besides above L.20,000,000 as the interest of the debt. To provide for these prodigious charges, war-supplies to the amount of L.17,000,000 existed; and to make up the difference he contracted a loan of L.23,500,000 for Great Britain; while Ireland, according to the agreement at the Union, was to provide 2-17ths of the whole expense, or L.4,500,000. To provide for the interest of the loan, and the sinking fund applicable to its reduction, new taxes, chiefly in the excise and customs, were imposed to the amount of L.1,794,000. These additional taxes, according to the admirable system of that great financier, were almost all laid on in the indirect form, being intended to be a permanent burden on the nation till the principal was paid off; and a sinking-fund of L.100,000 a-year was provided for this purpose in the excess of the additional taxes above the interest of the debt (4).

Prosperous
state of
Great Britain
at this
period.

Notwithstanding the unexampled difficulties which had beset the British empire in the years 1799 and 1800, from the extreme severity of the scarcity during that period, and the vast expenditure which the campaigns of these two years had occasioned, the condition

(1) Bign. i. 406. Ann. Reg. 1800, 119, 120.	
(2) Viz—Regular Forces,	193,000
Militia,	78,000
Fencibles,	31,000
Total,	302,000

Sugar, Malt, and Tobacco,	L.2,750,000
Lottery,	300,000
Income Tax,	4,260,000
Duty on Exports and Imports,	1,250,000
Surplus of the Consolidated Fund,	3,300,000
Irish Taxes and Loan,	4,324,000
Balance not issued for Subsidies,	500,000
Surplus of Grants,	60,000

L.16,744,000

Loan, 25,500,000

Ways and Means, L.42,244,000

Charges.

Navy,	L.15,800,000
Army and Extraordinary,	15,902,000
Ordnance,	1,938,000
Miscellaneous,	757,000
Unforeseen Emergencies,	800,000
Permanent charges of Ireland,	390,000
Deficiency of Income-Tax,	1,000,000
Discount on Loan,	200,000
Deficiency of Malt Duty,	400,000
Deficiency of Assessed Taxes,	350,000
Deficiency of Consolidated Fund,	150,000
Exchequer Bills of 1779,	3,800,000
Sinking Fund,	200,000
Interest of Exchequer Bills,	460,000

Charges, L.42,147,000

The expense of maintaining which was estimated at L.12,940,000. The total forces, both of land and sea, in 1792, was not 120,000; a signal proof what much greater efforts than she was generally supposed capable of, England could really make, and of the overwhelming force with which, at the commencement of the war, she might, by a proper exertion of her strength, have overwhelmed the revolutionary volcano.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, p. 142, and JOMINI, xiv. 251.

(3) Ships of the line, in commission and ordinary,	205
Building,	36
Fifty-gun ships,	27
Frigates,	257
Brigs and sloops,	312
Total,	837

—See JAMES'S *Naval Hist.* iii. Table ix; and JOMINI, xiv. 252.

(4) Parl. Deb. xxxv. 974, 978.

Mr. Pitt stated the War Revenue of the Nation, for the year 1801, as follows:—

of the empire in 1801 was, to an unprecedented degree, wealthy and prosperous. The great loan of twenty-five millions of that year was borrowed at a rate of interest under six per cent., although loans to the amount of above two hundred millions had been contracted in the eight preceding years; the exports, as compared with what they were at the commencement of the war, had tripled, and the imports more than tripled, in addition to the vast sums of money which the nation required for its loans to foreign powers, and payments on account of its own forces in foreign parts. Nearly a fourth had been added to the tonnage of the shipping and the seamen employed in it during the same period; while the national expenditure had risen to above sixty-eight millions, of which nearly forty millions were provided from permanent or war-taxes (1). Contrary to all former prece-

(1) Mr. Chancellor Addington, on June 29, 1801, brought forward a series of finance resolutions, which, as fully explaining the situation of the British empire at that period, are well deserving of attention. Their material parts are as follow:—

1. Expenditure for 1801.

Interest of debt and sinking fund, . . .	L.20,144,000
Additional interest on loans of 1801. . .	1,812,000
Civil list, share of Great Britain, . . .	1,376,000
Civil government pensions, charges, etc., in Scotland,	635,000
Charges of Collection,	1,851,000
Great Britain's share of the war charges of 1801,	39,338,000
Advances to Ireland from England, . .	2,500,000
Interest on Imperial loans,	497,000
Total charges,	<u>L.68,153,000</u>

2. Income for 1801.

Permanent Revenue, as in 1800, . . .	L.27,419,000
Produce of first quarter's taxes, 1801, . . .	1,000,000
Income tax,	5,822,000
Exports and Imports,	1,200,000
Repayments from Grenada,	800,000
Loan,	25,500,000

4. Sinking Fund.

Amount of sinking fund in 1786,	L.1,000,000, or 1—238 of debt.
in 1793,	1,427,000, or 1—160 of do.
in 1801,	5,300,000, or 1—76 of do.

5. Produce of Taxes.

Years.	Permanent Taxes.	Years.	Permanent Taxes.
Ending 5th Jan. 1793, . . .	L.14,284,000	1793, . . .	L.13,332,000
1794, . . .	13,941,000	1799, . . .	14,275,000
1795, . . .	13,858,000	1800, . . .	15,743,000
1796, . . .	13,557,000	1801, . . .	14,194,000
1797, . . .	14,292,000		

War Taxes of 1801, L.8,079,000.

6. Imports and Exports.

			Imports.
Average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1784,			L.13,122,000
1793,			18,685,000
1801,			25,259,000
Real value of imports in 1801,			54,500,000
			Foreign Goods Exported.
Average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1784,	L. 4,263,080		L. 8,616,000
1796,	5,468,000		14,771,000
1801,	17,166,000		20,085,000
Real value of exports in 1801,	16,300,000		39,500,000

7. Shipping.

	Registered vessels.	Tonnage.	Seamen.
1788,	13,827	1,363,000	107,500
1792,	16,079	1,540,000	118,000
1800,	18,877	1,905,000	143,000

The vast increase of exports, imports, and shipping, between 1793 and 1800, and especially since the Bank Restriction Act in 1797, is particularly worthy of observation.—See *Parl. Hist.* xxv. 1561, 1567.

Loan for Ireland,	2,500,000
Exchequer bills charged on supplies of 1802,	2,000,000
Additional produce of taxes deficient in 1800,	1,100,000
Unpaid part of German loan,	560,000
Redeemed land-tax,	62,000
Total income,	<u>L.67,963,000</u>

3. Public Debt.

Public debt on the 5th January, 1793,	L.227,000,000
Annuities at same period,	1,293,000
Public debt created from 5th Jan. 1793 to 1st Feb. 1801,	214,661,000
Annuities created since the same period,	302,000
Debt redeemed from 1793 to 1801, . .	52,281,000
Drawn by land tax redeemed,	16,083,000
Total public debt on 1st February, 1801,	400,709,000
Annuities existing then,	1,540,000
Annual charge of debt incurred before 1793, with sinking fund,	10,325,000
Annual charge of debt incurred since 1793, with do,	10,395,000

dent, the country had eminently prospered during this long and arduous struggle. Notwithstanding the weight of its taxation, and the immense sums which had been squandered in foreign loans or services, and of course lost to the productive powers of Great Britain, the industry of the nation in all its branches had prodigiously increased, and capital was to be had in abundance for all the innumerable undertakings, both public and private, which were going forward. Agriculture had advanced in a still greater degree than population; the dependence of the nation on foreign supplies was rapidly diminishing; and yet the united kingdom, which had added nearly a sixth to its inhabitants since 1791, numbered above fifteen million of souls in the British isles (1). The divisions and disaffection which prevailed during the earlier years of the war had almost entirely disappeared; the atrocities of the French Revolution had weaned all but a few inveterate democrats from Jacobinical principles; the imminence of the public danger had united the great body of the people in a strong attachment to the national colours; the young and active party of the population had risen into manhood since the commencement of the contest, and imbibed with their mother's milk the enthusiastie feelings it was calculated to awaken; while the incessant progress and alarming conquests of France had generally diffused the belief that no security for the national independence was to be found but in a steady resistance to its ambition. A nation animated with such feelings and possessed of such resources, was not unreasonably confident in itself when it bade defiance to Europe in arms.

England, however, had need of all its energies, for the forces of the maritime league were extremely formidable. Russia had eighty-two sail of the line and forty frigates in her harbours, of which forty-seven line-of-battle ships were in the Baltic and at Archangel, but of these not more than fifteen were in a state ready for active service; and the crews were extremely deficient in nautical skill. Sweden had eighteen ships of the line and fourteen frigates, besides a great quantity of small craft, in much better condition, and far better served, than the Russian navy; while a numerous flotilla, with ten thousand men on board, was prepared to defend its shores, and twenty thousand troops, stationed in camps in the interior, were ready to fly to any menaced point. Denmark had twenty-three ships of the line and fourteen large frigates, which the brave and energetic population of Zealand had made the utmost efforts to equip and man, to resist the attack which was shortly anticipated from the British arms. Could the three powers have united their forces, they had twenty-four ships of the line ready for sea, which might in a few months have been raised with ease to fifty, besides twenty-five frigates, a force which, combined with the fleet of Holland, might have raised the blockade of the French harbours, and enabled the confederated powers to ride triumphant in the British Channel (2).

In these circumstances every thing depended on England striking a decisive blow in the outset, and anticipating by the celerity of her movements that combination of force which otherwise might

Energetic measures of the British Government.

(1) Population in 1801 :—	
England,	8,331,000
Wales,	541,000
Scotland,	1,599,000
Ireland,	4,500,000
Army and navy,	470,000
<hr/>	
15,441,000	

—See PEBBLES's *Tables*, 332, and *Population Returns*.
(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 109. Dum. vi. 169, 172. Nap. ii. 137, 138. Southey's *Life of Nelson*, ii. 94.

prove so threatening to her national independence. Fortunately the Government were fully aware of the necessity of acting vigorously at the commencement, and by great exertions a powerful squadron was assembled at Yarmouth in the beginning of March. It consisted of eighteen ships of the line, four frigates, and a number of bomb vessels, in all fifty-two sail.

Nelson appointed second in command of the fleet destined for the Baltic.

This powerful force was placed under the command of Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson for his second in command. The hero of the Nile had good reason to be dissatisfied at finding himself placed under the command of an officer who, though respectable, and his superior in rank, was comparatively unknown in the annals of naval glory; but he was not a man to allow any personal feelings to interfere with his duty to his country. Though sensible of the slight, therefore, he cheerfully accepted the subordinate command. When he arrived at Yarmouth he "found the admiral a little nervous about dark nights and fields of ice; but we must brave up," said he, "these are not times for nervous systems. I hope we shall give our northern enemies that hail-storm of bullets which gives our dear country the dominion of the sea. All the devils in the north cannot take it from us, if our wooden walls have fair play (1)."

March 12. British fleet sails from the Downs.

The British fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th March; but soon after putting to sea, it sustained a serious loss in the wreck of the *Invincible*, which struck on one of the sand banks in that dangerous coast, and shortly sunk with a large part of the crew. Mr. Vansittart accompanied the squadron in the capacity of plenipotentiary, to endeavour to arrange the differences by negotiation, which unfortunately proved totally impossible. It arrived on the 27th off Zealand, and Sir Hyde immediately despatched a letter to the governor of Cronenberg castle, to inquire whether the fleet would be allowed without molestation to pass the Sound. The governor having replied that he could not allow a force, whose intentions were unknown, to approach the guns of his fortress, the British admiral declared that he took this as a declaration of war. By the earnest advice of Nelson it was determined immediately to attempt the passage; a resolution which, in the state of the northern powers, was not only the most gallant but the most prudent that could have been adopted (2). On the 30th March the British fleet entered the Sound, with a fair wind from the northwest; and spreading all sail, proudly and gallantly bore up towards the harbour of Copenhagen (3).

And passes the Sound.

Splendid appearance of the Sound.

The scene which opened upon the British fleet when it entered this celebrated passage was every way worthy of the cause in which it was engaged, and the memorable events of which it was soon to become the theatre. Nothing in the north of Europe can be compared to the prospect afforded by the channel which lies between the opposite shores of Sweden and Denmark. On the left, the coast of Scandinavia exhibits a beautiful assemblage of corn lands, pastures and copses, rising into picturesque and varied hills; while on the right, the shores of Zealand present a continued succession of rich plains, woods, meadows, orchards, villas and all the accompaniments of long established civilization. The isles of Huen, Saltholm, and

(1) Southey, ii. 95.

(2) Nelson on this occasion addressed Sir Hyde as follows.—"The more I have reflected, the more I am confirmed in my opinion, that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy. They will every day be stronger and stronger; we shall never be so good a match for them as at the present moment. Here you are with almost all the safety, cer-

tainly all the honour of England, more intrusted to you than ever yet fell to the lot of a British officer. On your decision depends whether our country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or rear her head higher than ever."—See SOUTHNEY, ii. 98, 99.

(3) Southey, ii. 100, 104. Ann. Reg. 1801, 109, 110.

Amack appear in the widening channel; the former celebrated as bearing the observatory of the great Tycho Brahe, and where most of his discoveries were made, the latter nearly opposite to Copenhagen. At the foot of the slope, on the Swedish side, is situated the old city of Helsingborg, with its picturesque battlements and mouldering towers; while on the south, the castle of Cronenberg and city of Elsinore rise in frowning majesty to assert the dominion of Denmark over the straits. Both are associated with poetic and historical recollections. Elsinore is familiar to every reader of Hamlet, and has recently been celebrated in thrilling strains by the greatest of modern lyric poets (1); while Cronenberg castle was the scene of a still deeper tragedy. There Queen Matilda was confined, the victim of a base court intrigue, and enlivened the dreary hours of captivity in nursing her infant; there she was separated from that, the last link that bound her to existence; and on these towers her eyes were fixed, as the vessel bore her from her country, till their highest pinnacle had sunk beneath the waves, and her aching sight rested only on the waste of waters (2).

To one approaching from the German ocean, the fortresses of Helsingborg, Elsinore, and Cronenberg seem to unite and form a vast castellated barrier on the north-east of an inland lake; but as he advances the vista opens, the Baltic is seen, and the city of Copenhagen, with its Gothic spires and stately edifices, appears crowding down to the water's edge. Its harbour, studded with masts; its arsenals, bulwarks, and batteries; its lofty towers and decorated buildings, render it one of the most striking cities in the north of Europe. During summer, the Sound exhibits an unusually gay and animated spectacle; hardly a day elapses in which an hundred vessels do not pass the straits, and pay toll to Denmark at Elsinore; and in the course of the season, upwards of ten thousand ships, of different nations, yield a willing tribute in this manner to the keeper of the beacons which warn the mariner from the dangerous shoals of the Cattegat. But never had so busy or brilliant a spectacle been exhibited there as on this day, when the British fleet prepared to force a passage where till now all ships had lowered their topsails to the flag of Denmark. Fifty vessels, of which seventeen were of the line, spread their sails before a favourable wind, and pressing forward under a brilliant sun, soon came abreast of Cronenberg castle. The splendour of the scene, the undefined nature of the danger which awaited them, the honour and safety of their country intrusted to their arms, the multitude who crowded every headland on the opposite shores, conspired to awaken the most thrilling emotions in the minds of the British seamen. Fear had no place in those dauntless breasts; yet was their patriotic ardour not altogether unmixed with painful feelings. The Danes were of the same lineage, and once spoke the same language as the English; the two nations had for centuries been united in the bonds of friendship; and numbers who now appeared in arms against them were sprung from the same ancestors as their gallant opponents. The effect of this common descent has survived all the divisions of kingdoms and political interest; alone, of all the continental states, an Englishman finds himself at home in that part of Jutland from whence the Angles originally sprung (3); and even the British historian, in recounting the events in this melancholy contest, feels himself distracted by emotions akin to those of civil

(1) Now joy, old England, raise!
For the tidings of thy might,
By the festal cities' blaze,
While the wine cup shines in light;
And yet amidst that joy and uproar,
Let us think of them that sleep,

Full many a fathom deep,
By thy wild and stormy steep,
Elsinore!
CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltic*.

(2) Southey, i. 108, 109. Ann. Reg. 1801, 111.
(3) Clarke's *Travels*, i. 284.

warfare, and dwells with nearly the same exultation on the heroism of the vanquished as the prowess of the victors (1).

Undaunted spirit of the Danes. Though they had enjoyed profound peace for nearly a century, and during that time had been ruled by a government in form absolute, the Danes had lost none of the courage or patriotism by which their ancestors, in the days of Canute and the Sea-kings, had been distinguished. Never was the public spirit of the country evinced with more lustre than in the preparations for, and during the perils of, this sanguinary struggle. All classes made the utmost exertions to put their marine in a respectable condition; the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasant vied with each other in their endeavours to complete the preparations for defence. The Prince Royal set the example by presiding at the labours of his subjects; workmen presented themselves in crowds to take a share in the undertakings; children even concealed their age in order to be permitted to join in the patriotic exertion; the university furnished a corps of twelve hundred youths, the flower of Denmark; the merchants, including those whose fortunes were at stake from the English embargo, came forward with liberal offers; the peasants flocked from the country to man the arsenals; the workmen in the dock-yards refused to leave their station, and continued labouring by torch-light during the whole night, with relays merely of rest, as in a man-of-war. Battalions were hastily formed; batteries manned with inexperienced hands; muskets made, and all kinds of warlike stores provided with astonishing celerity (2). History has not a more touching example of patriotic ardour to commemorate, nor one in which a more perfect harmony prevailed between a sovereign and his subjects for the defence of rights naturally dear to them all.

Passage of the Sound. From a praiseworthy, but ill-timed desire to avoid coming to extremities, the British armament had given a long delay to the Danes, which was turned to good account by their indefatigable citizens, and occasioned in the end an unnecessary effusion of blood. They had arrived in the Cattegat the 20th March, and on the same day, Mr. Vansittart proceeded ashore, with a view to settle matters without having recourse to extremities; but nevertheless it was not till the 50th that the passage of the Sound was attempted. In the interval, the Danes had powerfully strengthened their means of defence; the shore was lined with batteries, and Cronenberg castle opened a heavy fire, from above a hundred pieces of cannon, upon the leading ships of the squadron when they came within range. Nelson's division led the van, Sir Hyde's followed in the centre, while Admiral Graves brought up the rear. At first, they steered through the middle of the channel, expecting to be assailed by a destructive fire from both sides; but finding as they advanced, that the batteries of Helsingborg did not open upon the squadron, they inclined to the Swedish shore, and were thus enabled to pass almost without the reach of the Danish guns. The cannon balls and shells fell short of the line-of-battle ships, and did little injury even to the smaller craft, which were placed nearer the Danish coast, affording no small merriment to the sailors, whose minds were in an unusual state of excitement, from the novel and perilous enterprise on which they had entered. The passage lasted four hours, and about noonday the fleet came to anchor opposite the harbour of Copenhagen (3).

(1) Ann. Reg. 1801, 111. Southey, ii. 103.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1801, 110. Southey, ii. 109, 111.

(2) Dum. vi. 172. Jom. xiv. 252, 253. Southey, Dum. vi. 183, 184. Jom. xiv. 252, 253. i. 115, 130.

Prepara-
tions of the
Danes.

The garrison of this city consisted of ten thousand men, besides the battalions of volunteers, who were still more numerous. All possible precautions had been taken to strengthen the sea defences; and the array of forts, ramparts, ships of the line, fire-ships, gun-boats, and floating batteries, was such as would have deterred any other assailant but the hero of the Nile. Six line-of-battle ships, and eleven floating batteries, besides a great number of smaller vessels, were moored in an external line to protect the entrance to the harbour, flanked on either side by two islands, called the Crowns, on the smaller of which fifty-six, while on the larger, sixty-eight heavy cannon were mounted. To support these, four other sail of the line were moored within across the harbour mouth; and a fort, mounting thirty-six heavy cannon, had been constructed in a shoal, supported on piles. The fire of these formidable works crossed with that of the batteries on the island of Amack and the citadel of Copenhagen; it seemed hardly possible that any ships could endure, for a length of time, so heavy and concentric a discharge. But tremendous as these dangers appeared, they were neither the only nor the greatest with which the British fleet had to contend. The channel by which alone the harbour could be approached, was little known, and extremely intricate; all the buoys had been removed, and the sea on either side abounded with shoals and sand-banks, on which, if any of the vessels grounded, they would instantly be torn to pieces by the fire from the Danish batteries. The Danes considered this obstacle insurmountable, deeming the narrow and winding channel impracticable for a large fleet in such circumstances. Nelson was fully aware of the difficulty of the attempt; and a day and a night were occupied by the boats of the fleet in making the necessary soundings, and laying down new buoys in lieu of those which had been taken away. He himself personally assisted in the whole of this laborious and important duty, taking no rest night or day till it was accomplished. "It had worn him down," he said, "and was infinitely more grievous than any resistance he could experience from the enemy (1)."

Nelson's
plan of
attack.

No sooner were the soundings completed than Nelson, in a council of war, suggested the plan of operations, which was, to approach from the south and make the attack on the right flank of the enemy. The approach of the Danish exterior line was covered by a large shoal, called the Middle Ground, exactly in front of the harbour, at about three quarters of a mile distant, which extended along the whole sea front of the town. As this sand bank was impassable for ships of any magnitude, he proposed to follow what is called the King's channel, lying between it and the town, and thus interpose, as at Aboukir, between the Danish line and the entrance of the harbour. On the morning of the 1st April the whole fleet anchored within two leagues of the town, off the north-west end of the Middle Ground, and Nelson, having completed his last examination, hoisted the signal to weigh anchor. It was received with a loud shout from his whole division of the fleet, which consisted of twelve sail of the line, besides some smaller vessels. The remainder, under Sir Hyde Parker, were to menace the Crown batteries on the other side, threaten the four ships of the line at the entrance of the harbour, and lend their aid to such of the attacking squadron as might come disabled out of action. The small craft, headed by Captain Riou, led the way, most accurately threading their dangerous and winding course between the island of Saltholm and the Middle Ground; the whole squadron followed with a fair wind, coasting along the outer edge of the shoal, doubled its farther extremity,

(1) Southey, ii. 112, 113. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112, 113. Dum. vi. 186, 187. Jom. xiv. 256, 257.

and cast anchor, just as darkness closed, off Draco Point, not more than two miles from the right of the enemy's line. The signal to prepare for action had been made early in the evening, and the seamen passed the night in anxious expectation of the dawn which was to usher in the eventful morrow (1).

This was a night of anxiety and trepidation, but not of unmanly alarm, in Copenhagen. The citizens saw evidently that the attack would be made on the following day, and, amidst the tears of their mothers and children, bravely repaired to their appointed stations. Few eyelids were closed, save among those about to combat, in all its peopled quarters, so strongly was the solemnity of the occasion, and the coming dangers to all they held dear, impressed on the minds of the citizens. Nelson sat down to supper with a large party of his officers. He was, as he was ever wont to be on the eve of a battle, in high spirits; the mortal fatigue of the preceding days seemed forgotten, and he drank to a leading wind, and the success of the morrow. After supper, Captain Hardy went forward in a boat to examine the channel between them and the enemy. He approached so near as to sound round their leading ship with a pole, lest the noise of throwing the lead should alarm its crew, and returned about four with a valuable report to the admiral. Meanwhile Nelson, though he lay down, was too anxious to sleep. He dictated his orders till past one, and during the remainder of the night incessantly enquired whether the wind was south. At daybreak it was announced that it had become perfectly fair; the order was given for all the captains to come on board, and when they had received their final instructions he made the signal for action (2).

The pilots who were to conduct the fleet soon showed by their indecision that, in the absence of the buoys to which they had been accustomed to look, they hardly knew what course to follow; and Nelson experienced the utmost agony of mind from their failure, as the wind was fair, and there was not a moment to lose. At length the master of the *Bellona* declared he was prepared to lead the fleet, and put himself at its head accordingly. Captain Murray in the *Edgar* led the line-of-battle ships. The *Agamemnon* was next in order; but, in attempting to weather the shoal, she struck aground, and became immovable, at the time her services were most required. The *Bellona* and *Russell* soon after grounded also, but in a situation which enabled them to take a part, though not the one assigned them, in the battle. The want of these three ships at their appointed stations was severely felt in the action, as they were intended to have silenced the Crown batteries, and would have thereby prevented a heavy loss on board the *Defiance* and *Monarch*, who were exposed to their fire without the possibility of making any return. In advancing to take up their ground, each ship had been ordered to pass her leader on the starboard, because the water was supposed to get shallower on that side. Nelson, while advancing in the *Elephant* after these two ships which had struck on the sand bank, made a signal to them to close with the enemy, not knowing that they were aground; but when he perceived they did not obey the signal, he ordered the *Elephant's* helm to starboard, and passed within these ill-fated vessels. By this happy act of presence of mind he saved the whole fleet from destruction, for the other ships followed the admiral's track, and thereby keeping in deep water, arrived opposite to their

(1) Southey, ii. 113, 115. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112. (2) Southey, ii. 117, 119. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112.
Dum. vi. 187. Join. xiv. 257, 258. James iii. 99. James iii. 99, 100.
100.

appointed stations, anchored by the stern, and presented their broadsides, at the distance of half a cable's length from the Danes (1).

Battle of Copen- hagen. The action began at five minutes past ten, and was general by eleven. Nine only of the line-of-battle ships could reach the station allotted to them; only one of the gun-brigs could stem the current so as to get into action; and only two of the bomb-vessels were enabled to take up their appointed position on the Middle Ground. Captain Riou, with his squadron of frigates, undertook the perilous task of fronting the Crown batteries—a duty to which the three standard ships of the line would have been hardly adequate—and in the discharge of which that gallant and lamented officer lost his life. Nelson's agitation was extreme when, at the commencement of the action, he found himself deprived of three of his best ships of the line; but no sooner had he reached the scene of danger, where his squadron was assailed with the fire of above a thousand guns, than his countenance brightened, and he became animated and joyous. The cannonade soon became tremendous; above two thousand pieces of cannon on the two sides poured forth death within a space not exceeding a mile and a half in breadth; from the city on the one side, and the remainder of the squadron, under Sir Hyde, on the other, the hostile fleets seem wrapped in one dazzling conflagration. For three hours the fire continued without any appearance of diminution on either side; and Sir Hyde, seeing three ships aground under the iron tempest of the Crown batteries, and being unable, from the wind and current, to render any assistance, made the signal of recall; generously supposing that, if Nelson was in a situation to continue the contest, he would disobey the order; but that if he was not, his reputation would be saved by the signal for retreat having been made by his superior officer (2).

In the midst of this terrific cannonade Nelson was rapidly walking the quarter deck. A shot through the mainmast scattered splinters around; he observed to one of his officers with a smile, "This is warm work; and this day may be the last to any of us in a moment: but mark me, I would not be elsewhere for thousands." About this time the signal-lieutenant called out that the signal for discontinuing the action had been thrown out by the commander-in-chief, and asked if he should repeat it. "No," he replied; "acknowledge it." He then continued walking about in great emotion; and meeting Captain Foley, said, "What think you, Foley, the admiral has hung out No. 59 (3). You know I have only one eye; I have a right to be blind sometimes:" and then putting the glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, "I really don't see the signal. Keep mine for closer battle still flying. That's the way I answer such signals. Nail mine to the mast." Admiral Graves and the other ships, looking only to Nelson, continued the combat with unabated vigour; but the order to retire was seen in time to save Riou's little squadron, though not to preserve its gallant commander. "What will Nelson think of us," was that brave man's mournful exclamation, as with a heavy heart he gave orders to draw off. His clerk was soon after killed by his side, and several marines swept away, by a discharge from the Crown batteries. "Come then, my boys, let us all die together," said Riou; and just as the words were uttered, he was cut in two by a chain-shot (4).

(1) Southey, ii. 119, 123. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112. Dum. vi. 189. James, iii. 101.

(2) Southey, ii. 125. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112. Dum. vi. 189, 190. Jom. xiv. 259. James, iii. 101, 104.

"The fire," he said, "is too hot for Nelson to oppose; a retreat must be made. I am aware of the consequences to my own personal reputation, but it

would be cowardly in me to leave Nelson to bear the whole shame of the failure, if shame it should be deemed."—See SATTREY, ii. 125.

(3) The signal for discontinuing action.

(4) Southey, ii. 126, 129. Jom. xiv. 259. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112. James, iii. 104, 107.

It is needless to say from whom the chief inci-

Heroic
deeds on
both side.

But it was not on the English side alone that heroic deeds were performed; the Danes in that trying hour sustained the ancient reputation of the conquerors of the north. From the prince royal, who, placed on one of the principal batteries, was the witness of the glorious resistance of his subjects, to the humblest citizen, one heroic mind and purpose seemed to animate the whole population. As fast as the crews of the guard-ships were mowed down by the English fire, fresh bands of undaunted citizens crowded on board, and, unappalled by the dreadful spectacle, calmly took their station on decks choked by the dying and flooded with blood. Captain Lassen, in the *Provensten*, continued to fight till he had only two pieces standing on their carriages, and a few men to work them; he then spiked these guns, and throwing himself into the sea, swam at the head of his brave followers towards the isle of Amack. Captain Thura, in the *Indosforetten*, fell early in the action; her colours were shot away; and a boat was despatched to the prince royal to inform him of her situation, "Gentlemen," said he, "Thura is killed, which of you will take the command?"—"I will," exclaimed Schroedersee, a captain who had recently resigned on account of extreme ill health, and instantly hastened on board. No sooner had he arrived on the deck than he was struck on the breast by a ball and perished; a lieutenant, who had accompanied him, then took the command, and fought the ship to the last extremity. The *Dannebrog* sustained for two hours with great constancy the terrible fire of Nelson's ship; at length, after two successive captains and three-fourths of the crew had been swept away, she took fire, and the gallant survivors precipitating themselves into the sea, left the vessel to its fate, which soon after blew up with a tremendous explosion (1). But all these efforts, how heroic soever, were of no avail; the rapidity and precision of the British fire were irresistible; at one o'clock the cannonade of the Danish fleet began to slacken; loud cheers from the English sailors announced every successive vessel which struck; and before two the whole front line, consisting of six sail of the line and eleven huge floating batteries, was all either taken, sunk, burnt, or destroyed (2).

In this desperate battle the loss on board the British fleet was very severe, amounting to no less than 1200; a greater proportion to the number of seamen engaged than in any other general action during the whole war. On board the *Monarch*, there were 210 killed and wounded; she had to support the united fire of the *Holstein* and *Zealand*, besides being raked by the Crown battery (5). But the situation of the crews of the Danish vessels was still more deplorable. Their loss in killed and wounded had been above double that of the British; including the prisoners, it amounted to 6000; and the line had completely ceased firing; but the shot from the Crown batteries and the isle of Amack still continued to fall upon both fleets, doing as much injury to their friends as enemies; while the English boats sent to take posses-

dents in the actions of Nelson are taken. Mr. Southey's incomparable life is so deservedly popular, that its descriptions have become almost as firmly rooted in the public memory as the events they describe, and deviation from the one is as unpardonable as from the other.

(1) The gallant *Welmoes*, a stripling of seventeen, stationed himself on a small raft, carrying six guns, with twenty-four men, right under the bows of Nelson's ship; and though severely galled by the musketry of the English marines, continued, knee-deep in dead, to keep up his fire to the close of the heroic conflict. Nelson embraced him at the repast which followed in the palace ashore; and said to the

crown prince he should make him an admiral. "If, my lord," replied the prince, "I were to make all my brave officers admirals, I should have no captains or lieutenants in my service."—*Naval Chronicle*, xiv. 308.

(2) *Jom.* xiv. 259, 260. Southey, ii. 130, 134. *Dun.* vi. 190. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 112. James, iii. 105, 111.

(3) A singular piece of coolness occurred on board this vessel. "A four-and-twenty pounder from the Crown battery struck the kettle and dashed the peas and park about; the sailors picked up the fragments and ate while they were working the guns."—SOUTHEY, ii. 130.

sion of the prizes were fired on by the Danish batteries, and were unable to extricate them from destruction. In this extremity, Nelson retired into the stern gallery, and wrote to the crown prince in these terms: "Lord Nelson has been commanded to spare Denmark when she no longer resists. The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag; but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he must set fire to all the prizes he has taken, without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brothers, and should never be the enemies, of the English." A wafer was brought him; he ordered a candle from the cockpit, and sealed the letter deliberately with wax. "This is no time," said he, "to appear hurried and informal." At the same time the Ramillies and Defence, from Sir Hyde's squadron, worked up near enough to silence the remainder of the Danish line to the eastward of the Trekroner battery; but that tremendous bulwark was comparatively uninjured, and to the close of the action continued to exert with unabated vigour its giant strength (1).

In half an hour the flag of truce returned; the Crown batteries ceased to fire; and the action closed after four hours' continuance. The Crown prince enquired what was the English admiral's motive for proposing a suspension of hostilities. Lord Nelson replied—"Lord Nelson's object in sending the flag of truce was humanity; he therefore consents that hostilities shall cease, and that the wounded Danes may be taken ashore. And Lord Nelson will take his prisoners out of the vessels, and burn or carry off the prizes as he shall think fit. Lord Nelson will consider this the greatest victory he has ever gained, if it shall be the means of re-establishing a good understanding between his own Sovereign and the King of Denmark." The Danish prince made a reply, which was forwarded to the commander-in-chief; and Nelson, skilfully availing himself of the breathing time thus afforded, made the signal for the squadron to weigh anchor in succession. The Monarch led the way, and touched in rounding the shoal, but was got off by being taken in tow by two other ships; but Nelson's own ship, the Elephant, and the Defiance, grounded about a mile from the Crown batteries, and remained fast, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of their wearied crews. With these two exceptions, however, the whole fleet got clear off from the perilous shoals, and rejoined Sir Hyde's squadron in the middle of the straits; a fact which demonstrates that, though some of the British ships might have been lost if the action had continued, it could have made no difference on the ultimate result after the Danish line of defence had been destroyed (2).

The scene which now presented itself was heart-rending in the highest degree. The sky, heretofore so brilliant, became suddenly overcast; white flags were flying from the mast-heads of the Danes; guns of distress were occasionally discharged from those scenes of woe; while the burning vessels which had floated to a distance threw an awful and lurid light over the melancholy scene (3). The English boats, with generous but not undeserved humanity, covered the sea, rendering all the assistance in their power to the Danes who had escaped from the flaming wrecks; and the wounded men, as fast as the ships could be evacuated, were

(1) Southey, ii. 135, 137. Ann. Reg. 1801. 113. Jom. xiv. 260. Dum. vi. 191, 192. James, iii. 109, 111.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 113. Southey, ii. 140, 141. Jom. xiv. 261. James, iii. 115.

(3) Again, again, again,
And the havoc did not slack,

Till a feeble cheer the Dane
To our cheering sent us back:
Their shots along the deep slowly boom:—
Then ceas'd and all is wail,
As they strike the shattered sail,
Or, in conflagration pale,
Light the gloom.

CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltic*.

sent ashore; but great numbers perished, for such had been the unprepared ardour of the enemy that hardly any surgeons were provided to stanch the wounds of the numerous victims to patriotic duty. At daybreak on the following morning, the Elephant, to the infinite joy of Nelson, was got afloat; and the boats of the fleet being all manned, the prizes were brought away, including the Zealand of seventy-four guns, from under the cannon of the redoubted Trekroner battery. Thus terminated this murderous battle, one of the most obstinately contested ever fought by the British navy. Nelson said, "he had been in above a hundred engagements, but that of Copenhagen was the most terrible of them all (1)."

Next day was Good Friday; but all distinctions were forgotten in the universal grief which prevailed in the capital of Denmark. Every house was filled with mourners; the streets were occupied with the weeping crowds which attended the dead to their long home, or the still more distracted bands, which bore the wounded back to the hearths which they had so nobly defended. At mid-day, Nelson landed, attended by Captains Hardy and Freemantle; he walked slowly up from the quay through the crowded and agitated streets. The behaviour of the people was such as became a gallant nation, depressed, but not subdued by misfortune. "They did not," says the Danish chronicler, "either disgrace themselves by acclamations, nor degrade themselves by murmurs; the admiral was received as one brave enemy ever should receive another; he was received with respect." During the repast which followed, the particulars of the convention, which ultimately took place, were arranged. Nelson told the prince the French fought bravely, but they could not have stood for one hour the fight which the Danes had supported for four. Melancholy tributes were paid by the people of Copenhagen to the brave men who had fallen in the conflict; a public mausoleum was erected on the spot where the slain had been interred; a monument raised in the principal church, surmounted by the Danish colours; young maidens, clothed in white, stood round its base, with the widows or the orphans of those who had fallen; while a funeral sermon was delivered, and suitable patriotic strains were heard. The people were in that state of mingled grief and exultation, when the bitterness of individual loss is almost forgotten in the sympathy of general distress, or the pride of heroic achievement (2).

Armistice
agreed on
for fourteen
weeks.

Of all these vessels taken, the Holstein, of sixty-four guns, was alone brought to England; the remainder being rendered unserviceable by the fire, were sunk or burnt in the roads of Copenhagen. The negotiation which followed was attended with considerable difficulty, and Nelson was obliged to threaten to renew hostilities that very night unless the armistice was concluded. The Danes candidly stated their fears of Russia; and the English admiral avowed, that his object in wishing to make the armistice as long as possible, was, that he might have time to go to Cronstadt before returning to Copenhagen. At length it was agreed that it should last for fourteen weeks, and not be broken without a fortnight's previous notice; that the armed ships of Denmark should remain, during its continuance, *in statu quo*; that the principles of the armed neutrality should, in the mean time, be suspended as to Danish vessels; that the British fleet should obtain supplies of every sort from the island of Zealand (3); and that the prisoners and wounded should be sent ashore, to be carried to the credit of England, in the event of hostilities being renewed.

(1) Southey, ii. 143, 147. Ann. Reg. 1801, 113.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1801, 114. Southey, ii. 149, 153.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 114. Southey, ii. 146, 147. Dum. vi. 193, 194.

On the same day on which the English fleet forced the passage of the Sound, the Prussian Cabinet made a formal demand on the regency of Hanover, to permit the occupation of the electorate, and disband a part of their forces, and supported the proposition by an army of twenty thousand men. The Hanoverian Government, being in no condition to withstand an invasion from such a force, was compelled to submit, and Hanover, Bremen, and Hameln were immediately occupied by the Prussian troops. At the same time, the Danes took possession of Hamburgh and Lubeck, so as to close the mouth of the Elbe against the English commerce, while, on the other hand, a British squadron, under Admiral Duckworth, reduced all the Swedish and Danish islands in the West Indies (1).

During the brief period the alliance between Paul and Napoléon lasted, they had made great progress in maturing the favourite project of both these powers, for the overthrow of the British power in India. A formal agreement for this purpose had been made between the two Cabinets; thirty-five thousand French, under Masséna, were to have embarked at Ulm, on the Danube, and to have been joined by as many Russian troops, and fifty thousand Cossacks. The King of Persia had agreed to give them a passage through his dominions; and they were to have proceeded by land, or embarked in the Persian gulf according to circumstances. Whether this plan would have succeeded, if attempted entirely with land forces, must always be considered extremely doubtful, when it is recollected what formidable deserts and mountains must have been overcome, which have never been attempted by an army encumbered with the artillery and caissons necessary for modern warfare; but that it was perfectly practicable, if accomplished by embarking in the Persian gulf, is self-evident; and it is extremely doubtful, whether, if the northern confederacy had not been dissolved, Great Britain could have relied upon maintaining a permanent naval superiority in the Indian seas (2).

(1) *Jom. xiv.* 261, 262. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 114. *Southey*, ii. 151, 153.

(2) *Nap. in O'Mea.* i. 381. *Hard.* vii. 479.

The plan agreed on was in these terms:—

Feb. 28, 1801. "A French army, 35,000 strong, with light artillery, under the command of Masséna, shall be moved from France to Ulm, from whence, with the consent of Austria, it shall descend the Danube to the Black Sea.

"Arrived there, a Russian fleet will transport it to Taganrok, from whence it shall move to Taritzin, on the Volga, where it shall find boats to convey it to Astrakan.

"There it will find a Russian army of 35,000 men, composed of 15,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 10,000 Cossacks, amply provided with artillery and the horses necessary for its conveyance.

"The combined army shall be transported by the Caspian Sea, from Astrakan to Astrabat, where magazines of all sorts shall be established for its use.

"This march from the frontiers of France to Astrabat will be made in eighty days; fifty more will be requisite to bring the army to the banks of the Indus, by the route of Heral, Ferah, and Candahar." Paul afterwards agreed to increase the Cossacks to 50,000.—*See HARDENBERG*, vii. 497.

In forming an opinion on the probable result of such an expedition, no conclusion can be drawn from the successful irruptions of Alexander, Timour, Gengis Khan, or Nadir Shah, because their armies were unincumbered with the artillery and ammunition waggons indispensable to modern warfare. It appears from Colonel Connolly's Travels over this country, that for ten days' journey the army must

subsist only on chopped straw, carried with itself, and that in that desert there is little or no water, and no road for wheel carriages. Still the difficulties of the transit, according to him, are great rather than insuperable. [*Connolly*, ii. *ad fin.*] The point is most ably discussed in a learned article in the *United Service Journal*, where all the authorities and historical facts bearing on the subject are accumulated, and the conclusions drawn apparently equally just and irresistible. [*United Service Journal*, No 52.] In considering the probable success of Russia in such an undertaking, it is worthy of notice, that she never brought more than 35,000 men into the field at any one point in the late war with Turkey nor so many as 10,000 in that with Persia; facts singularly illustrative of the difficulty of pushing forward any considerable force to such distant regions by overland passage. On the other hand, the red-coats, natives and Europeans, assembled for the siege of Blunderpore, were as numerous as those which fought at Waterloo (36,000 men), and 188 cannons were planted in the trenches, and that too during the hottest of the struggle in the Burmese empire. Still, as the population of Russia is doubling every half century, and she will soon have the force of Persia at her command, the British government cannot too soon take measures, by alliance and otherwise, to guard against such a danger. Perhaps, however, the real perils lie nearer home, and our splendid Indian empire is destined to be dissolved by domestic rather than foreign causes. Considering the slender tenure which we have of that magnificent dominion, and its direct exposure, since the dissolution of the India Company, to

Death of
Paul.

But while every thing thus announced the commencement of a desperate and bloody war between England and the northern powers, an event took place within the palace of St.-Petersburg, which at once dissolved the northern confederacy, defeated the sanguine hopes of Napoléon, and changed the face of the world. This was the death of the Emperor Paul, which took place on the night of the 25d March, and led immediately to the accession of his son ALEXANDER, and a total change of policy on the part of the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg.

Napoléon announced this important event to the French in these words, "Paul I died on the night of the 25d March. The English fleet passed the Sound on the 30th. History will unveil the connexion which may have existed between these events." In truth there was a connexion, and an intimate one between them, though not in the way insinuated by the first consul. The connexion was that between flagrant misgovernment and Oriental revolution (1).

Causes of
that catas-
trophe,

In every country, how despotic soever, there is some restraint on the power of government. When oppression or tyranny have reached a certain height, a spirit of resistance is inevitably generated, which leads to convulsion, and this is the case equally in Oriental as European monarchy; in the age of Nero as that of James II. It is the highest glory and chief benefit of representative governments, to have given a regular and constitutional direction to this necessary element in the social system, to have converted a casual and transitory burst of revenge into a regular and pacific organ of improvement; and instead of the revolutions of the seraglio, introduced the steady Opposition of the British Parliament.

General ir-
ritation at
the Czar.

In Russia, this important element was unknown. No regular or useful check upon the authority of government existed; the will of the Czar was omnipotent. Measures the most hurtful might emanate from the palace without any constitutional means of redress existing, and if the conduct of the Emperor had risen to a certain degree of extravagance, no means of arresting it existed but his destruction. Many concurring causes had conspired to irritate the Russian noblesse at the Emperor Paul, and yet the vehemence of his character precluded all hope of a return to more rational principles of administration. The suspension of the commercial intercourse with England, by cutting off the great market for their rude produce, had injured the vital interests of the Russian landed proprietors; the embargo on English shipping, laid on in defiance of all the laws of war as well as the usages of humanity, had inflicted as deep a wound on their mercantile classes. The aristocracy of the country beheld with undisguised apprehension all the fixed principles of Russian policy abandoned, and a close alliance formed with a formidable revolutionary continental state, to the exclusion of the maritime power on whom they depended for the sale of almost all the produce which constituted their wealth, while the merchants felt it to be impossible to enter into any safe speculation, when the conduct of the Czar was so variable, and equal vehemence was exhibited in conducting war against an old ally, as in forming peace with a deadly foe. The internal administration of the empire was, in many respects, tyrannical and capricious; and although that might not by itself have led to a revolt in a country so habituated to submission as Muscovy, yet, combined with other and deeper causes of irritation,

British Legislation, in an assembly where its interests are neither directly nor indirectly represented, it is impossible to contemplate without alarm the probable effect upon its future destinies of the de-

mocratic influence which has recently received so great an increase.

(1) Dum. vi. 193. Jom. xiv. 263. Ann. Reg. 1801, 115. Bign. i. 47.

it produced a powerful effect. The French dress had been rigidly proscribed at the capital; the form of a coat might bring the wearer into peril of a visit to Siberia; and the Czar had renewed the ancient custom, which the good sense of preceding sovereigns had suffered to fall into disuetude, of compelling the noblesse, of whatever rank or sex, to stop their carriages and alight when they met any of the Imperial family. These causes, affecting equally the interests, the habits, and the vanity of the most powerful classes, had produced that general feeling of irritation at the Government, which in free states leads to a change of ministers, in despotic, to a dethronement of the sovereign (1).

Symptoms of instantly in his conduct. Latterly, the conduct of the Emperor had been so extravagant, as to have given rise to a very general belief that he laboured under a certain degree of insanity. This was confirmed, not less by his private than his public conduct. The state papers and articles in the St.-Petersburg Gazette, which avowedly issued from his hand, or were prepared under his direction, bore evident marks of aberration. When despatches of importance were presented to him from the British Government, containing terms of conciliation, he returned them unopened, after piercing them with his penknife. In the Court Gazette of December 30, 1800, he published an invitation to all the sovereigns of Europe to come to St.-Petersburg, and settle their disputes by a combat in a *champs clos*, with their ministers, Pitt, Thugut, Bernstorff, and Talleyrand, for esquires (2). He was so much enraged at Prussia for not instantly falling into his vehement hostility towards Great Britain, that he threatened some months before to put a stop to all intercourse between his subjects and the north of Germany, and immediately before his death entertained seriously the project of closing all the harbours in Europe against the British commerce, and overwhelming her Indian possessions by a cloud of Tartars and Kalmucks (3).

Conspiracy among the nobles for his dethronement. Alarmed at this perilous crisis of public affairs, several of the leading nobles in Russia entered into a conspiracy, the object of which, at first, was to dethrone the Czar merely, without depriving him of life; but experience in every age has confirmed the adage, that from the prisons to the grave of princes is but a step. The governor of St.-Petersburg, Count Pahlen, a minister high in the confidence of the Emperor, was deeply implicated in the conspiracy; and General Bennigsen, who afterwards bore a distinguished part in the war against France, is supposed to have taken a leading share in carrying it into execution. The plot was communicated to Paul's two sons, the Grand Duke Alexander, and Constantine, though without any insinuation that it would be attended with danger to their father's life, it being merely held out that the safety of the empire indispensably required that the Emperor's insanity should be prevented from doing any farther detriment to the public interests. The apprehension of private danger induced the young princes to lend a more willing ear than they might otherwise have done to these proposals; for, independent, of the natural violence of their father's temperament, with which they were well acquainted, they were aware that he had become lately prejudiced against his nearest relations, and had dropped hints to the Princess Gagarin, the object of his chivalrous devotion, of his intention of sending Alexander to Siberia, immuring Constantine in a fortress, and the empress-mother in a cloister. But notwithstanding this danger, it was with great difficulty that the young princes could be brought to

(1) Bign. i. 430, 433. Nap. ii. 152, 153.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1801, 114, 115. Jom. xiv. 265.

(2) "Latterly," said Napoleon, "I think Paul was mad."—O'MEARA, 380. Hord. vii. 41.

give their consent to the conspiracy; and Alexander in particular, the eldest son, only yielded on condition that his father's life should be spared (1).

His assassination. Its particulars. On the evening before his death, Paul received a note, when at supper with his mistress, warning him of the danger with which he was threatened. He put it in his pocket, saying he would read it on the morrow (2). He retired to bed at twelve. At two in the morning Prince Subof, whose situation and credit in the palace gave him access at all times to the imperial chambers, presented himself with the other conspirators at the door. A hussar, who refused admission, was cut down on the spot, and the whole party entered, and found the royal apartments empty. Paul, hearing the noise, had got up, and hid himself in a press. "He has escaped," said some of the conspirators. "That he has not," return Bennigsen. "No weakness, or I will put you all to death." At the same time Pahlen, who never lost his presence of mind, put his hand on the bed-clothes, and feeling them warm, observed that the Emperor could not be far off, and he was soon discovered, and dragged from his retreat. They presented to the Emperor his abdication to sign. Paul refused. A contest arose, and in the struggle an officer's sash was passed round the neck of the unhappy monarch, and he was strangled after a desperate resistance (3). The two grand dukes were in the room below. Alexander eagerly inquired, the moment it was over, whether they had saved his father's life. Pahlen's silence told too plainly the melancholy tale, and the young prince tore his hair in an agony of grief, and broke out into sincere and passionate exclamations of sorrow at the catastrophe which had prepared the way for his ascent to the throne. The despair of the empress and the Grand Duke Constantine was equally vehement; but Pahlen, calm and collected, represented that the empire indispensably required a change of policy, and that nothing now remained but for Alexander to assume the reins of government (4).

The evident symptoms of insanity which this ill-fated monarch evinced towards the close of his reign, his fickleness of conduct, tyrannical usage of British seamen, and general extravagance of demeanour, must not throw into the shade the good qualities which at an earlier period he displayed, and the important ameliorations which he effected in his country. He first established the hereditary succession to the crown; a matter of infinite importance in a government partaking so largely of the Oriental character. His improvements in the administration of the army were immense, and laid the foundation of the rapid strides which it made under his more fortunate successor. His prodigalities even contributed to the circulation of wealth, and sensibly augmented the public improvement. He was vehement, inconstant, and capricious, but not without a large intermixture of generous feeling, and occasionally capable of heroic actions (5).

The influence of the causes which had occasioned this violent and frightful revolution speedily appeared in the measures which the young Emperor pursued on his accession to the throne. The conspirators were invested with the chief offices of state, and the Czar was compelled to take counsel from those

(1) Bign. i. 434, 435. Hard. viii.

(2) Prince Mechercki wrote a letter to Paul in the early part of that day to warn him of his danger, and reveal the names of the conspirators. He delivered the letter into the hands of Koutaitsoff, another courtier, who put it in his coat pocket, and forgot it there when he changed his dress to dine with the emperor. He returned to get it; but Paul growing impatient, sent for him in a hurry, and the

trembling courtier came back without the epistle on which so much depended.—Hard. viii. 6.

(3) The dress of Ouvaroff, one of the conspirators, caused him to be mistaken by the Emperor for his son Constantine; and the last words which the unhappy monarch uttered were, "And you too, my Constantine!"

(4) Bigo. i. 438, 439. O'Meara. i. 380. Hard. viii. 86, 87.

(5) Hard. viii. 91.

Accession
of Alexan-
der, and
immediate
approach to
an accom-
modation
with Eng-
land.

whose hands had recently been imbrued in his father's blood, in every thing connected with the government of the empire (1). The new Emperor, on the day succeeding his elevation to the throne, issued a proclamation declaring his resolution to govern according to the maxims and system of his august grandmother, Catherine; and one of the first acts of his reign was to give orders that the British sailors and captains, who had been taken from the ships laid under sequestration, and marched into the interior, should be set at liberty, and carefully conducted, at the public expense, to the ports from which they had been severally taken. At the same time all prohibitions against the export of corn were removed; a measure of no small importance to the famishing population of the British isles, and hardly less material to the gorged proprietors of Russian produce. The young Emperor shortly after wrote a letter with his own hand to the King of England, expressing in the warmest terms his desire to re-establish the amicable relations of the two empires; a declaration which was received with equal shouts of joy in London as St.-Petersburg (2).

His charac-
ter.

Perhaps no sovereign since the days of the Antonines ever was called to higher destinies, or more worthily filled an important place in the theatre of the world than the Emperor Alexander. Placed at the head of the most powerful and rising empire in existence, stationed midway between ancient civilisation and barbaric vigour, he was called to take the lead in the great struggle for European freedom; to combat, with the energy and enthusiasm of the desert, the superiority of advanced information, and meet the condensed military force of a revolution, which had beat down all the strength of continental power, with the dauntless resolution and enduring fortitude which arise in the earlier ages of social existence. Well and nobly he fulfilled his destiny.—Repeatedly defeated, never subdued, he took counsel, like his great predecessor, from misfortune, and prepared in silence those invincible bands which, in the day of trial, hurled back the most terrible array which ambition had ever marshalled against the liberties of mankind. A majestic figure, a benevolent expression of countenance, gave him that sway over the multitude which ever belongs to physical advantages in youthful princes; while the qualities of his understanding and the feelings of his heart secured the admiration of all whose talents fitted them to judge of the affairs of nations. Misunderstood by those who formed their opinion only from the ease and occasional levity of his manner, he was early formed to great determinations, and evinced in the most trying circumstances, during the French invasion and the Congress of Vienna, a solidity of judgment equalled only by the strength of his resolution. A disposition naturally generous and philanthropic, moulded by the precepts of La Harpe, had strongly imbued his mind with liberal principles, which shone forth in full lustré when he was called on to act as the pacificator of the world after the fall of Paris; but subsequent experience convinced him of the extreme danger of prematurely

(1) A lady of rank and wit wrote to Fouché, on occasion of a public ceremony at which the Emperor was present soon after his accession—"The young Emperor walked, preceded by the assassins of his grandfather, followed by those of his father, and surrounded by his own."—"There," said Fouché, "is a woman who speaks Tacitus."—See Bign. i. 445 HAAD, vii. 103.

(2) Jom. xiv. 268, 269. Ann. Reg. 1801, 116.

The empress-mother, a woman of heroic spirit and noble character, and who possessed the greatest influence through life over her son, openly and uniformly avowed her horror at Paul's murder; and

shortly after that event, had a picture painted, representing him on his deathbed, and publicly exposed at the Foundling Hospital, which was under her peculiar charge. Prodigious crowds having been attracted by the sight, Count Pahlen became alarmed at the consequences, and prevailed on Alexander to request his mother to have it removed. But the princess was not to be shaken. "My son," said she, "you must choose between Pahlen and me." The painting remained, and the minister was soon after dismissed from his situations.—D'ABR. vi. 342.

transplanting the institutions of one country into another in a different stage of civilisation ; and his latter years were chiefly directed to objects of practical improvement (1), and the preparation of his subjects, by the extension of knowledge and the firmness of government, for those privileges which, if suddenly conferred, would have involved in equal ruin his empire and himself.

His early
peace and
popular
measures.

The first measures of his administration were eminently calculated to win that popularity which, notwithstanding the proverbial fickleness of the multitude, never afterwards forsook him. By an ukase, published on the 14th April, he restored to the nobility their privileges, and prerogatives, such as they had been in the time of the Empress Catherine, re-established the rights of municipalities, abolished secret proceedings in criminal cases, awarded a general amnesty, and stopped all the state prosecutions which had been commenced. Indulgences were at the same time granted to the clergy, and measures taken to re-open those vents for the rude produce of the state, the closing of which had occasioned so much alarm. Independent of his letter to the King of England, the Emperor wrote to Sir Hyde Parker, expressing an anxious wish to close with the amicable propositions made by the British Government to his predecessor, provided it could be done without violating his engagements to his allies, and entreating him in the mean time to suspend hostilities, and conveying the pleasing intelligence that orders had been given that the British seamen sent to prison by Paul were set at liberty (2). At the time when this letter arrived at the British fleet, Sir Hyde had not been recalled by the English ministry, and Nelson, wisely judging that the best way of forwarding a pacific negotiation was to support it by a hostile demonstration, made sail with all his squadron to Carls-crona, where, in answer to a message inquiring whether the Swedish Government was willing to be included in the armistice concluded with Denmark, he received an answer that they "could not listen to separate proposals, but would close with any equitable offers made by Great Britain to the united

April 18,
Nelson sails
for Cronstadt.

northern powers." This reply, coupled with the well-known pacific inclinations of the Court of Stockholm, led the English admiral to conclude that he would experience no difficulty in arranging an accommodation with the whole Baltic states, if the disputes with the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg could be adjusted; and therefore he proposed instantly to sail for Revel, where a large portion of the Russian fleet lay in an open bay, exposed to his attacks, and unable from the ice to make their escape. But Sir Hyde, who trusted that the death of Paul would immediately lead to a settlement of all the differences, insisted upon returning to Kiøge bay, where he cast anchor, and remained till the 5th May, when he was recalled by the British

May 7.

Government, and Nelson appointed to the command in chief. No sooner was he the unfettered master of his own actions, than he set sail for the gulf of Finland. But when he arrived there he found that in the interval the enemy had escaped; they had cut through the ice in the mole, six feet

His concilia-
tory measures
there.

thick, on the 5d May, and were now safe under the cannon of Cronstadt. Thither they were followed by the indefatigable Nelson, who saluted the forts when he approached, and wrote to the Emperor congratulating him on his accession, and urging the immediate release of the British subjects and property. A friendly intercourse was immediately established between the British admiral and the Russian authorities; but as the

(1) Jom. xiv. 270. Hard. viii. 96, 104.

(2) Ukase, April 7, 1801. State papers, 1801, 256.

Emperor expressed great uneasiness at the presence of the English squadron, and it was evident that the negotiation would proceed more favourably if this cause of irritation was removed, Nelson stood out to sea, and proceeded down the Baltic, leaving only a brig to bring off the provisions which had been contracted for. This judicious and conciliatory conduct was met with a corresponding disposition on the part of Russia. When at anchor off Rostock, he received an answer to his letter to the Emperor, couched in the most flattering terms, and containing the important intelligence, that the British vessels and crews which had been detained were ordered to be liberated. On his return to Copenhagen, he found that the conduct of Denmark during his absence had been actuated by very different principles; the most hostile preparations had been going forward, in defiance of the treaty, and ample grounds existed, if the English Government had been inclined, to renew hostilities, and utterly destroy the Danish naval power. But the death of Paul had dissolved the confederacy; conciliatory measures were now the most prudent course which could be adopted, and Nelson, wisely dissembling his resentment, proceeded to England to receive the thanks of a grateful nation, which his valour and skill had brought victorious out of a state of unprecedented danger (1).

Peace with
Russia, and
abandon-
ment of the
principles
of the arm-
ed neutral-
ity.

The British Cabinet immediately sent Lord St.-Helens to St.-Petersburg; and soon after his arrival at that capital, he signed a treaty as glorious to England as it was confirmatory of the correctness of the view she had taken of the law of nations in this great question. By this convention it was provided, "That the right of searching merchant-ships belonging to the subjects of one of the contracting powers, and navigating under a ship-of-war of the same power, shall only be exercised by ships-of-war of the belligerent party, and shall never extend to the fitters out of privateers or other vessels which do not belong to the imperial or royal fleet of their majesties, but which their subjects shall have fitted out for war; that the effects on board neutral ships shall be free, with the exception of contraband of war and of enemy's property; and it is agreed not to comprise in the number of the latter the merchandise of the produce, growth, or manufacture of the countries at war, which should have been acquired by the subjects of the neutral power, and should be transported for their account." And the contraband articles between the two powers were declared to be the same as those specified in the treaty 10th February 1797; viz. "cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, balls, bullets, firelocks, flints, matches, sulphur, helmets, pikes, swords, sword-belts, pouches, saddles and bridles, excepting such quantity of the said articles as may be necessary for the defence of the ship and crew." And "that, in order to determine what shall be deemed a blockaded port, that denomination only is given to such a one where there is, by the disposition of the power which attacks it, with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering (2)." By this treaty the right of search was placed upon its true footing; it was divested of the circumstances most likely to occasion irritation in neutral vessels, and not stipulated in favour of either party as a new right, but merely recognised as a privilege already existing, necessarily inherent by the practice of maritime states in every belligerent power, and subjected to such restraints as the enlarged experience of mankind had proved to be expedient.

(1) Southey, ii. 162, 171. Bign. i. 443, 446. *Jour.* xiv. 272, 274. *Nap.* ii. 154, 156.

(2) Convention, June, 17, 1801. Articles 3, 4. *State papers*, 213. *Ann. Reg.* 1801.

Napoléon's
indignation
at it.

Napoléon has observed upon this agreement, "Europe beheld with astonishment this ignominious treaty signed by Russia, and which, by consequence, Denmark and Sweden were compelled to adopt. It was equivalent to an admission of the sovereignty of the seas in the British Parliament, and the slavery of all other states. This treaty was such that England could have desired nothing more, and a power of the third order would have been ashamed to have signed it." A stronger panegyric could not have been pronounced on this memorable convention, or a more valuable eulogium on the firmness of the Cabinet and the intrepidity of the seamen, by whom these important advantages had been secured. The first consul early despatched Duroc to St.-Petersburg to endeavour to counterbalance the influence of Great Britain, and bring Alexander back to the footsteps of his predecessor; but though he received the most flattering reception, he could effect nothing against the ascendant of Nelson; and the treaty was signed, to the universal joy of both nations (1).

May 19.
Dissolution
of the naval
confederacy.

Sweden and Denmark were not expressly included in the convention of the 17th June; but they were compelled to follow the example of Russia. Unable of themselves to contend with the naval power of England, the anticipated loss of all their colonies, and the certainty of being deprived of their whole commerce, if they continued the contest, ultimately overcame the influence of France, and the recollection of their recent wounds at Copenhagen. On the 20th May, a convention was agreed to by the Danish Government, in virtue of which the city of Hamburg was, three days afterwards, evacuated by the Danish troops, and the free navigation of the Elbe restored; and on the 19th, the embargo was raised both in Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. These measures were immediately met by corresponding steps on the part of the British Government; the embargo on all the ships of the Baltic powers in the harbours of Great Britain was raised; and the expense both of putting it on and taking it off, so far as Danish vessels were concerned, defrayed by the English treasury. Prussia had been unwillingly drawn into the struggle, and took the first opportunity of escaping from its effects. Under the mediation of Russia, an arrangement was concluded, by which the Prussian troops were to evacuate Hanover, and restore the free navigation of the Weser (2).

Reflections
on these
events

Thus was dissolved, in less than six months after it had been formed, the most formidable confederacy ever arrayed against the English maritime power. Professedly contracted in order to obtain the liberty of the seas, it was really directed against the grandeur and prosperity of Great Britain; breathing only the sentiments of freedom and justice, it was, in truth, intended to divide among the coalesced states the power and the ascendancy of a more fortunate rival. The rapidity with which this powerful alliance was broken up by England, at the conclusion of a long and burdensome war, and when her people were labouring under the combined pressure of severe want and diminished employment, is one of the most remarkable features of this memorable contest; and, perhaps more than any other, characteristic of the vast ascendancy, moral as well as political, which she has acquired among the other nations in the world. It is in vain to say, the dissolution of the confederacy was owing to the death of Paul; the revolution at St.-Petersburg was itself the result of the influence of Great Britain; of that vast commerce, which has made her intercourse essential to the very

(1) Nap. ii. 159. Bign. i. 451, 452. Hard. viii. 62.

(2) Join. xiv. 275, 276. Bign. i. 451, 452. Ann. Reg. 1801, 116.

existence of the most haughty continental states; and that moral sway, which ranges under her banners the most powerful and important classes of distant nations. The conduct of the English Government and people, during this trying crisis, was a model of firmness and moderation, and was deservedly crowned by one of the most glorious triumphs recorded in their history. Disdaining to submit to the menaces even of combined Europe, they boldly fronted the danger; anticipated by the rapidity of their movements the junction of their adversaries, paralysed by the thunder of their arms the first of their opponents, and at the same time holding out the olive branch, succeeded in detaching the greatest power from the confederacy, and ultimately dissolving it, without the abandonment of one principle for which the war had been undertaken. The convention of 17th June fixed the maritime question upon its true basis; it arrogated no peculiar privilege to Great Britain, subjected to no exclusive humiliation the neutral states, but prescribing one equal rule for all belligerent powers, and imposing one equal obligation upon all neutrals, settled the right of search and blockade upon that equitable footing, which, alike obligatory upon England and inferior nations, must ever remain the law of the seas, while ambition and revenge continue to desolate the world.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT—CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.

AUGUST, 1799—OCTOBER, 1801.

ARGUMENT.

State of the Egyptian army when left by Napoléon—Desponding letter of Kléber to the Directory—It falls into the hands of the English, who forward it to Napoléon—Mourad Bey issues from the Desert, and is defeated—Advance of the Turkish force—Defeat of a detachment at the mouth of the Nile—Convention of El-Arish—The British Government had previously prohibited such a convention—Hostilities are in consequence resumed—Battle of Heliopolis—Total defeat of the Turks—Desperate situation of the garrison at Cairo—Storm and massacre at Boulak—Cairo is retaken—Defeat of the Turks in every quarter—Improved condition of the French army—Assassination of Kleber—His designs when he fell—Menon takes the command—Preparations for the English expedition—Magnificent conception of the attack—Whole contest falls on Abercromby's corps—Sir Ralph resolves to make the attack alone—Arrival of the expedition on the coast of Egypt—Landing of the troops—Severe action on the Sand-hills, and defeat of the French there—Caution measures of the English general—Bloody encounter with the French advanced guard—Description of the ground now taken up by the British Army—Position of the French—Interesting recollections connected with the spot—Battle of Alexandria—Wound and death of Sir Ralph Abercromby—Immense moral effects of this victory; but its first results are not equally decisive—Surrender of Damietta—Divisions break out among the French generals—Indecisive measures of Menon—General Hutchison assumes the command of the English army, and advances towards Cairo—Capture of Ramanieh—General Belliard is repulsed near Cairo—Which is invested—Advance of Sir David Baird's division from the Red Sea—Their march from Cosier to Thebes across the Desert—General Hutchison moves against Menon at Alexandria—Progress of the Siege—Surrender of Menon—Change in the Government of Egypt—Which falls into the hands of the Turks—Extravagant rejoicings in Constantinople and London at these events—Great maritime exertions of Napoléon to preserve Egypt—Naval action in the bay of Algesiraz—The English are worsted—Second battle of Algesiraz—Terrible catastrophe of the Spanish vessels, and defeat of the French—Attack of Napoléon on Portugal—Treaty with Spain for this purpose—The Portuguese apply to the English for aid—But can make no resistance to France—Peace concluded, which the First Consul refuses to ratify—A French army invades Portugal—Peace purchased by enormous pecuniary spoliation—Napoléon offers Hanover to Prussia—which declines the proposal—Preparations for the invasion of England—Apprehensions of the British Government—Attack on the flotilla at Bologne, by Lord Nelson, which is defeated—Negotiations for peace between France and England—First proposals of England—which are refused—Preliminaries signed at London—Transports of joy on the occasion, both in France and England—But it is severely stigmatized by many in England—Arguments urged against it in the country—Arguments urged in support of it by the Administration—Peace between France and Turkey—And treaties between France, and Bavaria, and America—Important treaty between France and Russia—Debates on the peace in the British Parliament—Arguments urged against it by the Opposition—Answer made by the Government and Mr. Pitt—Reflections on the peace, which appears to have been expedient—Vast increase of the naval and military resources of England during the war, as compared with those of France—Comparative increase in revenue of France and England during its continuance—Public debt, exports, imports, and shipping, of the two countries during its continuance—General result of these details—Reflections on the immense efforts made by England at the close of the war—Compared with the nigardly exertions at its commencement—Great part of this prosperity was owing to the paper currency—Its effects on prices—Glorious state and character of England at the conclusion of the contest.

State of
the Egyptian
army when left
by Napoléon.

WHEN Napoléon quitted the Egyptian shores, and the career of Asiatic glory, to follow his fortunes on the theatre of Europe, he left Kléber in the command of the army, and addressed to him a long letter, containing minute directions for the regulation of his conduct in all possible emergencies which might occur. As it was evident

that the victory of the Nile had completely cut off all chance of maintaining a regular intercourse with France, and it was therefore more than probable that the Egyptian army would be compelled to capitulate, he distinctly authorized his successor to conclude a convention for the evacuation of Egypt, if he received no succours or assistance from France during the following year, and the deaths by the plague should amount to above fifteen hundred persons. Immediately after being invested with the command, Kléber wrote a letter to the Directory, in which he gave the most desponding view of the situation of the army; asserted that it was reduced to half its former amount; was destitute of every thing, and in the lowest state of depression; that the manufactories of powder and arms had totally failed; that no resources existed to replace the stores which had been expended; that General Bonaparte, so far from leaving any money behind him to maintain the troops, had bequeathed to them only a debt of 12,000,000 of francs (L.480,000), being more than a year's revenue of the province; that the soldiers were 4,000,000 (L.160,000) in arrear of their pay; that the Mamelukes were dispersed, not destroyed; and that the Grand Vizier and Djezzar Pacha had arrived at Acre at the head of 50,000 men. He concluded in these terms: "Such are, citizen directors, the circumstances under which General Bonaparte has laid upon me the enormous burden of the Army of the East. He saw the fatal crisis was approaching; your orders doubtless prevented him from attempting to surmount it. That the crisis was at hand is attested equally by his letters, his instructions, his negotiations. It is notorious to all the world, and unhappily as well known to our enemies as to the French in Egypt. In these circumstances, I think the best thing I can do is to continue the negotiations commenced by Bonaparte, even if it should lead to no other result than to gain time. I have annexed the letter I have written to the Grand Vizier, sending him at the same time the duplicate of that of Bonaparte (1)."

(1) Napoléon and Kléber's letters, in Dum. iv. 110, 125.

Aug. 17, 1799. The letter which Napoléon had addressed to the Grand Vizier previous to his departure from the East, is one of the most characteristic of all his compositions. "Alas!" said he, "why are the Sublime Porte, and the French nation, after having been friends for so many years, now at war with each other? Your excellency cannot be ignorant that the French nation has ever been warmly attached to the Sublime Porte. Endowed as your excellency is with the most distinguished talents, it cannot have escaped your penetration, that the Austrians and Russians are united in a perpetual league against the Turkish empire, and that the French, on the other hand, have done every thing in their power to arrest their wicked designs. Your excellency knows that the Russians are the enemies of the Mus-ulman faith; and that the Emperor Paul, as Grand-Master of Malta, has solemnly sworn enmity to the race of Osmanlis. The French, on the other hand, have abolished the Order of Malta, given liberty to the Mahometan prisoners detained there, and profess the same belief as themselves, 'That there is no God but the true God.' Is it not strange then, that the Sublime Porte should declare war on the French, its real and sincere friend, and contract alliance with the Russians and Germans, its implacable enemies?"

"As long as the French were of the sect of the Messiah they were the friends of the Sublime Porte; nevertheless that power declares war against them. This has arisen from the error into which the Courts of England and Russia have led the Turkish Divan.

We had informed it by letter of our intended expedition into Arabia; but these Courts found means to interrupt and suppress our letters; and although I had proved to the Sublime Porte that the French Republic, far from wishing to deprive it of any part of its dominions, had not even the smallest intention of making war on it, his most Glorious Majesty, Sultan Selim, gave credit to the English, and with unaccountable precipitance declared war on the French his ancient allies. Though informed of this war, I despatched an ambassador to avert it; but he was seized and thrown into prison, and I was obliged, in spite of myself, to cross the Desert and carry the war into Syria.

"Though my army is as innumerable as the sands of the sea, full of courage; though I have fortresses and castles of prodigious strength; though I have no fear or apprehension of any sort; yet, out of consideration to the human race, and above all from a desire to be reunited to the first and most faithful of our allies, the Sultan Selim, I now make known my disposition for peace. If you wish to have Egypt, tell me so. France never entertained an idea of taking it out of the hands of the Sublime Porte and swallowing it up. Give authority to your minister who is at Paris, or send some one to Egypt with full powers, and all shall be arranged without animosity, and agreeably to your desires."

Under such a specious guise did Napoléon conceal his ambitious designs on the East; his resolution, so early formed and steadily adhered to, of making Egypt a French colony; his unprovoked seizure of that country while at peace with the Ottoman empire, and his attempt which, but for the repulse at

It falls into the hands of the English, who forward it to Napoléon. That this letter contained an exaggerated picture of the circumstances and sufferings of the army, is abundantly proved by the condition in which it was found by the English troops when they landed at Alexandria eighteen months afterwards. In truth, Kléber wrote under a bitter feeling of irritation at Napoléon for having deserted the Egyptian army; and his letter is tinged by those gloomy colours in which all exiles, but in an especial manner the French, regard the country of their banishment. It fell into the hands of the English during its passage across the Mediterranean, and was by their Government forwarded to the first consul after his accession to supreme authority; and it is not the least honourable trait in that great man's character, that he made allowance for the influence of the desponding feelings which he had so repeatedly witnessed in the Egyptian officers, and never sought to revenge upon his absent lieutenant the spiteful expressions which, in an official despatch to Government, he had used towards himself (1).

Mourad Bey issues from the Desert, and is defeated. Aug. 6, 1799. But although Kléber, under the influence of these gloomy views, addressed proposals of accommodation to the Grand Vizier, he made the most vigorous preparations to repel the attack with which he was threatened from the Ottoman army. The greater part of the French troops were stationed at El-Arish and the eastern frontier to watch the motions of the Syrian host, while six thousand were scattered along the course of the Nile, from the cataracts to the ocean, to overawe the Mamelukes, and guard the sea-coast from Turkish invasion. Encouraged by the approach of the Grand Vizier's army, the indefatigable Mourad Bey again issued from the Desert, at the head of two thousand Mamelukes; but he was attacked by Desaix, early in August, at Syout, and obliged to fall back. Following up his success, the French general mounted his infantry on dromedaries, and, at the head of a chosen band, pursued the Mameluke chief into Oct. 8. his farthest recesses. The latter, conceiving he had only to deal with horsemen, charged the attacking column with great impetuosity; but the cavaliers instantly dismounted, placed their dromedaries in the centre, and formed a square, with the front rank kneeling, as at the battle of the Pyramids. The Mamelukes were received with the murderous rolling fire of Sultan Kebir, and, after charging repeatedly on every side, they fled in disorder into the Desert, and did not again appear on the theatre of Egyptian warfare (2).

Advance of the Turkish force. Defeat of a detachment at the mouth of the Nile. Nov. 1. The Turkish army which Napoléon destroyed at Aboukir, was but the advanced guard of the vast force which the Sublime Porte had collected to recover Egypt from the Republican arms. Their main body, consisting of twenty thousand Janizaries and regular soldiers, and twenty-five thousand irregular troops, arrived in the end of October in the neighbourhood of Gazah, on the confines of the Desert which separates Syria from Egypt. At the same time a corps of eight thousand Janizaries, under the convoy of Sir Sidney Smith, arrived at the mouth of the Nile, to effect a diversion in that quarter. The leading division, consisting of four thousand men, landed, and made themselves masters of the tower of Bogaz, at the mouth of the Nile, where they immediately began to fortify themselves; but before their works had made any progress, they were attacked by General Verdier, at the head of a thousand French, routed, and

Acre, would in all probability have succeeded, of revolutionizing the whole of Asia Minor, and mounting himself on the throne of Constantine.—See the *Original Letter in Ann. Reg.* 1800, 218, 219.

(1) Dum. iv. 130, 131. Jom. iv. 376. Nap. in Month. ii. 215.

(2) Jom. xiv. 377, 378. Dum. iv. 151. Berth. 198.

driven into the sea, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, and all their standards (1).

Convention
of El-Arish.

Relieved by this decisive victory from all apprehensions in that quarter, Kléber turned his whole attention to the great array which was approaching from the Syrian Desert. The check at the mouth of the Nile rendered the Grand Vizier more disposed to enter into negotiations, while the declining numbers and desponding spirits of the French rendered them desirous on any terms to extricate themselves from a hopeless banishment, and revisit their beloved country. Napoléon had made propositions for an accommodation so early as 17th August; and Sir Sidney Smith had warned Kléber that, in virtue of the treaty, 5th January, 1799, Turkey could no longer make peace with France, but in concert with Russia and Great Britain. An unexpected reverse facilitated the negotiation; the Grand Vizier having crossed the Desert laid siege to El-Arish. The operations were conducted by Major Douglas and other British officers, and the fort carried, during a tumult

Dec. 29. of insubordination on the part of the garrison, on the 29th December. After their means of defence were exhausted, the garrison capitulated; but the terms were disregarded by the unruly crowd of Mussulmans, and in spite of the utmost efforts of the British officers, above three hundred French were put to the sword. The capture of this stronghold, which Napoléon termed one of the keys of Egypt, and the proof it afforded of the degree to which the spirit of the troops had been shaken, had a powerful effect in

Jan. 24, 1800. accelerating the negotiations; and a convention was signed at El-Arish about a month afterwards, by which it was stipulated, that the French army should return to Europe with its arms and baggage, on board its own vessels, or those furnished by the Turkish authorities; that all the fortresses of Egypt, with the exception of Alexandria (2), Rosetta, and Aboukir, where the army was to embark, should be surrendered within forty-five days; that the prisoners on both sides should be given up, and that the Grand Vizier should pay L.120,000 during the three months that the evacuation was going forward.

This convention was not signed by the British admiral, Sir Sidney Smith; nor was he vested either with express authority to conclude such a treaty, nor with such a command as necessarily implied such a power. It was, however, entered into with his concurrence and approbation, and like a man of honour, he felt himself as much bound to see it carried into effect, as if his

The British Government had previously prohibited such a convention.

signature had been affixed to the instrument. But the British Government had, three months before, sent out orders to Lord Keith, commanding the English fleet in the Mediterranean, not to consent to any treaty in which it was not stipulated that the French army

were to be prisoners of war; and Lord Keith, on the 8th January, a fortnight before the convention of El-Arish was signed, had sent a letter from Minorca, to Kléber, warning him that any vessels having on board French troops, returning home in virtue of a capitulation, other than an unconditional surrender, would be made prisoners of war (3). No sooner was

Hostilities in consequence resumed. this letter received by General Kléber, in February following, than he was filled with indignation, despatched instant orders to put a

stop to the evacuation of the country, which had commenced, and resolved to resume hostilities. In an animated proclamation to his troops, he declar-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1799, 217. Dumas, iv, 132, 133. Join, xiii. 396, 397.

(2) Join. xiv. 402. Ann. Reg. 1800, 219. State papers, 223. Berth. 310, 313.

(3) See Lord Keith's letter in Berthier, 391.

ed:—"Soldiers! we can only answer such insolence by victories—prepare to combat (1)." This announcement was received with loud shouts by the troops, who had already become highly dissatisfied at the humiliating convention which had been concluded, and they joyfully prepared to forget all their cares in the excitement of a battle (2).

March 20,
1800.
Battle of
Heliopolis. Kléber drew up his army, which had now arrived from all parts of Egypt, and was twelve thousand strong, by moonlight, on the night of 19th March, in four squares, in the plain of Koubbe, in front of the ruins of Heliopolis. The heavens ever serene in those latitudes, enabled them to perform the movement with precision, though the light was too feeble to permit the enemy to perceive what was going forward. In front were stationed the four squares, with artillery at the angles, and the cavalry in the intervals. Companies of grenadiers doubled the corners of each square, and were ready to be employed either in resisting an attack, or offensive movements. Order, silence, and regularity prevailed in the European army; the solemnity of the occasion had subdued the usual vivacity of the French character; they felt that the moment had arrived when they must either conquer or die. The Turks, on the other hand, were encamped, after the manner of Asiatics, in confused masses, in the neighbourhood of El-Hanka; six thousand Janizaries lay in the village of Matarieh, where they had thrown up some rude fortifications; their numerous cavalry, with the Mamelukes of Ibrahim Bey, extended on the right of that advanced guard as far as the banks of the Nile. Their whole force amounted to nearly fifty thousand men; but more than half of this array consisted of irregulars, upon whom little reliance was to be placed; and the situation of the regular corps in the village of Matarieh suggested the hope that they might be cut off before the remainder of the army could come up to their support. For this purpose, General Friant advanced before daybreak straight towards that village, while Regnier, with his division, moved forward in front of the ruins of Heliopolis to cut off the communication between their detached corps and the bulk of the Turkish army. No sooner did the Janizaries perceive that the enemy were approaching their intrenchments, than they sallied forth with their redoubtable scimitars in their hands, and commenced a furious attack

(1) *Jom* xiv. 404, 405. *Dnm*. iv. 136. *Berth*. 392.

(2) The continental historians of every description are loud in their abuse of the English Government for what they call their bad faith in refusing to ratify the convention of El Arish. The smallest attention to dates must be sufficient to prove that these censures are totally destitute of foundation. The convention was signed at El-Arish, on January 24th, 1800, and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that the British Government would agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorca, January, 8th, 1800, or sixteen days before the signature of the treaty. This letter was founded on instructions sent out by the English Cabinet to Lord Keith, dated December 17th, in consequence of the intercepted letters of Kléber, which had fallen into their hands immediately after Napoleon's return. Kléber no sooner received Lord Keith's letter than he resumed hostilities, and fought the battle of Heliopolis with his wonted precipitance, without once reflecting on the fact, that the letter on which he founded so much, was written not only long before intelligence of the treaty had reached England, but from Minorca, sixteen days before the treaty itself was signed. "No sooner, however," said Mr. Pitt in his place in Parliament, was it known in England that the French general had the faith of a British officer pledged to him, and was disposed to act upon it, than instructions were sent

out to have the convention executed, though the officer in question had, in fact, no authority to sign it." [*Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 590.] Orders accordingly were sent out to execute the treaty, and they arrived in Egypt, in May 1800, long after the battle of Heliopolis; and Kléber had consented to a renewal of the treaty, when it was interrupted by his assassination at Grand Cairo, on June 14, 1800. [*Jom*. xii. 421.] Sir Sidney Smith had no authority to agree to the convention, nor was he the commanding officer on the station, in whom that power necessarily resided, but a mere commodore in command of a ship of the line and two frigates, Lord Keith being the head of the squadron in the Mediterranean. This conduct, in agreeing, contrary to their obvious interests, to restore to France a powerful veteran army, irrecoverably separated from the Republic at the very time when it most stood in need of its assistance, in consequence of a convention acceded to without authority by a subordinate officer, is the strongest instance of the good faith of the English Cabinet; and affords a striking contrast to the conduct of Napoleon soon after, in refusing to ratify the armistice of Treviso, concluded with full powers by his general, Bruce, a proceeding which the French historians mention, not only without disapprobation, but manifest satisfaction.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 220. and *Napoleon*, ii. 134.

on the French squares. But Asiatic valour could effect nothing against European steadiness and discipline; the Ottomans were received in front by a murderous rolling fire, and charged at the same time, while disordered by their rush forward, in flank. In a few minutes they were mown down and destroyed; the ditches filled by their wounded fugitives, and over the breathing and bleeding mass the French grenadiers pressed on and scaled the works. Instantly the camp of the Janizaries was carried; cannon, ammunition, tents, all fell into the hands of the victors; and the small remnant who fled towards the main army were swept away by the fire of Friant's division, or cut down by the charges of the French cavalry (1).

Total defeat of the Turks.

The Grand Vizier no sooner saw his advanced guard destroyed than he moved forward with his whole army to avenge their loss. The French were reposing after the fatigues of their first onset, when the rays of the newly-risen sun were intercepted by a cloud of dust in the east. It was the Ottoman army, still forty thousand strong, which was approaching to trample under their horses' hoofs the diminutive band of Franks which had dared to await their charge. Immediately the French order of battle was formed; the troops were drawn up in squares, Friant on the left, Régnier on the right; the cannon advanced into the intervals between the masses; the cavalry remained close behind, ready to break through the moment a favourable opportunity occurred. The cannonade soon became extremely warm on both sides; but the balls of the Ottomans, ill-directed, flew over the heads of the Republicans, while their own artillery was rapidly dismounted by the well directed fire of their adversaries, and even the Grand Vizier's staff was melting away under the deadly tempest of bombs. Torn to pieces by the hail-storm of bullets, the Osmanlis prepared for a general charge. The concentration of their standards along their whole line gave the French warning that it was approaching; a cloud of dust filled the sky, the earth trembled as if shaken by an earthquake, and the roar of twenty thousand horsemen at full speed was enough to have struck terror into the most dauntless breasts. But nothing could break the firm array of the Republicans. As the enemy approached, they were received by a terrible discharge of grape-shot; their front rank almost all fell under the fatal storm; the rear wheeled about and fled, and in a few minutes the mighty array had disappeared, without a single musket having been fired by the French infantry. The Vizier rallied his troops, and brought them up again to the attack; but they were unable to break those flaming citadels, from which a devouring fire issued on every side. Surrounded by an innumerable multitude, not one of the balls from the French squares fell without effect, and in a short time the carnage became intolerable, and the Ottomans fled in indescribable confusion towards the desert. Kléber, following up his success, advanced rapidly to El-Hanka; the Turks fled the moment the French bayonets appeared; the whole army pressed forward, and before nightfall they had made themselves masters of the Ottoman camp, and reposed in the splendid tents, where the luxury of the East had displayed all its magnificence (2).

While these important events were going forward in the plain of Heliodopolis, the garrison of Cairo were reduced to the last extremity. Two thousand men had been left in that city, under the command of Generals Verdier and Zayoncheck, with orders, if a general insurrection broke out, to retire

(1) Berth. 399, 400. Jom. xiii. 406, 407. Dum. iv. 137, 138.

(2) Berth. 400, 403. Jom. xiii. 407, 408. Dum. iv. 138.

into the forts which had been constructed to overawe its turbulent population. A corps of Mamelukes and Turks was detached during the battle, and

Desperate
situation of
the garrison
at Cairo.

by a circuitous route reached Cairo, where it excited a revolt. The French were shut up in the forts, and it was only by a vigorous defence that they maintained themselves against the furious attacks of the Mussulmans. When the firing had ceased on the plain of Heliopolis, the sound of a distant cannonade, in the direction of Cairo, informed the victors of what was going forward at the capital. They instantly despatched a corps at midnight, which, traversing the Desert by starlight, arrived in time to rescue the brave garrison from their perilous situation. Kléber at the

March 23. same time pursued the broken army, to Balbier, which surrendered, though strongly garrisoned, at the first summons; and soon after, the Grand Vizier, abandoning all his artillery, baggage, and ammunition, retired across the Desert, actively pursued by the Arabs, and his mighty host was speedily reduced to a slender train of followers (1).

The Turks, under Ibrahim Bey, who had been detached to Cairo, agreed to evacuate the town when they were informed of the result of the battle of Heliopolis; but it was found impracticable to bring the insurgent population to terms of surrender, and it was necessary, at all hazards, to strike terror

Storm and
massacre at
Boulak.

into the country, by a sanguinary example near the capital. Boulak, a fortified suburb of Cairo, was surrounded, and the inhabitants having refused to capitulate, it was carried by storm, and every soul

April 15. within the walls put to the sword. The French troops, who came back from the pursuit of the Grand Vizier, soon after surrounded the city of Cairo, and summoned it to surrender. A refusal having been returned, a severe bombardment and cannonade was kept up for some hours, until several practicable breaches were made, when a general assault took place.

April 18. In vain the Mussulmans defended the walls with the courage which they have so often displayed in similar situations; after a bloody contest, the

Cairo is
retaken.

French entered on all sides, and a deperate struggle took place in the streets and houses, which was only terminated by the approach of night. On the following morning, however, the Turkish leaders, seeing

April 19. their defences forced, and being apprehensive of meeting with the fate of Boulak, if the resistance was any longer continued, made terms of capitulation; and Kléber, delighted at the prospect of terminating so bloody a strife, granted them favourable terms, and soon after the division of the army which had entered Cairo, took the route of the Desert, escorted by the French troops, and the insurgents of the capital purchased their lives by

Defeat of
the Turks
in every
quarter.

consenting to an enormous contribution. At the same time, the Turks, who had landed in the Delta, were driven into Damietta, where they surrendered to General Beliard; and Mourad Bey, seeing all hope at an end, concluded an honourable convention with Kléber, in virtue of which he was permitted to retain the command of Upper Egypt. Within a month after the battle of Heliopolis the crisis was entirely surmounted and the French had quietly resumed possession of all their conquests (2).

Improved
condition of
the French
army. This great victory completely re-established the French affairs on the banks of the Nile. The troops, recently so gloomy and depressed, returned to their quarters joyous and triumphant; the stores and ammunition were repaired from the spoils of the defeated army, the

(1) Berth. 403, 405. Jom. xiii. 409, 410. Dum. iv. 140, 142.

(2) Berth. 413, 427. Jom. xiii. 414, 415. Dum. iv. 141, 142.

booty obtained by the soldiers was immense, and from the contributions levied on the rebellious cities funds were obtained to clothe and equip the whole troops anew. Cairo expiated its offence by a contribution of twelve millions francs, of L.480,000; the other towns paid in the same proportion, and from the money thus acquired means were obtained, not only to discharge all the arrears due to the troops, but to remount the cavalry and artillery, restore the hospitals, and replace all the other establishments requisite for the comfort of the soldiers. Such was the affluence which prevailed at head-quarters, that Kléber was enabled to make his captives participate in his good fortune; and by promising half-pay to the Turks made prisoners at Aboukir and Heliopolis, recruited his army by a crowd of active horsemen, anxious to share in the fortunes of the victorious army. The Egyptians, confounded by the astonishing successes of the French, quietly resigned themselves to a fate which seemed inevitable, and their dominion was more firmly established than it had ever been since the disastrous expedition into Syria (1).

Assassina-
tion of
Kléber. It was in the midst of these pacific labours, and when he was just beginning to reap the fruits of his intrepidity and judicious conduct, that Kléber was cut off, by an obscure assassin, named Souleyman. This fanatic was stimulated to the atrocious act by religious persuasion, and the prospect of obtaining a sum of money to liberate his father who was in confinement. He remained a month in Cairo watching his opportunity, and at length concealed himself in a cistern in the garden of the palace which the general occupied, and darting out upon him as he walked with an architect, June 14, 1800. stabbed him to the heart. The assassin was brought before a military commission, and ordered to be impaled alive; a shocking punishment, the disgrace of the French generals, which he endured with unshrinking fortitude for three days together, evincing alike in his examinations and his last moments a mixture of fanatical spirit and filial piety, which would be deemed incredible if it had not occurred in real life (2).

The premature death of this distinguished general was a clap of thunder to the Egyptian army, and was attended with important effects upon the issue of the war. He had formed many important designs for the regulation of his colony, which, if they could have been carried into effect, might perhaps have long preserved that important acquisition to the French empire. It was his Designs of
Kléber
when he
fell. intention to have distributed the lands of the conquered country among his soldiers, after the manner of the Roman veterans; to have enlisted the Greeks, Mamelukes, and Copts, extensively in his service; disciplined them after the Western fashion; and on the stock of a formidable European infantry, engrafted the fire and celerity of the Asiatic horse. These designs were calculated unquestionably to have formed a native force on the banks of the Nile, which might in time have rivalled that which England has brought to such perfection on the plains of Bengal; and the revenue of Egypt, under a regular government, would soon have been equal to the support of 50,000 or 40,000 auxiliary troops of that description (3); but it is extremely doubtful whether, by these or any other measures, it would have been possible to have preserved this colony while England held Malta, and retained the command of the sea, if she were resolutely bent upon rescuing it from their hands (4).

(1) Berth. 427, 433. Jom. xiii. 416, 417. Dum. iv. 145, 146. Reg. 81.

(2) Sir Robert Wilson's Egyptian Campaign, 184. Dum. vi. 148.

(3) The revenue obtained by Menou from Egypt,

even after all the disasters of the war, amounted to 21,000,000 francs, or L.840,000. The present Pacha has raised it to L.2,500,000.—See REGNIER, 122.

(4) Jom. xiii. 422. Regn. 85, 86.

Menou
takes the
command.

Upon Kléber's death, Menou, the governor of Cairo, and the oldest of the generals of division, assumed the command. Intoxicated with the prosperity of his situation, and carried away by the idea that he would succeed in amalgamating the French and Egyptians, so as to render them impervious to any foreign attacks, he declined all steps towards an accommodation, rejected the new overtures of the Grand Vizier to evacuate the country at the conclusion of a general peace, and refused to listen to the proposals of Sir Sidney Smith, who was now empowered by his government to carry into effect the unauthorized convention of El-Arish. At the same time he exasperated the inhabitants by the imposition of additional imposts to meet the expenses of government, which had increased 400,000 francs (L.16,000) a-month since the death of his predecessor, and vainly flattered himself that, by assuming the title of Abdallah (the servant of God), wearing the Oriental costume, and embracing the religion of Mahomet, which he publicly did, he would succeed in maintaining the country against the united hostility of the Turks and English (1).

Prepara-
tions for
the English
expedition.

But the time was now approaching when the Republicans were to pay dear for their resolution to maintain themselves in Egypt, and that glorious train of military triumphs was to commence, which was destined to throw into the shade the disasters of former years, and terminate in the final overthrow of Napoléon on the field of Waterloo. The English Government no sooner received intelligence of the resolution of Menou to decline the execution of the convention of El-Arish than they put in motion all their resources to effect the expulsion of the French from that important settlement. For this purpose their ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Elgin, received orders to use his utmost efforts to induce the Turks to make a grand exertion, in conjunction with the forces of Great Britain; the corps of Abercromby, so long doomed to hurtful inactivity in the Mediterranean, was to bear the brunt of the contest, and an English expedition from India was to ascend the Red Sea, cross the Desert, descend by the waters of the Nile, and display the standards of Brama on the shores of Alexandria. So great and

(1) Dum. iv, 150, 151. Regn. 93, 97. Jom. xiv. 312. Bign. ii. 28.

The admission of the French themselves will show with whom the blame of residing from the convention of El-Arish really rests. The convention was signed at El-Arish on January 24, 1800; and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that he could agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorea, *January 8th*, more than a fortnight before the convention was signed, founded on orders dated 15th December, 1799, from the British Government, Sir Sidney Smith, on the 21st February, 1800, stated, in a letter to General Kléber, that he had received such instructions as prevented him from acquiescing in the convention of El-Arish. He adds, "You will observe that the despatches I enclose are of old date (1st January), written after orders transmitted from London on the 15th or 17th December, evidently dictated by the idea that you were about to treat separately with the Turks, and to prevent the execution of any measure contrary to our treaty of alliance. But now that my Government is better informed, and that the convention is really ratified, I have not the slightest doubt that the restriction against the execution of the treaty will be removed before the removal of the transports." [Perth. 351, 355.] In this expectation of what he might expect from the probity of the English Cabinet, Sir Sidney was not mistaken; for Mr. Pitt stated in Parliament, that though they had previously resolved to agree to no treaty between the Turks and French, in which the latter did not surrender as prisoners of

war, yet "the moment we found that a convention had been assented to by a British officer, though we disapproved of it, we sent orders to conform to it." [Parl. Hist. xxxv. 596, 597.] Lord Keith communicated the *previous* orders he had received, not only to the Turks, but to the French on the same day; but the English did nothing to dissolve the treaty; the French broke the armistice, and the battle of Heliopolis was the consequence. These orders to ratify the treaty as soon as they heard it had been assented to by an English officer, arrived in due time in Egypt, and were communicated by Sir Sidney Smith to General Menou. Let us hear his conduct from the mouth of General Regnier. "On the 9th Messidor (22d August) M. Wright, lieutenant on board the *Tiger*, arrived with a flag of truce from the Desert, with despatches from the Grand Vizier and Sir Sidney Smith. He announced that England had delivered to him passports necessary to carry into execution the treaty of El-Arish. He had presented himself at Alexandria, but was refused admittance, and he had come round by the Desert. He had endeavored to induce the troops to revolt against the generals who refused to lead them back to France. *He was sent back.*" And this is what the French call the British want of faith in refusing to ratify the treaty of El-Arish! and yet their declamations on this subject received frequent and able support from the Opposition in the English Parliament.—See *Parl. Debates*, xxxv. 595, 598, and 1436, 1438.

Magnificent conception of the attack.

extensive a project had never been formed by any nation, ancient or modern; and it was not the least marvellous circumstance of this eventful period, that a remote province of the Roman empire should have assembled at the foot of the Pyramids the forces of Europe, Asia, and Africa, in one combined enterprise, and brought to the shores of the Nile tribes unknown to the arms of Cæsar and Alexander (1).

Agreeably to this plan, the corps of SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, which had so long been tossed about by the winds in the bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean sea, set sail from Malta on December 10th, and after a tedious voyage of six weeks, and remounting two hundred of its cavalry with Turkish horse, arrived at Marmarice in the Levant in the beginning of February. Eight thousand men, under Sir David Baird, were to embark at Bombay at the same time, and proceed by the Red Sea to Suez, while the army of the Grand Vizier, which was to be reinforced since its late disasters, was to break up from Acre, and again cross the Desert which separates Egypt from Syria. The project was magnificently conceived, but it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution, and it was easy to perceive that the weight of the contest would fall upon Abercromby's forces. To combine an attack with success from various quarters, on an enemy in possession of a central position from whence he can at pleasure crush the first which approaches, is at all times a difficult and hazardous operation. But what must it be, when the forces brought together for the enterprise are drawn from different quarters of the globe, and the tumultuary levies of Asia Minor were to be supported by the infantry of England and the sable battalions of Hindostan (2)?

Whole contest falls on Abercromby's corps.

The English army had long delayed the commencement of operations in Egypt, in order to await the reorganization of the Turkish forces, and give time to the Grand Seignior to collect an armament of the promised strength on the Syrian side of the Desert. But when the fleet approached the Levant, they learned that no reliance could be placed on any co-operation in that quarter. The Ottoman forces, notwithstanding all the levies ordered in Asia Minor, did not yet amount to twelve thousand men, and they were all in the most wretched state of discipline and equipment. So completely had their spirit been broken by the recent disasters, that they anticipated with the utmost dread a renewal of the contest, and it was extremely doubtful whether they ever could be brought to face the French infantry. To complete their inefficiency, the plague had broken out in the camp, and rendered their co-operation a subject of dread rather than ambition; a frightful epidemic ravaged Palestine; the most violent discord raged between the Grand Vizier and the Pacha of Acre, and a reinforcement of ten thousand men, who had been collected at Aleppo to repair their losses, received a different destination, from the alarming rebellion of Oglou Pacha, one of the eastern satraps of the Turkish empire (3).

Deprived of all hope of co-operation in this quarter, and unable to rely on the distant and uncertain aid of the Red Sea expedition, Sir Ralph Abercromby perceived that the success of this great enterprise, on which the hopes of the nation had so long been set, and on which, in some measure, the fate of the war was involved, would depend on his own troops. Fortunately, he was of a character not to be intimidated by the prospect of danger, and although the forces at his disposal were little more than half of

(1) Wilson's Egypt, 3. Join. xiv. 308.

(3) Wils. 6. Dum. iv. 154. Regn. 146.

(2) Wils. 4, 5. Ann. Reg. 1801, 226. Join. xiv. 309.

Sir Ralph
resolves to
make the
attack
alone.
Feb. 23, 1801.

those which it was ultimately proved were in the hands of his adversary, he gallantly resolved, alone and unaided, to make the attempt. Orders, therefore, were given to the fleet to weigh anchor; and although the weather was still very tempestuous, and the Greek pilots unanimously declared that it was impracticable to attempt a landing on the Egyptian coast till the equinoctial gales were over, the admiral stood out to sea, bearing with him a noble array of two hundred ships (1).

March 1.
Arrival of
the expedi-
tion on the
coast of
Egypt.

On the 1st March the leading frigate made a signal for land, and on the following morning the whole fleet anchored in Aboukir bay, precisely on the spot where Nelson's great victory had been gained three years before. The remains of that terrible strife were still visible, the Foudroyant chafed her cables against the L'Orient's wreck, and soon after fished up her anchor. A nobler sight could hardly be imagined; two hundred vessels covered the ocean almost as far as the eye could reach; the sand-hills of Egypt were already covered with cannon and hostile troops; while every heart beat high with exultation at the prospect of soon measuring their strength with the enemy, and engaging in a contest on which the whole eyes of the world were fixed. The state of the weather for several days prevented the possibility of landing; but at length the wind having abated, the preparations were completed on the evening of

March 8.
Landing of
the troops.

the 7th, and on the morning of the 8th, at two o'clock, the first division, five thousand five hundred strong, assembled in the boats, one hundred and fifty in number, which were prepared to convey them to the shore. The clear silence of the night, the solemnity of the scene, the magnitude of the enterprise on which they were engaged, the unknown dangers to which they were approaching, filled every mind with anxious suspense; and thousands of brave hearts then throbbed with emotion, who were yet destined to astonish Europe by their gallant bearing, when the hour of trial approached. But not a vestige of confusion or trepidation appeared in the conduct of the debarkation; silently the troops descended from their transports, and took their places assigned them in the boats; and not a sound was heard as they approached the coast, but the measured dip of thousands of oars in the water, incessantly urging towards the shore the flower of the British empire (2).

(1) Wils. 7. Ann. Reg. 1801, 226.

The forces on board the fleet, and those to which they were opposed in Egypt, stood as follows:—

English.		French.	
Infantry,	15,433	Infantry,	23,690
Cavalry,	472	Cavalry,	1,250
Artillery,	578	Artillery,	1,100
		Dismounted Cavalry,	480
	16,513		26,520
Sick,	999	Sick,	996
	17,512		27,516
Total,	17,512		

[Sir Ralph Abercromby's return, Wilson, 270, 273.

There were 999 sick in the British army when it landed, and 996 in the French, so that this diminution left the relative forces of the two nations the same as before.

The French troops who capitulated at . . .	
Cairo were,	13,672
And at Alexandria,	10,508
	24,180

So that, supposing 4,000 had been lost in killed and wounded, and prisoners, during the campaign, the total force at its commencement must have been

[Jom. xiv. 316.]

from 27,000 to 28,000 men. The force under Sir David Baird, which ultimately landed at Suez, was 5,500 men, and as they could not be entirely neglected, and the French required to maintain garrisons in the interior, the active forces that could be relied on for immediate operations were nearly equal, and they proved exactly so in the decisive battle of Alexandria.—See JOMINI, xiv. 316.—SIR R. WILSON, 167, and REGNIER, p. 412.—*Tableau*, No. 2.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 227. Wils. 12, 13. Jom. xiv. 322,

Severe
action on
the sand-
hills.

The French on the heights were about two thousand strong, posted in a concave semicircle, about a mile in length, supported by twelve pieces of artillery on the one side, and the castle of Aboukir on the other. The boats remained for some time in the middle of the bay, menacing different points of the coast, and at length the whole being assembled, the signal was made to advance at nine o'clock. One hundred and fifty boats, each filled with fifty men, instantly moved forward with extraordinary rapidity, while the armed vessels, which covered their flanks, began to cannonade the batteries on shore. The French allowed them to approach within easy range, and then opened at once so heavy a fire that the water seemed literally to be ploughed up with shot, and the foam raised by it resembled a surf rolling over breakers. Silently the boats approached the tempest, the sailors standing up and rowing with uncommon vigour, the soldiers sitting with their arms in their hands anxiously awaiting the moment to use them. When they reached the fire, several boats were sunk, and the loss among their crowded crews was very severe; but notwithstanding this the line pressed forward with such precision, that the prows of almost all the first division struck the sand at the same time. The troops instantly jumped out into the water, and rapidly advancing to the beach, formed before they could be charged by the enemy; the 42d, 25d, and 40th regiments rushed up the steep front of the heights with fixed bayonets, and carried them in the most gallant style; the guards followed, and though disordered for a moment by a charge of horse before their formation was completed, made good their ground, and drove back the enemy; while the 5th and Royals landed in time to defeat a column which was advancing through a hollow against the flank of their newly established line. In an hour the whole division was established on the heights, though weakened by five hundred men killed and wounded; the enemy retired with the loss of three hundred, and left eight pieces of cannon in the hands of the victors (1).

And defeat
of the
French
there.

This brilliant opening had the most important effects on the fate of the campaign. The gallant conduct of the troops, the splendid spectacle which their landing in presence of the enemy had afforded, the rapidity of their success in the sight of the whole fleet, filled both the soldiers and sailors with exultation, and already began to produce that confidence in their own prowess which in military affairs, as well as elsewhere in life, is not the least important element in success. Sir Ralph hastened to profit by his good fortune, by landing the other divisions of the army, which was effected in the remainder of the day with the greatest expedition. Some uneasiness was at first experienced by the want of water, but Sir Sidney Smith soon relieved their anxiety by telling them that wherever date-trees grew water must be near; a piece of grateful information which, like every other furnished by that enterprising officer, proved to be correct (2).

It is now ascertained, that if the English army had pushed vigorously on before the enemy had time to recover from their consternation, they might soon have taken Alexandria with very little difficulty; and had they been as well aware of their prowess as they have since become, they would probably have done so (3). But they were then only novices in the military art, and

(1) Regn. 205, 209. Wils. 14, 15. Ann. Reg. 1801, 227, 228.

"This debarkation," said General Bertrand, "was admirable; in less than five or six minutes they presented 5,500 men in battle array; it was like a

movement on the opera stage; three such completed the landing of the army."—LAS CASES, i. 242.

(2) Wils. 17, 18. Ann. Reg. 1801, 228.

(3) Regn. 209. Dum. iv. 157.

naturally distrustful of themselves when opposed to the far-famed veterans of France. Abercromby, therefore, advanced with caution. His first care was to complete the disembarkation of the troops, cannon, and stores, a service of considerable difficulty and danger, from the tempestuous state of the weather, and which occupied the three following days. The castle of Aboukir was at the same time invested, and intrenchments thrown up round the camp. It then appeared how much reason the British had to congratulate themselves on the supineness of Menou in retaining his principal force at Cairo, when so formidable an enemy was establishing himself in his colony; for had he appeared with eighteen thousand men on the heights of Aboukir, the only point on the coast where a descent was practicable, the landing could never have been attempted, or if it had, it would in all probability have terminated in disaster. The truth was, the French general like all his contemporaries at that period, greatly underrated the British military forces, and he gladly heard of their debarkation, from a belief that they would soon become prisoners of war. Thus, while the English, from not being aware of their own strength, lost the opportunity of taking Alexandria in the outset of the campaign, the French, from an overweening confidence in theirs, reduced themselves, in the end, to the humiliation of the Caudine Forks (1).

The preparations being at length completed, the army moved forward, on the evening of the 12th, to Mandora tower, where they encamped in three lines. The enemy had by this time been considerably reinforced from Cairo and Rosetta, so that their force amounted to five thousand four hundred infantry, six hundred cavalry, and twenty-five pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding the smallness of their numbers, Generals Friant and Lanusse resolved to make good their ground against the invaders, trusting to their great superiority in cavalry, the strength of their position in front of an old Roman camp, and the facility of retiring to Alexandria in case of disaster. The English general advanced cautiously, at day-break on the morning of the 15th, in three lines; the enemy's force was unknown, and it was in an especial manner necessary to take precaution against his decided superiority in horse. The first line, when it came within range of the enemy, was received with a heavy fire of grape and musketry, while a regiment of cavalry impetuously charged its flank; but both attacks were gallantly repulsed by the 90th and 92d regiments, and the advance of the second line soon compelled the Republicans to retreat. Then was the moment to have followed up their success, and by a rapid charge completed the defeat of the enemy, in which case Alexandria would probably have fallen an easy conquest, but the English were still ignorant of their own powers, and the want of cavalry prevented them from taking the advantage which they might have derived from their victory. They contented themselves, therefore, with occupying the ground so easily won, and halted within cannon-shot of their second line of defence; and it was not till the enemy had established themselves on the heights in their rear in front of Alexandria, that they again moved forward to the charge. They then advanced with admirable coolness, and in parade order, under a murderous fire of cannon shot; but the attack was not conducted with the vigour and rapidity necessary to ensure decisive success, nor was any attempt made to turn a position which his great superiority of numbers would have enabled the English general so easily to outflank. The consequence was that the British sustained a

Cautions
measures of
the English
general.

Bloody en-
counter
with the
French
vanguard.

(1) Dum. iv. 158. Wils. 18, 19. Jom. xiv. 324, 325.

loss double of that of their adversaries (1); and though the second position was at length abandoned by the French, who withdrew the bulk of their forces within the walls of the town, yet this was done in perfect order, and without any loss of artillery; whereas had Abercromby possessed the confidence in himself and his soldiers which subsequent triumphs gave to Wellington or Picton, he would have carried the position of the enemy, by a combined attack in front and flank (2), in half an hour, and entered Alexandria along with their broken battalions.

Description of the ground now taken up by the British army. The position now occupied by the British was by nature strong; the right was advanced before the rest of the line nearly a quarter of a mile, on high ground, and extended to the large and magnificent ruins of a Roman palace within fifty yards of the sea; their left rested on the lake Maadieh; the intervening space, about a mile in breadth, consisted of a succession of low sand-hills. In front of the position was a level sandy surface, which commenced before the left, and extended as far as the French lines; on this plain cavalry could act, but as they approached the British videttes, they found the ground strewed with large stones, the remains of Roman edifices which formerly had covered all that part of the shore. Gun-boats in the sea and the lake Maadieh, protected each flank; on the left, in front of the lines occupied by the troops, was a redoubt mounted by twelve pieces of cannon; two were placed on the ruins of the Roman palace, and in the centre slight works were thrown up to aid the fire of the musketry. In this position the British army, now reduced by sickness, the sword, and detachments to the rear, to 11,500 men, with thirty-six pieces of cannon, awaited the attack of the enemy (3).

Position of the French. The position of the French was still stronger. A high ridge of hills extended from the sea to the canals of Alexandria; along this elevated ground their troops were placed, with fort Cretin rising in deceitful grandeur in the centre, and fort Caffarelli in the rear of the left. Their generals were at first fearful that the advance of the English had cut off the dikes which formed their line of communication with Menou; but that commander discovered a circuitous route, by which he was enabled to reach Alexandria, and on the evening of the 19th, the whole disposable French troops, 11,000 strong, including 1400 cavalry, with 46 pieces of cannon, were drawn up on this imposing position. Every thing conspired to recommend early and decisive operations; the ancient fame and tried prowess of the Egyptian army left no room for doubt that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; while by protracting operations, time would be afforded for the Grand Vizier to cut off the garrisons on the frontier of Syria, and the Indian army to menace their rear from the Red Sea (4).

Interesting recollections connected with the spot. The ground occupied by the two armies was singularly calculated to awaken the most interesting recollections. England and France were here to contend for the empire of the East in the cradle of ancient civilisation, on the spot where Pompey was delivered up to the victorious arms of Cæsar, and under the walls of the city which is destined to perpetuate to the latest generation the prophetic wisdom of Alexander.

(1) The English lost 1,200, the French 500 men in this affair. It is impossible to refuse a tribute of admiration to the skill of the generals and valour of the soldiers, which, with such inferior forces, enabled the Republicans, at so slight a cost, to inflict so serious a loss upon their adversaries—See WILSON, 23; REGNIER, 217, 219; and *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 227.

(2) Wils. 20, 23. *Regn.* 215, 219. *Jom.* xiv. 327, 328. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 229.

(3) Wils. 24, 25, 30. *Regn.* 220, 222. *Jom.* xiv. 330. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 232.

(4) Wils. 25. *Jom.* xiv. 329, 330. *Regn.* 222, 223. *Hard.* viii. 152.

Every object which met the eye was fraught with historic renown. On the right of the French line rose Pompey's Pillar, on the left Cleopatra's Needle; in the distance were seen the mouldering walls and Eastern domes of Alexandria, while on the extreme horizon, stretching into the sea, appeared the far-famed tower of Pharos. The British, as well as their antagonists, felt the influence of the scene and the grandeur of the occasion; and these ancient rivals in military renown prepared to join in their first serious contest since the Revolution (1), with a bravery worthy of the cause in which they were engaged, and the animating presence in which they stood.

Battle of
Alexan-
dria.

On the 20th, the castle of Aboukir, with its garrison of 490 men, surrendered. On the morning of the 21st, the army was under arms at three o'clock, eagerly expecting the attack which the movements of the preceding evening had led them to anticipate. A gloomy mist covered the plain, through which every eye was painfully striving to pierce; every ear was straining to catch the smallest sound; the eastern horizon was anxiously regarded, but though the grey of the morning was perceptible, it seemed reluctant to break. Suddenly the report of a musket was heard, followed by two cannon shots on the left; the officers, thinking the attack was to commence there, were already galloping in that direction, when a sharp rattle broke out on the right, followed by the loud shouts which too surely announced that the attack had begun in that quarter. In fact the enemy, under Lanusse, were advancing in great force against the Roman ruins, where the 58th and 25d regiments were placed; the English officers no sooner saw the glazed hats of the Republicans emerging through the mist, than they poured in a fire by platoons, so heavy and well-directed, that the French were compelled to swerve to their left, and in making this movement the brave Lanusse received a mortal wound. His division was so disconcerted by this event, and the fire of the English, which was kept up with uncommon vigour, both on their front and flank, that they broke and fled in confusion behind the sand-hills. But at this instant, General Rampon advanced at the head of a fresh column, two thousand strong, and joining the broken remains of Lanusse's division, renewed the attack with greater force, and succeeded in turning the Roman ruins so as to take the troops who defended them both in front and flank. Menou supported this attack by a grand charge with all his cavalry. No sooner did Sir Ralph perceive it advancing than he moved up the 42d and 28th regiments from the second line to the support of the menaced wing, but soon after it arrived in the fire, the first of these corps was suddenly charged in flank by the Republican horse, and broken. Notwithstanding this, the brave Highlanders formed in little knots, and standing back to back, resisted the cavalry when they endeavoured to cut them down. The 28th regiment was maintaining a severe action in front, when they were startled by hearing French voices behind their line, the rear rank had just time to face about, when it was assailed by a volley from a regiment which had got round under cover of the mist; and these gallant troops, without flinching, stood back to back, and maintained this extraordinary contest for a considerable time. But this bold irruption of the French soon exposed them to the same dangers with which they had threatened the English. The British reserve advanced in admirable order, and threw in a close and well-directed fire upon the attacking column; the Republicans, in their turn, were assailed at once in front and flank, and driven into the ruins, where a battalion which, by its great success in the Italian wars, had acquired the surname of the Invincibles, was obliged

(1) Wils. 25.

to lay down its arms, after having lost above two-thirds of its numbers. The French cavalry also, having now lost half their force by the close and murderous fire of the English infantry, prepared to cut their way back to their own lines. For this purpose they charged the English reserve with the utmost fury; but those steady men with admirable coolness opened their ranks so as to let the squadrons sweep through, and instantly closing them again, and wheeling about, threw in so deadly a fire upon the disordered horsemen, that they almost all, with their commander Roize, perished on the spot. The remnant, both foot and horse, of the force which had made this formidable attack, escaped in confusion from the scene of slaughter, and regained in dismay the French position (1).

Retreat of the French. The defeat of this desperate attack terminated the important operations of the Republicans were confined to a distant cannonade; and a more serious attack on the centre was repulsed by the close and destructive fire of the English guards. At length Menou, finding that all his efforts had proved unsuccessful, ordered a general retreat, which was effected in the best order, to the heights of Nicopolis on his rear, under cover of the cannon placed on that formidable position. The loss of the English amounted to 1500 in killed and wounded; that of the French to above 2000; but this was of comparatively little importance. They had lost the character of invincibles; the charm which had paralysed the world was broken; and on the standards taken by the victors, they pointed with exultation to the names, "Le Passage de la Serivia, le Passage du Tagliamento, le Passage de l'Isonzo, la Prize de Gratz, le Pont de Lodi (2)."

Wound and death of Sir Ralph Abercromby. But this important triumph was mingled with one mournful recollection. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had the glory of first leading the English to decisive victory over the arms of revolutionary France, received a mortal wound in the early part of the day, of which he died a few days afterwards. No sooner did that gallant veteran hear of the furious irruption of the French cavalry into the lines on the right, than he mounted his horse, and galloped in that direction; he arrived while it was yet dark, when almost unattended by his aides-de-camp, whom he had despatched in various directions, on the ground over which the cavalry were sweeping, and was assailed by the French dragoons, one of whom he disarmed in a personal conflict; but soon after he received a wound from a musket-shot on the thigh, which compelled him to dismount, and walk to the redoubt on the right of the guards, where he remained for the rest of the day, walking about, exposed to a terrible cannonade, insensible alike to the pain of his wound and the danger of his situation. With anxious hopes he watched the progress of the action, every part of which was visible from that elevated station, and had the satisfaction of seeing the French retire and the victory finally decided before the loss of blood began to darken his eyes. He lived till the morning of the 29th, expressing no solicitude but for the issue of the contest; he bore a painful operation for the extraction of the ball with the greatest firmness; but it could not be reached by the skill of the surgeons, and he sunk at length in the arms of glory, leaving a name enshrined in the grateful recollection of his country (3).

The battle of Alexandria not only delivered Egypt from the Republican yoke; it decided, in its ultimate consequences, the fate of the civilized

(1) Wils. 31, 33. Ann. Reg. 1801, 230, 231. 1801, 232. Join. xiv. 335, 337. Hard. viii. 153, 154. Regn. 226, 227. Join. xiv. 334, 335.

(3) Wils. 48. Ann. Reg. 1801, 232.

(2) Wils. 33, 38. Regn. 228, 231. Ann. Reg.

Immense
moral con-
sequences
of this vic-
tory.

world. The importance of a triumph is not always measured by the number of troops engaged; twenty-four thousand Romans, under Cæsar at Pharsalia, changed the face of antiquity; thirty thousand Republicans, at Marengo, seated Napoléon on the consular throne, and established a power which overturned all the monarchies of Europe. The contest of twelve thousand British, with an equal number of French, on the sands of Alexandria, in its remote effects overthrew a greater empire than that of Charlemagne, and rescued mankind from a more galling tyranny than that of the Roman emperors. It first elevated the hopes and confirmed the resolution of the English soldiers; it first broke the charm by which the continental nations had so long been enthralled; it first revived the military spirit of the English people, and awakened the pleasing hope that the descendants of the victors at Crécy and Agincourt had not degenerated from the valour of their fathers. Nothing but the recollection of this decisive trial of strength could have supported the British nation through the arduous conflict which awaited them on the renewal of the war, and induced them to remain firm and unshaken amidst the successive prostration of every continental power, till the dawn of hope began over the summit of the Pyrenees, and the eastern sky was reddened by the conflagration of Moscow. The continental nations, accustomed to the shock of vast armies, and to regard the English only as a naval power, attached little importance to the contest of such inconsiderable bodies of men on a distant shore; but the prophetic eye of Napoléon at once discerned the magnitude of its consequences, and he received the intelligence of the disaster at Alexandria with a degree of anguish equalled only by that experienced from the shock of Trafalgar (1).

Its first
effects are
not very
decisive.

But though destined in its ultimate effects to produce these important consequences, the victory of Alexandria was not at first attended by results at all commensurate to the ardent anticipations of the English people. The movements of the English army were for long cautious and dilatory; but, though their operations were not brilliant, they were skilful, and ultimately produced the desired results. For some days after the battle they remained on the ground where they had so bravely combated, and the French occupied the heights of Nicopolis—both parties being busied in repairing their losses, and restoring the strength of their forces. At length a reinforcement of six thousand Albanians having arrived in the bay of Aboukir, they were joined by a British detachment of a thousand men, and the combined forces approached Rosetta, situated on one of the mouths of the Nile. On their approach, the French garrison retired to Damietta, leaving a hundred and fifty men in fort Julien, who, after a spirited resistance, surrendered on the 19th April. Shortly after the English army was reinforced by three thousand men, who landed at Aboukir in the beginning of May, and General Hutchison (2), who had now succeeded to the command, resolved to commence offensive operations.

April 19.
Surrender
of Dami-
etta.
May 9.

Meanwhile divisions, the natural result of such unwonted disasters, broke

(1) Bour. iv. 299. D'Abr. v. 202. Jom. xiv. 336. "I can with safety affirm," said Junot, "that Napoléon's design was to have made Egypt the point from which the thunderbolt was to issue which was to overwhelm the British empire. I can easily sympathize, therefore, with the cruel agony which he underwent when he pronounced these words, 'Junot, we have lost Egypt.' The first consul never let those around know to what a degree he was afflicted by the stroke which he received from England on that occasion. Junot alone was fully

acquainted with it; it was only to the eyes of those who had enjoyed his early intimacy that he raised the veil which concealed the anguish of his heart. Junot wept like a child when he recounted what the first consul had said during the two hours that he was with him after he received intelligence of that disastrous event. "My projects alike with my dreams have been destroyed by England," said that great conqueror.—DUCHESS OF ABRANTES, v. 202, 203.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1801, 233. Jom. xiv. 338, 339.

Divisions
break out
among the
French ge-
nerals.

out among the French generals. General Regnier strongly urged the expedience of leaving garrisons only in Alexandria, Cairo, and other important points, and concentrating the mass of the troops

at Ramanieh, in a situation either to fall upon the English army, if they should leave their lines to attack Rosetta or Alexandria, or crush the Grand Vizier if he should attempt to cross the Desert. But nothing could induce Menou to adopt any thing but half measures. He detached four thousand troops to relieve Rosetta, who arrived on the Nile too late to disengage that place, and retired to El-Aft, where they threw up intrenchments, and awaited the movements of the English; but himself remained at Alexandria, obsti-

Indecisive
measures of
Menou.

nately persisting in the belief that the Grand Vizier would never cross the Desert, that the English would not venture to quit their position, and that if he remained firm a little longer, they would again betake

April 13.

themselves to their vessels. Meanwhile General Hutchison was rapidly circumscribing his limits at Alexandria; he cut the isthmus which separated the lake Maadieh from the dried bed of the lake Mareotis, and filled with the sea that monument of ancient industry, which in a great degree isolated Alexandria from the rest of Egypt; while the British flotilla ascended the Nile, and captured an important convoy descending that river for the use of its garrison. These disasters produced the greatest discouragement in the French army (1); the dissensions among the officers increased in vehemence, and General Regnier's language in particular became so menacing that the commander-in-chief, apprehensive that he might, with the concurrence of the army, assume the command, had him arrested and sent back to France (2).

General
Hutchison
assumes
the com-
mand, and
advances
towards
Cairo.

The detachment of La Grange, with four thousand men, having reduced the garrison of Alexandria to little more than six thousand, General Hutchison at length moved forward, with the main body of his forces, towards Ramanieh, in order to menace Cairo, and carry the war into the upper parts of Egypt. Four thousand

British and six thousand Turks, in the first instance, advanced against the intrenched position of La Grange at El-Aft. On the approach of such considerable forces, he retired to the fortified position of Ramanieh, an important post on the Nile, from which the canal branches off which connects it with Alexandria, where he collected four thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry,

and forty pieces of cannon. After a sharp skirmish, however, this position was abandoned, and the advance of Hutchison having cut off their retreat to Alexandria, the Republicans were compelled to fall back upon

Capture of
Ramanieh.

Cairo, which they reached a few days afterwards. The capture of Ramanieh was an important step in the campaign, as it completely isolated the troops at Cairo from those at Alexandria, cut off the chief supplies from the latter city, and rendered all attempt at co-operation impossible between them. The fruits of this acquisition soon appeared in the capture of a convoy of four hundred men and six hundred camels, bound for Alexandria, which, in the pathless solitude of the Desert, fell a prey to the activity and vigilance of the English cavalry (3).

(1) *Jom.* xiv. 339, 340. *Regn.* 235, 252. *Wils.* 56.

(2) The characters of Menou and Regnier are thus given by Napoléon:—"Menou appeared to have all the qualities fitted for the command; he was learned, upright, and an excellent civil governor. He had become a Mussulman, which, how ridiculous soever, was agreeable to the natives of the country; a doubt hung over his military capacity, but none over his personal courage; he had acted well in la Vendée and at the assault of

Alexandria. General Regnier was more habituated to war; but he wanted the chief quality in a general-in-chief; excellent when second in command, he was unfit to take the lead. His character was silent and solitary; having no knowledge of the means of electrifying, ruling, or guiding mankind."—*NAP. IN MONTU.* i. 73, 74.

(3) *Jom.* xiv. 339, 341. *Wills.* 84, 96. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 234.

General
Belliard is
defeated
near Cairo.

Meanwhile the Grand Vizier, encouraged by the unwonted intelligence of the defeat of the French forces, and relieved by the cessation of the plague in his army, one great cause of his weakness, mustered up courage to cross the Desert, and in the middle of April drew near to the French fortified position, on the frontiers of Syria, at the head of twelve thousand men. At his approach, the Republicans evacuated Salahieh and Balbeis, on the edge of the Desert, and Damietta, at the mouth of one of the branches of the Nile, and drew back all their forces to Cairo. the arrival of La Grange with the troops from Ramanieh having increased the disposable force of general Belliard to ten thousand veterans, he moved forward at the head of six thousand chosen troops to El-Hanka, to meet the Turkish force. But the Mussulmans were now under very different direction from that which led them to destruction at Heliopolis. Major Hope, afterwards one of the most distinguished lieutenants of Wellington, was with the artillery, and Major Holloway directed all the movements of the Grand Vizier. These able officers brought up the Turkish artillery and infantry to the fight in a wood of date-trees, where the superiority of European discipline was not so decisive as in the open plain; while a skilful movement of the cavalry towards their rear threatened to cut off the enemy's retreat to Cairo. The consequence was, that after an indecisive action of five hours, Belliard retreated to the capital; a result so different from any which had yet attended their warfare with the Republicans, that it elevated immensely the spirits of the Ottomans, and what was of still greater consequence, disposed them to resign themselves implicitly to the guidance of the British officers attached to their staff (1).

This important advantage having thrown the enemy on all sides back into the capital, and the success of the Turks having proved that under proper guidance some reliance could be placed upon them in active operations,

Cairo is
invested.

General Hutchison resolved to advance immediately against Cairo, although the promised co-operation of the troops from the Red Sea could not be calculated upon, as, from the prevalence of contrary winds in that dangerous strait, they had been detained much beyond the appointed time. The English army invested Cairo on the 20th May on the left,

while the Grand Vizier did the same on the right bank of the Nile. The fortifications of the town, begun by Kléber, had been assiduously continued by Menou; but they were too extensive, stretching over a circumference of fourteen miles, to be adequately guarded by nine thousand men, to which the effective part of the garrison was now reduced; and although General Baird, with the Indian army, had not yet arrived, there could be no doubt that they would make their appearance in the rear if the siege were continued for any

Capitulation of
Cairo.

length of time. Impressed with these considerations, and fearful that by delay he might not obtain equally favourable terms, Belliard, on the day following, proposed a capitulation, on the same conditions as had been agreed to the year before at El-Arish, viz. that the army should be conveyed to France within fifty days, with their arms, artillery, and baggage. This was immediately agreed to. The troops embarked on the Nile in virtue of this capitulation, amounted to 15,672, besides the civil servants, and they left in the hands of the British 520 pieces of heavy cannon, besides the field pieces of the corps which they carried with them; an astonishing conquest to have been achieved by a European force of smaller amount, and

May 22.

(1) Jom. xiv. 342, 343. Ann. Reg. 1801, 235. Wils. 110, 111.

a lasting monument of the important triumph gained by the British arms on the sands of Alexandria (1).

Advance of
Sir David
Baird's di-
vision from
the Red
Sea.

Shortly after this capitulation was signed, the army of General Baird, six thousand four hundred strong, of whom 5600 were British and 2800 sepoys, appeared on the banks of the Nile from India (2). They had sailed from Bombay in the end of December,

but unfortunately the monsoon had set in before they arrived at the mouth of the Red Sea, which rendered it impossible for them to reach their original destination, which was Suez, in time to operate as a diversion to the British

July 9. force when it first landed at the mouth of the Nile. After struggling hard with contrary winds for above two months, in the course of which two transports were lost, the expedition arrived at Cosseir, in Upper Egypt, in the beginning of July, and preparations were instantly made for crossing the Desert which separates the Red Sea from Thebes. This passage is one hundred and forty miles long; and as it was the first instance recorded in history of a European army, with the artillery and encumbrances of modern warfare, crossing one of the Eastern deserts, it is in a peculiar manner worthy of

July 29. Their march from Cosseir to Thebes across the Desert observation. The first detachment began its march from Cosseir, and in nine days it arrived at Kinneh on the Nile. The road across the arid wilderness lies almost the whole way through a succession of ravines, winding amongst hills varying from five to fifteen hundred feet in height. These hills are very remarkable, rising often perpendicularly on either side of the valley, as if they had been scarped by art, here again rather broken and overhanging, as if they were the lofty banks of a mighty river, and the traveller traversing its dry and naked bed. Now you are quite land locked; now again you open on lateral valleys, and see upon heights beyond small square towers. Dépôts of provisions had been provided at the eight stations where the army halted, and wells dug by the Arabs, from which a tolerable supply of water was obtained, though in many places rather of a brackish quality. Not a dwelling was to be seen, and hardly any traces of vegetation were discovered along this dreary tract; nothing met the eye but bare and arid rocks in the mountains, and loose sand or hard gravel in the hollows. The sufferings of the soldiers from heat and thirst were very great; for though they marched only during the night, yet the atmosphere, heated to 115 degrees of Fahrenheit in the shade during the day, was at all times sultry and oppressive in the highest degree. It was soon found that it was impossible by drinking to allay the thirst, and that indulgence in that respect only augmented the desire; a little vinegar mixed with water proved the only effectual relief. Every where the cannon and ammunition waggons passed with facility, drawn by oxen brought from India. No words can describe the transports of the soldiers when at Rensch they first came in sight of the Nile, flowing in a full majestic stream in the green plain at their feet; the bonds of discipline were unavailing to prevent a tumultuous rush of men, horses, camels, and oxen, when they approached its banks, to plunge into the waves. At length by great efforts the army was assembled at Thebes with very little loss, considering the arduous service they had undergone. They there gazed with wonder at the avenues of sphinxes and stately temples which are destined to transmit to the latest posterity the wonders of ancient Egypt, and embarking on the Nile, fell down in boats in nine days, a distance of three hundred miles, to Grand Cairo, where they arrived on the 10th

(1) Jom. xiv. 345, 346. Wils. 157, 265. Ann. Reg. 1801, 236, 237.

(2) Wils. 168, 189.

August. There, for the first time in the history of the world, the sable Hindoos from the banks of the Ganges, the swarthy Asiatics from the plains of the Euphrates, and the blue-eyed English from the shores of the Thames, met in arms at the foot of the Pyramids (1).

General
Hutchison
moves
against
Menou at
Alexan-
dria.

When Menou was informed of the capitulation of Cairo, he professed himself highly incensed at its conditions, and loudly proclaimed his resolution to bury himself under the ruins of Alexandria. He refused to take advantage, in consequence, of the proposal made to him to accede to the capitulation of the capital, and embark on the same terms for France. This determination was founded on intelligence he had received by the brig *Lodi*, which had eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers and penetrated into Alexandria, of the approach of Admiral Gantheaume with seven sail and five thousand men, accompanied with the most peremptory orders from the first consul to hold out to the last extremity. Finding that the reduction of this last stronghold could only be effected by force, General Hutchison, after the embarkation of General Belliard and his division, brought down the greater part of his troops from Cairo; and, in the beginning of August, commenced active operations, at the head of sixteen thousand men, against Alexandria. A flotilla was rapidly collected on the lake Mareotis, but to complete the investment of the place, it was necessary to reduce fort Marabon, situated on a tongue of land which unites the town to the opposite side of the lake, and by which alone the garrison received supplies of provisions from the Arabs. Four thousand men were embarked on

August. 17. the flotilla, and landed near the fort on the 17th, while a feint was made of a general attack on the heights of Nicopolis by General Hutchison. These operations were completely successful; the landing of the troops was effected with very little opposition; batteries were rapidly constructed, and so heavy a fire kept up, both by land and sea, that the fort was soon reduced to a heap of ruins; and the garrison, consisting of a hundred and sixty men, was compelled to capitulate. At the same time, some of the advanced batteries of the Republicans were carried on the heights near the sea; and a column of six hundred men, detached by Menou to recover them, driven back by Colonel Spencer, at the head of seven companies of the 50th, with the most distinguished gallantry. In endeavouring to set fire to the English flotilla, the French burnt their own schooners on the lake; while the light vessels of the fleet boldly sailed into the harbour of Alexandria, and opened a cannonade upon the enemy's squadron in the inner port. On the following day, General Coote followed up his success; and advancing along the isthmus beyond Marabon, opened his trenches in form against fort

Progresses of
the siege.

Aug. 27. Le Turc, which was soon breached by a formidable artillery. These disasters at length wakened Menou from his dream of security; he forgot his resolution to conquer or die, and agreed to a capitulation, in virtue of which the French were to surrender Alexandria, with all its artillery, and he transported back to France, with their arms, baggage, and ten pieces of cannon only. It was agreed between the military commanders that the collections of antiquities and drawings which had been made by the artists and learned men who accompanied the expedition should be surrendered to the British; but as they made the most vigorous remon-

Surrender
of Menou.

(1) *Scherer's Egypt*, 68, 69. *Wils.* 174, 173. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 237.

A singular incident occurred on this occasion. When the Sepoy regiments came to the monuments of ancient Egypt, they fell down and worshipped

the images; another proof among the many which exist, of the common origin of these early nations. I have heard this curious fact from several officers who were present on the occasion.

stances against such a condition, and threatened to destroy them rather than that they should fall into the hands of the victors, General Hutchison, with a generous regard to the interests of science and the feelings of these distinguished persons, agreed to depart from the stipulation, and allow those treasures of art to be forwarded to France. The sarcophagus of Alexander, however, was retained by the British, and formed the glorious trophy of their memorable triumph (1).

The military results of this conquest were very great. Three hundred and twelve pieces of cannon, chiefly brass, were found upon the works of Alexandria, besides seventy-seven on board the ships of war. No less than 195,000 pounds of powder, and 14,000 gun cartridges were taken in the magazines; while the soldiers who capitulated were 10,011, independent of 500 sailors and 655 civil servants. The total troops who capitulated in Egypt were nearly 24,000, all tried veterans of France; an astonishing success to have been achieved by a British force which had hardly ever seen a shot fired, and even including those who came up from India six weeks after Cairo had surrendered, never amounted to the same numerical strength (2).

(1) Ann. Reg. 1801, 238, 239. Wils. 194, 212. Jon. xiv. 850, 853. Regn. 280, 288.

(2) Wils. 179, 216, 217. Ann. Reg. 1801, 239. Jon. xiv. 352, 353. Regn. 280, 289.

The troops who capitulated at Cairo, exclusive of civil servants, were:—	13,672
At Alexandria	10,528
	<hr/> 24,200

[Wils. 179, 217.] which, supposing 4000 lost in the previous engagement, leaves a total of 28,000 men, to oppose the British in Egypt, having at their command in heavy cannon and field pieces, above 700 guns. The amount of the force which the French had in this contest, is ascertained by the best possible evidence, that of an unwilling witness, perfectly acquainted with the facts, and never disposed to exaggerate the amount of his beaten troops. "In March, 1801," says Napoléon, "the English disembarked an army of 18,000 men, without artillery or cavalry horses; it should have been destroyed. The army, vanquished after six months of false manoeuvres, was disembarked on the shores of *Providence* still 24,000 strong. When Napoléon quitted it, in the end of August 1799, it amounted in all to 28,500 men. As the British and allied forces did not enter simultaneously into action, but on the contrary, at an interval of several months from each other, the victory must have remained with the French if they had had a general of capacity at their head, who knew how to avail himself skilfully of the advantages of his central position." [Nap. in Month. i. 80, 81, and ii. 216.] The British forces which came with Sir Ralph Abercromby

were	16,599
Landed in April,	3,000
Came with Sir David Baird,	5,919
	<hr/> Total British and Indian troops, . 25,518

[Wils. 270, 308.] The army of the Grand Vizier, which advanced against Cairo after the battle of Alexandria, was only 14,000 strong, and in such a state of disorganization as to be capable of effecting very little in the field; [Wils. 116.] and the corps which landed at Rosetta was only 6000 men, and effected very little against the enemy. When, therefore, it is recollected that the campaign was really concluded by the capitulation of General Belliard at Cairo on the 26th June, that the forces from the Red Sea only landed at Cosseir on the 8th July, and arrived at Cairo on the 10th August, and consequently that the contest was decided by

19,500 British against 28,000 French, having the advantage of a central position and possession of all the fortified places in the country, it must be admitted that modern history has few more glorious achievements to commemorate.

This being the first great disaster which the Republicans had sustained by land since the commencement of the revolution, and it having fallen on so distinguished a portion of their army as that which had gone through the Italian and Egyptian campaigns, they have been indefatigable in their endeavours to underrate the credit due to the English troops on the occasion; forgetting, that if the British acted feebly, what must the French have been when, with such a superiority of force, they were compelled to capitulate. It is true, that the movements of Hutchison after the battles of 21st March were slow and cautious; but that they were not unreasonably so, is proved by the consideration that he had to advance with less than half his army against a force at Grand Cairo, which amounted to 13,000 men, and could send 10,000 into the field, and that even after all he arrived at the scene of action, and concluded the capitulation of Cairo, six weeks before the arrival of the troops from the Red Sea, with no more than 4,500 Europeans, and a disorderly rabble of 25,000 Turks, hardly provided with any battering train. [Wils. 158.] All the ingenuity of the French cannot obviate the important fact that, by Hutchison's advance to Ramanieh, he separated their armies at Cairo and Alexandria from each other, and enabled him, with a force greatly inferior to the two taken together, to be superior to both at the point of attack, the surest test, as Napoléon justly observes, of a good general. The British officers, after Alexandria was taken, discovered that the works on the heights of Nicopolis, and, in particular, forts Cretin and Caffarelli, were in such a state that they could have opposed no effectual resistance to a vigorous attack, and they were thus led to regret that they had been induced by their imposing appearance to relinquish the active pursuit of their advantages before Menou's arrival on the 13th March: [Wils. 212.] but if they had done so, and Alexandria had thereby fallen, it is doubtful whether the ultimate success of the expedition would not have been endangered; as it would have only deprived the enemy of 4000 men, and led to the concentration of the remainder, above 20,000 strong, in the central position at Cairo, from whence they might have destroyed either the grand Vizier, Sir D. Baird, or General Hutchison, as they successively approached the in-

After the reduction of Alexandria, the greater part of the army, with General Hutchison, returned to England, leaving twelve thousand men, including the Indian troops, to secure the country, until a general peace. The European officers and soldiers were much struck by the luxury of their comrades in the Indian service, and, accustomed to sleep on the bare sand, with no other covering than a tented canopy, beheld with astonishment the numerous retainers and sumptuous equipages which attested the magnificence of Asiatic warfare. But Sir David Baird soon showed that if they had adopted the pacific habits of the soldiers of Darius, they had not forgotten the martial qualities of those of Alexander, and their morning exercises in the camp of Alexandria exhibited a combination of activity and discipline never surpassed by the finest troops of the Western world (1).

Attempted treachery of the Turks. The expulsion of the French from Egypt was followed by a piece of treachery on the part of the Ottomans, which, if not firmly resisted by the English commander, would have brought indelible disgrace on the British name. The Turkish Government, aware of the insecure tenure by which their authority in Egypt was held, as long as the Beys retained their ascendancy in the country, had secretly resolved upon extirpating them; and in order to carry their design into effect, seven of the chiefs were invited to Alexandria, to hold a conference with the Capitan Pacha, by whom they were received with every demonstration of respect, and invited on board a British vessel. But when they got into the boats which were to convey them thither, they took fright, and desired to be returned ashore, and this having been refused, a struggle ensued, in the course of which three of the Beys were killed, and four wounded. This frightful violation of all public faith, though by no means unusual among Asiatic despots, excited the most lively indignation in the British army; General Hutchison immediately put his troops under arms, and made such energetic remonstrances to the Capitan Pacha, that he was obliged to surrender up the four Beys who had been wounded, and the bodies of the slain, who were interred with military honours at Alexandria. This resolute conduct completely cleared the British from all imputation of having been accessory to the intended massacre, though it was far from allaying the indignant feelings of the English officers, many of whom openly declared the Capitan Pacha should have been seized in the centre of his camp, and hung by the yard-arm of the frigate to which he intended to have conveyed the victims of his treachery (2).

Change in the government of Egypt, which falls to the Turks. When left to their own resources, however, the Mameluke chiefs were totally unable to maintain their former government in Egypt. Many of them had fallen in the contest with France, their redoubtable cavalry had perished; and out of the whole militia of the province scarce two thousand could be mustered in arms, when the Europeans withdrew. They were compelled to relinquish, therefore, their old feudal sovereignty on the banks of the Nile, and accept the offer of the Grand Seignior, to surrender on favourable terms the province into the hands of the Osmanlis. A pacha was established, who soon became the real sovereign of the country, and long contrived, by the regular payment of his tribute, to maintain himself undisturbed in his dominions. Under his able and undivided administration, order began to reappear out of chaos; life became comparatively secure, though excessive taxation was established, and the national

terior of Egypt, whereas, by the retention of Alexandria, that dispersion of force was occasioned, which ultimately proved fatal to them in the campaign,

(1) Wils. 177. Ann. Reg. 1801, 239.

(2) Wils. 245. Ann. Reg. 1801, 240. Dunn. iv. 173, 174.

resources were prodigiously augmented. By this means one singular and lasting consequence resulted from the French residence in Egypt. The old anarchical tyranny of the Mamelukes was destroyed; a powerful government established on the banks of the Nile, which, in the end, crushed the Wahabees in Arabia, extended itself over Syria, as far as the defiles of mount Taurus, and was only prevented, by the intervention of France and Russia, from utterly overturning the dominion of the Osmanlis. Thus every thing conspired to bring about the great Oriental Revolution of the nineteenth century; the power of the Turks, the chief bulwark of Mahometanism, was weakened alike by the victories of the French and the conquests of their opponents, and the Crescent, long triumphant in the East, was at length struck down, not less by the ultimate effects of the ambition of the Republicans, who ridiculed every species of devotion, than the devout enthusiasm of the Moscovites, who sought an entrance to Paradise through the breach of Constantinople.

But neither of the victorious states foresaw those remote consequences, which as yet lay buried in the womb of fate, and the demonstrations of joy at the surrender of Alexandria were as ardent on the shores of the Bosphorus as the banks of the Thames. The cannon of the seraglio were fired, the city was splendidly illuminated, medals were struck to be distributed among the English who had served in Egypt, and a palace built for the British ambassador at Pera, as a lasting monument of the gratitude of the Ottoman empire. In London, the public thankfulness, if less noisy, was still more sincere. The people of England hailed this great achievement as a counterpoise to all the disasters of the war; as a humiliation of France on that element where it had been so long victorious, and a check to its ambition in that quarter where its hopes had been most sanguine; and as the harbinger of those greater triumphs which would await them, if the enemy should carry into execution their long threatened invasion of the British islands. Under the influence of these sentiments the early disasters of the war were forgotten; the fears, the asperity of former times were laid aside; and the people, satisfied with having redeemed their honour in military warfare by one great triumph, looked forward without anxiety to the cessation of the contest, in the firm belief that they could renew it without apprehension whenever the national safety required that it should be resumed (1).

Jan. 7. Although the French were thus expelled from Egypt, it was not without the greatest efforts on the part of Napoléon to preserve so important an acquisition, that it eluded his grasp. By great exertions a squadron of seven ships of the line and five frigates, having on board six thousand men and vast supplies of all sorts, was made ready for sea, and sailed from Brest in the beginning of January; it eluded the vigilance of two British squadrons which were detached in pursuit under Sir John Borlase Warren and Sir Richard Bickerton, passed the straits of Gibraltar, and crept along the coast of Africa, almost to within sight of the Pharos of Alexandria; but there one of its frigates, the *Africaine*, was encountered, and captured by the English frigate *Phœbe*, of equal force; and the admiral, discouraged by this disaster, and alarmed at the accounts he received of the strength of Lord Keith's squadron off the coast of Egypt, which, united to that of Bickerton, now amounted to seventeen sail of the line, renounced his enterprise, and returned to Toulon. One of his frigates, however, the *Régé-*

(1) Ann. Reg. 1801, 239.

néré, passed, under false colours, through the British fleet, and made its way into Alexandria; and this the first consul considered as decisive evidence that the whole, if directed with equal skill, might have reached the same destination. Gantheaume, therefore, received positive orders to put again to sea, and at all hazards to attempt the relief of Egypt. He set sail accordingly on

March 20. the 20th March, avoided Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, which he met off Sardinia, and continued his route towards the coast of Africa; but Warren instantly made sail in the same direction, and arrived off Alexandria on the 25d April. No sooner was Gantheaume informed of this than he again turned about, and regained Toulon without any disaster. Irritated beyond measure by these repeated failures, Napoléon transmitted peremptory orders to the admiral to put to sea a third time, and endeavour, at all hazards, to convey the reinforcements he had on board into Alexandria; he

May 20. set sail accordingly on the 20th May, threw succours in passing to the Republican force besieging porto Ferrajo in the isle of Elba; increased his squadron by three frigates prepared for him by General Soult at Brundisium, and arrived in sight of the coast of Egypt, for the third time, on the 8th June. One of his brigs, the Heliopolis, reached Alexandria on the day following; but when Gantheaume was making preparations for landing the troops on the sands to the westward of that town, his look-out frigates made signals that the English fleet, consisting of forty sail, of which eighteen were of the line, was approaching. It was no longer possible to effect the object of the expedition; in a few hours longer the squadron would be enveloped in the enemy's fleet, and the landing of the troops in the desert shore without stores or provisions, would expose them to certain destruction. Gantheaume, therefore, refused to accede to the wishes of the officers of the army, who were desirous to incur that perilous alternative, and made sail again for the

June 24. coast of France. On his route homewards he fell in with the Swiftsure, of seventy-four guns, which Captain Hollowell defended long with his accustomed gallantry, but he was at length obliged to surrender to the vast superiority of the Republican force, and with this trophy the admiral regained the harbour of Toulon. The French journals, long accustomed to continued disasters at sea, celebrated this gleam of success as a memorable triumph, and loudly boasted of the skill with which their fleet had traversed the Mediterranean and avoided the English squadrons; "a melancholy reflection," says the historian of Napoléon, "for a country and its admirals when skill in avoiding a combat is held equivalent to a victory. (1)."

This effort, however, was not the only one made by the first consul for the relief of Egypt. His design was to support Gantheaume by a combined squadron of fifteen ships of the line, drawn from the harbours of France and Spain. For this purpose great efforts had been made by the Spanish marine; six ships of the line at Cadiz had been placed under the orders of the French admiral Dumanoir, and six others had reached that harbour from Ferrol, while the English blockading squadrons, under Sir John Borlase Warren and Sir Richard Bickerton, had left their stations off these harbours in search of Admiral Gantheaume; and Admiral Linois, with three ships of the line, was to join them from Toulon. The British Government, justly alarmed at such a concentration of force in the isle of Leon, hastily despatched Sir James Saumarez with seven ships of the line and two frigates, to resume the block-

June 13. ade of Cadiz; and he had hardly arrived off the harbour's mouth, when advices were received that Amiral Linois, with three ships of the line

(1) Big. ii. 34, 36. Jom. xiv. 363, 365. Dum. vii. 103, 112. Ann. Reg. 1801, 248.

and one frigate, was approaching from the Mediterranean. No sooner did the French admiral find that the blockade of Cadiz had been re-established by a force superior to his own, than he abandoned all hope of effecting the prescribed junction, and fell back to Algesiraz bay, where he took shelter under the powerful batteries which defend its coast. Thither he was followed by Sir James Saumarez, whose squadron was now reduced to six ships of the line by the detachment of one of his vessels to the mouth of the Guadalquivir; and the British admiral resolved upon an immediate attack notwithstanding that the forts and batteries and gun-boats, now manned by gunners from the French ships, presented the most formidable appearance. The British fleet

July 6.
Naval ac-
tion in the
bay of Al-
gesiraz.

stood into the bay, headed by Captain Hood in the *Venerable*, with springs on their cables, and in a short time the action began, the

Audacious and Pompey successively approaching, and taking their stations alongside of the French vessels, between them and the batteries on shore. The wind, however, fell shortly after the leading ships got into action, so as to prevent the remainder of the squadron from advancing to their support; and when at length a light breeze from the south enabled the *Hannibal* to work into the scene of danger, she grounded in such a situation as to be exposed to the shot of the French squadron on one side, of the formidable batteries of *Almirante* and *St. Jago* on the other, while fourteen gun-boats, securely posted under her stern, kept up with great vigour a destructive raking fire. To complete the disaster, the wind totally failed soon after, so as to render it impossible for the other vessels, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, to render any effectual assistance; and the boats, which had been destined to storming the batteries on the islands, were all required to tow the line-of-battle ships which were still afloat, so as to bring their broadsides to bear upon the enemy. After several gallant attempts, therefore, on the part of Sir James Saumarez and his squadron, to throw themselves between the batteries and the grounded vessel, they were compelled to draw off, leaving her to her fate, and after an honourable resistance, she was obliged to strike her colours (1).

The loss of the British in killed and wounded in this action was 361; that on the part of the French and Spaniards, 386; but the unwonted occurrence of the retreat of the former, and the capture of one of their line-of-battle ships, diffused the most extraordinary joy throughout France, in which the first consul warmly participated (2). It was publicly announced at their theatres and in the gazette published on the occasion, that three French sail of the line had completely defeated six British, and captured one of their number, without the slightest mention of

Great re-
joicings in
France at
this event.

(1) James, iii. 164, 172. Ann. Reg. 1801, 249. Dum. vii. 118, 121. Jom. xiv. 366, 368.

An incident, highly characteristic of the English sailors, occurred in this action. In its voyage through the Mediterranean, the French fleet had fallen in with, and captured, the brig *Speedy*, of fourteen guns, commanded by Captain Lord Cochrane, and that gallant officer, with his little crew, was on board the *Formidable* when the action took place in the bay of Algesiraz. At every broadside the vessel received from the English, these brave men gave three cheers, regardless alike of the threats of instant death from the French if they continued so unseemly an interruption, and the obvious danger that they themselves might be sent to the bottom by their friendly discharges.

(2) "The first consul," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "recounted this triumph to us with the most lively satisfaction, with eyes literally over-

flowing with joy at this unlooked-for event. Naval victories were rare at that period, and Napoleon felt the full satisfaction arising from this one. Admiral Linois received the sole recompense which it was in his power at that period to bestow, a sabre of honour. All those who have narrowly studied the character of Napoleon, must have seen that the ruling passion of his great mind was the humbling of England. It was his constant object of study; and I can safely affirm that during the fourteen years that he held the reins of power, during which I certainly saw him very frequently, he was constantly set upon that object, and passionately desirous of the glory which it would produce. He constantly thought that he could give France the means of combatting that power on equal terms, and subduing it; all his measures tended towards that end."—D'ABRANTES, v. 254, 256.

the batteries on shore, to which the Spanish official account, with more justice, ascribes the failure of the attack (1). But these transports were of short duration, and an awful catastrophe was destined to close the naval strife between the two nations. After the battle, the English fleet repaired to Gibraltar, and the utmost efforts were made night and day, to get the squadron ready for sea, but it was found that the Pompey was so much damaged that she could not be set afloat in time, and therefore her crew were distributed through the other vessels, and the fleet stood out to sea to avenge the affront they had received on the morning of the 12th July. Meanwhile, the Spanish squadron at Cadiz, consisting of six ships of the line and three frigates, two of which bore 112 guns each, had joined the shattered French fleet in Algesiraz bay, and the combined force was moving towards the isle of Leon, at the time that the English squadron, consisting of five ships of the line and one frigate, were working out of the harbour of Gibraltar (2).

Nothing in war could be conceived more animating than the circumstances under which the British fleet then set forth to redeem the honour of their flag. The combined squadron, consisting of nine ships of the line and four frigates, was proudly and leisurely moving towards Cadiz, with all sails set and a favourable wind, bearing with them their prize, the Hannibal, which they had contrived to get afloat, in tow of the Indienne frigate; the anxiety of the sailors to rescue her from their hands was indescribable; the day was clear, the rock covered with spectators, and loud shouts announced every successive British vessel which cleared the pier-head of Gibraltar to proceed on the perilous service. The mole, the quays, the batteries, the cliffs, were crowded with anxious multitudes, eager to witness the approaching conflict; the band of the Admiral's ship, the Cæsar, played the popular air, "Come, cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer," while the military bands of the garrison made the rock re-echo with the notes of "Britons, strike home!" So thrilling was the interest of the scene, so overpowering the feelings which it excited, that the foreigners who witnessed it wished they had been Englishmen; and even the wounded begged to be taken on board to share in the honours of the approaching conflict (3).

The British fleet again sails from Gibraltar.

It was in truth a proud sight for the English garrison to behold their fleet, of five ships of the line, only ten days after a bloody encounter, again put to sea to give chase to an enemy's squadron of line-of-battle ships, six of whom were perfectly uninjured, and which contained two three-deckers of stupendous magnitude. The Hannibal soon fell astern, and with the frigate which had her in tow, returned to Algesiraz; but the remainder of the squadron cleared Cabritta point, and stood away, as

Second battle of Algesiraz.

darkness set in, with all sail towards Cadiz. At ten at night, a fresh breeze filled the sails of the English fleet; they gained rapidly on the enemy, and Sir James gave orders that they should engage the first vessels which they could overtake. At eleven, the leading ship, the Superb, opened its fire upon the Real Carlos, of 112 guns, and after three broadsides she was seen to be on fire. Deeming this gigantic adversary so far disabled, that she must fall into the hands of the remainder of the fleet as they came up, the

(1) "The action," says the Madrid Gazette extraordinary, "was very obstinate and bloody on both sides, and likewise on the part of our batteries, which decided the fate of the day. It is to the hot and sustained fire of fort St. Jago that we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manœuvre of attempting to pass between the French admiral's ship and the shore, made her ground, and notwith-

standing the utmost exertions to get her afloat, it was found impossible, and the fire of the batteries very soon compelled her to strike."—See JAMES, iii. 173.

(2) James iii. 179, 181. Ann. Reg. 1801, 252. Jonn. xiv. 369. Dum. vii. 128.

(3) Braston, iii. 369. James, iii. 180.

Superb passed on, and in half an hour overtook and engaged the St.-Antoine, of 74 guns, which soon struck her colours. The Cæsar and Venerable came up in succession, and the chase was continued all night, in the midst of a tempestuous gale, by the light of the discharges which at intervals flashed through the gloom. But while the sailors were making the greatest efforts, and constantly nearing the enemy, a terrible catastrophe occurred, which for a moment daunted the stoutest hearts. The Superb, after having disabled the Real Carlos on her starboard, passed on, poured a broadside on the larboard into the San Hermenegildo, also of 112 guns, and soon outstripped both her first-rate antagonists. In the darkness of the night these two Spanish ships mutually mistaking each other for the enemy, were involved in a mortal combat; the violence of the winds spread the flames from the one to the other, the heavens were illuminated by the awful conflagration, and at midnight they both blew up with an explosion so tremendous as to shake Cadiz to its foundation, and spread a thrill of horror through every soul that witnessed it. Out of two thousand men, of which their crews consisted, not more than 250 were saved by the English boats, the remainder were blown into the air, or perished in the waves on that tempestuous night (1).

When morning dawned, both fleets were extremely scattered, the Venerable and Thames were far a-head of the rest of the British squadron, and the Formidable, of eighty guns, was seen in the rear of the French fleet. The British ships instantly gave chase, and soon brought her to action. It began within musket shot; and shortly the two ships were abreast of each other within pistol range, and a tremendous fire was kept up on both sides. Undismayed by the magnitude of the force brought against him, the French captain, made the most gallant resistance, which was soon rendered equal by the Thames unavoidably falling behind, and dropping out of the action. The fire of the Venerable, however, directed at the hull of her opponent, was beginning to tell severely on the enemy's crew, when the French gunners, by a fortunate discharge, succeeded in bringing down her mainmast, and with it most of her rigging, so that she fell behind, and soon after her other masts went by the board, and she struck on the shoals of San Pedro. In this desperate situation Captain Hood still maintained a contest with the stern chasers of the Formidable (2), and gave time for two other ships of the line to come up; upon the appearance of which the enemy relinquished their design of attacking the disabled vessel, and crowding all sail, stood in for Cadiz harbour, where they were soon after moored in safety.

The intelligence of this bold and fortunate engagement, in which a British fleet so severely handled an enemy's squadron of nearly double its own force, excited the greater joy in Great Britain, that the preceding failure in Algiers bay had somewhat mortified a people, nursed by long continued success to unreasonable expectations of constant triumph on their favourite element. On the other hand, the frightful catastrophe of their two first-rate men-of-war spread the utmost consternation through the Spanish peninsula, and increased that strong repugnance which the Castilian youth had long manifested for the naval service (3).

Attack of
Napoléon
on Portu-
gal.

Contemporaneous with these maritime operations was a measure, from which Napoléon anticipated much more in the way of forming a counterpoise to the vast colonial acquisitions made by Great

(1) James, iii. 180, 183. Ann. Reg. 1801, 253. Jom. xiv. 368, 371. Dum. vii. 132, 135. Bign. ii. 38, 39.

(2) James iii. 184, 185. Ann. Reg. 1801, 258.

(3) Jom. xix. 371. Ann. Reg. 1801. 253, 254.

Britain during the war; and this was an attack upon Portugal, the ancient and tried ally of England. The French, according to their own admission, had no cause of complaint against that power; the only motive of the war was to provide an equivalent to the maritime conquests of England. "We only wished," says Bignon, "to enter into that kingdom in order to leave it, and stipulate for that retreat some considerable concession from Great Britain." The most obvious means of effecting this object was to interest Spain in its execution, and this was adroitly managed by the first consul. In the treaty of Lunéville, as already observed, it was stipulated that the grand duchy of Tuscany should be ceded by the Austrian family, and erected into a separate principality in favour of Don Louis, a prince of the Spanish family; and that the duchy was soon after erected into royalty, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria. Europe was at a loss at first to divine what was the motive for this sudden condition in favour of the Spanish house of Bourbon; but it was soon made manifest, when it appeared that a treaty had been concluded between France and Spain, the object of which was, "to compel the court of Lisbon to separate itself from the alliance of Great Britain, and cede, till the conclusion of a general peace, a fourth of its territory to the French and Spanish forces (1)."

This flagrant and unprovoked invasion of the rights of a pacific state, took place at the very time when France was loudly proclaiming the principles of the armed neutrality, and the utter injustice of one belligerent interfering with the trade or alliances of independent powers. But it soon appeared that the first consul's tenderness for neutral rights was all on one element, where he was weakest; and that on the other, where his power was well nigh irresistible, he was prepared to go the utmost length of belligerent aggression, and compel every other state to enter into his projects of universal hostility against Great Britain. So early as December 1800, when the victory of Hohenlinden had relieved him of all anxiety on the side of Germany, he had given orders for the formation of an army of observation at Bordeaux, which gradually drew towards the Pyrenees, and was increased to twenty thousand men; and this was followed some months afterwards by a declaration of war on the part of Spain, against the Court of Lisbon. The ostensible grounds of complaint on which this step was rested, were the refusal by the Court of Lisbon to ratify a peace with France, signed by its plenipotentiary in 1797; accompanied with a complaint that she had furnished protection to the English fleets and sailors, and insulted the French in the harbour of Carthagen. The real reasons for the war were very different. "The Courts of Lisbon and Madrid," says the French historian, "united by recent intermarriages, had no real subjects of dispute. They were drawn into the contest because the one was attached to the political system of France, the other to that of Great Britain (2)". Spain was at this time entirely under the guidance of the Prince of Peace, a vain and ambitious favourite who had risen from an obscure origin, by court intrigue, to an elevation little short of the throne, and threw himself willingly into the arms of France, in order to seek an effectual support against the pride and patriotism of the Castilian noblesse, who were exceedingly jealous of his authority. Guided by such a ruler, Spain made herself the willing instrument of France in this tyrannical aggression. She afterwards expiated her faults in oceans of blood (3).

In this extremity the Portuguese Government naturally turned to England

(1) Eign. ii. 10. Ann. Reg. 1801, 256.

(2) Bignon. ii. 11.

(3) Journ. xiv. 289, 290. Ann. Reg. 1801, 256. Dum. vii. 61, 62.

The Portuguese apply to England for aid. for support, and offered, if she would send an army of twenty-five thousand men, to give her the command of the native forces. Had it been in the power of Great Britain to have acceded to this offer, the desperate struggle of the peninsula might have been accelerated by eight years, and the triumphs of Busaco and Vimiera graced the conclusion of the first part of the war. But it was impossible to make such an effort; her only disposable force was already engaged in Egypt, and the great contest in the north, as yet undecided required all the means which were at the disposal of her government. All that could be done, therefore, was to send a few regiments to Lisbon, with a loan of L.500,000, in order if possible to procure a respite from the impending danger till the general peace, which it was already foreseen could not be far distant (1).

Deprived in this manner of any effectual external aid, the Portuguese Government, to appearance at least, was not wanting to its ancient renown. An animated proclamation was put forth, in which the people were reminded of their ancestors' heroic resistance to the Romans, and their imperishable achievements in the southern hemisphere; new armaments were ordered, works hastily constructed, a levy *en masse* called forth, and the plate borrowed from the churches to aid Government in carrying on the means of defence. But during all this shew of resistance, there was a secret understanding between the courts of Lisbon and Madrid; the regular troops on the frontier, about twenty thousand strong, were hardly increased by a single soldier; and when, in the end of May, the Spanish army of thirty thousand combatants invaded the country, they experienced hardly any resistance. Jurumenha and Olivenza at once opened their gates; Campo Mayor, though amply provided with every thing requisite to sustain a siege, only held out a fortnight; and the Portuguese, flying in disorder, made haste to throw the Tagus between them and the enemy. Even Elvas, which never lowered its colours in a more glorious strife, surrendered, and in a fortnight after the war commenced, this collusive contest was terminated by the signature of preliminaries of peace at Abrantes. By this treaty, which was ratified on September 29th, Olivenza, with its circumjacent territory, was ceded to Spain, and the ports of Portugal were shut against the English flag (2).

Which the first consul refuses to ratify. No sooner were the terms of this treaty known in France than the first consul refused to ratify them. Not that he had either any animosity or cause of complaint against the Cabinet of Lisbon, but that by this pacification the main object of the war was missed, namely, the occupation of such a portion of the Portuguese territory by the French troops, as might give weight to the demands of France for restitution of her conquered colonies from Great Britain (3). The French army of observation, accordingly, under Leclerc and St.-Cyr, five-and-twenty thousand strong, which had advanced to Ciudad Rodrigo, entered Portugal, invested Almeida, and threatened both Lisbon and Oporto. The Portuguese Government now made serious preparations; six sail of the line were detached from Lisbon to reinforce the English blockading squadron off Cadiz, and such efforts as the time would admit made to reinforce the army on the frontier. But the contest was too unequal, and England, anticipating the seizure of the continental dominions of the house of Braganza, had already taken possession of the island of Madeira, to secure its colonial dominions from insult,

(1) Ann. Reg. 256, 257. Dum. vii. 63. Journ. xiv. 294.

(2) Big. ii. 12, 13. Journ. xiv. 223, 299. Ann. Reg. 1801, 258.

(3) Big. ii. 13.

when the tempest was averted by external events. The near approach of an accommodation between France and England, made it a greater object for the first consul to extend his colonial acquisitions, than enlarge his conquests on the continent of Europe; while the arrival of a convoy with a great supply of silver from Brazil, gave the Portuguese Government the means both of satisfying his pecuniary demands, and gratifying the cupidity of his inferior agents. To use the words of a French historian—"The Portuguese Government holding the purse, threw it at the feet of the robbers, and thus saved itself from destruction (1)." Bribes were liberally bestowed on the French generals (2), and so completely did this seasonable supply remove all difficulties, that a treaty was soon concluded, in virtue of which, Olivenza, with its territory, was confirmed to Spain, the harbours of Portugal were closed against English ships, both of war and commerce, one half of Guiana, as far as the Carapanatuba stream, was ceded to France, and the commerce of the Republic was placed on the footing of the most favoured nations (3). By a less honourable and secret article, the immediate payment of 20,000,000 francs was made the condition of the retreat of the French troops (4).

As the war approached a termination, the anxiety of Napoléon to procure equivalents for the English transatlantic acquisitions became more vehement. With this view, he made propositions to Prussia to seize Hanover; an insidious though tempting offer, which would have rendered that power permanently a dependent on France, and totally altered the balance of European politics. But the Prussian Cabinet had good sense enough, at that time at least, to see that no such gratuitous act of spoliation was likely to prove a permanent acquisition, and to decline the proposal (5).

Meanwhile, Napoléon, relieved by the treaty of Lunéville, from all apprehensions of a serious continental struggle, bent all his attention to the shores of Great Britain, and made serious preparations for invasion on his own side of the Channel. Though not of the gigantic character which they assumed in a later period of the contest, after the renewal of the war, these efforts were of a kind to excite the serious attention of the English Government. From the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Garonne, every creek and headland was fortified, so as to afford protection to the small craft which were creeping round the shore from all the harbours of the kingdom, to the general rendezvous of Dunkirk and Boulogne. The latter harbour was the general point of assemblage; gun-boats and flat-bottomed praams were collected in great quantities, furnaces heated for red-hot shot, immense batteries constructed, and every preparation made, not only for a vigorous defence, but the most energetic offensive operations. By an ordinance of July 12th, the flotilla was organized in nine divisions; and to them were assigned all the boats and artillerymen which had been attached to the armies of the Rhine and the Maine, which had been brought down those streams to the harbours on the Channel. The immensity of these preparations was studiously dwelt upon in the French papers; nothing was talked of but the approaching descent upon Great Britain; and fame, ever the first to sound the alarm, so magnified their amount, that when a few battalions pitched their tents on the heights of Boulogne, it was universally credited

(1) Bign. ii. 13, note.

(2) Leclerc got 5,000,000 francs, or £200,000, for his own share.—HARD. viii. 136.

(3) See the treaty in Dum. vii. 264. Pièces Just.

(4) Bign. ii. 14. Hard. viii. 136.

(5) Bign. ii. 17, 18. Hard. viii. 34, 35.

in England that the army of invasion was about to take its station preparatory to the threatened attempt (1).

Though not participating in the vulgar illusion as to the immine-
Apprehensions of the British Government. nence of the danger, the English Government had various weighty reasons for not disregarding the preparations on the southern coast of the Channel. The fleets of Great Britain in the narrow seas were indeed so powerful that no attempt at invasion by open force could be made with any chance of success (2); but it was impossible to conceal the alarming fact, that the same wind which wafted the French flotilla out of its harbours might chain the English cruisers to theirs; and the recent expeditions of Gantheaume in the Mediterranean, and of Hoche to the coast of Ireland, had demonstrated that, notwithstanding the greatest maritime superiority, it was impossible at all times to prevent a vigilant and active enemy from putting to sea during the darkness of autumnal or winter months. It was easy too to foresee, that even although ultimate defeat might attend a descent, incalculable confusion and distress would necessarily follow it in the first instance. It was to be expected also, that the destruction of the armament might influence the issue of the negotiations for peace; and that if the first consul saw that his flotilla was not secure from insult even in his own harbours, he would probably abate of the pretensions which his extraordinary successes had induced him to bring forward (3).

Influenced by these views, the British Government prepared a powerful armament of bombs and light vessels in the Downs, and intrusted the command to Lord Nelson, whose daring and successful exploits at Aboukir and the Nile pointed him out as peculiarly fitted for an enterprise of that description. On the 1st August he set sail from Deal at the head of three ships of the line, two frigates, and thirty-five bombs, brigs, and smaller vessels, and stood over to the French coast. He himself strongly urged that the expedition, aided by a few thousand troops, should be sent against Flushing; but the Cabinet resolved that it should proceed against Boulogne, and thither accordingly he went, much against his inclination. After a reconnoissance, attended with a slight cannonade on both sides, soon after his arrival, a more serious attack took place on the night of the 15th August. But in the interval the French line of boats had been rendered wellnigh unassailable. Every vessel was defended by long poles headed by iron spikes projecting from their sides; strong nettings were braced up to their lower yards; they were moored head and stern across the harbour-mouth in the strongest possible manner, chained to the ground and each other, and on board each was from fifty to an hundred soldiers, each provided with three muskets, as in defending a breach threatened with assault. In addition to this the whole were immediately under the guns of the batteries on shore, and every eminence capable of bearing a cannon had been armed with a powerful array of artillery. Notwithstanding these formidable circumstances, Nelson commenced the attack at midnight in four divisions of boats. The second division, under Captain Parker, first closed with the enemy; and in the most gallant style instantly endeavoured to board. But the strong netting baffled all their efforts, and as they were vainly endeavouring to cut their way through it, a discharge of musketry from the soldiers on board killed or wounded above half their number,

Attack on
the flotilla
at Bou-
logne by
Nelson.

Which is
defeated

(1) Dum. vii. 140, 144. Jom. xiv. 380, 381. Ann. Reg. 1804, 263.

(2) England at this period had fourteen ships of the line under Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, and

seventeen in the German Ocean observing the Dutch harbours."—JAMES, iii. Ap. No. 2, and DUMAS, vii. 144.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1801, 266. Jom. xiv. 385.

including their gallant leader Captain Parker, who was desperately maimed while cheering on his men. The darkness of the night, and the rapidity of the tide, which prevented the other divisions from getting into action at the same time as Captain Parker's, rendered the attack abortive, notwithstanding the most gallant efforts on the part of the seamen and marines engaged in the service. One of the commanders of the French division behaved like a generous enemy. He hailed the boats as they approached, and called out in English, "Let me advise you, brave Englishmen, to keep off; you can do nothing here, it is only shedding the blood of brave men to attempt it." After four hours gallant but unequal combat, the assailants were obliged to retire, with the loss of 172 men killed and wounded; but Nelson declared that, "If all the boats could have arrived at their destined points at the periods assigned to them, not all the chains in France could have prevented our men from bringing off the whole of the vessels (1)."

A singular circumstance occurred at this time, which demonstrates how little the clearest intellect can anticipate the ultimate result of the discoveries which are destined to effect the greatest changes in human affairs. At the time when all eyes in Europe were fixed on the Channel, and the orators in the French tribunate were wishing for "a fair wind and thirty-six hours," an unknown individual (2) presented himself to the first consul, and said, "The sea which separates you from your enemy gives him an immense advantage. Aided alternately by the winds and the tempests, he braves you in his inaccessible isle. This obstacle, his sole strength, I engage to overcome. I can, in spite of all his fleets, at any time, in a few hours, transport your armies into his territory, without fearing the tempests, or having need of the winds. Consider the means which I offer you." The plan and details accompanying it were received by Napoléon, and by him remitted to a commission of the most learned men which France could produce, who reported that it was visionary and impracticable, and in consequence it, at that time, came to nothing (3). Such was the reception which STEAM NAVIGATION received at the hands of philosophy; such is the first success of the greatest discovery of modern times since the invention of printing, of one destined in its ultimate effects, to produce a revolution in the channels of commerce, alter the art of naval war, work out the overthrow of empires, change the face of the world. The discovery seemed made for the age; and yet genius and philosophy rejected it at the very time when it was most required, and when it seemed calculated to carry into effect the vast projects which were already matured by its great leader. But the continental writers were in error when they suppose that this vast acquisition to nautical power would, if it had been fully developed at that time, have led to the subjugation of Britain; the English maritime superiority would have appeared as clearly in the new method of carrying on naval war as the old; Albion would have been encircled by steam vessels; if the French boats, aided by such auxiliaries, could have braved the wind and the tide, the English cruisers would have been equally assisted in the maintenance of their blockade; the stoutest heart and the last guinea would have finally carried the day, whatever changes occurred in the mode of carrying on the contest; and even if their wooden walls had been broken through, the future conquerors of Vittoria and Waterloo had no cause for despondency, if the war came to be conducted by land forces on their own shores.

(1) Southey, ii. 176, 180. Ann. Reg. 1801, 271.
 Jom. xiv. 387. Dnm. vii. 149, 159. Eign. ii. 59, 60.

(2) Fulton.

(3) Big. ii. 61, 62.

But these warlike demonstrations were a mere cover on both sides to the real intentions of the two Cabinets; and in the midst of the hostile fleets and armies which covered the Channel and the coasts of France, couriers were incessantly passing, carrying despatches containing the negotiations for a general peace. In truth, the war had now ceased to have any present or definitive object with both the powers by whom it was maintained, and they were driven to an accommodation from the experienced impossibility of finding any common element in which their hostilities could be carried on. After the loss of all her colonies, the ruin of her commerce, and the disappearance of her flag from the ocean, it was as impossible for France to find a method of annoying Great Britain, as it was for England to discover the means of reducing the continental power of her enemy, after the peace of Lunéville had prostrated the last array of the military monarchies of Europe. Even if their mutual hostility were inextinguishable, still both had need of breathing-time to prepare for a renewal of the contest; the former that she might regain the commerce and colonies on which her naval strength depended, the latter that she might restore the finances which the enormous expenses of the contest had seriously disorganised.

March 21. So early as the 21st March, the British Cabinet had signified to M. Otto, who still remained in London to superintend the arrangements for the exchange of prisoners, that they were disposed to renew the negotiations which had so often been opened without success; and it was agreed between the two governments that, without any general suspension of arms, the basis of a treaty should be secretly adjusted. When the terms, however, came to be first proposed, there appeared to be an irreconcilable difference between them; nor was this surprising, for both had enjoyed a career of almost unbroken success upon their separate elements, and each was called on to make sacrifices for peace, which it was quite evident could not be exacted from them by force of arms if the contest was continued. Lord Hawkesbury's first proposals were, that the French should evacuate Egypt, and that the English should retain Malta, Ceylon, Trinity, and Martinique, and evacuate all the other colonies which they had conquered during the war; acquisitions which, how great soever, did not seem disproportionate to the vast continental additions received by France in the extension of her frontier to the Rhine, and the establishment of a girdle of affiliated republics round the parent state. But to these conditions the first consul refused to accede. "The resolution of the first consul," says the historian of his diplomacy, "was soon taken. France could neither surrender any part of its ancient domains nor its recent acquisitions (1)."

July 23. The views of Napoléon were developed in a note of M. Otto, on the 23d July, after the dissolution of the northern confederacy had relieved England of one of the greatest of her dangers, and disposed France to proceed with more moderation in the negotiation; and their defeat in Egypt had deprived them of all hopes of retaining that colony by force of arms. He proposed that Egypt should be restored to the Porte; that the republic formed of the seven Ionian islands should be recognised; that the harbours of Italy should be restored to the Pope and the King of Naples; port Mahon ceded to Spain, and Malta to the Knights of Jerusalem, with the offer to raze its fortifications. In the East Indies, he offered to abandon Ceylon to Great Britain, upon condition that all the other colonial conquests of England in both he-

(1) Join, xiv. 379. Big. ii. 68.

mispheres should be restored, and in that event agreed to respect the integrity of Portugal (1). Lord Hawkesbury, in answer, suggested some arrangement by which Malta might be rendered independent of both parties, and insisted for the retention of some of the British conquests in the West Indies (2). The negotiations were prolonged for several months, but at length the difficulties were all adjusted, and the preliminaries of a general peace signed at London on the 1st October (5).

Oct. 1, 1801. By these articles it was agreed that hostilities should immediately cease by land and sea between the contracting parties; that Great Britain should restore its colonial conquests in every part of the world, Ceylon in the East and Trinidad in the West Indies alone excepted, which were ceded in entire sovereignty to that power; that Egypt should be restored to the Porte, Malta and its dependencies to the order of St.-John of Jerusalem, the Cape of Good Hope to Holland, but opened alike to the trade of both the contracting powers; the integrity of Portugal guaranteed; the harbours of the Roman and Neapolitan states evacuated by the French, and Porto Ferraio by the English forces; a compensation provided for the house of Nassau; and the republic of the Seven Islands recognised by the French Republic. The fisheries of Newfoundland were restored to the situation in which they had been before the war, reserving their final arrangement to the definitive treaty (4).

Though the negotiations had been so long in dependence, they had been kept a profound secret from the people of both countries, and their long continuance had sensibly weakened the hope of their being brought to a satisfactory result. Either from accident or design, this impression had been greatly strengthened, recently before the signature of the preliminaries, and the very day before, the report had gone abroad in London, that all hope of an amicable adjustment was at an end, and that interminable war was likely again to break out between the two nations. In proportion to the desponding feelings occasioned by this impression, were the transports of joy excited by the appearance of a London Gazette Extraordinary on the 2d October, announcing the signature of the preliminaries on the preceding day. The 5 per cents instantly rose from 59 to 66; the *tiers consolidé* at Paris from 48 to 55.

Universal joy pervaded both capitals. These feelings rapidly spread through the whole British nation, as the arrival of the post announced the joyful intelligence; and the public satisfaction was at its height, when on the 12th of the same month Colonel Lauriston arrived, bearing the ratification of the treaty by the French Government. Never since the restoration of Charles II. had such transports seized the public mind. The populace insisted on drawing the French envoys in their carriage; and they were conducted by this tumultuary array, followed by a guard of honour from the household brigade, through Parliament Street to Downing Street, where the ratifications were exchanged, and at night a general illumination gave vent to the feelings of universal exhilaration. Nor was the public joy manifested in a less emphatic manner at Paris. Hardly had the cannon of the Tuileries and the Invalides announced the unexpected in-

(1) Note, 23d July.

(2) Note, 5th August.

(3) Big. ii. 73, 76. Jom. xiv. 383.

(4) Big. ii. 77. Jom. xiv. 393, 394.

The clause regarding Malta, which became of so much importance in the sequel, from being the ostensible ground of the rupture of the treaty, was in these terms: "The island of Malta, with its de-

pendencies, shall be evacuated by the English troops, and restored to the order of St.-John of Jerusalem. To secure the absolute independence of that isle from both the contracting parties, it shall be placed under the guarantee of a third power to be named in the definitive treaty."—Dumas, vii. 319, and *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 18, 19.

telligence, when every one stopped in the streets and congratulated his acquaintance on the news; the public flocked in crowds to the theatres, where it was officially announced, and in the evening the city was universally and splendidly illuminated. There seemed no bounds to the prosperity and glory of the Republic, now that this auspicious event had removed the last and most inveterate of its enemies (1).

But while these were the natural feelings of the inconsiderate populace, who are ever governed by present impressions, and were for the most part destitute of the information requisite to form a rational opinion on the subject, there were many men gifted with greater sagacity and foresight in Great Britain, who deeply lamented the conditions by which peace had been purchased, and from the very first prophesied that it could be of no long endurance. They observed that the war had been abruptly terminated, without any one of the objects being gained for which it was undertaken; that it was entered into in order to curb the ambition, and stop the democratic propagandism of France, and in an especial manner prevent the extension of its authority in the Low Countries, whereas by the result its power was immensely extended, its frontier advanced to the Rhine, its influence to the Niemen, and a military chieftain placed at its head, capable of wielding to the best advantage its vast resources. That supposing the destruction of some, and the humiliation of other powers, had absolved England from all her ties with the continental states, and left her at full liberty to consult only her own interest in any treaty which might be formed, still it seemed at best extremely doubtful whether the preliminaries which had been signed were calculated to accomplish this object; that they contributed nothing towards the coercion of France on one element, while they gave that power the means of restoring its fleets, and recruiting the sinews of war on another; and that then the result necessarily would be, that England would be compelled to renew the contest again, and that too at no distant period, in order to maintain her existence, and she would then find her enemy's resources as much strengthened as her own were weakened during its cessation; that during the struggle we had deprived France of all her colonies, blockaded her harbours, ruined her commerce, and almost annihilated her navy, and therefore had nothing to fear from her maritime hostility; but could this be affirmed, if, in pursuance of this treaty, we restored almost all her colonial possessions, and enabled her, by a successful commerce, in a few years to revive her naval power? If, therefore, the principle, so long maintained by Great Britain, had any foundation, and the hostility of revolutionary France was implacable, it was evident that she has every thing to fear and nothing to hope from this pacification; and while England unlooses her own armour, and lays aside her sword, she will in truth place in the hands of her redoubtable adversary the weapons, and the only weapons, by which ere long she will be enabled to aim mortal strokes at herself.

Arguments
urged in
support of
it by the
Adminis-
tration.

The partisans of administration, and the advocates for peace throughout the country, opposed to these arguments, considerations of another kind, perhaps still more specious. They contended that the real question was not, what were the views formed, or the hopes indulged, when we entered into the war, but what were the prospects which could rationally be entertained, now that we had reached its tenth year? That without pretending to affirm that the resources of Great

(1) Dum. vii, 208, 209. Ann. Reg. 1801, 277. Jom. xiv. 394, 395.

Britain were worn out, or peace had become a matter of necessity, still it was impossible to dispute that, in consequence of the cessation of continental hostilities and the dissolution of the last coalition, the prospect of effectually reducing the military power of France had become almost hopeless; that thus the question was, whether, after it had become impossible, by the disasters of our allies, to attain one object of the war, we should obstinately and single-handed maintain the contest, without any definite end to be gained by its prosecution; that though the frontiers of France had been extended, and her power immensely increased, still the revolutionary mania, by far the greatest evil with which Europe was threatened, had been at length effectually extinguished. That thus the contest had ceased to be, as at first, one of life and death to England, and returned to the usual state of warfare between regular governments, in which the cost of maintaining it was to be balanced by the advantages to be gained from its prosecution; that without doubt the return of peace, and the restoration of her colonies would give France the means of increasing her naval resources, but it would probably do the same in an equal or greater degree to Great Britain, and leave the maritime power of the two countries in the same relative situation as before; that it was impossible to remain for ever at war, lest your enemy should repair the losses he had sustained during the contest, and the enormous expenses with which the struggle was attended would, if much longer continued, involve the finances of the country in inextricable embarrassment; that it was surely worth while trying, now that a regular government was established in the Republic, whether it was not possible to remain with so near a neighbour on terms of amity; and it would be time enough to take up arms again, if the conduct of the first consul demonstrated that he was not sincere in his professions, and that a renewal of the contest would be less perilous than a continuance of peace (1).

The termination of hostilities between France and England speedily drew after it the accommodation of the differences of the minor powers engaged in the war. No sooner were the preliminaries signed with Great Britain, than Napoléon used his utmost efforts to conclude a treaty on the most favourable terms with the Ottoman Porte. On this occasion the finesse of European diplomacy prevailed over the plain sense and upright dealing of the Osmanlis. The news of the surrender of Alexandria reached Paris on the 7th October, six days after the preliminaries had been signed with England; instantly the Turkish ambassador, Esseyd Ali Effendi, who had long been in a sort of confinement, was sent for, and before he was aware of the important success which had been gained by his countrymen, persuaded to agree to a treaty, which was signed two days afterwards. In this negotiation, the French diplomatists made great use of their alleged moderation in agreeing to the restoration of Egypt, which they knew was already lost, and so worked upon the fears of the ambassador by threats of a descent from Ancona and Otranto, that he agreed to give to the Republican commerce in the Levant the same advantages which the most favoured nations enjoyed; and, at the same time, the Republic of the Seven Ionian Islands was recognised. Thus, by the arts of M. Talleyrand, were the French, who, in defiance of ancient treaties, had done all in their power to wrest Egypt from the Turks, placed on the same footing with the English, by whose blood and treasure it had been rescued from their grasp (2).

Oct. 9.
Peace be-
tween
France and
Turkey,
and treaties
with Bavaria
and America.

(1) An Reg. 1801, 278, 279.

(2) *Jom. xiv.* 393. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 280, and *State Papers*, 292.

Aug. 24. In the end of August, a definitive treaty was concluded between France and Bavaria, by which the latter power renounced in favour of the former all their territories and possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, and received, on the other hand, a guarantee for its dominions on the right bank (1). The preliminaries, signed at Morfontaine on September 30, 1800, between France and America, were ratified by a definitive treaty which somewhat abridged the commercial advantages stipulated in favour of the Re-
Sept. 9. public, although it placed the French on the footing of the most favoured nations (2). But notwithstanding all his exertions, the first consul was obliged to forego the peculiar advantages which, in the treaty of 1778, the gratitude of the Americans to Louis XVI had granted to the subjects of France. Finally, a treaty of peace was, on October 8th, concluded between France and Russia, and on December 17th, between the same power and the Dey of Algiers (5).

The preliminary articles of peace underwent a protracted discussion in both Houses of Parliament, immediately after the opening of the session in November 1801. The eyes of all the world were fixed on the only assembly in existence, where the merits of so important a treaty, and the mighty interests it involved, could receive a free discussion.

Debates in
Parliament
on the
peace.

It was urged by Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and the war party in both houses, "By the result of this treaty we are in truth a conquered people. Bonaparte is as much our master as he is of Spain

or Prussia, or any of those countries which, though nominally independent, are really subjected to his control. Are our resources exhausted? Is the danger imminent, that such degrading terms are acceded to? On the contrary, our wealth is unbounded, our fleets are omnipotent, and we have recently humbled the veterans of France, even on their own element! We now make peace, it seems, because we foresee a time at no distant period, when we shall be obliged to do so; we capitulate, like General Menou, when we have still
Arguments against the peace. some ammunition left. The first question for every independent power inheriting a glorious name to ask itself is, 'Is the part I am to act consonant to the high reputation I have borne in the world?' Judging by this standard, what shall we say of the present treaty? France gives up nothing, for Egypt, at the time of its conclusion, was not hers to give. England, with the exception of Trinidad and Ceylon, gives up every thing. By

(1) State Papers. Ann. Reg. 1801, 297.

(2) *Jom.* xiv. 399.

(3) *Ann. Reg.* 1801. State Papers, 291, 300.

Important treaty between France and Russia. The public articles of this treaty merely re-established the relations of the two empires on the footing on which they stood prior to the commencement of hostilities; but they contained also several secret articles, which ultimately became of the greatest importance in the complicated system of European diplomacy. The first article related to the division of the indemnities provided by the treaty of Lunéville for the princes dispossessed on the left bank of the Rhine. The two cabinets bound themselves "to form a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to adopt their principles, which are to preserve a just equilibrium between the houses of Austria and Prussia." The second article provided, that the high contracting parties should come to an understanding to terminate on amicable terms the affairs of Italy and of the Holy See. The sixth article provides, "The first consul and the Emperor of Russia shall act in concert in relation to the King of Sardinia, and with all the regard possible to the actual state

of affairs." The ninth article guaranteed the independence of the republic of the Seven Islands; "and it is specially provided, that those isles shall contain no foreign troops." Finally, the eleventh article, the most important of the whole, declares:—"As soon as possible after the signature of the present treaty, and these secret articles, the two contracting parties shall enter upon the consideration of the establishment of a general peace, upon the following basis: 'To restore a just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, and to ensure the liberty of the seas, binding themselves to act in concert for the attainment of these objects by all measures, whether of conciliation or vigour, mutually agreed on between them, for the good of humanity, the general repose, and the independence of governments.'" So early had these great potentates taken upon themselves to act as the arbiters of the whole affairs of the civilized world! These secret articles were in the end the cause of all the differences which ensued between those powers, and brought the French to Moscow and the Russians to Paris. So often does overweening ambition outvault itself, and fall on the other side.—See *Buxton*, ii. 90, 93.

the result of the treaty, France possesses in Europe all the continent, excepting Austria and Prussia; in Asia, Pondicherry, Cochin, Negapatam, and the Spice Islands; in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, Goree, and Senegal; in the Mediterranean, every fortified port, excepting Gibraltar, so that that inland sea may now be truly called a French lake; in the West Indies, part at least of St.-Domingo, Martinique, Tobago, St.-Lucie, Guadeloupe, Curaçoa; in North America, St.-Pierre and Miguelon, Louisiana, in virtue of a secret treaty with Spain; in South America, Surinam, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, and Guiana, as far as the river of the Amazons. Such is the power which we are required to contemplate without dismay, and under the shadow of whose greatness we are invited to lie down with perfect tranquillity and composure. What would the Marlboroughs, the Godolphins, the Somers, or such weak and deluded men, as viewed with jealousy the power of Louis XIV, have said to a peace which not only confirms to France the possession nearly of the whole of Europe, but extends her empire over every other part of the globe?

“But it is said that France and the first consul will stop short in the career of ambition; that they will be satisfied with the successes they have gained, and that the progress of the Revolution will stop at the elevation it has already attained. Is such the nature of ambition? Is it the nature of French revolutionary ambition? Does it commonly happen that either communities or single men are cured of the passion for aggrandisement by unlimited success? On the contrary, if we examine the French Revolution, and trace it correctly to its causes, we shall find that the scheme of universal empire was, from the beginning, what was looked forward to as the consummation of its labours; the end first in view, though the last to be accomplished; the *primum mobile* that originally set it in motion, and has since guided and governed all their movements. The authors of the Revolution wished, in the first instance, to destroy morality and religion, but they wished these things, not as ends, but as means in a higher design. They wished for a double empire, an empire of opinion, and an empire of political power, and they used the one of these as the means of effecting the other. When there is but one country intervenes between France and universal dominion, is it to be supposed that she will stop of her own accord, and quietly surrender all the fruits of her efforts, when they are just within her grasp?

“But the peace is founded, it would appear, on another hope; on the idea that Bonaparte, now that he has become a sovereign, will no longer be a supporter of revolutionary schemes, but do his utmost to maintain the rank and authority which he has so recently acquired. But although nothing seems more certain than that, in that quarter at least, the democratic mania is for the present completely extinguished, yet it by no means follows from that circumstance that it does not exist, and that too in a most dangerous form, in other states in close alliance with the present ruler of France. Though the head of an absolute monarchy in that kingdom, he is adored as the essence of Jacobinism in this country; and maintains a party here, only the more dangerous that its members are willing to sacrifice to him not only the independence of their country, but the whole consistency of their previous opinions. If any doubt could exist in any reasonable mind that the grand object of the first consul, as of all preceding governments in France, has been the destruction of this country, it would be removed by the conduct which has been pursued, and the objects that have been insisted for in this very treaty. What can be the object of demanding so many settlements in South America and the West Indies, the Cape, and Cochin-China, and Malta, so re-

cently won by our arms, if not of building up a maritime and colonial power, which may in time come to rival that of this country? It does not augur very favourably of the intentions of a party in any transaction, that his conduct throughout has been marked by the clearest proofs of duplicity and fraud. Now, what shall we think of the candour and fairness which, in a treaty with us, proposes the evacuation of Egypt at the very time when they knew, though we did not, that at that moment all their soldiers in Egypt were prisoners of war? Where was their good faith to the Turks, when in the same circumstances they, knowing the fact and the Turks not, took credit from them for this very evacuation? What is this but ensuring the lottery-ticket at the moment when they know it to be drawn?

“What, it is said, are we to do? War cannot be eternal, and what prospect have we of reaching a period when it may be terminated under circumstances upon the whole more favourable? The extent to which this delusion has spread, may truly be said to have been the ruin of the country. The supporters of this opinion never seem to have apprehended the important truth, that if France is bent upon our destruction, there must be perpetual war till one or other is destroyed. This was the conduct of the Romans, who resolved that Carthage should be destroyed, because they were sensible that if that was not done, it would speedily be their own fate. If we are to come at last only to an armed truce, would it not have been better to have suspended the war at once in that way, that taken the roundabout course which has now been adopted? The evils of war are indeed many; but what are they compared to those of the armed, suspicious, jealous, peace which we have formed? Against all its own dangers war provided; the existence of our fleets upon the ocean, shut up at once all those attempts which are now let loose upon our possessions in every quarter of the globe. In peace, not the least part of our danger will arise from the irreligious principles and licentious manners which will be let loose upon our people, and spread with fatal rapidity, from the profligacy of the neighbouring capital. French Jacobinism will soon break through stronger bulwarks than the walls of Malta. The people of this country have enjoyed, in such an extraordinary degree, all the blessings of life during the war, public prosperity has increased so rapidly during its continuance, that they have never been able to comprehend the dangers which they were engaged in combating. If they had, we never should have heard, except among the ignorant and disaffected, of joy and exultation through the land, at a peace such as the present. When a great military monarch was at the lowest ebb of his fortunes, and had sustained a defeat which seemed to extinguish all his remaining hopes, we wrote from the field of battle: ‘We have lost all except our honour.’ Would to God that the same consolation, in circumstances likely to become in time not less disastrous, remained to Great Britain!

“France, it is true, has made great acquisitions; she has made the Rhine the boundary of her empire; but on our side we have gained successes no less brilliant and striking; we had multiplied our colonies, and our navy rode triumphant. We had rescued Egypt, we had captured Malta and Minorca, and the Mediterranean was shut up from the ships of France and Spain. In the East Indies we had possessed ourselves of every thing except Batavia, which we should have taken, if it had been worth the cost of an expedition. We had made ourselves masters of the Cape, an important and necessary step towards Eastern dominion. In the West Indies, we had every thing desirable, Martinique, Trinidad, St.-Lucie, and Guadeloupe; while on the continent of South America we had an absolute empire,

under the name of Surinam and Demerara, almost equal to the European power to whom we have now restored it. But what have we done with these immense acquisitions, far exceeding in present magnitude, and ultimate importance, all the conquests of France on the continent of Europe? Have we retained them as pledges to compel the restoration of the balance of European power, or, if that was impossible, as counterpoises in our hands to the acquisitions of France? No! we have surrendered them all at one fell swoop to our implacable enemy, who has thus made as great strides towards maritime supremacy in one single treaty as he had effected toward continental dominion in nine successful campaigns (1).”

Answer made by the Government and Mr. Pitt. To these powerful and energetic arguments it was replied by Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington, who on this occasion found an unexpected but powerful ally in Mr. Pitt, “That after the conclusion of peace between France and the great continental powers; after the dissolution of the confederacy of the European monarchies, a confederacy which Government had most justly supported to the utmost of their power, the question of peace became merely one of time, and of the terms to be obtained for ourselves. With regard to the terms which were obtained, they were perhaps not so favourable as could have been wished, but they were decidedly preferable to a continuance of the contest, after the great objects for which it was undertaken were no longer attainable; and the difference between the terms we had obtained, and those of retaining all we had given up, would not have justified us in protracting the war. Minorca was a matter of little importance, for experience has proved that it uniformly fell to the power which possessed the preponderating naval force in the Mediterranean; and although it was certainly a matter of regret that we could not have retained so important an acquisition as Malta, yet, if we could not do this, no better arrangement could have been made as to its future destination, than had been made in the present treaty. Ceylon, in the East, and Trinidad in the West Indies, are both acquisitions of great value, and although it would be ridiculous to assert that they afforded any compensation for the expense of the war, yet, if, by the force of external events, over which we had no control, the chief objects of the struggle have been frustrated, it becomes a fit subject of congratulation, that we have obtained acquisitions and honourable terms for ourselves at the termination of a contest, which to all our allies had been deeply checkered by disaster.

“The great object of the war on the part of Great Britain was *security*; defence of ourselves and our allies in a war waged against most of the nations of Europe, and ourselves in particular, with especial malignity. In order to obtain this, we certainly did look for the subversion of the government which was founded on revolutionary principles; but we never insisted as a *sine qua non* on the restoration of the old government of France; we only said, at different times, when terms of accommodation were proposed, there was no government with which we could treat. It doubtless would have been more consistent with the wishes of Ministers and the interest and security of this country, if such a restoration could have taken place, and it must ever be a subject of regret that efforts corresponding to our own were not made by the other powers of Europe for the accomplishment of that great work; but in no one instance did we ever insist upon restoring the monarchy. There were periods during the continuance of the

war in which we had hopes of being able to put together the scattered fragments of that great and venerable edifice; to have restored the exiled nobility of France; to have re-established a government, certainly not free from defects, but built upon regular foundations instead of that mad system of innovation which threatened, and had nearly effected, the destruction of Europe. This, it was true, had been found not attainable, but we had the satisfaction of knowing that we had survived the revolutionary fever, and we had seen the extent of its principles abated. We had seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination; we had seen it stripped of the name and pretext of liberty; it had shown itself to be capable of destroying only, but not of building, and that it must necessarily end in military despotism.

“But being disappointed in our hopes of being able to drive France within her ancient limits, and to make barriers against her future incursions, it became then necessary with the change of circumstances to change our plans; for no error could be more fatal than to look only at one object, and obstinately pursue it, when the hope of accomplishing it no longer remained. If it became impossible for us to obtain the full object of our wishes, wisdom and policy both required that we should endeavour to obtain that which was next best. In these propositions there was no inconsistency, either in the former conduct or language of Ministers, in refusing to treat with the person who now holds the destiny of France; for it was even then announced, that if events should take the turn they have since done, peace would no longer be objectionable.

“Much exaggeration prevails as to the real amount of the additional strength which France has acquired during the war. If, on the one hand, her territorial acquisitions are immense, it must be recollected, on the other, what she has lost in population, commerce, capital, and industry. The desolation produced by convulsions such as France has undergone, cannot be repaired even by large acquisitions of territory. When, on the other hand, we contemplate the immense wealth of this country, and the natural and legitimate growth of that wealth, so much superior to the produce of rapacity and plunder, it is impossible not to entertain the hope, founded in justice and nature, of its solidity. When to these we add the great increase of our maritime power, the additional naval triumphs we have obtained, the brilliant victories of our armies, gained over the flower of the troops of France, we have the satisfaction of thinking, that if we have failed in some of our wishes, we have succeeded in the main object, of adding strength to our security, and at the same time shed additional lustre over our national character. Nor are our colonial acquisitions to be overlooked in estimating the consolidation of our resources. The destruction of the power of Tippoo Saib in India, who has fallen a victim to his attachment to France and his perfidy to us, cannot be viewed but as an important achievement. The union with Ireland, effected at a period of uncommon gloom and despondency, must be regarded as adding more to the power and strength of the British Empire than all the conquests of France have effected for that country. If any additional proof were required of the increase of national strength to England, it would be found in the unparalleled efforts which she made in the last year of the war, contending at once against a powerful maritime confederacy in the north, and triumphing over the French on the sands of Egypt; while at the same time the harbours of Europe were so strictly blockaded, that not a frigate even could venture out to sea but under the cover of mist or darkness. Finally, we have seen that proud array of ships, got together for the invasion of this country, driven for shelter under their own batteries, and only preserved

from destruction by the chains and nets thrown over them at their harbour mouths.

“After nine years of ceaseless effusion of blood; after contracting an increase of debt to the amount of above two hundred millions; after the indefatigable and uninterrupted exertions of this country, and, it may be added, after its splendid and unexampled achievements, there is no one who can deny that peace is eminently desirable, if it can be purchased without the sacrifice of honour. This country never volunteered into a war with France; she was drawn into it against her will by the intrigues of the Republicans in her own bosom, and the disaffection, sedition, anarchy, and revolt which they propagated without intermission in all the adjoining states; but that danger has now totally ceased; the revolutionary fervour of France is coerced by a military chieftain far more adequate to the task than the exiled race of monarchs would have been; and the only peril that now exists is that arising from her military power. But if war is to be continued till adequate security against that danger is obtained, when will it terminate? Where are the elements to be found of a new coalition against France; and how can Great Britain, burdened as she is with colonial possessions in every part of the world, descend single-handed into the continental arena with her first-rate antagonist?

“Peace can now, for the first time since the commencement of the war, be obtained without compromising the interests of any existing ally of England. Austria, Sardinia, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Holland, the original parties to the alliance, have successively at different periods, dropped out of it, and requested to be liberated from their engagements. We did not blame them for having done so; they acted under the influence of irresistible necessity; but unquestionably they had thereafter no remaining claim upon Great Britain. In so far, therefore, as we stipulated any thing in favour of powers which had already made peace, we acted on large and liberal grounds, beyond what we were bound to have done either in honour or honesty. In this respect the stipulations in favour of Naples, who had not only excluded our shipping from her harbours, but joined in an alliance against us, were highly honourable to the British character. The like might be said of the stipulations in favour of Portugal; while the Ottoman Porte, the only one of our allies who remained fighting by our side at the conclusion of the contest, has obtained complete restitution. The seven islands of the Adriatic, originally ceded by France to Austria, and again transferred by Austria to France, might, from their situation, have been highly dangerous in the hands of the latter power to the Turkish dominions, and therefore they have been erected into a separate republic, the independence of which is guaranteed. We have even done something in favour of the House of Orange and the King of Sardinia, although, from having left the confederacy, they had abandoned every claim excepting on our generosity. And thus having faithfully performed our duties to all our remaining allies, and obtained terms, which, to say the least of them, took nothing from the security of this country, was it expedient to continue the contest for the sake of powers who had abandoned our alliance, and themselves given up as hopeless the objects we had originally entertained, and in which they were more immediately interested than ourselves? Compare this peace with any of those recorded in the former history of the two nations, and it will well bear a comparison. By the treaty of Ryswick and Aix-la-Chapelle we gained nothing; by that of Versailles we lost considerably: it was only by the peace of Utrecht in 1715, and that of Paris in 1765, that we made any acquisitions; but if we compare the present treaty with either of

these, it will be found that it is by no means inferior either in point of advantage or the promise of durability. Minorca and Gibraltar, obtained by the former, and Canada and Florida, by the latter, will not bear a comparison with Ceylon, the Mysore, and Trinidad, the glorious trophies of the present contest (1)."

In the Commons no division took place on the preliminaries. In the Lords the house divided, 114 to 40, in favour of the Ministers; but in the minority were found the names of Earls Spencer, Grenville, and Caernarvon (2).

The definitive treaty of peace was signed at AMIENS, on the 27th March, 1802. Its conditions varied in no material circumstance from the preliminaries agreed to at London nine months before. The fisheries in Newfoundland were replaced in the condition in which they were before the war (3); an "adequate compensation" was stipulated for the House of Orange (4), and it was agreed that Malta should be placed in a state of entire independence of both powers; that there should be neither English nor French *langues*, or branches of the order; that a Maltese *langue* shall be established, and the King of Sicily invited to furnish a force of 2000 men to form a garrison to the fortresses of the island and its dependencies, along with the Grand Master and Order of St.-John; and that "the forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies within three months after the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner if it can be done." The cession of Ceylon and Trinidad to Great Britain, and the restoration of all the other conquered colonies to France and Holland, the integrity of the Ottoman dominions, and the recognition of the republic of the Seven Islands, were provided for as in the preliminary articles (5).

A long debate ensued in both Houses on the definitive treaty, in which the topics already adverted to were enlarged on at great length. Government were supported by a majority of 276 to 20 in the Lower, and 122 to 16 in the Upper House (6).

Such was the termination of the first period of the war, and such the terms on which Great Britain obtained a temporary respite from its perils and expenses. On calmly reviewing the arguments urged both in the legislature and in the country on this great question, it is impossible to resist the conclusion, that the advocates of peace were well founded in the views they entertained of the interests of the country at that period. Even admitting all that Mr. Wyndham and Lord Grenville so strongly advanced as to the magnitude of the sacrifices made by Great Britain, and the danger to which she was exposed from the territorial acquisitions and insatiable ambition of France to be well founded, still the question remained, was it not incumbent on a prudent government to make at least the trial of a pacification, and relieve the country for a time even from the burdens and anxiety of a war, on the faith of a treaty solemnly acceded to by its new ruler. The government of the first consul, compared to any of the revolutionary ones which had preceded it, was stable and regular; and the revolutionary fervour, the continuance of which had so long rendered any safe pacification out of the question, had exhausted itself, and given place to a general and anxious disposition to submit to the ruling authority. The dissolution of the last coalition had rendered hopeless, at least for a very long period, the reduction of the military power of France; and the maritime superiority of

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 36, 38.

(2) Ibid. 191.

(3) Art. 15.

(4) Art. 18.

(5) See the treaty in Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 559. Ann. Reg. 1802. State papers, 62.

(6) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 733, 827.

England was so decided, as to render any danger to her own independence a distant and problematical contingency. In these circumstances, it seems indisputable that it was the duty of Government, if it could be done without dishonour, to bring to a conclusion a contest of which the burdens were certain and immediate, and the advantages remote, if not illusory, and put the sincerity of the first consul's professions of moderation to such a test as might relieve them of all responsibility, in the event of their being obliged, at a subsequent period, to renew the contest. The fact of this having ultimately been found to be the case, and of the peace of Amiens having turned out only an armed truce, is no impeachment whatever of the justice of these views; it, on the contrary, affords the strongest corroboration of them, for England lost none of her means of defence during the intermission of hostilities, and she avoided the heavy responsibility which otherwise would have lain upon her to the latest generation, of having obstinately continued the war, when peace was within her power, and compelled Napoléon, although otherwise inclined, to continue a contest which ultimately brought such unparalleled calamities on the civilized world. Nor could the terms of the treaty be impugned as disgraceful, with any degree of justice towards Great Britain, when she terminated a strife, which had proved so disastrous to the greatest continental states, with her constitution untouched, and without the cession of a single acre which belonged to her at its commencement; while France, accustomed to such large acquisitions at every pacification, was compelled to surrender territories belonging to herself, or her allies, larger than the whole realm of England, and even, in their existing state, of first-rate importance.

For these important advantages, Great Britain was indebted to the energy of her population, and the happy circumstances of her maritime situation, which enabled her to augment her commerce and increase her resources at the very time when those of all the other belligerent powers were wasting away under the influence of a protracted and desolating contest. The increase of the wealth, population, commerce, and industry of these islands, was unprecedented during its whole continuance, and was so great as fully to justify Mr. Pitt's observation, that it left the relative strength of the two powers nearly the same at its termination as at its commencement (1). Great as the increase of the French army was, that of the British had been still greater, and but for the immense

Vast increase of the naval and military resources of England during the war, as compared with France.

(1) On the 1st February, 1793, the British navy consisted of 135 sail of the line and 133 frigates; whereas at its close it numbered no less than 202 sail of the line and 277 frigates, manned by 120,000 seamen and marines (*). The navy of France was, at the commencement of the war, 73 sail of the line and 67 frigates, manned by 80,000 seamen; at its termination it consisted only of 39 sail of the line and 35 frigates. [Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 47.] That is, at the outset, the English sail of the line and frigates together were not double those of the enemy; whereas at its close they were above *six times* their number. [Stat. de la France, 591.] Napoléon calculates a fleet of 30 ships of the line, and frigates in proportion, as equal to an army of 120,000 men: measured by that standard, the British navy in

1801 was equivalent to a land force of above 800,000 men.

Nor had the military resources of the empire increased in a less striking manner. In 1793, the army amounted only to 64,000 regular soldiers and 12,000 fencibles in the British isles and its colonial dependencies; [Ann. Reg. xxxiii. 250.] whereas in 1801 they had increased to the immense force of 168,000 men and 80,000 militia, [Parl. Ret. Dec. 31, 1800.] exclusive of the Sepoys in the service of the East India Company, who amounted to 130,000 men, and above 100,000 volunteers in the British islands. [Parl. Hist. xxxv. 15.] The French army in 1793 consisted of 150,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery, [Jom. i. 224. St.-Cyr, i. 36. Introd. état de France, 573.] exclusive of

(*) The total navy on 1st October, 1801, was—

Line in commission	104
Line in ordinary, and building	98
Frigates in commission	126
Frigates in ordinary, and building	151
Sloops, brigs, etc.	302
Total	781

—See JAMES, vol. iii. tab. 10, *ad fin.*

surface which she had to defend, and the vast colonial possessions to protect, England might have descended with confidence into the continental arena, and measured her strength, single-handed, with the conqueror of Europe (1).

During the war the British navy increased a half, while the French declined to a half. The British army was more than doubled, and the French increased in nearly the same proportion. The French revenue, notwithstanding all its territorial acquisitions, was diminished, while the permanent income of England was nearly doubled; the French debt, by the destruction of a large proportion of its proprietors, was diminished, while that of England was doubled; the French exports and imports were almost annihilated; while the British exports were doubled, and the imports had increased more than fifty per cent; the French commercial shipping was almost destroyed, while that of England had increased nearly a third (2).

77,000 provincial troops; in 1801, they amounted to 350,000 regular soldiers, exclusive of the national guards. [Dum. vi. 70, 71.]

(1) General Mathien Dumas estimates the regular force of France, after the peace of Luneville, at 277,000 men, exclusive of the coast guards, the gendarmerie, the depots of the corps, and the national guard, on active service. It is a most moderate computation to take them at 73,000 more

In 1805 the military establishment of France consisted of the following forces:—

Infantry of the line,	341,000
Light infantry,	100,000
Infantry,	441,000
Light cavalry,	60,500
Heavy cavalry,	17,000
Cavalry,	77,500

Foot and horse artillery, pontoneers engineers, etc.	53,500
Imperial guard,	8,500
Gendarmerie,	15,600

This would amount to a total of—

Infantry,	441,000
Cavalry,	77,500
Artillery and Engineers,	53,500
Imperial Guard,	8,500
Gendarmerie,	15,600

Total, 596,100 men.

See DUMAS, vi. 70-71; and PEUCHET, *Statistique de la France*, 576, 580.

Comparative increase in revenue of France and England during the war.

(2) The regular revenue of France in 1789 (for no approximation even to a correct estimate can be formed of its amount during the period of confiscation and assignats) had reached 469,000,000 francs, or L.18,800,000; [Lac. vi. 110. *Etat de la Dette Pu-*

blique, 8. Young, i. 577.] while that of England amounted to L.16,382,000. At the termination of the war, the revenue of France was 450,000,000 fr. or L.18,000,000, and its total expenditure 560,000,000 francs, or L.22,400,000; while the permanent revenue of England at the same period amounted to L.28,000,000 exclusive of L.8,000,000 war taxes, and its total expenditure to L.61,617,000. [Ann. Reg. 1793, 250. Moreau and Pebrer's Tables. Feb. 154. Bigu. ii 130, 131.] (*)

The public debt of France, which, at the commencement of the Revolution, was 5,587,060,000 fr., or L.219,000,000, and occasioned an annual charge of 259,000,000 francs, or L.10,450,000, was still very considerable, amounting to 1,380,000,000 fr. or L.55,000,000, and occasioning an annual charge of 69,000,000 francs, or L.2,800,000, at the termination of the war, notwithstanding the extinction of two thirds of its amount during its continuance, and the unexampled measures of spoliation by which its expenses had been defrayed. [Etat de la Dette Pub. 8. 9. Gaeta, i. 199. Peuchet, 500. Young, ii. 578.] Public debts. The public debt of England, in 1792, exports and imports was L.244,440,000, and occasioned an annual charge, including the sinking two countries fund, of L.9,317,000; while, at the termination of the war in 1801, it had risen to L.484,465,000, funded and unfunded, of which L.447,000,000 was funded, and L.37,313,000 unfunded. The annual charge of this immense burden had swelled to L.21,661,000, of which L.8,653,000 was for the debt existing before 1792, L.13,025,000 for that created since that period, and L.4,649,000 for the sinking fund. [Moreau's tables. Feb. 154, 246.] (**)

The imports of France in 1787, amounted to 349,725,000 francs, or about L.14,000,000; the exports to 310,000,000 francs, or L.12,500,000. [Young's Travels, ii. 501.] At the same period the exports of British manufactures were L.14,700,000, and of foreign merchandise L.5,460,000, and the imports L.18,680,000. [Mr. Addington's finance re-

(*) M. Necker, in 1788, estimated the total revenue of Old France at 585,000,000 francs: whereas, in 1801, notwithstanding the great addition to its territory which the Republic had received from the Low Countries, Savoy, Nice, and the frontier of the Rhine, which yielded an addition of 100,000,000 francs yearly, it had fallen to 450,000,000 francs, a striking proof how immensely the resources of the country had diminished during the Revolution. Before the increase of its territory, the territorial revenue of France was 1,200,000,000; after it had been swelled by a fifth of superficial surface, it was only 850,000,000. Greater lightness of taxation was certainly not the cause of the diminution, for the direct land and window tax of that latter year amounted to 265,000,000, or L.10,750,000, a sum equivalent to at least double that amount in the British islands, if the dif-

ference of the value of money in the two countries is taken into account. Dupin estimates the income derived from the soil in France in 1828, at L.626,000,000 francs, or L65,000,000. Supposing the increase of cultivation between 1801 and 1828 to counterbalance the reduction of territory by the peace of Paris in 1815, it follows that the French landholders in 1801 paid about a sixth, or sixteen per cent. on their incomes.—see NECKER's *Compte Rendu*, 1785; *Stat. de la France*, 514; GAETA, i. 189, 310; BIGNON, ii. 130; and DUPIN, *Forces Commerciales de France*, ii. 266.

(**) In 1789, according to the Duke of Gaeta, a deficit of 54,000,000 francs, or L.2,150,000 yearly, was made "the apology for the Revolution." In 1801, when it was closed, it was above 100,000,000 francs annually, or L.4,000,000 sterling—GAETA, i. 189.

Reflections on the immense efforts made by England during the war. Nothing but this continual and rapid increase in the resources of the British empire, during the course of the struggle, could have accounted for the astonishing exertions which she made towards its close, and the facility with which, during its whole continuance, the vast supplies required for carrying it on were raised without any sensible inconvenience to the country. When we reflect that, during a war of nine years' duration, the yearly expenditure of the nation varied from forty to sixty millions; that loans to the amount of twenty or thirty millions were annually contracted; and that the British fleets covered the seas in every quarter of the globe, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the efforts made by a state so inconsiderable in extent, and with a population, even at the close of the period, and including Ireland, not exceeding fifteen millions (1). But the phenomenon becomes still more extraordinary when the efforts made at the termination of the struggle are considered; and the British empire, instead of being exhausted by eight years' warfare, is seen stretching forth its giant arms at once into every quarter of the globe, striking down the throne of Tippoo Saib by as great a force as combated under the standards of Napoléon at Marengo (2); while it held every hostile harbour in Europe blockaded by its fleets, and sending forth Nelson to crush the confederacy of the northern powers at the very moment that it accumulated its forces in Europe and Asia against the Republican legions on the sands of Egypt. It had been frequently asserted that the naval forces of England were equal to those of the whole world put together; but the matter was put to the test in spring 1801, when, without raising the blockade of a single harbour from the Texel to Calabria, she sent eighteen ships of the line with Abercromby to the mouth of the Nile, while nineteen under Nelson dissolved by the cannon of Copenhagen the northern confederation. The annals of Rome contain no example of a similar display of strength, and few of equal resolution in exerting it.

solutions. *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563.] In 1801, the French imports and exports were almost annihilated; the imports from the West Indies had fallen to L.61,000, and the exports to the same quarter to L.41,000; [*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 787.] whereas the British exports in that year were L.24,440,000 manufactures, and L.17,166,000 foreign and colonial produce, and the imports L.29,900,000; amounting in real value to about L.54,000,000. [*Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563 *Pebrer's tables*, 340.] Nor had the British shipping undergone a less striking increase; the tonnage, which, at the commencement of the war, was 1,600,000 tons, having risen, in 1801, to 2,100,000; and the mercantile seamen who, at the former period, were 118,000, having at the latter

increased to 143,000, exclusive of 120,000 seamen and marines employed in the royal navy. [*Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563, and xxxvi. 787.] (*)

(1) Population of Great Britain in

1801,	10,942,000
Ireland, about,	4,000,000
	<u>14,942,000</u>

—See *PEBRER'S Tables*, 332.

(2) Thirty-five thousand British and Sepoy troops formed the siege of Seringapatam in May 1799. Thirty-one thousand French combated under the first consul at Marengo.

(*) The revenue and charges of the Indian Empire in the years 1793, and 1799, and 1800, were as follow :—

	1793.	1799.	1800 and 1801.
Revenues—Bengal,	L.5,454,000	L.6,259,000	L.6,339,000
Madras,	1,296,000	2,004,000	3,273,000
Bombay,	147,000	346,000	300,475
	<u>L.6,897,000</u>	<u>L.8,609,000</u>	<u>L.9,912,475</u>
Charges — Bengal,	L.3,131,000	L.3,954,000	L.4,472,000
Madras,	1,578,000	2,857,000	3,723,000
Bombay,	524,000	996,000	1,031,000
	<u>L.5,233,000</u>	<u>L.7,807,000</u>	<u>L.9,196,000</u>
Surplus,	1,664,000	802,000	716,475

Parl. Hist. xxxv. 15. *East India Budget*, and *Ann. Reg.* 1793, p. 78, and 1801, p. 164, *Ap. to Chronicle*.

Compared with the niggardly exertions at its commencement. The contemplation of this astonishing display of strength at the close of the struggle, compared with the feeble and detached exertions made at its commencement, is calculated to awaken the most poignant regret at the niggardly use of the national resources so long made by government, and the inexplicable insensibility to the magnitude of the forces at their command, which so long paralysed the might of England, during the earlier years of the war. From a return laid before the House of Commons, it appears that the number of men that had been raised for the service of the army from the commencement of hostilities down to the close of 1800, was 208,808, being at the rate of 26,000 a-year on an average during its continuance (1). France, with a population hardly double that of Great Britain, raised 1,500,000 men in 1793 alone. It is in the astonishing disproportion of the land forces of this country either to her naval armaments, her national strength, or the levies of her antagonist, that the true secret of the long duration, enormous expenditure, and numerous disasters of the war is to be found. Secure in her insular situation, protected from invasion by invincible fleets, and relieved from the most disastrous consequences which resulted from defeat to the continental powers, England was at liberty to employ her whole disposable force against the enemy, yet she never brought 25,000 native troops into the field at any one point. Had she boldly levied 100,000 men in 1795, and sent them to Flanders after the route in the camp of Cæsar, when the French troops were shut up in their entrenched camps, and could not be brought by any exertions to face the allies in the field, she would beyond all question have encamped under the walls of Paris in two months, and the royalists of the south and west would have obtained a decisive superiority over the anarchical faction in the capital. During the nine years of the war, upwards of L.100,000,000 was paid in army, and a still larger sum in naval expenses, while in 1793 the military charges were not L.4,000,000, and in the latter and more expensive years of the war, only amounted annually to L.12,000,000. If a fifth part of this total sum had been expended in any one of the early years in raising the military force of England to an amount worthy of her national strength and ancient renown, triple the British force which overthrew Napoléon at Waterloo, might have been assembled on the plains of Flanders, and the war terminated in a single campaign (2).

Great part of this prosperity was owing to the paper currency. If the rapid growth of wealth, power, and prosperity in the British islands during this memorable contest, had been all grounded on a safe and permanent foundation, it would have presented a phenomenon unparalleled in such circumstances in any age or country. But though part of this extraordinary increase was undoubtedly a real and substantial addition to the industry and resources of the empire, arising from the vast extension of its colonial possessions, and the monopoly

(1) Parl. Ret. Dec. 31, 1800. Ann. Reg. 1800, 40.

(2) The expenses of the army and navy, during the war, were as follow :—

	Army.	Ordnance.	Navy.
1792, . . .	L.1,819,000	L.422,000	L.1,485,000
1793, . . .	3,993,000	783,000	3,971,000
1794, . . .	6,641,000	1,345,000	5,525,000
1795, . . .	11,610,000	2,321,000	6,315,000
1796, . . .	14,911,000	1,954,700	11,833,000
1797, . . .	15,488,000	1,643,000	13,033,000
1798, . . .	12,852,000	1,303,000	13,449,000
1799, . . .	11,840,000	1,500,000	13,642,000
1800, . . .	11,941,000	1,695,000	13,619,000
1801, . . .	12,117,000	1,639,000	15,857,000

of almost all the trade of the world in its hands (1), yet part was to be ascribed to other causes, attended in the outset with deceptive and temporary advantages, and in the end with real and permanent evils. Like an extravagant individual who squanders in the profusion of a few years, the savings of past centuries, and the provision of unborn generations, the Government of England threw a fleeting lustre over its warlike administration, by trenching deep on the capital of the nation, and creating burdens little thought of at the time when the vast expenditure was going forward, but grievously felt in subsequent years, when the excitation of the moment had passed away, and the bitter consequences of the debt which had been contracted, remained. But this was not all. England, during those eventful years, drank deep at the fountains of paper currency, and derived a feverish and unnatural strength from that perilous but intoxicating draught. From the accounts laid before Parliament, it appears that the notes of the Bank of England in circulation, had increased upwards of a half, from 1795 to 1801, and that the commercial paper under discount at the same establishment, during the same period, had more than tripled (2). The effect of this great increase speedily appeared in the prices of grain, and every other article of life. Wheat which, on an average of five years prior to 1792, had sold at 8s. 4d. a-bushel, had risen, on an average of five years, ending with 1802, to 10s. 8d., and on an average of five years, ending 1815, to 14s. 4d. a-bushel (3). Thus, during the progress of the war, the prices of the necessaries of life were at one time nearly tripled, and even at the peace of Amiens had permanently more than doubled. The effect of this of course was, that the money price of all the other articles of life rapidly rose in the same proportion; rents advanced; all persons who lived by buying and selling found their commodities constantly rising in value; credit, both public and private, immensely improved; industry was vivified by the progressive rise

(1) The operation of these causes appeared, in an especial manner, in the vast increase of our export of foreign and colonial merchandise during the war, which, on an average of six years, ending 5th January, 1793, was L.5,468,000; and in the year

ending 5th January, 1801, had risen to the enormous sum of L.17,166,000; being more than triple its amount at the commencement of the contest.—See *Mr. ADDINGTON'S Finance Resolutions, 1801.—Parl. Hist. xxv. 1564.*

(2) Circulation in Bank of England Notes.

1792,	...	L.11,006,000
1793,	...	11,888,000
1794,	...	10,744,000
1795,	...	14,017,000
1796,	...	10,729,000
1797, Feb. 28,	...	9,674,000
1798, August 31,	...	11,114,000
1798,	...	13,095,000
1799,	...	13,389,000
1800,	...	16,844,000
1801,	...	16,213,000

Commercial Paper discounted at the Bank.		Gold Coined.	
			L.1,171,000
No account kept.			2,747,000
			2,558,000
...	L.2946,000	...	493,000
...	3,505,000	...	464,000
...	5,350,000	...	2,000,000
...	5,870,000	...	2,067,000
...	4,490,000	...	449,000
...	5,403,000	...	189,000
...	6,401,000	...	450,000
...	7,905,000	...	437,000

See *Appendix to Report on Bank, 1832*, and *PERCIVAL'S Tables*, 254, 260, and 279.

The slightest consideration of this most instructive Table is sufficient to demonstrate to what source the crisis of February 1797 was owing. The paper of the bank was then contracted from fourteen millions, its amount in 1795, to nine millions. This

was doubtless owing to necessity, but it unavoidably brought about the general panic which rendered the suspension of cash-payments in that month unavoidable, and landed the nation in the bottomless pit of paper currency, inconvertible into gold, and all the prodigious change of prices with which it was necessarily attended.

(3) Lords' Report on Banks, Ap. No. 39, and Lords' Report on Corn, 1814, No. 12.

The prices of wheat from 1790 to 1801 were as follow:—

Per Quarter.			Per Quarter.		
1790,	...	L 2 13 2	1796,	...	3 12 0
1791,	...	2 7 0	1797,	...	2 12 0
1792,	...	2 2 4	1798,	...	2 9 8
1793,	...	2 8 8	1799,	...	3 7 4
1794,	...	2 11 0	1800,	...	5 12 8 scarcity.
1795,	...	4 7 0	1801,	...	5 18 0 scarcity.

See *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 167, *App.* to *Chron.*

in the value of its produce; and difficulties were overcome by the rapid diminution in the weight of money debts. It is to the influence of this cause, combined with the vast expenditure of Government, and the concentration of almost all the colonial trade of the world in Great Britain, in consequence of her maritime superiority, that the extraordinary prosperity of the empire during the latter years of the war is to be ascribed. But it was not unmixed good which accrued to the nation, even for a time, from these violent changes; the whole class of annuitants, and all dependent on a fixed money income, suffered as much as the holders of commodities gained by their effects; creditors were defrauded as much as debtors were relieved, and almost as great a transference of property was ultimately effected by the silent operation of the alternation of prices which followed this great experiment, as was produced in other countries by the direct convulsions of a revolution.

But without anticipating these ultimate effects, which as yet lay buried in the womb of time, and might perhaps have been avoided by a more manly adherence to the principles of Mr. Pitt's financial policy than was deemed practicable in later times, it is impossible to conclude the history of this first period of the war without rendering a just tribute to the memory of those illustrious and high-minded men who bore the British nation victorious through the greatest perils which had assailed it since the Norman Conquest; who clearly perceiving, amidst all the delusion of the times, the disastrous tendency of the revolutionary spirit, "struggled with it when it was strongest, and ruled it when it was wildest;" who amidst the greatest perils disdained to purchase safety by submission, and undismayed alike by foreign disaster and domestic treason, held on their glorious way conquering and to conquer. No other monument is required to the memory of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke but the British empire, as they left it at the peace of Amiens, unconquered by force, undivided by treason, unchanged in constitution, untainted in faith, the bulwark of order, the asylum of freedom; the refuge of religion, contending undauntedly against the world in arms, covering the ocean with its fleets, encircling the earth in its grasp, the ark to which the fortunes of humanity were committed amidst the waves of the Deluge, the polar star to which alone the eye of hope was turned, from all the suffering realms of the earth (1).

Glorious
state and
character of
England at
the conclu-
sion of the
contest.

(1) In making these observations, the author is fully aware of the burdens consequent on Mr. Pitt's administration, and the disastrous effects which have in the end followed the change of prices begun in 1797. What he rests upon is, that this change was forced upon the British statesmen by overwhelming necessity, and that Mr. Pitt had provided

a system of finance, which, if steadily adhered to by his successors, as it might have been, would have discharged the whole debt contracted in the revolutionary war before the year 1835, that is, in the same time that it was created.—See below, on Mr. Pitt's financial policy, chapter 39.

CHAPTER XXXV.

RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIETY IN FRANCE BY NAPOLEON.

FROM THE CONTINENTAL PEACE TO HIS ASSUMPTION OF THE IMPERIAL CROWN.

OCTOBER, 1801—MARCH, 1804.

ARGUMENT.

Deplorable internal state of France when Napoleon succeeded to the helm—Means which were at his disposal to reconstruct society—and difficulties which he had to encounter—He resolves to make the attempt—Constitutional freedom was then impossible in France—Explosion of the Infernal Machine—Napoleon at once ascribes it to the Jacobins—Speech which he made on the occasion to the authorities of Paris—He refuses to listen to any attempts to exculpate them—A *coup d'état* is resolved on against the Jacobins—Terms of the *Senatus-Consultum* ordaining it—And 130 persons are transported—It is afterwards discovered that the Chouans were the really guilty parties—Napoleon creates the King of Etruria—Parallel of Cæsar, Cromwell, and Napoleon—Debate on the lists of Eligibility in the Council of State—Decision on it by the Legislature—Legion of honour—Napoleon's argument in favour of it in the Council of State—Argument against it by Thibaudeau—Napoleon's reply—It is adopted by the Legislature—General opposition which it experienced—but it is nevertheless carried into execution—Napoleon is created First Consul for ten years additional—Grounds set forth in the *Senatus-Consultum* on the occasion—State of religion in France at this period—Napoleon's views on this subject—Arguments in the Council of State against an Established Church—Napoleon's reply—Concordat with the Pope—Its provisions in favour of the Gallican church—General dissatisfaction which it occasioned—Ceremony on the occasion in Notre-Dame, and general discontent which it produced—Constrained religious observances at Paris—Great joy at the change in the rural departments—Prudence of Napoleon in restraining the High Church party—His admirable proclamation on the subject to the people of France—General satisfaction which the measure excited in foreign countries—Subsequent views of Napoleon on the subject—Renewed indulgence towards the emigrants—*Senatus-Consultum* proclaiming a general amnesty—Inadequacy of these measures to heal the evils of revolutionary confiscation—Immense extent of this evil in France, and its irremediable effects—Measures to promote public instruction—Trial of public feeling by the Royalists—Measures for recruiting the army and navy—Debate on that subject in the Council of State—Discussion there on the *Ecole militaire*—Speech of Napoleon on the government of the colonies—Finances of France—General valuation, or *cadastre*—Statistical details—Indignation of Napoleon at the language used in the Tribunal—Important change in the municipal government carried in spite of that body—Debate on the Tribunal in the Council of State—Napoleon's speech on the subject—He resolves to make himself Consul for life—Incessant efforts of Government to spread monarchical ideas—Strong opposition of Joséphine to these attempts—The project at first fails in the Council of State—Means adopted to ensure its success—The question is directly submitted to the people—Result of the appeal, and great satisfaction which it gave—Letter of Lafayette when he declined to vote for it—Answer of the First Consul to the address of the Senate on the occasion—His ideas on the lists of Eligibility—Great changes on the constitution—Their acceptance by the Senate—Aspect of Paris and its society at this period—Generous conduct of Mr. Fox in defending Mr. Pitt to the First Consul—Great satisfaction which these changes give in foreign courts—Rapid increase of the central executive power—Infamous proposals made to Joséphine regarding an heir to the throne—Suppression of the ministry of police—and disgrace of Fouché—Changes in the constitution of the Senate—Renewed correspondence between Louis XVIII and Napoleon—Formation of the Code Napoleon—Reflections on the difficulty of this subject—Discussions on it in the Council of State—Law of succession as finally fixed by Napoleon—Sketch of the French revolutionary system of inheritance—Prodigious effects of this change in subdividing land in France—Singular attachment of the modern French to this law, which precludes the possibility of real liberty—Law regarding divorce—Great effects of these salutary changes of Napoleon—Magnificent public works set on foot in France—Vast improvements of Paris.

WHEN Napoleon seized the reins of power in France, he found the institutions of civilization and the bonds of society dissolved to an extent of which

Deplorable
internal
state of
France
when Na-
poléon suc-
ceeded to
the helm.

the previous history of the world afforded no example. Not only was the throne overturned, the nobles exiled, their landed estates confiscated; the aristocracy destroyed; but the whole institutions of religion, law, commerce, and education, had been overturned. There remained neither nobles to rule, nor priests to bless, nor teachers to

instruct the people; commerce no more spread its benign influence through the realm, and manufacturing industry, in woful depression, could not maintain its numerous inhabitants. The great cities no longer resounded with the hammer of the artisan, and the village bells had ceased to call the faithful to the house of God; the chateaux in ruins existed, only to awaken the melancholy recollection of departed splendour, and the falling churches to attest the universal irreligion of its inhabitants; the ocean was no more whitened by the sails of its commerce, nor the mountains enlivened by the song of its shepherds. Even the institutions of charity, and the establishments for the relief of suffering, had shared in the general wreck; the monastery no longer spread its ample stores to the poor; and the hospital doors were closed against the numerous supplicants who laboured under wounds or disease; hardened by want and steeled against pity by the multiplicity of its objects, humanity itself seemed to be closing in the human heart; and every one, engrossed in the cares of self-preservation, and destitute of the means of relieving others, turned with callous indifference from the spectacle of general misery. In one class only the spirit of religion glowed with undecaying lustre, and survived the wreck of all its institutions. Persecuted, reviled, and destitute, the Sisters of Charity still persevered in their pious efforts to assuage human suffering; and sought out the unfortunate alike among the ranks of the Republicans who had overturned, as the Royalists who had bled for the faith of their fathers (1).

Means
which were
at his dis-
posal o re-
construct
society.

To restore the institutions which the insanity of former times had overturned, and draw close again the bonds which previous guilt had loosened, was the glorious task which awaited the first consul.

The powers which he possessed for it were great, but the difficulties attending its execution were almost insurmountable. On the one hand, he was at the head of a numerous, brave, and experienced army, flushed by victory, and obedient to his will; the whole remaining respectable classes of the state had rallied round his standard; and all ranks, worn out with revolutionary contention and suffering, were anxious to submit to any government which promised them the first of social blessings, peace and protection. On the other, almost all the wealth and all the nobility of the state had disappeared during the Revolution; the church was annihilated; and great part of the landed property of the country had passed into the hands of several millions of little owners, who might be expected to be permanently resolute in maintaining them against the dispossessed proprietors. That society could not long go on, nor any durable government be established, without some national religion or some connexion between the throne and the altar, was sufficiently evident; but how was either to be reconstructed in the midst of an infidel generation, and by the aid of the very men who had contributed to their destruction? That a constitutional mo-

And diffi-
culties
which he
had to en-
counter.

(1) It is not to be supposed that the revolutionary governments had done nothing for education. On the contrary, the Polytechnic School, and many other institutions, particularly a school of medicine, and the Institute itself, were owing to their exertions. But in the distracted state of the country, and when the care of self-preservation came home to

every one, little attention could be paid to the education of the young; and by destroying every sort of religious tuition, the Convention had cut off the right hand of public instruction, the only branch of it which is of paramount importance to the poor.—See *THUR.* 123.

narchy could not exist without a representative system, founded on all the great interests of the state, and tempered by the steadiness of an hereditary aristocracy, was indeed apparent; but where were the elements of it to be found, when the former had almost all been crushed during the convulsions of the Revolution, and the latter, destitute and exiled, was the object of inveterate jealousy to the numerous classes who had risen to greatness by its overthrow?

He resolves
to make the
attempt.

These difficulties were so great that they would probably have deterred any ordinary conqueror from the attempt; and he would have been content to accept the crown which was offered him, and leave to others the Herculean task of closing the wounds of the Revolution. But Napoléon was not a man of that character. He believed firmly that he was the destined instrument in the hand of Providence to extinguish that terrible volcano, and he was conscious of powers equal to the undertaking. From the very outset, accordingly, he began, cautiously indeed, but firmly and systematically, to coörcé the democratic spirit, and reconstruct those classes and distinctions in society which had disappeared during the preceding convulsions, but were the indispensable bulwarks of the throne. The success with which his efforts were attended is a more glorious monument to his memory than all the victories which he won.

Constitutional freedom was then impossible in France.

Those who reproach Napoléon with establishing a despotic government, and not founding his throne on the basis of a genuine representation of the people, would do well to show how he could have framed a counterpoise to democratic ambition, or a check on regal oppression, out of the representatives of a community from which all the superior classes of society had been violently torn; how the turbulent passions of a Republican populace could have been moulded into habitual subjection to a legislature, distinguished in no way from their own members, and a body of titled senators, destitute of wealth, consideration, or hereditary rank; how a constitutional throne could have subsisted without either any support from the altar, or any foundation in the religious feelings of its subjects; and how a proud and victorious army could have been taught that respect for the majesty of the legislature which is the invaluable growth of centuries of order, but which the successive overthrow of so many previous governments in France had done so much to destroy. After its patricians had been cut off by the civil wars of Sylla and Marius, Rome sunk necessarily and inevitably under the despotic rule of the emperors. When Constantine founded a second Rome on the shores of the Bosphorus, he perceived it was too late to attempt the restoration of the balanced constitution of the ancient republic. On Napoléon's accession to the consular throne, he found the chasms in the French aristocracy still greater and more irreparable. The only remaining means of righting the scale was by throwing the sword into the balance. The total failure of all subsequent attempts to frame a constitutional monarchy out of the elements which the Revolution had left in the society of France, proves that Napoléon rightly appreciated its political situation, and seized upon the only means of restoring order to its troubled waters (1).

(1) "There is, in the English constitution," said Napoléon, "a body of noblesse which unites to the lustre of descent a great part of the landed property of the nation. These two circumstances give it a great influence over the people, and interest attaches it to the government. In France, since the Revolution, that class is totally wanting. Would you re-

establish it? If you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it would be necessary to concentrate in their hands a large portion of the national property, which is now impossible. If it were composed of the ancient noblesse, it would soon lead to a counter revolution."—See THIBAUDEAU, 291.

Circumstances soon occurred which called forth the secret but indelible hatred of the first consul at the Jacobin faction. The conspiracy of Arena and Ceracchi, which failed at the opera, had been traced to some ardent enthusiasts of that class; and soon after a more formidable attempt at his assassination gave rise to a wider proscription of their associates. On the day on which the armistice of Steyer was signed, Napoléon went to the opera. Ber-
Dec. 24, 1800. thier, Lannes, and Lauriston were with him in the carriage. In going from the Tuileries to the theatre, in the rue de Richelieu, his carriage passed through the rue St.-Nicaise; an overturned chariot in that narrow thoroughfare almost obstructed the passage, but the coachman, who was driving rapidly, had the address to pass it without stopping. Hardly had he got through when a terrible explosion broke all the windows of the carriage, struck down the last man of the guard, killed eight persons, and wounded twenty-eight, besides occasioning damage to the amount of 200,000 francs (L.8000), in forty-six adjoining houses. Napoléon drove on without stopping to the opera, where the audience were in consternation at the explosion, which was so loud as to be heard over all Paris; every eye was turned to him when he entered, but the calm expression of his countenance gave not the slightest indication of the danger which he had escaped. Speedily, however, the news circulated through the theatre, and the first consul had the satisfaction of perceiving, in the thunders of applause which shook its walls, the most fervent expressions of attachment to his person (1).

Before the piece had terminated, Napoléon returned to the Tuileries, where a crowd of public functionaries were assembled from every part of Paris to congratulate him on his escape. He anticipated all their observations by commencing in a loud voice, "This is the work of the Jacobins; it is they who have attempted to assassinate me. Neither the nobles, nor the priests, nor the Chouans had any hand in it. I know on what to form my opinion, and it is in vain to seek to make me alter it. It is the Septembrisers, those wretches steeped in crime, who are in a state of permanent revolt, in close column against every species of government. Three months have hardly elapsed since you have seen Ceracchi, Arena, and their associates attempt to assassinate me. Again, it is the same clique, the bloodsuckers of September,
Napoléon at once ascribes it to the Jacobins. the assassins of Versailles, the brigands of 31st May, the authors of all the crimes against government, who are at their hellish work.

It is the tribes of artizans, and journalists who have a little more instruction than the people, but live with them, and mingle their passions with their own ardent imaginations, who are the authors of all these atrocities. If you cannot chain them you must exterminate them; there can be no truce with such wretches; France must be purged of such an abominable crew." During this vehement harangue, delivered with the most impassioned gesticulations, all eyes were turned towards Fouché, the well-known leader of that party, and stained, at Lyon and the Loire, with some of its most frightful atrocities. Alone, he stood in a window recess, pale, dejected, hearing every thing, answering nothing. The crowd of courtiers broke into exclamations, the echo of the first consul's sentiments. One, gifted with more courage than the rest, approached, and asked the minister of police why he made no reply, "Let them go on," said he. "I am determined not to compromise the safety of the state. I will speak when the proper time arrives. He laughs securely who laughs the last (2)."

(1) Thib. 23, 24. Bour. iv. 199, 200. D'Ab. iv. 108, 110.

(2) Thib. 27, 28. Bour. iv. 201, 202. D'Ab. iv. 110, 114.

Speech
which he
made on
the occa-
sion to the
authorities
of Paris.

On the following day a public audience was given to the prefect of the Seine, and the twelve mayors of Paris. Napoléon said : "As long as that handful of wretches attacked me alone, I left to the laws the charge of chastising their offences; but since, by a crime without example, they have endangered the lives of a part of the population of Paris, their punishment must be as rapid as extraordinary. They consist of an hundred miscreants who have brought disgrace on liberty by the crimes committed in its name; it is indispensable that they should be forthwith deprived of the means of inflicting farther injuries on society." This idea was more fully unfolded at a meeting of the Council of State which took place on the same day. It was proposed to establish a special commission to try the offenders; but this was far from meeting Napoléon's views, who was resolved to seize the present opportunity of inflicting a deathblow on the remnant of the Jacobin faction. "The action of a special tribunal," said he, "would be too slow; we must have a more striking punishment for so extraordinary an offence; it must be as rapid as lightning; it must be blood for blood. As many of the guilty must be executed as there fell victims to their designs, say fifteen or twenty; transport two hundred, and take advantage of this event to purge the Republic of its most unworthy members. This crime is the work of a band of assassins, of Septembrisers (1), whose hands may be traced through all the crimes of the Revolution. When that party sees a blow struck at its head-quarters, and that fortune has abandoned its chiefs, every thing will return to established order; the workmen will resume their labours; and ten thousand men, who, in France, are ranged under its colours, will abandon it for ever. That great example is necessary to attach the middling classes to the throne; the industrious citizens can have no hope as long as they see themselves menaced by two hundred enraged wolves, who look only for the proper moment to throw themselves on their prey.

"The metaphysicians are the men to whom we owe all our misfortunes. Half measures will no longer do; we must either pardon every thing, like Augustus, or adopt a great measure which may be the guarantee of the social order. When after the conspiracy of Catiline, Cicero caused the guilty to be strangled, he said he had saved his country. I should be unworthy of the great task which I have undertaken, and of my mission, if I evinced less firmness on this trying occasion. We must regard this affair as statesmen, not as judges. I am so convinced of the necessity of making a great example, that I am ready to call the accused before me, interrogate them, and myself subscribe their condemnation. It is not for myself that I speak; I have braved greater dangers; my fortune has preserved me, and will preserve me; but we are now engaged with the social order, with the public morality, the national glory."

In the midst of this energetic harangue, it was evident that Napoléon was losing sight of the real point to be first considered, which was, who were the guilty parties. Truguet alone had the courage to approach this question, by suggesting that there were different classes of guilty persons in France; that there were fanatics as well as Jacobins who misled the people, and that the priests, whose denunciations against the holders of the national domains, had already appeared in several recent publications, might possibly be the authors of the infernal project. Napoléon warmly interrupted him, "You will not make me alter my opinion by such vain declamations; the wicked are known; they are pointed out by the nation. They are the Septembrisers, the authors

(1) In allusion to the massacres in the prisons in September, 1792.

He refuses to listen to any attempt to exculpate them.

of every political crime in the Revolution, who have ever been spared or protected by the weak persons at the head of affairs. Talk not to me of nobles or priests. Would you have me proscribe a man for a title, or transport ten thousand grey-haired priests! Would you have me prosecute a religion, still professed by the majority of Frenchmen and two-thirds of Europe! La Vendée never was more tranquil; the detached crimes which still disgrace its territory are the result merely of ill-extinguished animosities. Would you have me dismiss all my counsellors excepting two or three; send Portalis to Sinnamary, Devaine to Madagascar, and choose a Council from the followers of Babœuf. It is in vain to pretend that the people will do no wrong but when they are prompted to it by others. The people are guided by an instinct, in virtue of which they act alone. During the Revolution they frequently forced on the leaders who appeared to guide them; the populace is a tiger when he is unmuzzled. I have a dictionary of the men employed in all the massacres. The necessity of the thing being once admitted, our duty is to attain it in the most efficacious way. Do they take us for children? Do not hope, citizen Truguet, that you would, in the event of their success, be able to save yourself by saying, 'I have defended the patriots before the Council of State.' No, no. These patriots would sacrifice you as well as us all." He then broke up the Council, and when passing Truguet, who was endeavouring to say something in his vindication, said aloud, "Come now, citizen, all that is very well for the *soirées* of Madame Condorcet or Maille-Garat, but it won't do in a council of the most enlightened men of France (1)."

These vehement apostrophes from a man vested with despotic authority cut short all discussion, and the Council found itself compelled, notwithstanding a courageous resistance from some of its members, to go into the arbitrary designs of the first consul. The public mind was prepared for some great catastrophe by repeated articles in the public journals, drawn up by Fouché, in which that astute counsellor, suppressing his private information, directed the thunders of the executive against his former associates (2). But while these measures were in preparation, Fouché and the first consul received decisive information that it was the Royalists, and not the Jacobins, who were the real authors of the conspiracy, and a clue was obtained which promised soon to lead to the discovery of the guilty parties. The minister of police, therefore, received secret instructions not to allude in his report against the Republicans to the affair of the infernal machine, but to base the proposed *coup-d'état* generally on the numerous conspiracies against the public peace, and on this report Napoléon urged the immediate delivery to a military commission of eighteen, and transportation of above an hundred persons, without either trial or evidence taken against them. In vain Thibaudeau and Roederer urged in the Council of State, that there was

A *coup-d'état* is resolved on against the Jacobins.

(1) Thib. 33, 34.

(2) In one of these, the minister of police addressed the following report to the first consul:—

"It is not against ordinary brigands, for whose coercion the ordinary tribunals are sufficient, and who menace only detached persons or articles of property, that the Government is now required to act; it is the enemies of entire France, who are now at the bar; men who threaten every instant to deliver it up to the fury of anarchy.

"These frightful characters are few in number, but their crimes are innumerable. It is by them that the Convention has been attacked with an armed force in the bosom of the sanctuary of the laws; it is

they who have endeavoured so often to render the committees of Government the agents of their atrocious designs. They are not the enemies of this or that government, but of every species of authority.

"They persist in an atrocious war, which cannot be terminated but by an extraordinary measure of the supreme police. Among the men whom the police has denounced, many were not found with the poniard in their bands; but all were equally capable of sharpening and using it. In disposing of them, we must not merely punish the past, but look to a guarantee of social order in future."—See THIBAUDEAU, 43, 44, and BOURRIENNE, iv. 204, 205.

no evidence against the suspected persons, and that it was the height of injustice to condemn a crowd of citizens untried and unheard, to the severe punishment of transportation. The first consul, though well aware that they had no connexion with the late conspiracy, was resolved not to let slip the opportunity of getting quit at once of so many dangerous characters. "We have strong presumptions, at least," said he, "if not proofs against the Terrorists. The Chouannerie and emigration, are maladies of the skin, but terrorism is a malady of the vital parts. The minister of police has purposely omitted the mention of the late conspiracy, because it is not for it that the measure is proposed. If that reserve were not observed, we would compromise our character. The proposed step is grounded upon considerations independent of the late event; it only furnished the occasion for putting them in force. The persons included in the lists will be transported for their share in the massacres in the prisons on September 2d; for their accession to the Jacobin revolt of 31st May; for the conspiracy of Babœuf, and all that they have done since that time. Such a step would have been necessary without the conspiracy, but we must avail ourselves of the enthusiasm it has excited to carry it into execution." In pursuance of these views, an arrest was proposed by the Council of State, and adopted by the Senate, which condemned to immediate transportation no less than a hundred and thirty individuals, among whom were nine persons who had been engaged in the massacres of September, and several members of the Convention, Choudien, Taillefer, Thirion, and Talot, Félix Lepelletier, and Rossignol, well known for his cruelty in the war of la Vendée. The decree was forthwith carried into execution, and thus did the arbitrary tyranny which the Jacobins had so long exercised over others, at length, by a just retribution, recoil upon themselves (1).

And one hundred and thirty persons are transported.
It is afterwards discovered that the Chouans were the really guilty parties.

In less than a month afterwards, Fouché made a second report upon the conspiracy of the infernal machine, in which he admitted, that when these measures of severity were adopted against the Jacobins, he had other suspicions; that George Cadoudal and other emigrants had successively disembarked from England; and that the horse attached to the machine had furnished a clue to its authors, who had at length been detected in the house of certain females of the Royalist party. Saint Regent and Carbon accordingly, the really guilty persons, were tried by the ordinary tribunals, condemned, and executed. Not a shadow of doubt could now remain that the conspiracy had been the work of the Royalists; but Napoléon persisted, though he saw that as clearly as any one, in carrying into effect the sweeping decree of transportation against the Jacobins. "There is not one of them," he said to those who petitioned for a relaxation of the sentence in favour of certain individuals, "who has not deserved death an hundred times over, if they had been judged by their conduct during the Revolution; these wretches have covered France with scaffolds, and the measure adopted in regard to them is

(1) Thib. 42, 51. Bour. iv. 205, 206.

Terms of the Senatus Consultum was in these terms:—"Considering that the constitution has not determined measures necessary to be taken in certain emergencies; that in the absence of any express directions, the Senate is called upon to give effect to the wishes of the people, expressed by that branch of the constitution of which it is the organ; that according to that principle, the Senate is the natural judge of any conservative measures proposed in perilous circumstances by the Government; and considering that the mea-

sure proposed by the Council of State seems to be based on necessity and public expedience, the Senate declares that that measure is conservative of the constitution." Upon this decree being obtained, the Council of State decided that their resolution was obligatory on the constituted authorities, and that it should be promulgated, like the laws and acts of the Governments, but without receiving the sanction of the Legislative Body and the Tribunate; and it was immediately put in force without their concurrence.—See THIBAUDEAU, 51, 52.

rather one of mercy than severity; the attempt of the infernal machine is neither mentioned as a motive nor the occasion of the *Senatus-Consultum*; with a company of grenadiers I could put to flight the whole faubourg St.-Germain, with its Royalist *coteries*; but the Jacobins are men of determined character, whom it is not so easy to make retreat. As to the transportation of the Jacobins, it is of no sort of consequence; I have got quit of them; if the Royalists commit any offence, I will strike them also (1)."

May, 1801. The next important step of Napoléon was the exhibition of a king of his own creation, to the astonished Parisians. By a convention with Spain, it was stipulated that the province of Tuscany, ceded to the Infanta of Spain, Marie-Louise, third daughter of Charles IV, and the Duke of Parma, her husband, should be erected into a monarchy, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria. In May, 1801, the newly-created king, Louis I, with his young bride, arrived in Paris, on his way from Madrid to Florence, and was received with extraordinary distinction both on the road and in the capital. Numerous *fêtes* succeeded each other in honour of the royal pair, among which those of M. Talleyrand, in his villa at Neuilly, was remarked as peculiarly magnificent. The young King early evinced symptoms of that imbecility of character by which he was afterwards distinguished; but it was deemed of importance to accustom the court of the first consul to the sight of royalty, and the Parisians to the intoxicating idea that, like the Roman Senate, they were invested with the power of making and unmaking kings. Napoléon received the reward of this policy in the transports with which, when he was present, the celebrated line of Oedipus was received at the theatre (2)—

"J'ai fait des souverains, et n'ai pas voulu l'être."

But it was not merely by such exhibitions of royalty that Napoléon endeavoured to prepare the French nation for his own assumption of the crown. At the time when the public mind was strongly excited by the danger which the state had run from the success of the infernal machine, a pamphlet appeared, with the title, "Parallel between Cæsar, Cromwell, and Bonaparte," in which the cause of royalty and hereditary succession was openly advocated. It excited at first a great sensation, and numerous copies were sent to the first consul from the prefects and magistrates, with comments on the dangerous effects it was producing on the public mind. Fouché, however, soon discovered that it had issued and been distributed from the office of the minister of the interior, and shortly after that it came from the pen of Lucien Bonaparte. Napoléon affected to be highly indignant at this discovery, and reproached Fouché with not having instantly sent his imprudent brother to the Temple; but the cautious minister was too well informed to put the hint in execution, as Lucien had shown him the original manuscript corrected by the hand of the first consul himself. However, it was necessary to disavow the production, as its effect proved that it had prematurely disclosed the designs of the fortunate usurper, and therefore Lucien was sent into an

(1) Thib. 51, 62. Bour. iv. 212, 213, 214.

It is a curious and instructive fact, that no sooner was the determination of the first consul, in regard to the Jacobins, known, than a multitude of revelations flowed in from the prefects, mayors, and magistrates over all France, implicating the Republicans still farther in the conspiracy, and detailing discoveries of the vast Jacobin plot which was to have burst forth in every part of the country the

moment intelligence was received of the leading stroke given in the capital! A striking instance of the distrust with which the officious zeal of such authorities should be received, and of the necessity of the executive not letting their wishes be known, if they would in such circumstances preserve the semblance even of justice in their proceedings.—See THIBAUDEAU, 53, 63; BOURRIENNE, iv. 212.

(2) Thib. 61, 69. Bour. iv. 270, 273.

honourable exile, as ambassador at Madrid, with many reproaches from Napoléon for having allowed the device to be discovered. "I see," said Napoléon to his secretary, "that I have been moving too fast; I have broken ground too soon; the pear is not yet ripe." He received secret instructions to exert all his influence at the court of Spain, to induce that power to declare war against Portugal, in order to detach the whole peninsula from the alliance with England, and shut its harbours against the British flag (1).

Debate on
the lists of
eligibility
in the
Council of
State.

The numerous complaints against the lists of eligibility which formed so important and remarkable an effect in the constitution under the consulate, induced Napoléon to bring them again under the consideration of his state council. It was justly objected against this institution, that it renewed, in another and a more odious form, all the evils of privileged classes which had occasioned the Revolution; that to confine the seats in the legislation, and all important offices under government, to five thousand individuals, out of above thirty millions of souls, was to the last degree unjust, and seemed peculiarly absurd at the close of a Revolution, the main object of which had been to open them indiscriminately to all the citizens. It became necessary to consider whether these complaints should be attended to, as the time was approaching when a fifth of the legislative body and tribunate were to be renewed, in terms of the constitution, and therefore the lists, already formed, were about to be forwarded to the electors. It was urged by the advocates for a change in the Council of State, that "public opinion had strongly pronounced itself against these lists, because they at once deprive a great body of citizens of that result of the Revolution which they most prized, eligibility to every public function. Out of delicacy to five thousand persons, who are inscribed on the highest class of these lists, you leave the seeds of a dangerous discontent in a hundred times that number. Doubtless it is not impossible from these lists to make for a few years a suitable choice of representatives; but such a result would only the more confirm a system radically vicious, and augment the difficulty which will hereafter be experienced in correcting it."

The first consul replied:—"The institution of the lists is objectionable. It is an absurd system, the growth of the ideology which, like a malady, has so long overspread France. It is not by such means that a great nation is reorganized. Sovereignty is inalienable. Nevertheless, bad as the system is, it forms part of the constitution; we are only intrusted with its execution. It is impossible, besides, to let the people remain without any species of organization: better a bad one than none at all. It is an error to suppose that the people are organized merely because the constitution has created the powers of government. The supreme authority must have intermediate supports, or it has neither any stability nor any hold of the nation. We must not think, therefore, of abandoning the lists without substituting something else in their room. It is admitted that they form at present a sufficient body out of which to choose the Legislature; the constitution has established them; they form an organic law of the state; all France has aided in their construction; in the rural districts in particular they are universally approved of. Why, then, should we overlook the people of France, and their expressed approbation, merely because Paris has made a bad choice for her share of the list, and her citizens reckon the departments as nothing? It is better for the Government to have to deal with a few thousand individuals than a whole nation. What harm can there be in going on for two or three years longer with these

lists? They form the sole channel by which the influence of the people is felt on the Government. It will be time enough at the close of that period to consider what changes should be made on it." Guided by these considerations, the Council resolved that the lists should remain unchanged. They were already regarded as the nucleus of a new nobility instead of that which had been destroyed, and as an indispensable attendant on the throne which was anticipated for the first consul (1).

Legion of
Honour.

But Napoléon's views in this important particular went much farther, and he resolved to establish an order of nobility, under the title of the LEGION OF HONOUR, which should gradually restore the gradation of ranks in society, and at the same time attach the people to its support. This important matter was brought before the Council of State in May, 1801. It met with more opposition than any other measure of the consulate; the debates on it in the Council of State were in the highest degree curious and instructive.

May 4, 1801.
Napoléon's
arguments
in favour of
it, in the
Council of
State.

"The eighty-seventh article of the constitution," said Napoléon, "sanctions the establishment of military honours, but it has organized nothing. An *arrêt* has established arms of honour, with double pay as a consequence; others with a mere increase; there is nothing formal or regular constructed. The project I propose to you gives consistence to the system of recompenses; it is the beginning of organization to the nation." It was proposed by General Mathieu-Dumas that the institution should be confined to military men, but this was strongly combated by the first consul. "Such ideas," said he, "might be well adapted to the feudal ages, when the chevaliers combated each other man to man, and the bulk of the nation was in a state of slavery; but when the military system changed, masses of infantry, and phalanxes constructed after the Macedonian model, were introduced, and after that it was not individual prowess, but science and skill which determined the fate of nations. The kings themselves contributed to the overthrow of the feudal *régime*, by the encouragement which they gave to the commons; finally, the discovery of gunpowder, and the total change it induced in the art of war, completed its destruction. From that period the military spirit, instead of being confined to a few thousand Franks, extended to all the Gauls. It was strengthened rather than weakened by the change; it ceased to be exclusive in its operation, and from being founded solely on military prowess, it came to be established also on civil qualities. What is it now which constitutes a great general? It is not the mere strength of a man six feet high, but the *coup-d'œil*, the habit of foresight, the power of thought and calculation; in a word, civil qualities, not such as you find in a lawyer, but such as are founded on a knowledge of human nature, and are suited to the government of armies. The general who can now achieve great things is he who is possessed of shining civil qualities; it is their perception

(1) Thib. 69, 74.

The subject of the lists was warmly debated both in the Council of State and before the Legislature, and the maintenance of the existing system only carried by a majority of 56 to 26 in the Tribunal, Decision on it and 239 to 36 in the Legislative Body. by the Legis- It is not surprising that it excited a

lature. violent opposition in the popular party, seeing that it overturned the whole objects for which the nation had been fighting during the Revolution. "The law," says Thibaudeau, "called to the honours and the advantages of eligibility for offices in the communes, 50,000 individuals; to eligibility for offices in the departments, 50,000; to

eligibility for the legislature or national offices, 5,000. The whole of the other inhabitants were altogether excluded both from the rights of election and eligibility. The partisans of representative governments regarded this as far too narrow a circle in a country embracing thirty millions of souls. But the public in general took very little interest in this matter, justly observing, that as the electors were no longer intrusted with the choice of representatives, or of persons to fill any offices, but only of a large body of candidates from whom the selection was to be made by the government, it was of very little consequence whether this privilege was confined to many or few hands."—THIBAudeau, 200.

of the strength of his talents which makes the soldiers obey him. Listen to them at their bivouacs; you will invariably find them award the preference to mental over physical qualities. Mourad Bey was the most powerful man among his Mamelukes; without that advantage he never could have been their leader. When he first saw me, he could not conceive how I could preserve authority among my troops, but he soon understood it, when he was made acquainted with our system of war.

"In all civilized states force yields to civil qualities. Bayonets sink before the priest who speaks in the name of Heaven, or the man of science who has gained an ascendancy by his knowledge. I predicted to all my military followers that a government purely military would never succeed in France till it had been brutalized by fifty years of ignorance. All their attempts to govern in that manner accordingly failed, and involved their authors in their ruin. It is not as a general that I govern; but because the nations believe me possessed of the ability in civil matters necessary for the head of affairs; without that I could not stand an hour. I knew well what I was about, when, though only a general, I took the title of member of the Institute; I felt confident of being understood by the lowest drummer in the army.

"We must not reason from ages of barbarity to these times. France consists of 30,000,000 of men, united by intelligence, property, and commerce. Three or four hundred thousand soldiers are nothing in such a mass. Not only does the general preserve his ascendancy over his soldiers chiefly by civil qualities, but when his command ceases he becomes merely a private individual. The soldiers themselves are but the children of citizens. The tendency of military men is to carry every thing by force; the enlightened civilian, on the other hand, elevates his views to a perception of the general good. The first would rule only by despotic authority; the last subject every thing to the test of discussion, truth, and reason. I have no hesitation, therefore, in saying, that if a preference was to be awarded to the one or the other, it belongs to the civilian. If you divide society into soldiers and citizens, you establish two orders in what should be one nation. If you confine honours to military men, you do what is still worse, for you sink the people into nothing (1)."

Moved by these profound observations, the Council agreed that the proposed honours should be extended indiscriminately to civil and military distinction.

But the most difficult part of the discussion remained, the consideration of the expedience of the institution itself, even in its most extended form. Great opposition was manifested to it in the capital, from its evident tendency to counteract the levelling principles of the Revolution. It was strongly opposed, accordingly, in the Council of State, the Tribunate, and the Legislative Body, and all the influence of the first consul could only obtain in these different assemblies a feeble majority (2).

(1) *Thib.* 75, 81.

Arguments (2) It was urged in the Council of State against it by Thibaudeau, and the opponents of the measure,—“That it was diametrically opposed to all the principles of the Revolution. The abolition of titles did not take place during those disastrous days which threw into discredit every thing, even of the best character, which was then established; it was the Constituent Assembly who made the change at one of the most enlightened periods of the Revolution. The nation is profoundly influenced by the feeling of honour; but that principle, strong as it is, yields to the universal passion for equality. It was these two powerful mo-

tives, combined with the love of freedom and the feelings of patriotism, which gave its early and astonishing victories to the republic. I do not see that the Legion of Honour could have made the public spirit greater. Considered as a guarantee of the Revolution, the institution appears to me to run counter to its object; and as laying the foundation of an intermediate body between the throne and the people, to involve a principle inconsistent with the representative system, which can recognise no distinction but that which flows from the choice of the citizens. I fear that the desire of possessing these ribbons may weaken the feelings of duty and of honour, instead of strengthening them. I have the

General
opposition
it met with,
but is car-
ried into
execution.

Notwithstanding the profound and unanswerable observations by which he supported it, it was by a very slender majority that the institution of the Legion of Honour passed the great bodies of the

highest respect for the motives which have led to this proposition, but I have still great doubts, and it seems highly desirable that such an institution should not be established but after the decided approbation of the great bodies in the state.

"In the theory which is presented for our consideration on this subject, representative governments are confounded with monarchical. It is quite true, that distinctions of rank are indispensable in a monarchy, in order to counterbalance, by intermediate bodies, the weight of the throne; but in a republic they are a never-failing source of irritation, because they destroy that equality among the citizens which is the foundation of all such institutions. In a monarchy, the safeguard of the people is to be found in a multitude of obstacles which restrain the inclinations of the ruler; in representative states, sovereign power is divided, the people are subjected only to magistrates of their own selection, and know of none but those whom the constitution recognises. By placing in the state the proposed institution, you voluntarily admit a patrie, of which the immediate and inevitable tendency will be, to run into a military and hereditary nobility. [Dum. viii. 105.]

"The Legion of Honour involves within itself all the elements which have elsewhere led to a hereditary nobility, individual distinction, power, honours, titles, and fixed revenues. Hardly any where has a hereditary noblesse commenced its career with such advantages. It is in vain to pretend that the progress of intelligence and the lights of the age are a sufficient guarantee against any such abuse. The human heart is ever the same; a renewal of the same circumstances will reproduce the same errors and the same desires. From the institution of the Legion will spring up afresh all the ancient prejudices, and these prejudices will fortify the military spirit and the respect for nobility, and introduce a separate in the midst of the general interest. Under pretence of effacing the last traces of nobility, it will establish a new one, and strongly confirm the old. Considered as an intermediate body, the Legion is, to say the least of it, a perfect superfluity. Such intermediate bodies are of some use in despotic countries; but in a representative state, and among a nation fortunate enough to possess a free discussion on public affairs, the sole intermediate body which is required, or should be tolerated, is the representatives of the people. The institution proposed is alike contrary to the principles of the Revolution and the text of the constitution. The proposed order leads directly to a monarchy. Crosses and ribbons are the pillars of an hereditary throne: they were unknown to the Romans who conquered the world."

Napoleon's reply. Napoleon replied:—"We are always referred by the Opposition to the Romans. It is singular that, as an argument against distinctions, reference should so frequently be made to the nation that ever existed in which they were most firmly established. The Romans had patricians, the equestrian order, citizens, and knights; for each class they had a separate costume, different habits. To reward achievements, they awarded all sorts of distinctions, surnames recalling great services, mural crowns, triumphs. Superstition was called in to lend her aid to the general impression. Take away the religion of Rome, and nothing remains. When that fine body of patricians was des-

troyed, Rome was torn in pieces; there successively arose the fury of Marius, the proscriptions of Sylla, the tyranny of the emperors. Brutus is continually referred to as the enemy of tyrants; and yet Brutus was the greatest of all aristocrats. He slew Caesar only because he wished to degrade the influence of the senate, and exalt that of the people. This is the use which the spirit of party makes of history (*).

"I defy you to show me a republic, ancient or modern, where distinctions have not prevailed. They call them baubles,—well, it is with baubles that you govern mankind. I would not say that at the tribune; but in a Council of State nothing should be coucealed, I have no conception that the passion for liberty and equality is to be lasting in France. The French have not been so far changed by ten years of revolution; they are still as gallant and volatile as their Gaulish ancestors. They have but one prevailing sentiment, and that is honour; every thing should be done therefore to nourish and encourage that principle. Observe how forcibly the people have been struck by the decorations of the strangers amongst us; that revealed their secret predilections.

"Voltaire called soldiers Alexanders at five sous a-day. He was right; they really are so. Do you believe that you would ever make a man fight by abstract principles? Never; such views are fit only for the scholar in his study. For the soldier, as for all men in active life, you must have glory and distinction; recompenses are the food which nourish such qualities. The armies of the Republic have done such great things, because they were composed of the sons of labourers and substantial farmers, and not the mere rabble; because the officers stepped into the situations of those of the old régime, and were animated by the same sentiments of honour. It is the same principle which led to all the triumphs of Louis XIV. You may call, if you please, the Legion of Honour an order; it matters not, names will not alter the nature of things. For ten years you have been constantly speaking of institutions, and what, after all, have you done? Nothing. The moment had not yet arrived. The Republicans proposed to unite the people to the country, by assembling them in churches, where, dying of cold, they were made to listen to the reading and exposition of the laws; it may easily be imagined what effect such an institution had in attaching them to their government. I am well aware, that, if you judge of this institution according to the prejudices produced by ten years of a revolution, it must appear worse than useless; but if you consider that we are placed *after* a revolution, and called upon to reconstruct society, a very different opinion will be formed. Every thing has been destroyed; we must commence the work of creation. We have, indeed, a nation and a government; but they are united by a rope of sand. There exist at the same time amongst us several of the old privileged classes, organized from the unity of their principles and interests, and who will always pursue one definite object. But we are scattered, without union, system, or lasting bond of connexion. As long as I survive I will answer for the Republic; but we must consider what is likely to occur after my death. Do you suppose the Republic is definitely established? You never were more mistaken.

(*) These observations of Napoléon are very remarkable. They show how much more clearly his natural sagacity, even amidst all the tumult of camps, had ap-

prehended the truth of ancient history, than the numerous declaimers who, through the whole of the Revolution, had descanted on its examples.

state (1). So strongly implanted were the principles of the Revolution, even in the highest functionaries of the realm, and so difficult was it to extinguish that hatred at distinctions or honours, which formed so leading a feature in the passions by which it was at first distinguished. No measure during the consulate experienced nearly so powerful an opposition. Napoléon was much struck with this circumstance, and confessed in private that he had precipitated matters, and that it would have been better to have waited before so obnoxious a change was introduced (2).

It was carried into execution, however, with all those circumstances of pomp and ceremony which Napoléon well knew are so powerful with the multitude. The inauguration of the dignitaries of the order took place, with extraordinary magnificence, in the church of the Hôtel des Invalides, in presence of the first consul and of all the great functionaries of the Republic; and the decorations soon began to be eagerly coveted by a people whose passion for individual distinction had been the secret cause of the Revolution (3).

The event, however, proved that Napoléon had rightly appreciated the true character of the revolutionary spirit. The leading object in the Revolution was the extinction of *castes* not of *ranks*; equality of rights and not of classes; the abolition of hereditary not personal distinction (4). "Vanity," as Napoléon elsewhere observed, "is the ruling principle of the French, and was at the bottom of all the convulsions of the Revolution; it was the sight of the noblesse enjoying privileges and distinctions to which they could not aspire, which filled the Tiers-État with inextinguishable and natural animosity (5). But an institution which conferred lustre on individuals and not on families, and led to no hereditary distinctions, was so far from running counter to this desire, that it afforded it the highest gratification, because it promised the objects of this passion to any, even the humblest of the citizens, who was worthy of receiving it. The Legion of Honour accordingly, which gradually extended so as to embrace two thousand persons of the greatest eminence in every department, both civil and military, in France, became an institution in the highest degree both useful and popular; and served as the forerunner to that new nobility which Napoléon afterwards created as safeguards to his imperial throne.

When so many institutions were successively arising which pointed to the establishment of a regular government, it was impossible that its head could remain in a precarious situation. Napoléon accordingly was created by the obsequious legislature first consul for ten years, beyond the first ten fixed at his original appointment; an appointment which, although far from coming up to the anticipations and wishes of the first consul, was yet important as a

We have the means of doing so, but we have not yet done it, and never will do it, till we have scattered over the surface of France some masses of granite. Do you suppose you can trust the people for the preservation of your institutions? Believe me, you are mistaken. They will exclaim in a short time, 'Vive le Roi!' or, 'Vive la Ligue!' with as

much alacrity as they now cry, 'Vive la République!' It is necessary therefore to give a lasting direction to the public impulse, and to prepare instruments for that purpose. In the war of la Vendée, I have seen forty men obtain the absolute direction of a department; that is the system that we must make use of." [Thib. 83, 85.]

(1) The numbers were :—

It is adopted by the legislature.	In the Council of State.	Ayes.		Noes.	
	Tribunate.	14	...	10	
	Corps Legislatif.	56	...	38	
		166	...	110	

236

158

Majority, 78 [Thib. 92.]

(2) Thib. 91, 92 Bour. iv. 357, 358.

(3) D'Ah. vi. 21.

(4) Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 526.

(5) D'Ah. vii. 169, 170.

step to the establishment of perpetual and hereditary succession in his family (1).

But all these measures, important as they were, yielded to the great step which at the same time was adopted of re-establishing the Catholic religion in France, and renewing those connexions with the Pope, which had been violently broken during the fury of the French Revolution.

Although the institutions of religion had been abolished, its ministers scattered, and its property confiscated, by the different revolutionary assemblies who had governed the country, yet a remnant of the Christian faith still lingered in many parts of the rural districts. When the horrors of Robespierre ceased, and a government comparatively lenient and regular was established under the Directory, the priests obtained leave to open their churches, provided they undertook to maintain them at their own expense, and a considerable number returned from exile, and commenced in poverty and obscurity the reconstruction of religious observances. They were again exposed to persecution and danger after the 18th Fructidor, and being destitute of any species of property, and entirely dependent upon the voluntary contributions of their flocks, they were totally unequal to the Herculean task of combating the irreligious spirit which had acquired such strength during a revolutionary interregnum of ten years. A remnant of the faithful, composed for the most part of old women, attended the churches on Sunday, and marked by their fidelity an institution which might otherwise have been totally forgotten; but they were hardly observed amidst the crowds who had discarded every species of devotion; and a great proportion of the churches, both in the towns and the country, had either been pulled down, or converted to secular purposes during the Revolution; while of those which remained, a still greater number were in such a state of dilapidation, from the total absence of any funds for their support, as to threaten speedily to become unserviceable for any purpose whatever. In this general prostration of the Christian faith, the bewildered multitude had sought refuge in other and extravagant creeds; the sect of the Theophilanthropists had arisen, whose ravings amidst fruits and flowers, were listened to by a few hundreds, perhaps thousands, of the credulous or enthusiastic of Paris; while the great majority of the people, educated without any religious impressions, quietly passed by on the other side, and lived altogether without God in the world (2).

Although neither a fanatic nor even a believer in Christianity, Napoléon was too sagacious not to perceive that such a state of things was inconsistent with any thing like a regular government. He had early, accordingly, commenced a negotiation with the Pope; and the head of the Church, delighted at finding such a disposition in a revolutionary chief, had received the advances with the utmost cordiality. Cardinal Gon-

Napoléon's
views on
this sub-
ject.

(1) Bour. iv. 361.

Grounds set forth in the thus ably set forth in the *Senatus Consultum* which introduced it:—“Considering that in the existing circumstances of the Republic, it is the first duty of the Conservative Senate to employ all the means in its power in order to give to the government the stability which can alone augment the national resources, inspire confidence without, establish credit within, reassure our allies, discourage our secret enemies, remove the evils of war, bring to maturity the fruits of peace, and leave to the wisdom of administration the selection of the proper period for bringing forward all the designs

which it may have in view for the happiness of a free people,” etc. Napoléon replied in the following words, which subsequent events rendered prophetic:—“Fortune has hitherto smiled on the Republic, but she is inconstant; and how many are there whom she has overwhelmed with her favours have lived too long by a few years! The interests of my glory and happiness seem to have marked as the termination of my public career the moment when a general peace was signed. But you deem a new sacrifice necessary on my part. I will not scruple to undertake it, if the wishes of the people prescribe what your suffrages authorize.—DUMAS, viii. 98, 99.

(2) D'Abr. vi. 38, 41. Thib. 151, 152. Jom. Vic de Nap. i. 489.

zalvi, who with singular ability directed the conclave, had, in the name of the supreme Pontiff, written to General Murat, when advancing towards the Roman states, after the armistice of Treviso, to express "the lively admiration which he felt for the first consul, to whose fortunes were attached the tranquillity of religion not less than the happiness of Europe." The views of Napoléon on that matter were strongly expressed to the counsellors of state with whom he conversed on the subject. "Yesterday evening," said he, "when walking alone in the woods, amidst the solitude of nature, the distant bell of the church of Ruel struck my ear. Involuntarily I felt emotion; so powerful is the influence of early habits and associations. I said to myself, if I feel thus what must be the influence of such impressions on simple and credulous men? Let your philosophers, your *idéologues* answer that if they can. It is absolutely indispensable to have a religion for the people; and not less so, that that religion should be directed by the government. At present, fifty bishops in the pay of England, direct the French clergy; we must forthwith destroy their influence; we must declare the Catholic the established religion of France, as being that of the majority of its inhabitants; we must organize its constitution. The first consul will appoint the fifty bishops; the Pope will induct them. They will appoint the parish priests; the people will defray their salaries. They must all take the oath; the refractory must be transported. The Pope will, in return, confirm the sale of the national domains. He will consecrate the Revolution; the people will sing, God save the Gallican Church. They will say I am a Papist; I am no such thing. I was a Mahometan in Egypt; I will become a Catholic here for the good of my people. I am no believer in particular creeds; but as to the idea of a God, look to the heavens, and say who made that (1)."

Concordat,
July 15,
1801.
Passed into
a law, 8th,
April, 1802.

Notwithstanding these decided opinions of the first consul, the negotiations with the Court of Rome were attended with considerable difficulty, and proved very tedious. At length, however, they were brought to a conclusion, and, despite the opposition of a

(1) Thib. 152, 153. Nap. ii. 88.

"To discuss the necessity of a religion," replied the opponents of the establishment, "is to mistake the question. There can be no doubt on that subject; but the point is, cannot religion exist without an established Church? There is to be found in the clergy one hierarchy, one spirit, one object. If this colossus had for its head the chief of the state, the evil would exist only in half; but if a foreign potentate, the Pope, is its leader, a schism is introduced into the community. Never will you attach the clergy sincerely to the new order of things. The Revolution has despoiled them both of their honours and their property; they will never pardon these injuries; eternal war is sworn between the rival powers. The clergy will be less dangerous when they are detached from each other than when organized in one body. It is not necessary either to persecute or transport a single individual; all that is required is to let them say mass as they choose, and allow every citizen to go either to church or the philanthropic temples, as suits his inclination. If the incompatibility between priests and the Republic becomes so evident as to disturb the public tranquillity, we must never hesitate to banish them; you must either proscribe them or the Revolution. The spirit of the age is wholly opposed to a return to Catholicism. We are nearer the truths of Christianity than the priests of Rome. You have but to say the word, the Papacy is ruined, and France takes its place as a Protestant state."

"You are deceived," said Napoléon; "the clergy

exist, and ever will exist; they will exist as long as the people are imbued with a religious spirit, and that disposition is permanent in the human heart.

Napoléon's reply. We have seen republics and democracies; history has many examples of such governments to exhibit, but none of a state without an established worship, without religion, and without priests. Is it not better to organize the public worship, and discipline the priests, than to leave both entirely emancipated from the control of the state? At present the clergy openly preach against the Republic, because they experience no benefit from it. Should we transport them? Unquestionably not! for what alone constitutes their authority in the wreck of their fortunes is the fidelity with which they adhere to the church of their fathers, and that will be increased rather than diminished by all the sufferings they undergo. You may send into exile the English or the Austrians, for they are bound by no ties to our country; but the French, who have families here, and are guilty of no offence but an adherence to their religious opinions, must be treated differently. You cannot extinguish their opinions; you must therefore attach them to the Republic. If the Protestant faith is proclaimed, one half of the country will adopt that creed and the other half remain Catholic; we shall have the Huguenot wars over again, and interminable divisions. We have nothing to take from the clergy, and as little to ask from them. The affair is entirely a political matter, and the line I have adopted appears the safest that could have been chosen." [Thib. 153, 157.]

large portion of the Council, and a still larger proportion of the Legislature, the concordat with the Pope passed into a law, and the Christian religion was re-established through the French territory (1).

By this memorable law the Catholic religion was declared that of the French people. Ten archbishops and fifty bishops were established, the former with a salary of 15,000 francs (L.600) a-year, the latter with one of 10,000, or L.400. It was provided that there should be at least a parish priest in every district of a *juge de paix*, with as many additional ministers as might be deemed necessary; the bishops and archbishops were to be appointed by the first consul; the bishops nominated the parish priests and inferior clergy, subject to the approbation of the same authority. The salary of the priests in the larger parishes was fixed at 1500 francs, or L.60 a-year; in the smaller, 1200, or L.48. The Departmental Councils were charged with the procuring of houses, or lodgings and gardens, for the bishops, priests, and curates. The churches which had survived the Revolution were placed at the disposal of the bishops, and provision made for the repair, at the expense of the department, of such as were ruinous. Such was the establishment which in France emerged from the chaos of the Revolution, and such the provision for the ministers of religion made by the nation which, in the outset of the convulsions, had confiscated the vast possessions of the church, on the solemn assurance contained in the decree of the Constituent Assembly, that it "committed the due and honourable maintenance of religion and its ministers to the honour of the French people (2)."

Although the opposition in the Legislature was not nearly so formidable to the concordat as to the Legion of Honour, a much stronger feeling of discontent was excited by the change in the Revolutionary party and the army. "Bonaparte," said they, "is striving in vain to destroy the remains of the Revolution, and to close every avenue against the anti-revolutionary party, when by his concordat he opens to the latter an ample gateway, and with his own hands digs the mine which is to blow his edifice into the air." In truth, such was the extraordinary and unprecedented extent to which irreligion had spread under the Republican Government, that "two-thirds of the French people," according to the admission of their own historians, "were ignorant of the principles on which

(1) The numbers were,—

	For.	Against.
Tribunate,	78	7
Legislative Body, . .	228	21
	306	28

Its provisions in favour of the Gallican Church.

or elsewhere, any function relative to the affairs of the Gallican Church.

whereas the Legion of Honour was only carried by a majority of 236 to 158; a striking proof how much more strenuous the opposition was to any approach towards the re-establishment of a nobility, than even the Christian religion, which was held forth as so much the object of obloquy.—THIBAudeau, 210.

(2) See the Concordat and Articles Organiques, in Nap. Mélanges, i. 297, et seq.

Some very important articles were included in the same treaty relative to the independence of the Gallican Church. It was provided, "1. That no bull, brief, rescript, decree, mandate, or provision, or other writing whatever, emanating from the Court of Rome, even concerning individuals, should be received, published, printed, or put in execution, without the authority of government. 2. That no individual announcing himself as legate, vicar, or commissioner of the Holy See, should, without the same authority, exercise on the French territory

published in France, without a previous examination by the Government, to ascertain whether they were in harmony with the laws and institutions of the French Republic, or were in any way calculated to affect the public tranquillity. 4. That no national or metropolitan council, diocesan synod, or other deliberative assembly, should be held without the express authority of government. 5. That an appeal should lie to the Council of State in every case of alleged abuse or misgovernment on the part of the superior ecclesiastical authorities; and that under this head should be included every infraction of the rules established in the Councils of the Church, every attempt calculated to injure the liberties of the Gallican Church, every infringement on the liberty of public worship, or of the rights which the laws secured to its ministers." [Nap. Mélanges, i. 301.] By these articles, the Church in France was practically rendered nearly as independent of the Papal authority as the Protestant establishment of Great Britain.

such a measure was founded, and regarded it as a strange and dangerous innovation." The opposition which it experienced was indeed almost inconceivable, and afforded the clearest evidence of the pernicious tendency of those measures of extermination which former governments had adopted against the possessions of the established church, and how rapidly the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, founded on the pretence of applying it to purposes of beneficence and public instruction, leads to the total destruction of every species of religious belief. Universally the opinion prevailed that the restoration of the altar was but a prelude to that of the throne, and that the concordat was to be regarded as a solemn pledge for the speedy re-establishment of the ancient *régime*, a manifesto against all the principles of the Revolution. These feelings were in an especial manner prevalent among the military and democratic parties. Moreau, Lannes, Oudinot, Victor, and many others, openly expressed their repugnance to the measure, and declined to join the ceremony which took place in Notre-Dame on the occasion of its solemn proclamation. "Never," said the soldiers, "have the Republican arms been adorned by so many laurels as since they ceased to receive the benediction of the priests (1)."

Napoléon, however, remained firm, notwithstanding all the opposition which took place, and the loud discontents of the capital; the re-establishment of public worship was announced by a proclamation of the consuls, and on the following day a grand religious ceremony took place, in honour of the

April 11, 1802.

Ceremony
on the occa-
sion in Notre-
Dame.

On this occasion, for the first time, the servants of the first consul appeared in livery; the foreign ambassadors were invited to appear with all their attendants arrayed in the same manner, and a similar commendation was addressed to such of the public functionaries as had carriages of their own; but so few of them were possessed of that luxury, that the equipages made a very indifferent appearance. The military, however, were obliged to attend in great numbers, and the brilliancy of their uniforms more than compensated the want of civil decoration. Such, however, was the repugnance of many of the generals to the ceremony, that it required all the authority of the first consul to make Lannes and Augereau remain in the carriage, when they perceived they were going to hear mass. It proceeded, nevertheless, with great *éclat* in the cathedral of Notre-Dame, which only eight years before had been polluted by the orgies of the Goddess of Reason. "What thought you of the ceremony?" said Napoléon to General Delmas, who stood near him when it was concluded. "It was a fine piece of mummary," replied he. "Nothing was wanting but the million of men who have perished in order to destroy what you have now re-established." It was at first intended to have had the standards blessed by the archbishop, but the government were obliged to abandon the design, from being given to understand, that if this was done, the soldiers would trample them under their feet (2). So difficult is it to eradicate the passions which have been nursed up during the frenzy and convulsions of a revolution, and so obstinately do mankind, under the influence of prejudice, sometimes resist the establishment of those very institutions from which they are themselves destined to receive the most unalloyed advantages (3).

(1) Big. ii. 198, 199. Norv. ii. 166, 167. Jom. iv. 404.

(2) Thib. 163, 164. Bour. iv. 279. Big. ii. 199.

(3) Rapp, one of Napoléon's aides-de-camp, who

was a Protestant, positively refused to attend the ceremony, even when requested to do so by the first consul himself. "Provided," said he, "you do not make these priests your aides-de-camp or your

Constrained religious observances at Paris.

Immediately after this great change, the observance of Sunday was to a certain degree resumed. It was provided in the concordat, that the government offices should be closed on Sunday, and this was immediately done. Shortly after, a decree of the consuls directed that all marriages should be proclaimed on that day, and the daily service of mass began in the Tuileries. Encouraged by so many symptoms of returning favour, the clergy made the utmost efforts to induce the first consul to join publicly in the more solemn duties which the church prescribed; but to this he never could be brought to consent. "We are very well as we are," said he; "do not ask me to go farther: you will never obtain what you wish: I will not become a hypocrite: be content with what you have already gained." Mass, however, was regularly performed at the Tuileries in the morning. The first consul went to it on Sunday, and remained during the service, which seldom exceeded ten minutes, in an adjoining apartment, with the door open, looking over papers, or engaged in his usual occupations. He had considerable difficulty in preserving the balance so imperiously required in the head of the state, during the first return to religious observances after the revolutionary fever, yet by great firmness he succeeded, during his whole reign, in maintaining a just equilibrium between the impassioned characters on both sides (1).

But although the opposition which the restoration of religion met with in the corrupted population and revolutionary circles of Paris was very powerful, it was viewed in a very different light in the rural districts of France. The peasants beheld with undisguised delight the re-establishment of the priests, from whose labours and beneficence they had gained so much in former times; and the sound of the village bells again calling the faithful to the house of God, was hailed by millions, as the dove with the olive branch, which first announced peace to the "green undeluged earth." The restoration of Sunday, as a day of periodical rest, was felt as an unspeakable relief by the labouring population, who had never been able to establish the exemption from work on the tenth day, which the Convention had prescribed, and were borne down by years of continued and unbroken toil (2). But the pernicious effect of the total cessa-

cooks, you may do with them what you please." The well-known devotion of Rapp to his general procured him impunity for these sort of speeches, which he very frequently made; but Delmas was not so fortunate. The first consul was extremely irritated at his reply, which made a great noise at the time, and he was soon after sent into exile in consequence.—See THIBAUD DEAU, 164.

(1) Bour. iv. 281, 282. Thib. 166, Prudence of Napoléon in restraining the high church party. The wisdom with which Napoléon restrained the imprudent zeal of the church party appears in the proceeding which took place on the death of Mademoiselle Chameiroi, a celebrated opera dancer. The priest of St.-Roch refused to receive the body into his church, or celebrate over it the solemnities of interment, and this gave rise to a vehement dispute between the artists who accompanied the body and the clergy. It came to be discussed in the Council of State, "It amounts to nothing," said the Senator Monge, "but a dispute of one set of comedians with another."—"What!" said the first consul, with a severe air. "Yes, citizen-consul," replied Monge, "we may say that when the grand crosses do not bear us." But Napoléon viewed the matter in a very different light; and on the following day an article appeared in the *Moniteur* which bore internal marks of his composition.

"The curate of St.-Roch, in a moment of hallucination, has refused to pray for Mademoiselle Chameiroi, or to admit her body into the church. One of his colleagues, a man of sense, received the procession into the church of the Filles Saint-Thomas, where the service was performed with all the usual solemnities. The Archbishop of Paris has suspended the curate of St.-Roch for three months, to give him time to recollect that Jesus-Christ commanded us to pray even for our enemies; and that being recalled by meditation to a proper sense of his duties, he may learn that all these superstitious observances, the offspring of an age of credulity, or of crazed imaginations, tend only to the discredit of true religion, and have been proscribed by the recent concordat of the Gallican Church."—THIBAUD DEAU; 166, 168.

April 14, 1802. (2) The conclusion of the concordat His admirable was announced in these eloquent proclamation words in a proclamation issued by the first consul. "An insane policy has sought during the Revolution to smother religious dissensions under the ruins of the altar, under the ashes of religion itself. At its voice all those pious solemnities ceased in which the citizens called each other by the endearing name of brothers, and acknowledged their common equality in the sight of heaven. The dying,

tion of all religious instruction and observances for nine years could not so easily be eradicated. A generation had been educated, who were ignorant of the very elements of the Christian faith; the frenzy of the Revolution had snapped asunder a chain which had descended unbroken from the Apostolic ages. The consequences of this chasm have been to the last degree pernicious to the existing generation, and are, it is much to be feared, now irreparable. It is to this cause that we are to ascribe the spirit of irreligion which has since been so peculiarly the characteristic of the higher and urban classes of French society, and which has worked out its natural consequences throughout all the subsequent periods of the empire and the Restoration. A nation, which, in its influential classes at least, has lost all respect for religion, is incapable of freedom, and can be governed only by force. "*Natura, tamen*," says Tacitus, "*infirmittatis humanæ, tardiora sunt remedia quam mala, et ut corpora, lente augescunt, cito extinguuntur, sic ingenia studiaque opprimeris facilius quam revocaveris.*"

To foreign nations, however, who could not foresee the deplorable internal effects of this long interruption in religious instruction, the spectacle of France again voluntarily returning to the Christian faith was in the highest degree acceptable. Contrasting it with the monstrous profanations and wild extravagances of the irreligious fanaticism which had prevailed during the Revolution, they deemed it the harbinger of tranquillity to its distracted people, and peace to Europe. It contributed more than any circumstance to weaken the horror with which the Revolutionary Government had so long been regarded, and opened the way to the establishment of more kindly relations, not only with the governments, but the people of foreign states. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia publicly expressed their satisfaction at the auspicious event; forgetting in their joy at the restoration of so important a member to the Christian family, the jealousy with which a change so likely to consolidate the power of the first consul might possibly have been regarded. The Emperor of Austria styled it, with great felicity of expression, "*a service truly rendered to all Europe.*" And the thoughtful and religious every where justly considered the voluntary return of a great nation to the creed of its fathers, from the experienced impossibility of living without its precepts, as the most signal triumph to the Christian faith which had occurred since it ascended the Imperial throne, under the banners of Constantine (1).

It was as the first step in a great political improvement, and as closing the door against the worst principles of the Revolution, that Napoléon, in spite of so much opposition from his own subjects, undertook and carried through the concordat with Rome. Many persons urged him to complete the system; separate the church of France from the Pope, and at once declare himself its head. These persons, however, did not know the real state of the country, and still less the character of the first consul. So far from thinking that he could dispense with the court of Rome in settling this matter, he openly declared—"That if the Pope had not existed, it would have been well to have

left alone in his agonies, no longer heard that consoling voice which calls the Christian to a better world. God himself seemed exiled from the face of nature. Ministers of the religion of peace, let a complete oblivion veil over your dissensions, your misfortunes, your faults; let the religion which unites you bind you by indissoluble cords to the interests of your country. Let the young learn from your precepts that the God of peace is also the God of arms, and that he throws his shield over those who

combat for the liberties of France. Citizens of the Protestant faith, the law has equally extended its solicitude to your interests, let the morality, so pure, so holy, so brotherly, which you profess, unite you all in love to your country, and respect for its laws; and, above all, never permit disputes on doctrinal points to weaken that universal clarity which religion at once inculcates and commands."—See DUMAS, viii. 95, 96.

(1) Big. ii. 200, 204.

Subsequent
opinions of
Napoleon
on the sub-
ject.

created him for that occasion, as the Roman consuls created a dictator in difficult circumstances. The concordat indeed recognised a foreign authority in religious matters, which might possibly disturb the republic on some future occasion; but it did not create it, and, on the contrary, brought it under restraints more favourable than could possibly have been expected to the interests of the reigning power in France. By connecting the church with the state, Napoléon hoped to withdraw it from foreign or English influence, while by the conquest of Italy he expected to make the Pope the ready instrument of his will. He has himself told us, that he never repented of this great step.—“The concordat of 1801,” says he, “was necessary to religion, to the republic, to the government; the churches were closed, the priests persecuted, part of the bishops were in exile, and in the pay of England, part merely apostolic vicars, without any bond to unite them to the state. The concordat put an end to these divisions, and made the Catholic apostolic church emerge from its ruins. Napoléon restored the altars, caused the disorders to cease, directed the faithful to pray for the republic, dissipated the scruples of the purchasers of national domains, and broke the last thread by which the exiled dynasty communicated with the country, by dismissing the bishops who resisted the reconciliation with the court of Rome, and holding them out as rebels to the holy see, who preferred their temporal interests to the eternal concerns of religion (1).”

Connected with the revival of religion was a great and generous design of the first consul, which it would have been well for him if he could have carried completely into effect, viz. the complete restoration of all the unalienated national property to the original proprietors. His first project was to make the restitution to that extent complete, with the single exception of the buildings devoted to public establishments; and even to restore the two-thirds which had been cut off from the public creditors by the barbarous decree of 1797. He never contemplated, however, the restoration of the alienated property, being well aware of the inextricable difficulties in which that question was involved. But when the subject was brought forward in the Council of State, he found the opposition so great that he was compelled to modify the project so much as amounted almost to its total abandonment. The severity of the laws against the emigrants had been gradually relaxed by successive edicts. An important change was first made by the *arrêt* of 28th of Vendémiaire (26th November, 1800), which divided the emigrants into two classes, from the first and most numerous of which the prohibition was removed (2). They returned in consequence, in crowds; and the gates were opened still more widely by the lenient policy of the Government, which directed the minister of police to grant passports of admission to almost all who applied for them, without regard to the formal distinctions established by the decree of the first consul. In granting these indulgences,

(1) Nap. i. 115. *Mélanges*.

Mr. Fox, after the peace of Amiens, ventured to blame Napoleon in conversation for not having permitted the marriage of priests in his dominions. “I then had,” replied he, “and still have, need to pacify. It is with water, and not oil, that you must extinguish theological volcanoes. I would have had less difficulty in establishing the Confession of Augsburg in my empire.”—*NAPOLEON, Mélanges*, i. 121.

(2) When this *arrêt* was under discussion in the Council of State, Napoleon observed, “There are above 100,000 names on these unhappy lists; it is enough to turn one’s head. In the general calamity the most elevated and dangerous characters can

alone extricate themselves; they possess the means of purchasing testimony in their favour. Thus the practical result is, that a duke is struck off the list, while a poor labourer is kept on it. We must extricate the matter by classing the emigrants according to certain distinctions, which may admit equally persons of all descriptions. The lists must be reduced by three-fourths of its number to the names of such as are known to be hostile to the Government. Having effected such a diminution, we shall be the better enabled to distinguish the really dangerous characters; they will no longer escape notice in the troubled flood of misfortune.”—*TAL-LEPÉRE*, 95.

Napoléon was influenced by more than a feeling of pity for the exiled families; he already looked forward to them as the firmest support of his throne. But it was not without difficulty that these concessions were made to the aristocratic party; the executive even was divided, and the second consul said to him, at the Council of State;—"The existence of the Government will be always precarious when it has not around itself several hundred revolutionary families, uniting in themselves the principal fortunes and offices of the state, to counterbalance the influence of the emigrant noblesse (1)."

Renewed
indulgence
towards the
emigrants.

April 29, 1802. On the 29th April, 1802, a general amnesty was published by a *senatus consultum*, which reduced the exiled persons to about a thousand, and the melancholy list was, by the indulgence of the police, soon after reduced to a few hundreds. Above a hundred thousand emigrants, in consequence, returned to their native country, happy again to tread the soil and breathe the air of France, though deprived for the most part of all their possessions, and in a deplorable state of destitution. The *senatus consultum* restored to every emigrant who was permitted to return, such part of his former property as had not been alienated by the state; but as it was soon found that they began in consequence to cut the forests to a great extent, in order to relieve their necessities, it became necessary to put a restriction upon this liberality, and a subsequent *arrêt* prohibited the removal of the sequestration on the woods belonging to emigrants, amounting to three hundred arpents and upwards (2). By a subsequent decree of the legislature, it was provided, through the urgent representations of the first consul, that all successions to which the republic had acquired right as coming in place of the emigrants prior to the 1st September, 1802, and were unalienated, should be restored to the persons having right to them; that all claims of the republic on the emigrants prior to the amnesty should be extinguished; and that the goods of emigrants which had devolved to the republic, and were unalienated, should be declared liable to the claims of their creditors (3).

Senatus
Consultum
proclaim-
ing a general
amnesty.

These measures, how humanely and wisely soever designed by Napoléon, proved almost totally inadequate to remedy the dreadful evils produced by the barbarous confiscation of property during the Revolution. He admits this himself. "My first design," says he "was to have thrown the whole unalienated property of the emigrants into a mass, or *syndicat*, and divided it according to a certain proportional scale among the restored families. I met with so much resistance, however, that I was induced to abandon that design; but I soon found that, when I came to restore individually to each what belonged to him, I made some too rich and many too insolent. Those who had received the greatest fortunes proved the most ungrateful. It was a sense of this which induced me to pass the *arrêt*, which suspended the operation of the restitution contained in the act of amnesty as to all woods above a certain value. This was a deviation undoubtedly from the letter of the law; but circumstances imperiously

Inadequacy
of these
measures to
heal the
evils of re-
volutionary
confisca-
tion.

(1) Thib. 96, 103. Bour. iv. 333, 334.

(2) On this occasion the first consul said in the Council of State, "The emigrants who have been struck out of the lists are cutting their woods, partly from necessity, partly to transport their money to foreign states. We cannot allow the greatest enemies of the Republic, the defenders of old prejudices, to recover their fortune, and despoil France. I am quite willing to receive them; but the nation is interested in the preservation of the forests.

The navy requires them; their destruction is contrary to every principle of good government. We must not, however, keep the woods without giving an indemnity to their proprietors; but we will pay them gradually, and as we acquire funds, and the delay of payment will prove a powerful means of rendering the claimants obedient to the Government."—THIBAUDEAU, 98.

(3) Thib. 98, 105.

required it; our error consisted in not having foreseen it before the original law was framed. This reaction, however, on my part, destroyed all the good effect of the recall of the emigrants, and alienated from me all the great families. I would have avoided all these evils if I had followed out my original design of a syndicat; instead of one discontented great family, I would have made an hundred grateful provincial nobles, who, being all dependent on my government for their subsistence, could have been relied on to the last. It is evident that the emigrants had lost their all; that they had embarked their property on board the same vessel, and what was rescued from the waves should have been proportionally divided. It was a fault on my part not to have done so, which is the more unpardonable that I had entertained the idea; but I was alone, surrounded by thorns; every one was against me, time pressed, and still more important affairs imperiously required my attention (1)."

Immense
extent of
this evil,
and irreme-
diable ef-
fects.

But in truth, even if the projects of Napoléon could have been carried into complete effect, they would have remedied but a small part of the evils consequent on the frightful confiscation of private property which took place during the Revolution. From a report made by M. Ramel on the finances of the Republic, it appears that before the year 1801 there had been sold national domains to the enormous amount of 2,555,000,000 francs, or above L.100,000;000 sterling; and that there remained to sell property to the amount of 700,000,000 francs, or L.28,000,000 sterling (2). When it is recollected that during the greater part of this period, the national domains, from the insecure tenure by which they were held, and the general confusion, were sold for a few years' purchase, it may be conceived what a prodigious mass of landed property must have been torn from the rightful proprietors in this way, and how fatal was the wound thus inflicted on the social system of France. Mr. Burke declared at the outset of the Revolution, that without complete restitution or indemnification to all the dispossessed proprietors, it would be impossible to construct a stable constitutional monarchy in France (3), and the result has now completely established the justice of his opinion. The want of a landed aristocracy to coerce the people, on the one hand, and restrain the executive on the other, has ever since been felt as the irreparable want in the monarchy; its absence was bitterly lamented by Napoléon (4), and all the attempts of subsequent

(1) Las Cas. ii. 221, 222.

Considerable alarm was excited among the holders of national domains by these proceedings in favour of the emigrants. To allay them, the following article appeared in the *Moniteur*:—"The first duty of the French people, the first principle of the republic, ever must be, to preserve untouched, and with-

out any sort of distinction, the purchasers of national domains. In truth, to have trusted the fortunes of the republic, when it was assailed with the united forces of Europe, to have united their private fortunes to those of the state in such a period of anxious alarm, must ever constitute a claim on the gratitude of the state and the people."—THIBAUDEAU, 176.

(2) *Compte rendu*, par Ramel. Stat. de la France, 545.

The periods during which this prodigious confiscation of private property took place were as follow:—

From 17th May, 1790, to 18th Jan. 1795, the sales of national domains, chiefly church property, produced,	1,500,000,000, or L. 60,000,000
From Jan. 18, 1795, to Sept. 20, 1795,	611,438,000, or 24,500,000
From Sept. 20, 1795, to Nov. 25, 1797,	316,464,000, or 12,750,000
From Nov. 25, 1797, to June 30, 1801,	127,231,000, or 5,800,000

2,555,133,000 or L.103,050,000

—See *Compte Rendu de Ramel*, Stat. de la France, 545.

(3) Burke v. 289, et seq.

(4) "I am now convinced," said he, "that I was in the wrong in my arrangements with the faubourg St.-Germain. I did too much and too little; enough to excite jealousy in the opposite party, and not enough to attach to my interest the restored no-

blesse. There were but two lines to take; that of extirpation or fusion. The first could not for a moment be entertained; the second was by no means easy, but I do not think it was beyond my strength. I was fully aware of its importance. It was incumbent on us to complete the fusion; to cement the

governments to construct a constitutional throne, or establish public freedom on a durable basis, have failed from the absence of that element. Neither Napoléon nor the Bourbons were ever strong enough to attempt the restitution of the confiscated estates at the expense of the four millions of landed proprietors among whom they were now divided. The conclusion, to be drawn from this, however, is not that Mr. Burke's and Napoléon's opinion were erroneous, or that the fabric of liberty can be erected on the basis of robbery and spoliation; but that the national sins of France had been so great, that reparation or restitution was impossible, and she has received the doom of perpetual servitude in consequence.

Measures
to promote
public in-
struction.

When so many great ideas were passing through the mind of the first consul, the important subject of public instruction, and the progress of science, could not long remain unnoticed. Insatiable in his desire for every species of glory, he aspired, like Charlemagne, not only to extend the frontiers, and enhance the renown of the republic, but to construct a monument to science, which should perpetuate its fame to the latest generation. When he ascended the consular throne, the state of knowledge and public instruction was in the highest degree deplorable. The old establishments of education, which were for the most part in the hands of the clergy, and endowed from ecclesiastical foundations, had shared the fate of all the feudal institutions, and perished alike with their blessings and their evils. During the long interregnum of ten years which intervened under the revolutionary government, public instruction was generally neglected, and religious education, by far its most important department, entirely ceased, except in a small and persecuted class of society. Not that the Convention had overlooked this great subject of general instruction; on the contrary, they were fully aware of its importance, and had done their utmost, during the distracted and stormy period that they held the reins of government, to fill up the chasm. They established several seminaries of medicine, the Polytechnic school, which afterwards attained such deserved celebrity, various schools of rural economy, and a complete system for the instruction of the young men destined for the artillery, the engineers, the mines, and the naval service. Central schools were also introduced by their exertions in each department; and to them is due the formation of the Institute; which so long kept alive the torch of science during the melancholy night of modern civilisation. But these efforts, how meritorious soever, were wholly inadequate to remedy the evils which the Revolution had produced. The distracted state of the country, after the subversion of all its institutions, caused no education to be of any value but such as tended at once to military advancement; and the abolition of religious instruction, rendered all that was, or could be, taught to the great body of the people, of little practical benefit. Under de-

union at all hazards: with it we should have been invincible. The want of it has ruined us, and will for long prolong the misfortunes and agony of unhappy France. An aristocracy is the true support of the throne; its moderator, its lever, its fulcrum; the state without it is a vessel without a rudder; a balloon in the air. But the whole advantage of an aristocracy, its magic, consists in its antiquity; that was the precise thing, and the only thing, which I could not create: I did not possess the intermediate elements. A reasonable democracy will not seek more than equal capacity in all to rise to the highest dignities; the true course would have been to have employed the remains of the aristocracy with the forms and spirit of democracy. Above all, it was desirable to have assembled together the ancient fa-

milies, the names celebrated in our history; that was the only way to have conferred an air of grandeur on our modern institutions."—LAS CASES, iii. 23. How exactly have all men of a certain elevation of thought concurred, in all ages and countries, in the same opinions on this subject. "With the government of the multitude, and the destruction of the aristocracy," says Polybius, "commences every species of violence; they run together in tumultuous assemblies, and are hurried into every excess, assassinations, banishments, and divisions of lands, till, being reduced at last to a state of savage anarchy, they once more find themselves under a master and monarch, and submit to arbitrary sway."—POLYBIUS, vi. ex. i.

mocratic rule, France, amidst incessant declamations in favour of general illumination, and pompous eulogies on the lights of the times, was rapidly sinking into a state of darkness, deeper than the gloom of the middle ages (1).

By directions from the first consul, Chaptal presented to the Council of State a project for a general system of public instruction. It was founded on singular principles; distrust of the general education of the people, especially in the rural districts, and an anxiety to train up a body of favoured young men in the interest of the government, were its leading features. Schools of

primary instruction in the communes were every where permitted, but Government contributed nothing to their support, and the teachers were left to such remuneration as they could obtain from their scholars. Secondary schools, the next in gradation, were placed on the same footing, with this difference, that they could not be established without the special authority of Government. The favour of the executive was reserved for academies of the higher kind, which, under the name of lyceums and special schools, were established to the number of thirty in different parts of the Republic, and at which not only were the masters paid by the state, but the scholars, 6400 in number, were also maintained at the public expense. The teachers in these institutions were required to be married; a regulation intended to exclude the priests from any share in the higher branches of tuition; and no mention whatever was made of religion in any part of the decree; a striking proof of the continued influence of the infidel spirit which had grown up during the license and sins of the Revolution, and which rendered the whole establishment for education of little real service to the labouring classes of the community (2).

Following out the same plan of concentrating the rays of government favour upon the higher branches of knowledge, the sum of 60,000 francs (L.2400) was set aside to encourage the progress of French philosophy in electricity and galvanism; a galvanic society was instituted; a senatus consultum awarded the rights of French citizenship to every stranger who had resided a year in its territory, and had deserved well of the Republic by important discoveries in science or art; the Institute was divided into four classes, and each member received a pension of 1500 francs, or L.60 a-year; while a chamber of commerce was established in each considerable city of the Republic, and a council-general of commerce at Paris (3).

The rapid succession of objects, tending to monarchical ideas, encouraged the Royalists in the capital to make a trial of their influence over the public mind. Duval composed a play, entitled "Edward in Scotland," which Napoléon resolved to see performed before he determined whether or not it should be allowed to be represented. He listened attentively to the first act, and appeared even to be in-

(1) Thib. 122, 125. Big. ii. 211.

These observations apply to France as a nation. The splendid discoveries and vast talent displayed in mathematics and the exact sciences by the Institute, throughout all the Revolution, can never be too highly eulogized, and will be fully enlarged upon, in treating of the French literature during its progress.

(2) Thib. 134, 135. Big. ii. 212.

It was a fundamental rule of these establishments to admit no young man whose family was not attached to the principles of the Revolution. "We must never," said Napoleon, "admit into these schools any young man whose parents have

combated against the Republic. There could be no concord between officers of such principles and the soldiers of the army. I have never appointed even a sub-lieutenant, to my knowledge, unless he was either drawn from the ranks, or was the son of a man attached to the Revolution. The lion of the Revolution sleeps; but if these gentlemen were to waken him, they would soon be compelled to fly with their best speed." How much attached soever to his favourite system of fusing together the opposite parties in the Revolution, Napoleon had no notion of extending it to the armed force of the state. —THIEBAUDEAU, 130, 131.

(3) Thib. 134, 141. Norv. ii. 189, 190.

terested in the misfortunes of the exiled prince; but the warm and enthusiastic applauses which ensued as the piece advanced, convinced him that it could not be permitted without risk. It was interdicted, and the author counselled to improve his health by travelling; he retired to Russia, and remained there for a year (1).

A general system was now set on foot for the maintenance of the requisite forces by sea and land, and the instruction of the young officers in the rudiments of the military art. A levy of 120,000 men was ordered; one-half of which was destined to replace the discharged veterans, and the other to form an army of reserve (2). At the same time, a project was discussed for the formation of a fixed body of seamen, divided into regiments, and

Measures
for recruit-
ing the
army and
navy.

allotted to each vessel in the navy. Truguet observed, "If you have only commerce you will never want sailors, and they will cost nothing; it is only when a nation has no trade that it is necessary to levy sailors; much longer time is required to form a sailor than a soldier; the latter may be trained to all his duties in six months."

Debates on
that subject
in the
Council of
State.

Napoléon replied, "There never was a greater mistake; nothing can be more dangerous than to propagate such opinions; if acted upon, they would speedily lead to the dissolution of our army.

At Jemappes, there were fifty thousand French against nine thousand Austrians; during the first four years of the war all the hostile operations were conducted in the most ridiculous manner. It was neither the volunteers nor the recruits who saved the Republic; it was the 180,000 old troops of the monarchy, and the discharged veterans whom the Revolution impelled to the frontiers. Part of the recruits deserted, part died; a small proportion only remained, who, in process of time, form good soldiers. Why have the Romans done such great things? Because six years' instruction were with them required to make a soldier. A legion composed of three thousand such men was worth thirty thousand ordinary troops. With fifteen thousand men such as the guards, I would any where beat forty thousand. You will not soon find me engaging in war with an army of recruits.

"In this great project we must not be startled by expense. No inland boatmen will ever voluntarily go to the sea-ports. We must make it a matter of necessity. The conscription for the marine should commence at ten or twelve years of age; the men should amount to twelve thousand, and serve all their lives. We are told there is no such naval conscription in England; but the example is not parallel. England has an immense extent of coasts which furnish her with abundance of seamen. We have a comparatively small coast, and but few seamen. Nature has been niggardly to us in this particular; we must supply its defects by artificial means." In Oct. 4, 1802. pursuance of these principles an *arrêt* appeared upon the 4th October, which laid the foundations of the conscription for the naval service of France (5).

About the same time a project was brought before the Council for the

(1) Thib. 147, 148. Bour. v. 257.

(2) Thib. 107, 109.

Discussion (3) The establishment of the Ecole on the Ecole Militaire at the same time underwent Militaire. a discussion at the Council of state. Napoléon observed—"This institution diminishes the severity of the conscription. It enables the young man to complete his education, which the conscription would otherwise prevent, at the same time that he is learning the rudiments of the military art. I know of no other school equally well

constituted; it will raise the organization of our army to the very highest point. The army under the Republic was for long supported by the youths who in 1793 issued from this establishment. All the commanders of corps feel the want of skilled young men; I can appoint them, but if they are ignorant of the duties of the private soldier, it is felt as an injustice by the common men. The Ecole Militaire furnishes scholars instructed in both departments, and therefore its great excellence."

establishment of Chambers of agriculture in the colonies. They were decreed; but the war which soon afterwards broke out, prevented the plan being carried into execution. The principles, however, advanced by Napoléon in support of the proposal, are admirable for their wisdom and sagacity.

Nov. 9, 1802.
Speech of
Napoléon
on the go-
vernment
of the colo-
nies.

"Doubtless," said he, "you must govern the colonies by force; but there can be no force without justice. Government must be informed as to the real situation of the colonies, and for this purpose, it must patiently hear the parties interested; for it is not sufficient to acquire the character of justice, that the ruling power does what is right. It is also necessary that the most distant subjects of the empire should be convinced that this is the case, and this they will never be, unless they are sensible that they have been fully heard. Were the Council of State composed of angels or gods, who could perceive at a glance every thing that should be done, it would not be sufficient unless the colonists had the conviction that they had been fully and impartially heard. All power must be founded on opinion; it is in order to form it that an institution similar to that proposed is indispensable. At present there is no constitutional channel of communication between France and the colonies; the most absurd reports are in circulation there as to the intentions of the central government, and it is as little informed as to the real wants and necessities of its distant possessions. If Government had, on the other hand, a colonial representation to refer to, it would become acquainted with the truth, it would proclaim it, and transmit it in dispatches to its colonial subjects.

"Commerce and the colonies have opposite interests; the first is that of purchasers and consumers, the latter that of raisers and producers. No sooner is it proposed to impose duties on colonial produce than I am besieged with memorials from all the chambers of commerce in France, but no one advances any thing in behalf of the colonies; the law, whatever it is, arrives there in unmitigated rigour, without the principles which led to it being explained, or their receiving any assurance that their interests have been balanced with those of the other side. But the colonists are Frenchmen, and our brothers; they bear a part of the public burdens, and the least that can be done for them in return is to give them such a shadow of a representation.

"Many persons here see only in the colonies the partisans of the English; that is held out merely as a pretext for subjecting them to every species of insult. Had I been at Martinique, I should have espoused the cause of the English; for the first of social duties is the preservation of life. Had any of your philanthropic liberals come out to Egypt to proclaim liberty to the blacks or the Arabs, I would have hung him from the masthead. In the West Indies similar enthusiasts have delivered over the whites to the ferocity of the blacks, and yet they complain of the victims of such madness being discontented. How is it possible to give liberty to the Africans when they are destitute of any species of civilisation, and are ignorant even of what a colony or a mother country is. Do you suppose that had the majority of the Constituent Assembly been aware what they were doing, they would have given liberty to the blacks? Certainly not; but few persons at that time were sufficiently far-sighted to foresee the result, and feelings of humanity are ever powerful with excited imaginations. But now, after the experience we have had, to maintain the same principles cannot be done in good faith; it can be the result only of overweening self-confidence or hypocrisy (1)."

(1) Thib, 117, 121.

Words of true political wisdom, which demonstrate how admirably qualified Napoléon was to have held, with just and even hands, the reins of power in a vast and varied empire, and which have since become of still greater value from the contrast they afford to the measures subsequently pursued by another state, in regard to far greater colonial dependencies, and with the lamentable result of former rashness even more forcibly brought before its eyes (1).

France, both under the monarchy and during the course of the Revolution, like every other country which has fallen under despotic power, had become burdened with an enormous and oppressive land-tax. The clear produce of the direct contributions in the year 1802 was 273,600,000 francs, or L.11,000,000 sterling, which, on the net amount of agricultural labour in the Republic, was about twenty per cent (2). This immense burden was levied according to a scale, or "cadastre," at which it was estimated the land was worth; and as the smiles of government favour were bestowed on the official persons employed in making the surveys in a great degree in proportion to the amount to which they contrived to bring up the revenue of their districts, the oppression exercised in many parts of the country was extreme, and the less likely to be remedied, that it fell on a numerous body of detached little proprietors, incapable of any effective or simultaneous effort to obtain redress. The "cadastre," or scale of valuation, had been of very old standing in France, as it regulated the *taille* and *vingtièmes*, which constituted so large a portion of the revenue of the monarchy (3). By a decree of the National Assembly of 16th September 1791, sanctioned by the King on the 25d September in the same year, the method prescribed for fixing the valuation was as follows:—"When the levy of the land-tax in the territory of any community shall commence, the surveyor charged with the operations shall make out a scheme in a mass which shall exhibit the general result of the valuation, and its division in sections. He shall then make out detailed plans which shall constitute the parcelled valua-

(1) It is observed by Mr. Ilume, that the remote provinces and colonial dependencies of a despotic empire, are always better administered than those of a popular government, and that the reason is, that an uncontrolled monarch being equally elevated above all his subjects, and not more dependent on one class than another, views them all, comparatively speaking, with equal eyes; whereas a free state is ruled by one body of citizens who have obtained the mastery of an other, and govern exclusively the more distant settlements of the empire, and are consequently actuated by personal jealousy or patrimonial interests, in their endeavours to prevent them from obtaining the advantage of uniform and equal legislation. The admirable

wisdom of the principles of colonial government thus developed by Napoléon, compared with the unjust and partial principles of administration which have so long been adopted by Great Britain towards her West Indian settlements, afford a striking illustration of the justice of this remark. England will ultimately lose her splendid colonial empire, from the same cause which proved fatal to that of Athens, Carthage, and Venice; viz, the selfish system of legislation, exclusively adapted to the interest, or directed by the prejudices of the holders of political power in the centre of the state, and the general neglect of the wishes of its remote and unrepresented colonial dependencies.

	Francs.	
produce of France in 1805 at,	2,750,000,000	or L.110,000,000
Statistical de- Net produce, deducting cost of production,	1,200,000,000	or 48,000,000
tails. Direct Taxes falling on land,	250,000,000	or 10,000,000
Indirect Taxes,	350,000,000	or 14,000,000
Drawn by the owners of the soil,	600,000,000	or 24,000,000

So that of the net produce of the soil one-half was absorbed in taxation and no less than 20 per cent taken from the proprietors in a *direct form*; a signal proof how little the French peasantry had gained, in alleviation of burdens at least, by the result of the Revolution.—See PEUCHET, *Stat. de la France*, 286, 287.

The committee of the Constituent Assembly, who reported in 1790 on this subject, estimated the net territorial revenue of France at 1,500 millions, or L 60,000,000. M. Ganihl, after various laborious calculations, estimates it in 1816, at 1,300,000,000,

or L.52,000,000; while the Duke de Gaeta, in 1817, fixed it at 1,323,000,000, or L.53,000,000.—See DUC DE GAETA, ii. 299.

(3) The Constituent Assembly in 1790 estimated the territorial revenue at 1,500,000,000 francs, or L.60,000,000 annually, but took the cadastre, or valuation at 1,200,000,000 francs, or L.48,000,000, and fixed the land-tax at 240,000,000 francs, or L.9,200,000, and, with the expenses of collection, 300,000,000 francs, or L.12,000,000, being a fourth of the income of every landed proprietor" [Duc de Gaeta, ii. 288. Peuchet, *Stat. de France*, 524.]

tions of the community." These directions were justly and impartially conceived; but the difficulty of forming just and equal valuations in a country so immensely subdivided, and of such vast extent as France, was extreme; and, during the license and tyranny of the Revolution, the most flagrant inequality prevailed in the land-tax paid in different parts of the country. We have the authority of Napoléon's finance minister in 1802 for the assertion, that in every district of France, "there were some proprietors who were paying the fourth, the third, and even the half, of their clear revenue, while others were only rated at a tenth, a twentieth, a fiftieth, or an hundredth (1)." The gross injustice of such a system naturally produced the most vehement complaints, when the restoration of a regular government afforded any prospect of obtaining redress. The consular government, during the whole of 1802, was besieged with memorials from all quarters, setting forth the intolerable injustice which prevailed in the distribution of the land-tax, the utter inefficacy of all attempts which had been made in preceding years to obtain from the councils or prefects of the departments any thing like equality in the valuation, and the complete disregard which both the Convention and Directory had evinced towards the loud and well-founded complaints of the country (2).

The matter at length became so pressing, that it was brought before the Council of State.—The magnitude of the evil did not escape the penetration of the first consul (3). The formation of a valuation was decreed, proceeding on a different principle. This was to adopt as the basis of the scale, a valuation, laid, not on parcels of ground, but on masses of the same kind of cultivation. This system, however, although in appearance the most equitable, was found by experience to be attended with so many difficulties, that its execution did not proceed over above a fifth of the territory of the Republic, and it was at length abandoned from the universal complaints of its injustice. The discussion of the "cadastre" was again brought forward, and made the subject of anxious consideration in 1817, but the inequality of the valuation still continued, and is the subject of loud and well-founded complaints at this hour. In truth, such are the obstacles thrown in the way of an equal valuation by individual interests, and such the difficulties with which the execution of such a task is attended, from the variation in the amount of the produce of the soil, and the prices which can be got for it at different times

(1) Duc de Gaeta, ii. 261.

(2) Duc de Gaeta, ii. 257.

(3) "Your system of land-tax," said he, in the Council of State, "is the worst in Europe. The result of it is, that there is no such thing as property or civil liberty in the country; for what is freedom without security of property? There can be no security in a country where the valuation on which the tax proceeds can be changed at the will of the surveyors every year. A man who has 3,000 francs of rent a-year (L.120) cannot calculate upon having enough next year to exist; every thing may be swept away by the direct tax. We see every day questions about fifty or a hundred francs gravely pleaded before the legal tribunals, and a mere surveyor can, by a simple stroke of the pen, surcharge you several thousand francs. Under such a system there cannot be said to be any property in the country. When I purchase a domain, I know neither what I have got, nor what I should do in regard to it. In Lombardy and Piedmont there is a fixed valuation; every one knows what he is to pay; no extraordinary contributions are levied but on extraordinary occasions, and by the judgment of a solemn tribunal. If the contribution is augmented,

every one, by applying it to his valuation, knows at once what he has to pay. In such a country, therefore, property may truly be said to exist. Why is it that we have never had any public spirit in France? Simply because every proprietor is obliged to pay his court to the tax-gatherers and surveyors of his district; if he incurs their displeasure he is ruined. It is in vain to talk of appealing; the judgments of the courts of review are arbitrary. It is for the same reason that there is no nation so servilely submissive to the government as France, because property depends entirely upon it. In Lombardy, on the other hand, a proprietor lives on his estate without feeling any disquietude as to who succeeds to the government. Nothing has ever been done in France to give security to property. The man who shall devise an equal law on the subject of the cadastre will deserve a statue of gold." [Bign. i. 221. Thib. 179.] What an instructive testimony as to the amount of security which the Revolution had conferred upon property in France, and the degree of practical freedom which had been enjoyed, or public spirit developed, under its multifarious democratic administrations!

and seasons, that it is not going too far to pronounce it to be impossible. Inequality, severity, and oppression are the invariable and inevitable attendants of direct taxation wherever established, and even under the very best system of local administration. The only taxes which are, comparatively speaking, equal, just, and unfelt, are indirect burdens, which, being laid on consumption, are voluntarily incurred, disguised under the price of the article, and accurately proportioned to the amount of expenditure of each individual (1).

But in the midst of these great designs of Napoléon for the reconstruction of society in France, he experienced the greatest annoyance from the independent, and sometimes cutting language used by the popular orators in discussing the projects sent from the Council of State to the Tribunal. Though friendly to a free and unreserved discussion of every subject in the first of these bodies, which sat with closed doors, the first consul was irritated to the last degree by the opposition which his measures experienced in the only part of the legislature which retained a shadow even of popular constitution, and openly expressed his resolution to get quit of an institution which reminded the people of the dangerous powers which they had exercised during the anarchy of the Revolution. He loved unfettered arguments in presence only of men competent to judge of the subject, but could not endure the public harangues of the tribune, intended to catch the ears, or excite the passions of an ignorant populace (2). On various occasions, during the course of 1802, his displeasure was strongly excited by the ebullitions of republican spirit or spleen which occasionally took place in the Tribunal. An expression in the treaty with Russia roused the indignation of the veteran democrats of the Revolution. It was provided that "the two contracting parties should not permit their respective subjects to entertain any correspondence with foreign powers." When the treaty came to be discussed at the Tribunal, this expression gave rise to an angry discussion. Thibaut exclaimed, "The French are citizens, and not subjects." Chenier observed, "Our armies have combated ten years that we should remain citizens, and we have now become subjects. Thus are accomplished the wishes of the two coalitions." Napoléon was highly displeased with these symptoms of a refractory spirit. "What," said he, "would these declaimers be at? It was absolutely necessary that my government should treat on a footing of equality with that of Russia. I would have become contemptible in the eyes of all foreign nations if I had yielded to these absurd pretensions on the part of the Tribunal. These gentlemen annoy me to such a degree that I am strongly tempted to be done at once with them (3)."

Important change in municipal government carried in spite of that body.

Another law was brought forward about the same time, which excited a still more vehement opposition on the part of the public orators. It related to certain changes in the constitution of the judges intrusted with the arrest of individuals and the municipal police. These powers were, by the existing law, invested in the hands of the *juges de paix*, who were still appointed by the people; the proposed change took this branch of jurisdiction from these functionaries, and vested it in a small number of judges appointed for that special purpose by the government, who were to take cognizance of the crimes of robbery,

(1) Gaeta, ii. 253.

(2) Bour. v. 85. Thib. 198.

He often said to the leading orators of the Tribunal,—"Instead of declaiming from the tribune, why do you not come to discuss the points

under deliberation with me in my cabinet. We should have family discussions as in my Council of State."—THIBAUDEAU, 198.

(3) Bour. i. 85, 87. Thib. 193, 207.

housebreaking, and some others, without a jury. The importance of this change, which so nearly concerned the personal liberty of every individual, was at once seen, and the public indignation, in an especial manner, roused by a clause which subjected every citizen to arrest by the simple authority of the minister of police, and took away all personal responsibility on the part of the members of administration, on account of any acts infringing on the liberty of the subject which they may have committed. The storm was so violent, and the complaints on this point especially, so well founded, that government was obliged to withdraw the obnoxious article; but the necessity of the case, and the universal knowledge which prevailed of the total insecurity to life and property, from the height to which outrage and violence still existed in the interior, prevailed over the opposition, and the law passed Dec. 17, 1802. after a strenuous resistance. Napoléon's displeasure was so great, that he could not conceal it, even in an audience to which the Senate was admitted on this subject. Speaking of the Tribune, he said with the utmost energy. "There are assembled within its walls a dozen or fifteen metaphysicians; they are fit only to be thrown into the Seine. They are a kind of vermin, who have overrun my dress. But don't let them imagine I will suffer myself to be attacked like Louis XVI; I will never allow matters to come to that (1)."

Debates on
the Tribu-
nate in the
Council of
State.

His opinions on this subject were emphatically expressed, and the grounds of them powerfully urged in the Council of State, when the project for the renewal of the constitution was brought forward.

"We must make a change," said he, "the example of England must not mislead us; the men who compose its opposition are neither emigrants who regret the feudal *régime*, nor democrats who seek to revive the Reign of Terror. They feel the natural weight of talent, and are chiefly desirous to be bought at a sufficient price by the crown. With us the case is very different; our opposition is composed of the remnant of the privileged classes, and of the outrageous Jacobins. They by no means limit their ambition to an accession to place or office; the one half would be satisfied with nothing but a return to the ancient *régime*; the other the reign of democratic clubs. No two things are more opposite than the effects of free discussion among a people long habituated to its excitement, and in a country where freedom has only commenced. Once admitted into the Tribune, the most honourable men aim only at success, without caring how violently they shake the fabric of society? What is Government? Nothing, if deprived of the weight of opinion. How is it possible to counterbalance the influence of a Tribune always open for the most inflammatory speeches? When once the patrician classes are destroyed, the freedom of the tribune must of necessity be suppressed. The circumstances were widely different at Rome; yet, even there, the tribunes of the people did infinite mischief. The constituent assembly placed the king in a secondary position; they were right, for he was the representative of the feudal *régime*, and was supported by all the weight of the nobles and the clergy. At present the government is the representative of the people. These observations may appear foreign to the subject in hand, but in reality they are not so; they contain the principles on which I am persuaded government must now be conducted, and I willingly throw them out in order that they may be more largely disseminated by the intelligent circle which I see around me."

In conformity with these principles, the first consul brought forward his

plan, which was to divide the Tribunal into five sections, corresponding to the divisions of the Council of State; that the proposed laws should be *secretly* transmitted from the section of the Council of State to the corresponding section of the Tribunal; that they should be *secretly* discussed in the Tribunal, and between the Tribunal and the Council of State by three orators appointed on both sides; and no public discussion take place except by three orators, mutually in like manner chosen, between the Tribunal and the Government pleaders before the legislature. It was strongly objected to this change, that it tended to destroy the publicity of proceedings in the only quarter where it still existed, and eradicated the last remnants of a free constitution. Napoléon replied: "I cannot see that. Even if it were so, a constitution must be moulded by circumstances, modified according to the results of experience, and ultimately constructed in such a way as not to impede the necessary action of Government. My project secures a calm and rational discussion of the laws, and upholds the consideration of the Tribunal. What does the Tribunal mean? nothing but the tribune, that is, the power of rational discussion. The Government has need of such an addition to its means of information: but what is the use of an hundred men to discuss the laws introduced by thirty? They declaim, but do nothing of real utility. We must at length organize the constitution in such a manner as to allow the Government to advance. No one seems yet sufficiently impressed with the necessity of giving unity to the executive; until that is effected, nothing can be done. An universal disquietude prevails; speculation, exertion of every kind is arrested. In a great nation the immense majority of mankind ever are incapable of forming a rational opinion on public affairs. Every one must contemplate, at some period or another, the death of the first consul; in that case, without a cordial union of the constituted authorities, all would be lost (1)."

The opposition, however, was very powerful against these great alterations; and Napoléon, whose prudence in carrying through political changes was equal to his sagacity in conceiving them, contented himself, at the annual renewal of the constitution, with an *arrêt* of the Senate, that thenceforward the duties of the Tribunal and the Legislative Body should be exercised only by the citizens who were inscribed on the two lists as the first elected to continue the exercise of the national functions. The great change of the constitution involved in the mutilation of the Tribunal, was reserved for the period when Napoléon was to be elected first consul for life; an event which soon afterwards took place (2).

He resolves to make himself consul for life. Influenced not merely by ambition, but a profound and philosophic view of the existing state of France, Napoléon had firmly resolved to convert the republic into a monarchy, and not only seat himself on the throne, but render the dynasty hereditary in his family, or those whom he might designate as his successors. Nothing could be more apparent to an impartial spectator of the state of France, and the adjoining nations, than that it was utterly impossible that republican institutions could exist in a country so situated. Destitute of any of the elevated or ennobled classes which alone in a great and powerful community can give stability to such institutions; exposed to all the sources of discord and corruption arising from a powerful military force, selfish and highly civilised manners, and the influence of a vast revenue; placed in the midst of the great military monarchies of Europe, who were necessarily hostile to such institutions, from

(1) Thib. 229, 231.

(2) Ibid. 232.

the experience they had had of the evils with which they were attended to all the adjoining states, France could not by possibility avoid falling under the government of a single individual. Napoléon had no alternative but to restore the Bourbons, or seat himself on the throne (1).

Incessant efforts of Government to spread monarchical ideas.

During the whole of 1802, the efforts of Government were incessant to extend monarchical ideas by means of the press, and the private influence of all persons in official situations. Lucien Bonaparte has been already noticed as one of the earliest and most zealous propagators of these new opinions a year before; but as they came forth at too early a period, and somewhat startled the public, he was rewarded for his services by an honourable exile as ambassador at Madrid. But in the succeeding season, the change of the public mind had become so evident, that it was no longer necessary to veil the real designs of Government; and the appointment of Napoléon to the consulship for life was accordingly zealously advocated by all persons in prominent situations. Roederer supported it with all the weight of his acute metaphysics; Talleyrand gained for it the suffrages of the whole diplomatic body. Arbitrary power advanced with rapid steps in the midst of general declamations in favour of order and stability; whoever spoke of liberty or equality was forthwith set down as a Jacobin, a Terrorist, and looked on with suspicious eyes by all the servants of Government. The partisans of revolution, finding themselves reduced to a miserable minority, retired into the obscurity of private life, or consoled themselves for the ruin of their republican chimeras, by the personal advantages which they derived from situations round the consular throne (2).

The attempt at first fails in the Senate.

The project for appointing Napoléon consul for life had failed a few months before, when the prorogation of that appointment for ten years took place. Napoléon affected at that period to decline such an elevation; the two other consuls, acquainted with his real desires, insisted that it should be forced upon him; and it was so carried in the Council of State by a majority of ten to seven. Lanfrede, who brought up the report of the committee of the Senate on the subject, and was not in the secret, proposed only a temporary prorogation; Despinasse moved that it should be for life. But Tronchet, who was president, and whose intrepidity nothing could overcome, held firm for the first proposal, and it was carried by a majority of sixty to one, Languinais alone voting in the minority. Tronchet was neither a republican nor a courtier; he preferred a monarchy, but notwithstanding his admiration for Napoléon, he feared his ambition. He said of Napoléon, in a company where several senators were assembled:—"He is a young man; he has begun like Cæsar, and will end like him; I hear him say too frequently,

(1) Big. ii. 231. Thib. 236.

(2) Big. ii. 231, 232. Thib. 236.

Strong opposition of Josephine to these attempts.

It is remarkable, that while all around the first consul beheld with undisguised satisfaction his approaching elevation to the throne, the individual in existence who, next to himself, was to gain most by the change, was de-voured with anxiety on the subject. All the splendour of the throne could not dazzle the good sense of Joséphine, or prevent her from anticipating in the establishment of the Napoléon dynasty, evident risk to her husband, and certain downfall to herself. "The real enemies of Bonaparte," said she to Roederer, who was advocating the change, "are those who put into his head ideas of hereditary succession, dynasty, divorce, and marriage." She employed all the personal influence which she possessed with the first consul and his most intimate

counsellors to divert him from these ideas, but in vain. "I do not approve the projects of Napoléon," said she; "I have often told him so; he hears me with attention, but I can plainly see that I make no impression. The flatterers who surround him soon obliterate all I have said. The new honours which he will acquire will augment the number of his enemies; the generals will exclaim that they have not fought so long to substitute the family of the Bonapartes for that of the Bourbons. I no longer regret the want of children; I should tremble for their fate. I will remain attached to the destiny of Bonaparte, how dangerous soever it may be, as long as he continues to me the regard which he has hitherto manifested; but the moment that he changes I will retire from the Tuileries. I know well how much he is urged to separate from me." See BOURRIENNE, v. 44, 47; THIBAUDEAU, 237, 242.

that he will mount on horseback and draw his sword (1)." What a glorious distinction for the same individual to have with equal courage pleaded the cause of Louis XVI. in the Temple, and restrained the career of Napoléon on the throne; and how noble a contrast to the baseness of so many of the popular faction, who then showed as great vehemence in the persecution of a falling, as they now displayed servility in the adulation of a rising monarch (2).

The design of making Napoléon consul for life, having thus failed in the Senate, probably from mis-apprehension of what he really desired, the method of attaining the object was changed. He began, as he usually did in such cases, to blame severely those who had been most prominent in urging forward the plan, and in an especial manner animadverted on Roederer, whose efforts to procure his elevation had been peculiarly conspicuous. But in the midst of his seeming displeasure at the proposal which had been made, the most efficacious means were taken to secure its adoption. In reply to the address of the Senate, which prorogated his power for ten years beyond the

Measures
adopted to
ensure its
success.

term originally assigned, he observed—"The suffrages of the people have invested me with the supreme authority; I should not deem myself sufficiently secured in the new proof which you have given

me of your esteem, if it were not sanctioned by the same authority." Under cover of this regard for popular sovereignty, the partisans of Napoléon veiled a design of conferring on him hereditary power. It was proposed in the Council of State, that the people should be consulted on the question whether the consulship for *life* should be conferred upon him. Roederer said—"A prorogation of the consulship for ten years gives no stability to Government. The interests of credit and of commerce loudly demand a stronger measure. The Senate has limited its appointment to ten years, because it conceived it did not possess power to confer authority for a longer period; but we should submit to the people the question, whether the first consul should be nominated for life, and invested with the right to appoint his successor (3). So clearly was the design seen through, that the proposal was carried without a division, though some of the popular members abstained from voting. In conformity with this resolution of the Council of State, and without any authority from the other branches of the Legislature, the question was forthwith submitted to the people,—“Shall Napoléon Bonaparte be consul for

The ques-
tion is di-
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life?" Registers were directed to be opened in every commune, to receive the votes of the citizens. Napoléon declined the addition of the question, whether he should be invested with the right to nomi-

minate his successor, deeming the inconsistency too glaring between a refusal to accept a prorogation for ten years from the Senate, if not confirmed by the people, and the demand of a right to nominate a successor to the throne of France (4).

Aug. 2,
1802.

The result of this appeal was announced by the *Senatus Consultum* of August 2. It appeared that 5,557,885 citizens had voted, of whom 3,568,259 were for the affirmative. This is one of the most remarkable events recorded in the history of the Revolution, and singu-

(1) Thib. 245. Bour. v. 17, 18.

(2) So far did the spirit of servility proceed among the courtiers of the Tuileries, that they seriously proposed to Napoléon to restore the ancient titles of honour, as being more in harmony than republican forms with the power with which he was now invested. But Napoléon had too much sense to disclose at once the whole of his designs. "The pear," said he to Bourrienne, "is not yet ripe. All that will come in good time; but it is essentially re-

quisite that I myself, in the first instance, assume a title, from which those which I bestow on others may naturally flow. The most difficult part is now over; no one can be deceived; every body sees there is but a step which separates the consulship from the throne. Some precautions are still requisite; there are many fools in the Tribune, but let me alone, I will overcome them."—BOURRIENNE, v. 17.

(3) Bour. v. 17. Thib. 34. Bign. ii. 233.

(4) Thib. 250, 253, 265. Bour. v. 17.

Result of
the appeal,
and great
satisfaction
which it gave.

larly descriptive of that longing after repose, that invincible desire for tranquillity which uniformly succeeds to revolutionary convulsions, and so generally renders them the prelude to despotic power. The rapid rise of the public funds demonstrated that this feeling was general among the holders of property in France. They advanced with every addition made to the authority of the successful general; as low as eight before the 18th Brumaire, they rose at once to sixteen when he seized the helm, and after the consulship for life was proclaimed, reached fifty-two. Contrast this with the rise of the public securities, thirty *per cent*, on the day on which Necker was restored to the ministry on the shoulders of the people (1), to carry through the convocation of the States-General, and observe the difference between the anticipation and the experience of a revolution (2).

Answer of
the first
consul to
the address
of the Sen-
ate on the
occasion.

The answer of the first consul to the address of the Senate on this important occasion is valuable, as illustrating the great views which he already entertained of his mission, to extinguish the discord which had preceded him, and restore the reign of order upon earth. "The life of a citizen," said he, "belongs to his country; the French people have expressed their wish that mine should be solely devoted to it; I obey their will. In bestowing upon me a new, a permanent pledge of their confidence, the nation has imposed upon me the duty of moulding the system of its laws, so as to bring it into harmony with durable institutions. By my exertions, aided with your assistance, citizen-senators, by the concurrent voice of all the authorities, by the trust and the will of the whole people, the liberty, the prosperity, the equality of France will be established beyond the reach of chance. The most distinguished of people will be the most fortunate, and their prosperity will secure that of all Europe. Content to have been called by the will of Him, from whom every thing emanates, to bring back the reign of justice, order, and equality upon the earth, I will hear the voice which summons me hence without regret, and without disquietude on the opinion of future generations (5)."

Napoleon's
ideas on the
limits of eli-
gibility.

Important changes in the constitution followed this alteration in the character of the executive authority; they were preceded by memorable discussions on the principles of government in the Council of State (4).

(1) Bour. v. 55. Novr. ii. 129. Thib. ii. 81.

(2) In the midst of the general unanimity, M. Lafayette had the courage declining to vote against the appointment of the first consul for life. He added to his vote these words: "I cannot vote for such a magistracy, until public freedom is sufficiently guaranteed; when that is done I give my voice to Napoleon Bonaparte." In a letter, addressed to the first consul, he fully expressed the grounds of his jealousy:—"When a man," said he, "penetrated with the gratitude which he owes you, and too much enamoured with glory, not to admire that which encircles your name, has given only a conditional vote, it is the less suspected that no one will rejoice more than himself to see you the first magistrate for life, in a free republic. It is impossible that you, general, the first in that class of men who occasionally arise at the interval of ages, should wish that such a revolution, illustrated by so many victories, stained by so many crimes, should terminate only in the establishment of arbitrary power: patriotic and personal motives would lead me to desire for you that ennoblement to your glory which the consulship for life would afford; but the principles, the engagements, the actions of my life forbid me to wish for any such appointment if not founded on a basis worthy of you." In a private conversation with the first consul, he added:—"A

free government, and you at its head; that encompasses all my desires." The veteran republican did not perceive, what indeed none of the enthusiasts of his age were aware of, that the establishment of the freedom to which he so warmly attached had been rendered impossible by the crimes of the Revolution in which he had borne so conspicuous a part. He was taught the same truth in a still more striking manner thirty years afterwards by the result of the Revolution which overturned the restoration; but it is seldom that political fanatics, how sincere or respectable sinner, are taught even by the most important lessons of contemporaneous history. [Big. ii. 235, 236.]

Napoleon said on this occasion:—"In theory Lafayette is perhaps right; but what is theory? a mere dream when applied to the masses of mankind. He thinks he is still in the United States, as if the French were Americans. He has no conception of what is required for this country. The Catholic religion has still its root here; I have need of the Pope. He will do all I desire." From that period all communication between the general and the first consul ceased. Napoleon tried repeatedly afterwards to regain him to his government, but in vain. [Bour. v. 61, 62.]

(3) Thib. 287. Novr. ii. 193.

(4) Napoleon did not attempt to disguise his contempt for the venal revolutionists who now fawned

Aug. 4, 1802. On the views taken by Napoléon the new constitution was framed, which was proclaimed on the 4th August. The chief changes were, that the Tribune was reduced from one hundred to fifty members; a diminution of importance, which was regarded at the time, as it really was, as a prelude merely to its total extinction, and which so completely deprived that remnant of freedom of consideration, as to render it from thenceforward, no obstacle whatever to the despotic tendency of the government. The legislative body was reduced to 258 members, and divided into five divisions, each of which was annually renewed; the electors also retained their functions for life. The Senate was invested with the power to dissolve the Legislative Body and the Tribune, declare particular departments *hors de la constitution*, and modify the fundamental institutions of the Republic. The first consul received the right to nominate his successor, and pardon offences. In return for so many concessions to the executive, a shadow of privilege was conferred on the electors; the electoral colleges were allowed each to present two citizens for the functions of the municipality department and nation. In all but name, the consulship was already a despotic monarchy (1). So evident did this soon become, that even the panegyrists of Napoléon have not scrupled to assert that the consular and imperial institutions were "fraudulent constitutions, systematically intended by servile hands to introduce despotic power." Subsequent experience has warranted the belief that how arbitrary soever, they were the only institutions under which France could enjoy any degree of tranquillity, and that

on the sceptre of the consulate. "How contemptible are these men," said he; "all your virtuous Republicans are at my service, if I will condescend to put gilt lace on their coats."—BOUARRIERNE, v. 10. 11. "All the powers of the state," said Napoléon, "are in the air; they have nothing to rest upon. We must establish relations between them and the people, a particular in which the constitution was essentially defective. The lists of those eligible to particular offices, have by no means answered the desired end. If they were for life, they would establish the most fearful aristocracy that ever existed; if temporary, they would keep the nation in a continual ferment for an imaginary advantage. What flatters and captivates the people in democratic institutions is the real and practical exercise of their powers; but in the existing system the people who discover only 5000 persons eligible to the higher offices of state, cannot flatter themselves that they possess such a share in the elections as to have any influence on the administration. To ensure the stability of government, the people must have a larger share in the elections, and feel themselves really represented.

"The electoral colleges attach the people to the government, and *vice versa*. They are a link, and a most important one, between the authorities and the nation. In that link it is indispensable to combine the class of proprietors with the most distinguished of those who have not that advantage; the former, because property must be the basis of every rational system of representation; the latter, because the career of ambition must not be closed in obscure or indigent genius.

"We are told to look at the English constitution for a model; I am of opinion that it is inapplicable to this country, situated as it now is; and my reasons for that opinion are these:—England embraces in the bosom of society a body of nobles who hold the greatest part of the property of the nation, and are illustrated by ancient descent. In France that body is totally wanting; it cannot be created; if you compose it of the men of the Revolution, it could

only be brought about by a concentration in their hands of the whole property of the nation, which is impossible; if of the ancient noblesse, a counter-revolution would immediately ensue. Besides this, the character of the two people is different; the Englishman is brutal, the Frenchman is vain, polite, inconsiderate. Look at the elections; you will see the English swilling for forty days at the expense of the nobles; never would the French peasantry disgrace themselves by similar excesses. Their passion is for equality. For these reasons I am clearly of opinion that the English constitution is inapplicable to France.

"The constitution may be aptly compared to a vessel; if you abandon it to the winds with all its sails set, no one can tell where it may be drifted. Where are now the men of the Revolution? the moment they were expelled from office, they sunk into oblivion. This will happen in all cases if precautions are not taken to prevent it; it was with that design that I instituted the Legion of Honour; among all people, in every republic that ever existed, classes are to be found. At present nothing has a lasting reputation but military achievement; civil services are less striking, more open to differences of opinion. Hereditary succession to the first consul is absurd; not in itself, for it is the best guarantee for the stability of the state, but because it is incompatible with the present state of France. It long existed in the ancient monarchy; but with institutions which rendered it feasible, which exist no longer, and cannot be restored. Hereditary succession is founded on the idea of civil right; it presupposes property; it is intended to ensure its transmission from the dead to the living. But how is it possible to reconcile hereditary succession in the chief magistrate with the principle of the sovereignty of the people? When the crown was hereditary, the chief situations in the kingdom were hereditary also; the fiction on which it was founded was but a branch of the general law. At present there is no longer any of that. [Thib. 295, 299]

(1) Nov. ii. 193. Bonr. v. 56. Bign. ii. 242, 246. Thib. 289, 297.

if they were calculated to extinguish freedom, it was because the sins of the Revolution had rendered her people neither worthy of receiving, nor capable of enjoying that first of blessings.

Aug. 8, 1802. A few days after the constitution was published, the first consul presided at the Senate, and received the congratulations of the constituted authorities, the public bodies, and the foreign ambassadors, on his appointment for life. This was remarkable as the first occasion on which he openly displayed the pomp and magnificence of regal power. The soldiers formed a double line from the Tuileries to the Luxembourg; the first consul was seated in a magnificent chariot, drawn by eight horses; the two other consuls followed in carriages drawn by six. A splendid *cortège* of generals, ambassadors, and public functionaries followed, whose gorgeous appearance captivated the Parisian multitude, more passionately devoted than any in Europe to spectacles of that description. Enthusiastic applause from the inconstant populace rent the heavens; they did not manifest greater rapture when the Constituent Assembly began the work of demolishing the monarchy, than they now did when the first consul restored it (1).

The aspect of Paris at this period was sufficient to have captivated a nation gifted with a less volatile imagination than the French, the more especially coming as it did after the sad and melancholy scenes of the Revolution. The taste for luxury and pleasure had spread rapidly in a capital where they had all the charms of novelty; while the people, captivated with the return of enjoyments, to which they had long been strangers, drank deep and thankfully of the intoxicating draught. The vast influx of strangers, especially English and Russians, filled the streets with brilliant equipages; while the gay and party-coloured liveries dazzled the inhabitants, from the contrast they afforded to the sombre appearance of the Jacobins' costume. The whole population of Paris flocked to the Place Carrousel, where their eyes were daily dazzled by splendid reviews, attended by a concourse of strangers, which recalled the prosperous days of Louis XIV; while the higher classes of citizens were not less captivated by the numerous and brilliant levees and drawing-rooms, where the court of the first consul already rivalled the most sumptuous displays of European royalty (2). M. de Markoff, who had succeeded Kalitscheff as ambassador from Russia, Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, and the Marquis Luchesini, the representative of Prussia, were in an especial manner distinguished by the magnificence of their retinues, and the eminent persons whom they presented to the first consul. Among the illustrious Englishmen who hastened to Paris to satiate their curiosity by the sight of the remains, and the men of the Revolution, was Mr. Fox, whom Napoleon received in the most distinguished manner, and for whom he ever after professed the highest regard; but the praises of an enemy are always suspicious, and the memory of that able man would have been more honoured if the determined foe of England had bestowed on him some portion of that envenomed hatred which he so often expressed towards Pitt or Wellington, and all the British leaders who had advanced the real interests and glory of their country (3).

(1) Thib. 305, 506.

(2) The court of Napoleon at this period was happily characterised by the Princess Dolgorucki, who then resided in Paris. "The Tuileries," said she, "is not, properly speaking, a court; and yet it is as little a camp: The consulship is a new institution. The first consul has neither a *chapeau bas* under his arm, nor do you hear the clank of a sabre at his side."—LAS CASES, iii. 241.

(3) Bour. v. 55. D'Abr. vi. 136, 140.

Generous To the honour of Mr. Fox it must be mentioned, that during his intercourse with the first consul he never failed to impress upon him the absurdity and falsehood of those ideas in regard to the privacy of Mr. Pitt to any designs against his life, or any desire for his destruction, which were then so prevalent in the Tuileries. Alone

Formation
of the low-
er gallery.

Nor was the French metropolis less illustrated by the spoils which were collected there from the vanquished states in every part of Europe. Already the *Vénus de Médieis*, torn from her sanctuary in the tribune of Florence, diffused over the marble halls of the Louvre her air of matchless grace; the *Pallas of Velletri* attested the successful researches of the French engineers in the Roman states; while the *St.-Jerome of Parma*, the transfiguration of Rome, and the last communion of the Vatican, exhibited to wondering crowds the softness of Correggio's colouring, the grandeur of Raphael's design, and the magic of Dominichino's finishing. Dazzled by the brilliant spectacle, the Parisians came to regard these matchless productions, not as the patrimony of the human race, but their own peculiar and unalienable property (1), and thus prepared for themselves that bitter mortification which afterwards ensued on the restoration of these precious remains to their rightful owners.

Great satisfaction
which these
changes
gave in foreign
courts.

In foreign states the re-establishment of a regular government in France, and its settlement, under the firm and able guidance of Napoléon, diffused as great contentment as among its own inhabitants. In London, Vienna, and Berlin, the consulship for life gave unalloyed satisfaction. All enlightened persons in these capitals perceived that the restoration of the feudal *régime* and the property of the emigrants had already become impossible, and that the fury of the Revolution, under which they had already suffered so severely, was never so likely to be stilled as under the resolute and fortunate soldier who had already done so much to restrain its excesses. The Queen of Naples, a woman endowed with masculine spirit and great penetration, expressed the general feeling at Vienna, where she then was, in these words: "If I had possessed a vote in France, I would have given it to Napoléon; and written after my signature, I name him consul for life, as being the man most fitted to govern the country. He is worthy of the throne since he knows how to fill it (2)."

Public opinion, after this change, ran so strongly in favour of the centralization of influence and hereditary succession, that if the first consul had not repressed the general transports, he would have received at once the unlimited gift of absolute power. The agents of Government pursued with unrelenting severity the last remains of democratic fervour. It was generally suggested that authority should be concentrated in the same hands, from the consulship for life to the appointment of mayor to the lowest village in France; and that the citizens should as rapidly as possible be estranged from any exercise of powers which they were evidently incapable of using to advantage.

Rapid increase of
the central
executive
power.

Innumerable projects were set on foot for reducing the number of the communes, the prefectures, and the tribunals; the old parliaments were held up as models of the administration of justice; the old intendants of provinces as a perfect system of local administration. So powerful was the reaction against the ideas and the changes of the Revolution (3).

and unaided, in the midst of the officers and generals of Napoléon, Mr. Fox undertook the defence of his illustrious opponent, and pleaded his cause with a warmth and generosity which excited the admiration even of the most envenomed enemies of the English administration.—See *Duchess D'Angantes*, vi. 136, 143.

He said frequently, in his bad French, "Premier consul, ôtez cela de votre tête."—See *Las Cases*, iv. 172.

(1) Bour. v. 55. D'Abr. vi. 259.

(2) Bign. ii. 250.

(3) Thib. 311, 312.

Infamous proposals made to Josephine regarding an heir. So strong was the desire generally felt at this time for perpetuating the dynasty in the descendants of Napoléon, that the persons around his throne went the length of proposing to Josephine that she should palm off a stranger or bastard child upon the nation. "You are going to the waters of Plombières," said Lucien to her. "You must have a son, if not of him, of some one else." And when she expressed her indignation at the proposal,—“Well,” says he, “if you will not or cannot

Suppression of the ministry of police;

Shortly after Napoléon was appointed to the consulship for life, several changes in the administration took place. The most important of these was the suppression of the ministry of police, and the transference of Fouché to a comparatively insignificant situation in the Conservative Senate. This austere but able statesman, notwithstanding his share in the massacres of the Loire and the fusillades of Lyon, had now become one of the most important supporters of the consular throne. His great value consisted in his perfect knowledge of the revolutionary characters, and the clear guidance which he afforded to the first consul on all the delicate points where it was necessary to consult the inclinations, or yield to the prejudices of the immense body of men who had risen to importance on the ruins of the ancient proprietors. He formed the same link between the Government and the revolutionary interests which Talleyrand did between them and the ancient *régime*. The honours and fortune to which he had risen, had in no respect changed the simplicity of his former habits; but with the possession of power he had acquired a taste for its sweets, and became little scrupulous as to the means by which it was to be exercised. Ambition had become his ruling passion; he loved office and the wealth which it brought with it, not for the enjoyments which it might purchase, but the importance which it conferred. Such was his dissimulation, that he never suffered his real views to escape either from his lips or his countenance; and by the extraordinary hypocrisy of which he was master, inspired parties the most at variance with a sense of his importance, and a desire to propitiate his good-will (1). The Republicans beheld in the ancient Jacobin who had voted for the death of Louis, and presided over the executions of Nevers and Lyon, the representative of their party in the state; the ancient noblesse lavished on him their praises, and acknowledged with gratitude the favours he had conferred on many of the most illustrious of their body. Joséphine made him her confidant in all her complaints against the brothers of her husband, and received large sums of money from his coffers to reveal the secrets she had elicited from the first consul; while he himself yielded to a fascination which seemed to extend alike over the greatest men and most powerful bodies in the state (2).

And disgrace of Fouché.

Napoléon, however, at length perceived, that the immense influence which Fouché enjoyed as head of the police, might one day become formidable even to the Government. He had the highest opinion of the importance of that branch of the Administration; but he began to conceive disquietudes as to its concentration in the hands of so able an individual. It was impossible to disguise the fact that its members had conspired in favour

comply, Bonaparte must have a child by some other woman, and you must adopt it; for a family is indispensable to him, and it is for your interest that he should have one; you can be at no loss to understand why."—"Lucien," replied she, "you are mad. Do you suppose France would ever submit to be governed by a bastard?" Shortly after she recounted this extraordinary scene to one of the counsellors of state. "You may depend upon it," said she, "they have not abandoned their idea of hereditary succession, and that it will be brought about some day, one way or other. They wish that Bonaparte should have a child of some other woman, and that I should adopt it; but I told them I would never lend myself to such an infamous proposal. They are so blinded as to believe that the nation would permit a bastard to succeed. They are already beginning to hint at a divorce and a large pension to me. Bonaparte even is carried away by their ideas. The other day, when I expressed my

fears in regard to the Princess Hortense, on account of the infamous reports which are in circulation about her infant being his son, he answered, 'These reports are only accredited by the public, from the anxiety of the nation that I should have a child.' He is more weak and changeable than is generally imagined. It is owing to that circumstance that Lucien has got such an extraordinary dominion over him." [Thib. 309, 310.] Napoléon at St. Helena alluded to this proposal, though, with his usual disregard of truth, he made it come from Joséphine herself; an assertion which his secretary most properly denies, and which is completely disproved by the event. If Joséphine had been willing to adopt an illegitimate son of Napoléon, and pass it off as her own offspring, she would have lived and died Empress of France. [Bour. v. 21, 49.]

(1) His ruling maxim was, that the chief use of words was to *conceal* the thoughts.

(2) Bour, v. 32, 33. Thib. 325, 326.

of the Consulate against the Directory, and the powerful machinery which was then put in motion to support Napoléon, might with equal facility be directed to his overthrow. Influenced by these considerations, the first consul lent a willing ear to the party at the Tuileries who were adverse to Fouché, at the head of which was Talleyrand, who openly opposed and cordially hated his powerful rival. Yet such was the ascendancy of the minister of police, even over the powerful mind of Napoléon, that he long hesitated before he took the decisive step; and, after it had been resolved on, felt the necessity of veiling it under a professed measure to increase the popularity of Government. He represented to Fouché, therefore, that the office of minister of police was one which might now be dispensed with and that the Government would derive additional popularity from the suppression of so obnoxious a branch of the Administration. Fouché saw through the device; but, according to his usual policy, yielded to a power which he could not brave, and expressed no dissent to the first consul, though he was far from

Sept. 12. supposing the storm was so soon to break on his head. The *arrêt* for his dismissal was signed when he was on a visit to Joseph Bonaparte at Morfontaine. Fouché was named a senator, and loaded with praises by the Government which deemed him too powerful to be retained in his former situation; and at the same time the ministry of police was suppressed, and united to that of justice, in the person of Regnier (1).

Aug. 15, 1802. Soon after, an important change took place in the constitution of the Senate. It had been originally provided that those elevated functionaries should, after their appointment, be incapable of holding any other situation; but it was subsequently enacted that

Changes in
the consti-
tution of
the Senate.

the senators might hold the offices of consuls, ministers, inspectors of public instruction, be employed in all extraordinary missions, and receive the decoration of the Legion of Honour. Subsequently a munificent provision was made for the Senate, and every member on his nomination received an

Jan. 14, 1803. appointment for life. Pensioned by the executive, nominated by the first consul, surrounded by every species of seduction, this branch of the Government in reality served thereafter no other purpose but to throw a thin veil over the omnipotence of the executive. Napoléon was careful, however, to keep up its name, and bring forward all his despotic measures under the sanction of its authority, as the Roman emperors retained the venerable letters S. P. Q. R. on their ensigns, and the preamble “*ex auctoritate Senatus*,” to the most arbitrary acts of their administration (2).

Renewed
correspon-
dence be-
tween
Louis
XVIII
and Napo-
léon.

An event occurred at this period, which tended in a remarkable manner to illustrate the dignity with which the exiled family of the Bourbons bore the continued rigours of fortune. When Napoléon was pursuing his projects for the establishment of a hereditary dynasty in his family in France, he caused a communication to be

(1) Bourr. v. 36, 37. Thib. 325, 329.

The letter of the first consul to the Senate, announcing the suppression of the ministry of police, was conceived in these terms:—“Appointed minister of police in the most difficult times, the Senator Fouché has fully answered by his talents, his activity, and his attachment to the Government, all that the circumstances demanded of him. Placed now in the bosom of the Senate, he is called to equally important duties; and if ever a recurrence of the same circumstances should require a restoration of the office of minister of police, it is on him that the eyes of Government would first be fixed to discharge its functions.” These consolatory words opened to Fouché a ray of hope in the midst of his disgrace; all

his efforts were from that moment directed to bring about his restoration to office; and at length, as will appear in the sequel, he attained his object.”—See BOURRIENNE, v. 37; and THIBAUDEAU, 328.

(2) Thib. 335.

Another *arrêt* at the same period regulated the costume of the persons employed in the legal profession. The robes of the judges were ordered to be red, and those of the bar black. During the Revolution, all the distinguishing marks had been abolished. The black robe which Molière had so exquisitely ridiculed, had given way to the costume of the *sans-culottes*. At the same time, the old habillements at the *Messe Rouge* were re-established; and the service was celebrated by the Archbishop of Paris.

made to the Count de Lille, afterwards Louis XVIII, then residing, under the protection of the Prussian King at Königsberg, offering, in the event of his renouncing in his favour his right to the throne of France, to provide for him a principality, with an ample revenue, in Italy. But Louis answered in these dignified terms, worthy of the family from which he
Feb. 1803. sprung:—"I do not confound M. Bonaparte with those who have preceded him. I esteem his valour, his military talents; I am gratified by many acts of his administration, for the happiness of my people must ever be dear to my heart. But he deceives himself, if he imagines that he will prevail upon me to surrender my rights. So far from it, he would establish them himself, if they could admit of doubt, by the step which he has taken at this moment. I know not the intentions of God to my family or myself, but I know the obligations which he has imposed upon me. As a Christian, I will discharge the duties which religion prescribes to my last breath; son of St. Louis, I will make myself be respected even in fetters; successor of Francis I, I wish ever to be able to say with him, 'All is lost except our honour (1).'"

It was at the same period that Napoléon commenced the great undertaking which has so deservedly covered his memory with glory, and survived all the other achievements of his genius, the formation of a CIVIL CODE, and the concentration of the heterogeneous laws of the monarchy and republic into one consistent whole. In contemplating this great work, it is difficult whether to admire most the wisdom with which he called to his assistance the
Formation of the Code Napoléon. ablest and most experienced lawyers of the old *régime*, the readiness with which he apprehended the difficult and intricate questions which were brought under discussion, or the prudence with which he steered between the vehement passions and contending interests which arose in legislating for an empire composed of the remains of monarchical and republican institutions. It is no longer the conqueror of Rivoli or Austerlitz whom we recognise; it is Solon legislating for a distracted people; it is Justinian digesting the treasures of ancient jurisprudence, that arises to our view; and the transient glories even of the imperial reign fade before the durable monument which his varied genius has erected in the permanent code of half of Europe.

Reflections on the difficulty of this subject. It is observed by Lord Bacon, that when "laws have been heaped upon laws, in such a state of confusion as to render it necessary to revise them, and collect their spirit into a new and intelligible system, those who accomplish such an heroic task, have a good right to be named among the benefactors of mankind." Never was the justice of this observation more completely demonstrated than by the result of the labours of the first consul in the formation of the Code Napoléon. The complication of the old laws of France, the conflicting authority of the civil law, the parliaments of the provinces, and the local customs, had formed a chaos of confusion which had suggested to many statesmen before the Revolution, the necessity of some attempt to reduce them to an uniform system. By an astonishing effort of mental vigour, Pothier had contrived to extract out of this heterogeneous mass, the elements of general jurisprudence, and followed out the principles of the Roman law, with a power of generalization and clearness of expression to which there is nothing comparable in the whole annals of legal achievement. But his lucid works had not the weight of

Every thing breathed a return to the ancient *régime*. Cambacérès was the great promoter of these changes; well aware of the importance of whatever

strikes the eye on the inconsiderate multitude.—
THIBAUDEAU, 338.

(1) *Bour. v. 147. Bign. iii. 233, 237.*

general law; they could not be referred to as paramount on every question; they contained principles to be followed from their equity, not rules to be obeyed from their authority. The difficulty of the task was immensely increased by the Revolution; by the total change in the most important branches of jurisprudence, personal liberty, the rights of marriage, the descent of property, and the privileges of citizenship, which it occasioned; and the large inroads which revolutionary legislation had made on the broken and disjointed statutes of the monarchy.

To reform a system of law without destroying it is one of the most difficult tasks in political improvement, and requiring, perhaps more than any other change, a combination of practical knowledge with the desire of social amelioration. To retain statutes as they are, without ever modifying them according to the progress of society, is to make them fall behind the great innovator, Time, and often become pernicious in their operation; to new model them, in conformity with the wishes of a heated generation, is almost certainly to incur unforeseen and irremediable evils. Nothing is more easy than to point out defects in established laws, because their inconvenience is felt, and the people generally lend a ready ear to those who vituperate existing institutions; nothing is more difficult than to propose safe or expedient remedies, because hardly any foresight is adequate to estimate the ultimate effects which any considerable legal changes produce. They are in general calculated to remedy some known and experienced evil, and in so far as they effect that object, they are salutary in their operation; but they too often go beyond that limit, and in the pursuit of speculative good, induce unforeseen inconveniences much greater than those they remove. The last state of a nation, which has gone through the ordeal of legal innovation, is in general worse than the first.

The only way in which it is possible to avoid these dangers, is to remedy experienced evils, and extend experienced benefits only, without advancing into the tempting but dangerous regions of speculative improvement. It is the clearest proof that the Code of Napoléon was formed on these wise principles, that it has not only survived the empire which gave it birth, but continues, under new dynasties and different forms of government, to regulate the decisions of many nations who were leagued to bring about the overthrow of its author. Napoléon has said, "that his fame in the eyes of posterity would rest even more on the code which bore his name than all the victories which he won;" and its permanent establishment, as the basis of the jurisprudence of half of Europe, has already proved the truth of the prophecy.

Deviating altogether from the rash and presumptuous innovations of the Constituent Assembly, which took council of its own enthusiasm only, Napoléon commenced his legislative reforms, by calling to his councils the most distinguished lawyers of the monarchy. Tronchet, Roederer, Portalis, Thibaudeau, Cambacérès, Lebrun, were his chief coadjutors in this Herculean task (1); but although he required of these eminent legal characters the benefit of their extensive experience, he joined in the discussions himself, and struck out new and important views,

Discussions on that subject in the Council of State.

(1) Their respective merits were thus stated by Napoléon: "Tronchet is a man of the most enlightened views, and a singularly clear head for his advanced years. Portalis would be the most eloquent orator, if he knew when to stop. Thibaudeau is not adapted for that sort of discussion; he is too cold. He requires, like Lucien, the animation and fire of

the Tribune. Cambacérès is the Advocate-General; he pleads sometimes on one side, sometimes on another. The most difficult part of the duty is the reduction of their ideas into the *procès verbal*; but we have the best of *rédauteurs* in Lebrun."—THIBAudeau, 415.

on the most abstract questions of civil right, with a facility which astonished the counsellors who had been accustomed to consider only his military exploits. To the judgment of none did the first consul so readily defer as that of Tronchet; notwithstanding his advanced age, and monarchical prepossessions, he deemed no one so worthy as the illustrious defender of Louis XVI to take the lead in framing the code for the empire. "Tronchet," said he, "was the soul of the commission, Napoléon its mouthpiece. The former was gifted with a mind singularly profound and just; but he soared above those around him, spoke indifferently, and was seldom able to defend his opinions." The whole council, in consequence, was in general adverse to his propositions when they were first brought forward; but Napoléon, with the readiness and sagacity which he possessed in so remarkable a degree, saw at a glance where the point lay, and with no other materials than those which Tronchet had furnished, and hardly any previous acquaintance with the subject, brought forward such clear and lucid arguments as seldom failed to convince the whole assembly. He presided at almost all the meetings of the commission for the formation of the civil code, and took such a vivid interest in the debates, that he frequently remained at them six or eight hours a-day. Free discussion in that assembly gave him the highest gratification; he provoked it, sustained it, and shared in it. He spoke without preparation, without embarrassment, without pretensions; in the style rather of free and animated conversation than premeditated or laboured discussion. He never appeared inferior to any members of the council, often equal to the ablest of them, in the readiness with which he caught the point at issue, and the logical force with which he supported his opinions, and not unfrequently superior to any in the originality and vigour of his expressions. The varied powers and prodigious capacity of Napoléon's mind nowhere appeared in such brilliant colours as on those occasions; and would hardly appear credible, if authentic evidence on the subject did not exist in the *procès-verbaux* of those memorable discussions (1).

The limits of a work of this description render it impossible to enter into a survey of the many important subjects brought under review in the formation of the Code Napoléon. Two only can be noticed, as those on which the interests of society chiefly depend, the laws of succession, and those regarding the dissolution of marriage.

How clearly soever Napoléon saw and expressed the dangers of the minute subdivision of landed estates, and consequent destruction of a territorial noblesse, arising from the establishment of an equal division of property, whether in land or money, among the heirs of a deceased person, he found this system too firmly established to venture to shake it. It was identified in the eyes of all the active and energetic part of the nation with the first triumphs of the revolution; it had been carried by Mirabeau in the Constituent Assembly, with the general concurrence of the people, and had since become the foundation of so many private interests and individual prospects, that it was universally regarded as the great charter of the public liberties, and any infringement on it the first step towards a restoration of feudal oppression. Great as was the power, apparently unbounded the in-

(1) Thib. 412. Bour. v. 122, 123. Las Cases, iii. 241, 242.

Bertrand de Moleville, formerly minister of Marine to Louis XVI, and a man of no ordinary capacity, said, in reference to these discussions, "Napoléon was certainly an extraordinary man; we were very far indeed from appreciating him on the other

side of the water. From the moment that I looked into the discussions on the civil code, I conceived the most profound admiration for his capacity. It is utterly inconceivable where he acquired so much information on these subjects."—LAS CASES, iii. 249, 250.

fluence, of Napoléon, it would have been instantly shattered by any attempt to break in upon this fundamental institution. Wisely abstaining, therefore, from change, where he could not introduce improvement, he contented himself with consolidating the existing laws on the subject, and establishing in the Code Napoléon a general system of succession, fundamentally at variance with that in all the other states of Europe, and of which the ultimate consequences are destined to be more important than any of the other changes brought about by the Revolution.

By this statute, which may be termed the revolutionary law of succession, the right of primogeniture, and the distinction between landed and moveable property were taken away, and inheritance of every sort divided in equal portions among those in an equal degree of consanguinity to a deceased person (1). This indefeasible right of children to their parents' succession was declared to be a half, if one child was left; two thirds, if two; three-fourths, if three or more; all entails or limitations of any sort were abolished. The effects of such a system, co-operating with the immense subdivision of landed estates which took place from the sale of the forfeited properties during the

Sketch of
the French
revolution-
ary system
of succe-
sion.

(1) By the decree April 19, 1803, the law of succession was established in the following manner:—

1. 1. The law pays no regard either to the nature of property, or the quarter from which it comes, in regulating succession.

2. Every succession which devolves to ascendants or collaterals, is divided into two equal parts; the one for the relations by the father's side, the other for those of the mother.

3. The proximity of relations is determined by the number of generations by which they are separated from the deceased; in the line direct, by the number of descents; in the collateral, by the number which separates each from the common ancestor, up and down again. Thus two brothers are related in the second degree; the uncle and nephew in the third; cousins-germain in the fourth.

4. In all cases where representation is admitted, the representatives enter as a body into the place, and enjoy the rights of the person represented. This right obtains *ad infinitum* in the direct line of descendants, but not in that of ascendants. In the collateral line, it is admitted in favour of the children of a brother or sister deceased, whether they are called to the succession concurrently with their uncles or aunts, or not. In all cases where representation is admitted, the succession is divided *per stirpes*; and if the same branch has left several descendants, the subdivision in the same manner takes place *per stirpes*, and the members of each subdivision divide what devolves to them *per capita*.—*Code Civil*, § 731-745.

11. Children or their descendants succeed to their father or mother, grandfather, grandmother, or other ascendants, without distinction of sex or primogeniture, and whether of the same or different marriages. They succeed *per capita*, when they are all related in the first degree; *per stirpes*, when they are called in whole or in part by representation. If the defunct leaves no issue or descendants, his succession divides according to the following rules:—

III. 1. In default of descendants, the brothers and sisters are called to the succession, to the exclusion of collaterals or their descendants. They succeed either *per capita* or *stirpes*, in the same way as descendants,

2. If the father and mother of a deceased person survive him, his brothers and sisters, or their descendants, are only called to half of the succession; if the one or the other, only to three-fourths.

3. The division of this half, or three-fourths, is made on the same principles as that of descendants, if the collaterals are of the same marriage; if of different, the succession is divided equally between the paternal and maternal lines.—*Code Civil*, § 750, 755.

IV. In default of collaterals, or their issue, ascendants succeed according to the following rules:—

1. The succession divides into two equal parts; of which the one half ascends to the father's side, the other to the mother's.

2. The ascendant, the nearest in degree, receives the half belonging to his line, to the exclusion of the more remote.

3. Ascendants in the same degree, take *per capita*, there being no representation in the ascending line.

4. If the father and mother of a deceased person, who dies without issue, survive him, and he leaves brothers and sisters, or their descendants, the succession is divided into two parts; one to the ascendants, one to the collaterals. But if the father and mother have predeceased him, their share accretes to that of the collaterals.—*Code Civil*, § 746, 749.

V. 1. Voluntary gifts, whether by deeds *inter vivos*, or by testament, cannot exceed the half of the deceased's effects if he leaves one child; the third, if two; the fourth, if three or more.

2. Under the description of children in this article, are included descendants in whatever degree; estimating these, however, *per stirpes*, not *per capita*.

3. Voluntary gifts, either by deeds *inter vivos*, or testamentary deeds, cannot exceed the half of the effects of the deceased if he leaves no descendants, but ascendants in both the paternal and maternal line, or three-fourths, if one of these only.—*Code Civil*, § 913, 915.

VI. Natural children have a right of succession to their parents alone, if they have been legally recognised, but not otherwise.

1. If the father or mother have left legitimate issue, the natural child has a right to a third of what he would have had right to if he had been legitimate.

2. It extends to a half, if the deceased left no descendants, but ascendants, or brothers or sisters.

3. It extends to three-fourths, when he leaves neither descendants nor ascendants, nor brothers nor sisters; to the whole when he leaves neither.—*Code Civil*, § 756, 758.

Revolution, have been incalculable. It is estimated by the Duke de Gaeta, long minister of finance to Napoléon, that, in 1815, there were 15,059,000 individuals in France belonging to the families of agricultural proprietors, and 740,500 belonging to the families of proprietors not engaged in agriculture, all living on the revenue of profit derived from their properties (1). As may be supposed, where so extreme a subdivision of property has taken place, the situation of the greater part of these little proprietors is indigent in the extreme. It appears from the authority of the same author, that there were in 1815 no less than 10,400,000 of persons taxed in France; and that of this immense number only 17,000 paid direct taxes to the amount of 1000 francs, or L.40 a-year each (2); while no less than 8,000,000 were taxed at a sum below twenty-one francs, or sixteen shillings. Direct taxes to the amount of sixteen shillings correspond to an income of five times the amount, or L.4 a-year; to the amount of L.40 a-year, to one at the same rate of L.200. Thus the incomes of only 17,000 proprietors in France exceeded L.200 a-year, while there were nearly 8,000,000 who were worth in property only L.4 per annum (3).

It is a singular fact, pointing apparently to an important law in the moral world, that when men yield to the seductions of passion, and engage in the career of iniquity, they are led by an almost irresistible impulse to covet the very changes which are to lead to their own destruction, and cling with invincible tenacity to the institutions which are calculated to defeat the very objects on account of which all these crimes have been committed. The confiscation of property in France was the great and crying sin of the Revolution, because it extended the consequences of present violence to future ages, and injured the latest generations on account of the political differences of the present

(1) Gaeta, ii. 335.

(2) Taxed at	Number of Persons taxed.	Produce of Tax. Francs.
1000 francs, or L.40	17,745	31,649,468 or L. 1,300,000
500 to 1000, or from 20 to L. 40,	40,773	27,653,016 or 1,140,000
101 to 500, or from 4 to 20,	459,937	90,411,706 or 3,500,000
51 to 100, or from 2 to 4,	591,618	41,181,488 or 1,650,000
31 to 50, or from 25s. to 2,	699,637	27,229,518 or 1,200,000
21 to 30, or from 16s. to 25s.	704,871	17,632,083 or 750,000
Below 21 frs. or below 16s. 10d.	7,897,110	47,178,649 or 1,900,000
	10,414,721	282,935,928 or L.11,440,000

[Gaeta, ii. 327.]

When it is recollected that the contribution *foncière* in France is fully 20 per cent, [Peuchet, 287, *Ante*, iv.] upon all estates without exception, this table gives the clearest proof of the changes in property brought about by the Revolution. It results from it, that in 1815 there were only 17,000 proprietors in the whole country who were worth L.200 a-year and upwards; a fact incredible, if not stated on such indisputable authority, and speaking volumes on the disastrous effects of that convulsion.

(3) Duc de Gaeta, ii. 327. Peuchet, 246, 247.

From the report to the minister of the finances, published in 1817, by the commissioners on the cadastre, it appears that at that period there were 10,083,000 separate properties assessed to the land-tax in France. This number has since that time been constantly increasing, as might be expected under the revolutionary order of succession. The numbers were,—

1816,	10,083,751
1826,	10,296,693
1833,	10,814,799

Allowing that there are several separate properties often accumulated in the same individuals, this implies in the estimation of the French writers at least 8,000,000 separate proprietors. The total clear produce of the agriculture of France is estimated by Dupin at 4,500,000,000 francs, or L.180,000,000 sterling. Supposing that the half of that sum, or L.90,000,000 sterling, is the annual clear profit of cultivation, after defraying its charges, it follows that the average income of the eight millions of French proprietors, including all the great estates, is about L.11 a-year! Nothing more is requisite to explain the experienced impossibility of constructing a durable free government in that country. It exhibits Asiatic, not European civilisation.—See SARRANS's *Contre-Révolution de 1830*, ii. 273, 274.—*Deux Ans de Règne de Louis-Philippe*, 271.—And DUPIN, *Force Commerciale de France*, i. 7.

time; and it is precisely that circumstance which has rendered hopeless all the efforts for freedom made by the French people. By interesting so great a number of persons in the work of spoliation, and extending so far the jealousy at the nobles, by whom the confiscated properties might be resumed, it has led to the permanent settlement of the law of succession, on the footing of equal division and perfect equality. Opinion there as elsewhere, founded on interest, has followed in the same direction. No doctrine is so generally prevalent in France as that this vast change is the leading benefit conferred upon the country by the Revolution; and yet nothing can be so evident to an impartial spectator, as that it is precisely the circumstance which has ever since rendered nugatory all attempts to establish public freedom there, because it has totally destroyed the features and the elements of European civilisation, and left only Indian ryots engaged in a hopeless contest with a metropolis wielding the influence of a central government, and the terrors of military power. The universality of the illusion under which the French labour on this subject is owing to the wide extent of the instinct which leads the Revolutionary party to shun every thing that seems to favour an approach even to the restoration of the dispossessed proprietors; and in their terror of this remote and chimerical evil they have adopted measures which, by preventing the growth of any hereditary class between the throne and the peasant, have rendered the establishment of constitutional freedom utterly impracticable, and doomed the first of European monarchies to the slavery and decrepitude of Oriental despotism. By such mysterious means does human iniquity, even in this world, work out its merited punishment; and so indissoluble is the chain which unites guilty excess with ultimate retribution.

Law re-
garding di-
vorce.

The principle of admitting divorce in many cases was too firmly established in the customs and habits of France to admit of its being shaken. Important deliberations, however, took place on the subject of the causes which should permit it. The first consul, who entertained very singular ideas on the subject of marriage and the proper destiny of women (1), warmly supported the looser side; and it was at length agreed, March 21, 1803, 1. That the husband might in every case sue out a divorce on the account of the adultery of his wife. 2. That she might divorce her husband for adultery in those cases only where he brought his concubine into their common habitation. 3. Divorce was permitted for severe and grave injuries inflicted by the one spouse on the other; for the condemnation of either to an infamous punishment. 4. The mutual consent of the spouses steadily adhered to, and expressed in a way prescribed by law, is also a sufficient cause of divorce (2). The only limitations in the last case were, that it could not take place until two, nor after twenty years of married life had elapsed, or after the wife had attained the age of forty-five; that the parents or other ascendants of the spouses should concur, and that the

(1) When the article in the code, "The husband owes protection to his wife, she obedience to him," was read out, Napoléon observed, "The angel said so to Adam and Eve,—the word *obedience* is in an especial manner of value in Paris, where women consider themselves at liberty to do whatever they please; I do not say it will produce a beneficial effect on all, but on some it may. Women in general are occupied only with amusement and the toilet. If I could be secure of never growing old, I would never wish a wife. Should we not add, that a woman should not be permitted to see any one who is displeasing to her husband? Women have constantly

the words in their mouths—"What, would you pretend to hinder me from seeing any one whom I choose?"—THIBAUDEAU, 436.

In these expressions it is easy to discern that Napoléon's thoughts were running on Joséphine, whose extravagance in dress and passion for amusement knew no bounds. But independent of this, he had little romance or gallantry in his disposition, and repeatedly expressed his opinion, that the Oriental system of shutting up women was preferable to the European, which permitted them to mingle in society.

(2) Code civil, 229, 233.

husband should be above twenty-five, and the wife above twenty-one years of age (1). It may easily be conceived what a wide door such a facility in dissolving marriage opened for the introduction of dissolute manners and irregular connexions; and in its ultimate effects upon society this change is destined to be not less important, or subversive of public freedom, than the destruction of the landed aristocracy by the revolutionary law of succession (2). In such a state of society, the facility of divorce and dissolution of manners act and react upon each other. Napoléon admitted this himself. —“The foundlings,” says he, “have multiplied tenfold since the Revolution (3).” But it is not in so corrupted a source that we are to look for the fountains either of public freedom or durable prosperity.

Great effects of these salutary changes of Napoléon. The effects of these great measures carried into execution by Napoléon are thus justly and emphatically summed up in his own words:—“In the course of the four years of the consulship, the first consul had succeeded in uniting all the parties who divided France; the list of emigrants was infinitely reduced; all who chose to return had received their pardon; all their unalienated property had been restored, excepting the woods, of which, nevertheless, they were permitted to enjoy the life-rent; none remained exiled but a few persons attached to the Bourbon princes, or such as were so deeply implicated in resistance to the Revolution as to be unwilling to avail themselves of the amnesty. Thousands of emigrants had returned under no other condition but that of taking the oath of fidelity to the constitution. The first consul had thus the most delightful consolation which a man can have, that of having reorganized above thirty thousand families, and restored to their country the descendants of the men who had illustrated France during so many ages. The altars were raised from the dust; the exiled or transported priests were restored to their dioceses and parishes, and paid by the Republic. The concordat had rallied the clergy round the consular throne; the spirit of the western provinces was essentially changed; immense public works gave bread to all the persons thrown out of employment during the preceding convulsions; canals every where were formed to improve the internal navigation; a new city had arisen in the centre of la Vendée; eight great roads traversed that secluded province, and large sums had been distributed to the Vendéens, to restore their houses and churches, destroyed by orders of the Committee of Public Safety (4).”

The difficulty with which the restoration of order in a country recently emerging from the fury of a revolution was attended, cannot be better stated than by the same masterly hand. “We are told, that all the first consul had to look to was to do justice: but to whom? to the proprietors whom the Revolution had violently despoiled of their properties, for this only, that they had been faithful to their legitimate sovereign and the principle of honour which they had inherited from their ancestors? Or to the new proprietors, who had adventured their money on the faith of laws flowing from an illegitimate authority? Justice; but to whom? To the soldiers mutilated in the fields of Germany, la Vendée, and Quiberon, who were arrayed under the white standard or the English leopards, in the firm belief that they were serving the cause of their king against an usurping tyranny; or to the

(1) *Ibid.* 275, 278.

(2) From the returns lately made, it appears that, in the year 1824, out of 28,812 births, only 18,591 were legitimate; 2378 being of children born in concubinage, and 7843 children brought to the

foundling hospitals.—*DUFIX, Force Com. de France*, 99, 100.

(3) *Las Cas. v.* 41.

(4) *Nap. in Month.* ii, 225.

million of citizens, who, forming round the frontiers a wall of brass, had so often saved their country from the inveterate hostility of its enemies, and bore to so transcendent a height the glory of the French eagle? Justice! but for whom? For that clergy, the model and the example of every Christian virtue, stript of its birthright, the reward of fifteen hundred years of beneficence; or the recent acquirers, who had converted the convents into workshops, the churches into warehouses, and turned to profane uses all that had been deemed most holy for ages (1)?”

Great public works set on foot in France. Amidst these great undertakings, the internal prosperity of France was daily increasing. The budget for the year 1805 presented a considerable increase over that of 1802 (2). Various public works calculated to encourage industry were every where set on foot during that year; chambers of commerce established in all the principal cities of the Republic; a grand exhibition of all the different branches of industry formed at the Louvre, which has ever since continued with signal success; the Hôtel des Invalides received a new and more extended organization, adapted to the immense demands upon its beneficence, which the wounds and casualties of the war had occasioned (3); a portion of the veterans settled in national domains as a reward for their services during the war (4); a new establishment was formed at Fontainebleau for the education of youths of the higher class for the military profession (5); and the great school of St.-Cyr, near Paris, opened gratuitously to the children of those who had died in the service of their country (6); an academy was set on foot at Compiègne for five hundred youths, where they were instructed in all the branches of manufactures and the mechanical arts (7); the Institute received a new organization, in which the class of moral and political science was totally suppressed; a change highly symptomatic of the resolution of the first consul to put an end to those visionary speculations from which so many calamities had ensued to France (8); while the General Councils of the departments were authorized, in cases where it seemed expedient, to increase the slender incomes of the bishops and archbishops, a power which received a liberal interpretation, under the empire, and rapidly led to the cordial support of the clergy throughout all France to the consular government (9).

April 8, 1803. Nor was it only in measures of legislation that the indefatigable activity and beneficent intentions of the first consul were manifested. Then were projected or commenced those great public improvements which deservedly rendered the name of Napoléon so dear to the French, and still excite the admiration even of the passing traveller in every part of the kingdom. That extensive inland navigation was set on foot, which, under the name of the canal at St.-Quentin, was destined to unite the Scheldt and the Oise; other canals were begun, intended to unite the waters of the Saône to the Yonne, the Saône to the Rhine, the Meuse to the Rhine and the Scheldt, the Rance to the Villaine, and thereby open an internal communi-

(1) Nap. in Month. ii. 225.

(2) The budget for that year stood thus, being an increase of 17,900,000 francs, or L.700,000 over the preceding year:—

Direct taxes, . .	305,105,000	francs, or	L.12,300,000
Registers, . . .	200,106,000	— or	8,100,000
Customs, . . .	36,924,000	— or	1,400,000
Post-office, . .	11,205,000	— or	450,000
Lottery, . . .	15,326,000	— or	620,000
Salt tax, . . .	2,300,000	— or	92,000
	570,966,000		or L.22,942,000

(3) July 8, 1803.

(4) June 15, 1803.

(5) Jan. 28, 1803.

(6) Oct. 8, 1803.

(7) April 1803.

(8) Jan. 1803.

(9) Big. ii. 252, 258.

cation between the channel and the ocean; the canals of Arles and Aigues-Mortes were opened, and an inexhaustible supply of fresh water was procured for the capital by the canal of Ourcq. This great step led to farther improvements. Paris had long suffered under the want of that necessary element, and the means of cleaning or irrigating the streets were miserably deficient; but, under the auspices of Napoléon, this great want was soon supplied. Numerous fountains arose in every part of the city, alike refreshing to the eye, and salutary to the health of the inhabitants; the beautiful cascade of the Château-d'Eau cooled the atmosphere on the Boulevard du Temple, while the water-works and lofty *jets d'eau* in the gardens of the Tuileries, attracted additional crowds to the shady alleys and marbled parterres of that splendid spot. Immense works, undertaken to improve and enlarge the harbours of Boulogne, Havre, Cherbourg, Rochelle, Marseille, Antwerp, and Ostend, sufficiently demonstrated that Napoléon had not abandoned the hope of wresting the sceptre of the seas from Great Britain; while the order to erect in the centre of the place Vendôme, a pillar, in imitation of the column of Trajan, to be surmounted by the statue of Charlemagne, already revealed the secret design of his Imperial successor to reconstruct the Empire of the West (1).

(1) Big. ii. 252, 264.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

NAPOLEÓN'S ASSUMPTION OF THE IMPERIAL THRONE.

JAN.—MAY.—1804.

ARGUMENT.

Favourable prospects of Napoléon's Government in the beginning of 1804—Discontent, however, of the Republican part of the army—Pichegru in London—Royalist movements in France—Project of Fouché for getting up a conspiracy composed of Royalists and Republicans—The Royalist leaders are landed on the French coast—Artful measures of Fouché to draw them on—He reveals the plot to Napoléon and is in consequence restored to power—Arrest of Moreau—Consternation which it excites in Paris—Seizure of Pichegru—and of Georges Cadoudal—History and character of the Duke d'Enghien—Generous conduct of his father on receiving a proposal to assassinate Napoléon—His arrest is unjustly resolved on by Napoléon and the Council of State—Occupations of the Prince at that time—He is seized and conducted to Strashourg—Fruitless intercession of Joséphine—He had been vainly warned of his danger—Is removed to Paris and sent to Vincennes—Where he is delivered over to a military commission by Napoléon's orders—Gross iniquity committed towards him—He is convicted upon his declaration only, without any evidence—His noble demeanour before the judges—Sentence and execution—His innocence is completely established after his death—Napoléon's vindication of himself on this subject at St.-Helena—Remarkable retribution which reached all the actors in this murder—Consternation which it excited in Paris—and in the foreign ambassadors there—Courageous conduct of M. Châteaubriand—Opinion which Napoléon entertained of him—Death of Pichegru—Surgeon's report on his body—Reflections on the probable privy of the First Consul to his death—Napoléon resolves to assume the Imperial Crown—This explains his murdering the Duke d'Enghien—First broaching of the project to the Senate—The Tribunate is put forward to make the proposal in public—Speech of the mover on the occasion—Honourable resistance of Carnot—Universal adulation with which Napoléon was surrounded—His answer to the address of the Senate—Key which it affords to his whole conduct on the throne—He is declared Emperor of the French—General concurrence of the nation—Rank conferred on his family—Absolute power vested in the Emperor—Creation of the Marshals of the empire—Rapid progress of court etiquette—Dignified protest of Louis XVIII—Reflections on these events—Difference between the English and French Revolutions—Which was all owing to the violence and injustice of the French convulsion—Vast concentration of influence at this period in the hands of Government—Total destruction of the liberty of the Press—Inference in political science to which this leads.

It were well for the memory of Napoléon if the historian could stop here; and after having recounted the matchless glories of his military exploits, conclude with the admirable wisdom of his civil administration, and the felicity with which, amidst so many difficulties, he reconstructed the disjointed members of society after the Revolution. But history is not formed of panegyric; and after discharging the pleasing duty of recording the great and blameless achievements which signalized that consulate, there remains the painful task of narrating the foul transactions, the dark and bloody deeds which ushered in the empire.

Favourable prospects of Napoléon's government in the beginning of 1804.

Every thing seemed to smile upon Napoléon. In the civil administration all were reconciled to the consulate for life, or submitted in silence to an authority which they could not resist. The army, dazzled by his brilliant exploits, rallied round his standard, and sought only to give expression to its admiration for the illustrious

chief who had raised to such an unprecedented height the glory the republican eagles. The people, worn out with the sufferings and anxieties of the Revolution, joyfully submitted to a government which had given them that first of blessings, security and protection, and forgetting the dreams of enthusiasm and the fumes of democracy, returned to their separate pursuits, and sought in the enjoyments of private life a compensation for the experienced vanity of their political anticipations (1).

But among the generals and higher officers of the army the same unanimity by no means prevailed. Bernadotte, though brother-in-law to Joseph Bonaparte, was constantly in opposition to the first consul. Early attached to republican principles, he viewed with undisguised jealousy the evident approaches which the chief magistrate was making to arbitrary power; and in consequence of his influence, a number of officers in his staff and in the garrison of Rennes voted against the consulate for life. Moreau, however, was the head of the malecontent party. On every occasion he made it a point to oppose, to the increasing splendour of military dress and uniformity of court etiquette, the simplicity and uniformity of republican costume. The conqueror of Austria traversed, amidst crowds of brilliant uniforms, the place Caroussel or the saloons of the Tuileries, in the plain dress of a citizen, without any sort of decoration. He declined on various pretences repeated invitations to the Tuileries, and at length was no longer asked to appear. He often manifested to the first consul, when they met in public, a degree of coldness, which must have estranged persons even less jealous of each other's reputation than the heroes of Marengo and Hohenlinden. Nothing could induce him to attend the ceremony performed in Notre-Dame on occasion of the concordat; and at a dinner of military men at his house on the same day, he openly expressed the greatest contempt for the whole proceeding. Female jealousy added to the many causes of discord which already existed between these rival chiefs; Madame Hulot, his mother-in-law, and Madame Moreau, his wife, were influenced with the most violent jealousy at the elevation of Joséphine, and unceasingly urged Moreau to step forward, and openly claim that place in society and the state to which his dignity and services so well entitled him. So far did this spirit of rivalry proceed, that Madame Moreau could not be prevented from breaking out into unseemly expressions, when, on one occasion of a visit, she was detained a few minutes waiting in the antechambers of Joséphine; and on one occasion she was only prevented by force from taking the precedence, at a public assembly, of the wife of the first consul (2).

While Moreau was thus insensibly and unavoidably becoming the leader of the discontented Republicans in Paris, circumstances were preparing for another distinguished general of the Revolution the chief direction of the royalist party. Escaped from the deserts of Sinnamari, Pichegru had found an asylum in London, where he entered into close correspondence with the French emigrants who endeavoured in that capital to uphold the sinking cause of the monarchy. His great abilities and acknowledged reputation procured for him the confidence of the British Government, and he was occasionally consulted by them, especially in 1799, as to the probability of a Royalist movement declaring itself in the south of France (3).

On the renewal of the war, various attempts were made by the Royalist emigrants in London to effect an insurrection in favour of

(1) Thib. 321.

(3) Big. iii. 318. Norv. ii. 272.

(2) Thib. 321, 323. Bour. v. 232. Las Cas. vii.

the exiled family in different parts of France (1). The object of these attempts was the restoration of the Bourbons, and to effect the expulsion of the first consul from the throne; but it formed no part of the plan of any design, at least in which Louis XVIII, or any of the royal family were participants, to embroil their hands in his blood, or do aught to him that he had not repeatedly done to every state with which he was in hostility. The celebrated Chouan chief, Georges, was the soul of the conspiracy. He had resisted all the offers of the first consul, who was anxious to engage him in his service; and in a secret interview the elevation and disinterestedness of his character excited the admiration of that keen observer of human character (2). Since that time he had resided chiefly in London, and was deeply implicated, along with Pichegru, in a conspiracy, which had for its object to rouse the Royalist party in France, and overturn the government of the first consul (3).

On the existence of these opposite elements of conspiracy, emanating from the extremes of the Republican and Royalist parties, Fouché founded the project of uniting them in a conspiracy which might at once prove ruinous to both, and restore him to that consideration in the eyes of the first consul, which it had been his unceasing object to regain since his dismissal from office. The words of the *Senatus Consultum* were constantly present to his mind, that "if difficult circumstances should again arise, there was no one to whom the ministry of police might so fitly be entrusted;" and if he could only engage the two greatest generals in the Republic, next to the first consul, in a conspiracy against his government, there seemed to be no doubt that he would attain the object of his ambition. With this view, in the end of 1805, he began to instigate some of their mutual friends to effect a reconciliation between these illustrious characters. The Abbé David was the first person employed in this service; but having been arrested and sent to the Temple, his place was supplied by General Lajolais, a relation of General Klingin and Wurmser, who came to London, arranged with Pichegru the period of his departure for Paris, and returned soon after to the French capital to prepare matters for his reception there (4).

Meanwhile Georges, Polignac, Lajolais, and the other conspirators, had been landed on the coast of Normandy, and had cautiously and secretly advanced to Paris, not with the view of engaging in any plot at that time, but to obtain accurate information as to the real state of the Royalist party in the capital. All their measures were known to the police by means of secret information communicated by Lajolais and other traitors in the party; the points of their descent, the places where they were to sleep every night, were regularly detailed to Fouché. Every thing was made easy by the agents of the police. They were allowed to come to the capital, and remain there for a considerable time unmolested.

(1) "I must do Louis XVIII" said Napoléon, "the justice to say, that I never discovered his participation in any plot against my life, although it was permanent elsewhere; his operations were confined to systematic plans and ideal changes."—*LAS CASES*, ii. 368.

(2) "You cannot be permitted," said Napoléon in 1800, "to remain in the Morbihan; but I offer you the rank of lieutenant-general in my armies."—"You do me injustice," replied Georges; "I have taken an oath of fidelity to the house of Bourbon, which I will never violate." The first consul then offered him a pension of 100,000 francs if he would abandon the cause of the King and remain quiet; but he was proof also against this temptation. He

learned soon after that an order for his arrest had been given, and set off the same day for Boulogne, from whence, with M. Hyde Neuville, he reached England in safety. [Beauché iv. 512.] Napoléon, alluding to this interview, observed,—"Georges evinced that elevation of character which belongs to a great mind; but he was so enthusiastic in favour of his own party, that we could come to no understanding. His mind was cast in the true mould; in my hands he would have done great things. I know how to appreciate his firmness of character; I would have given it a good direction." [Bour. vi. 158, 159.]

(3) Bour. v. 274.

(4) Bour. v. 272, 273. Norv. ii. 273.

Project of
Fouché for
getting up a
conspiracy
of Repub-
licans and
Royalists.

The Royal-
ist leaders
are landed
on the
French
coast, Jan.
16, 1804.

Several meetings took place between Georges, Pichegru, Lajolais, and the other leaders of the party, and Moreau had a conference with Pichegru on the Boulevard of Madeleine, and another in his own house (1). The principles of Moreau, however, were those of the Revolution, and therefore it was impossible that he could agree with the Royalists upon ulterior measures, and the only purpose of the conferences was to put the Chouan chiefs in possession of the views of this illustrious leader of the Republican party. The agents of Fouché had given the Royalists to understand that Moreau would readily enter into their views; but in this they soon found that they had been completely deceived; and, accordingly, it was proved at the trial that Moreau declared to Pichegru that he knew of no conspiracy whatever; and that Polignac was heard to say to one of the party, "All is going wrong; we do not understand each other; Moreau does not keep his word; we have been deceived." Discouraged by these appearances, the conspirators were about to leave Paris, and Georges was on the point of setting out for la Vendée (2).

But matters had now arrived at that point when Fouché deemed it expedient to divulge the information he had acquired, and reap the fruit of his intrigues. He had previously written to Napoléon that "the air was full of poniards," and prepared him, by various mysterious communications, to expect some important intelligence. Regnier, who was intrusted with the duties though not the situation of minister of police, was totally ignorant of what was going forward, and confidently maintained that Pichegru had dined a few days before in the neighbourhood of London, when Fouché arrived with evidence that he had been for some time in Paris. Napoléon upon this devolved the farther conduct of the affair upon the ex-minister, whose superior information was now clearly manifested, and the immediate charge of the matter was entrusted to Real, one of his creatures, with orders to take his instructions from Fouché alone. At length, matters being ripe for the *dénouement*, the whole suspected persons, to the number of forty-five, with the exception of Moreau, Georges, and Pichegru,

Feb. 17, 1804. (1) The accurate intelligence which the secret police of Fouché had of all the proceedings of the Royalist leaders, and the art with which they led them into the snare prepared for them, is completely proved by the proclamation published by the Government on the day of their arrest. "In the year 1803," said Régnier, the head of the police, "a criminal reconciliation took place between Pichegru and Moreau, two men between whom honour should have placed an eternal barrier. The police seized at Calais one of their agents at the moment when he was preparing to return for the second time to England. In his possession were found all the documents which proved the reality of an accommodation inexplicable on any other principle but the connexions which crime occasions. Meanwhile the plot advanced. Lajolais, the friend and confident of Pichegru, passed over secretly from Paris to London, and from London to Paris, communicating to Moreau the sentiments of Pichegru, and to Pichegru those of Moreau. The brigands of Georges were all this time preparing, underhand at Paris, the execution of their joint projects. A place was fixed on between Dieppe and Treport, at a distance from observation, where the brigands of England, brought thither in English ships of war, disembarked without being perceived, and there they met with persons corrupted to receive them; men paid to guide them during the night, from one station to another, as far as Paris. There they found rooms ready hired for them by trusty guardians;

they lodged in different quarters at Chaillot, in the Rue du Bac, in the faubourg St.-Marceau, in the Marais. Georges and eight brigands first disembarked; then Coster St.-Victor and ten others; and in the first days of this month a third party arrived, consisting of Pichegru, Lajolais, and others; the conspirators met at the farm of La Potterie; Georges and Pichegru arrived at Paris. They lodged in the same house, surrounded by thirty brigands, whom Georges commanded. They met with General Moreau; the day, the hour, the place, where the first conference was held, were known: a second was fixed on, but not realized: a third and a fourth took place in the house of Moreau himself. The traces of Georges and Moreau have been followed from house to house; those who aided in their embarkation, those who, under cloud of night, conducted them from post to post; those who gave them an asylum at Paris, their confidants, their accomplices, Lajolais, the chief go-between, and General Moreau, have been arrested."—Bour. v. 293—295.

(2) Bour. v. 283, 287. Norv. ii. 274, 275.

This is established by the testimony of Napoléon himself:—"Real (the head of the police) told me," said Napoléon, "that when Moreau and Pichegru were together, they could not come to an understanding, as Georges would undertake nothing but for the interest of the Bourbons. He had therefore a plan, but Moreau had none; he wished to overturn my power, but had no person in view to put in my place. It was no wonder, therefore, they could not come to terms of agreement."—Bour. vi. 100.

Fouché reveals the plot to Napoléon, and is restored to power.

Artful measures of Fouché to draw them on.

who had not yet been discovered, were arrested at once in Paris, and thrown into prison. Among them were two young men of noble family and generous dispositions, destined to a melancholy celebrity in future times,—Counts Armand and Jules Polignae (1).

Feb. 15, 1804.

Arrest of
Moreau.

Moreau was the first of the three who was seized. Charles d'Hozter, one of the prisoners, had attempted to commit suicide in prison, and his dying declarations, wherein he had implicated that general, were made use of as a ground to order his arrest, although the subsequent report by Regnier admitted that the police had been throughout privy to all his meetings with the conspirators. Returning from his country estate to Paris, he was arrested and conveyed to the Temple; and on the morning of the 17th, all Paris was astonished by the following order of the day, addressed to the garrison of the capital. "Fifty brigands have penetrated into the capital; Georges and General Pichegru were at their head. Their coming was occasioned by a man who is yet numbered among our defenders, by General Moreau, who was yesterday consigned to the hands of the national justice. Their design was, after having assassinated the first consul, to have delivered over France to the horrors of a civil war, and all the terrible convulsions of a counter-revolution (2).

Consternation which
it excites in
Paris.

No words can convey an adequate idea of the consternation which prevailed in Paris on this intelligence being promulgated. Moreau was looked up to by a numerous and powerful party, especially in the army, as one of the greatest men of the Revolution; his name was illustrated by the most glorious exploits; the simplicity and modesty of his private life had long endeared him to all classes, and especially the numerous body who were enamoured of Republican manners. To find so illustrious a name coupled with brigands, to hear the known supporter of Republican principles accused of a design to bring about a counter-revolution, was so violent a revulsion, so inconceivable a change, as to excite in the highest degree the suspicions and passions of the people. The Revolutionists regarded Moreau as the leader of their party, and the only consistent supporter of their principles; the soldiers looked back with pride to his military achievements, and burned with indignation at the incredible imputations cast upon his honour; the ancient and ill extinguished jealousy of the armies of Italy and the Rhine, broke forth again with redoubled fury; the latter openly murmured at his arrest, and declared that the first consul was about to sacrifice the greatest general of the Republic to his ambitious designs; he had then good cause to congratulate himself that Richempanse and twenty-five thousand of the conquerors of Hohenlinden had met with an untimely end on the shores of S.-Domingo (3).

Feb. 28, 1804.

Napoléon, however, was not intimidated. The arrest of Moreau was soon followed up by that of Pichegru, who was seized in his bed a fortnight after. It was not without difficulty that this renowned leader was made prisoner; his ready presence of mind, undaunted spirit, and prodigious personal strength, made it no easy matter to secure him even under circumstances the most favourable to the assailants. He was at length betrayed by an old friend, in whose house he had sought refuge. This infamous wretch, who was named Leblanc, had the baseness to reveal his place

(1) Norv. ii. 276. Bour. v. 274, 275, 287.

(2) Norv. ii. 276.

(3) Norv. ii. 277. Nap. vii. 243.

"The crisis," says Napoléon, "was of the most violent kind; public opinion was in a state of fer-

mentation; the sincerity of Government, the reality of the conspiracy, was incessantly called in question. All the violent passions were awakened; the rumours of change were incessant; the storm was tremendous,"—LAS CASES, vii, 243, and iii, 361.

of retreat for 100,000 crowns. "His treachery," says Napoléon, "was literally a disgrace to humanity (1)." Guided by this traitor, and fully informed as to the means of resistance which he always had at his command, a party of police, strongly armed, entered his bedroom at night, by means of false keys, furnished by their perfidious assistant. They found the general asleep, with a lamp burning on a table near the bed, and loaded pistols by his side. Advancing on tiptoe, they overturned the table so as to extinguish the light, and sprung upon their victim before he was aware of their approach. Suddenly awaking, he exerted his strength with undaunted resolution, and struggled long and violently with the assailants. He was at length, however, overpowered by numbers, bound hand and foot, and conducted, naked as he was, to the Temple (2).

Feb. 26, 1804. The arrest of Pichegru was immediately followed by a decree of the Senate, which suspended for two years trial by jury in all the departments of the Republic, "for the crimes of treason, attempts on the person of the first consul or the exterior or interior security of the Republic." For this purpose the tribunals were organized in a different manner, agreeably to the direction of the law of 25 Florial, 1802. All the persons accused in Paris were sent for trial to the tribunal of the department of the Seine (3).

March 9, 1804. Georges, however, was still at liberty, although a rigid hlockade prevented his leaving Paris; but he did not long escape the vigilance of the police. On the 9th March, he was arrested as he was crossing the place of the Odéon, at seven in the evening, in a cabriolet. He never went abroad without being armed, and his arrest in that public manner cost the life of one man, whom he shot dead as he stopped his horse, and he desperately wounded another who advanced to seize him in the carriage. He was instantly conducted to the Temple, and treated with such rigour, that when Louis Bonaparte went to see him the next day in prison, he found him lying on his mattress, with his hands strongly manacled, and bound across his breast; a spectacle which excited the indignation of that humane prince as well as that of General Lauriston, who was present on the occasion (4). Moreau, however, was treated in a very different manner; he met with the most respectful attention, and was surrounded by military men who would not have permitted any insult to be offered to so illustrious a character.

History and character of the Duke d'Enghien. On the day after the arrest of Georges, a meeting of the Council of State was held, in which Napoléon took a step from which his memory will never recover. He decided the fate of the DUKE D'ENGHIEN. This young prince, son to the Duke de Bourbon, and a lineal descendant of the great Condé, was born, apparently to the highest destinies, at Chantilly, on August 2, 1772. He accompanied his father, while yet a boy, in his flight from Paris on July 16, 1789, and had ever since remained in

(1) Las Cas. iii. 362.

(2) Las Cas. iii. 363. Bour. vi. 10, 11.

"Pichegru's seizure was owing to his generosity in declining to receive another asylum, where he would have been perfectly safe. An old aide-de-camp of his, M. Lagrenie, who had retired from the service some years before, and a man of undoubted honour, besought him to accept an asylum in his house; but he positively refused to endanger, by accepting the offer, a man who had given so striking a proof of attachment to his person."—Bour. vi. 11, 12.

(3) Big. iii. 327, 328.

(4) Bour. vi. 37, 45.

When examined before the judge of police, Georges openly avowed his intention to overturn

the first consul. "What was your motive for coming to Paris? To attack the first consul. What were your means of attack? By force. Where did you expect to find the means of applying force? In all France. There is, then, a conspiracy extending over all France, under the direction of you and your accomplices? No, but there was a reunion of force at Paris. What were the projects of yourself and your associates? To place a Bourbon in the room of the first consul. What Bourbon did you mean to place on the throne? Louis Xavier Stanislas formerly, whom we now designate Louis XVIII. What weapons were you to use? Weapons similar to those of his escort and guard."—See CAPEFIGUE—*Hist. de la Restauration*, ii, 159, and NOUVINS, ii, 279.

exile, attached to the noble but unfortunate corps which, under the Prince of Condé, continued, through adverse equally as prosperous fortune, faithful to the cause of the monarchy. A noble countenance, a commanding air, and dignified expression bespoke, even to a passing observer, his illustrious descent, while the affability of his manners and generosity of his character justly endeared him to his numerous companions in adversity. On all occasions in which they were called into action, these shining qualities displayed themselves. Ever the foremost in advance, he was the last to retreat, and by his skill and bravery eminently contributed to the brilliant success gained by the emigrant corps at Bertshiem in an early period of the war. On that occasion a number of Republican prisoners fell into the hands of the Royalists; the soldiers loudly demanded that some reprisals should be made for the sanguinary laws of the Convention, which had doomed so many of their comrades to the scaffold; but the young prince replied, "the blood of our companions, shed in the most just of causes, demands a nobler vengeance (1). Let them live; they are Frenchmen, they are unfortunate; I put them under the safeguard of your honour and humanity (2)."

His arrest is unjustly resolved on by Napoléon and the Council of State. It was on the fate of a prince, thus richly endowed with every noble virtue, that the Council of State, under the presidency of Napoléon, sat at Paris on the 10th March, 1804. It appeared from the depositions of two of the prisoners who had been apprehended, that a mysterious person was present at some of the meetings of the Royalist chiefs, who was treated by Georges with the utmost respect, and in whose presence none of the persons assembled sat down (3). Suspicion turned on some prince of the blood as the only person to whom these marks of respect were likely to be shown; and no one was thought to answer the description so completely as the Duke d'Enghien, who at that period was at Ettenheim, a chateau situated on the right bank of the Rhine, in the territories of the Duke of Baden, and four leagues from Strasbourg. A confidential officer was despatched to Strasbourg to make enquiry; he ascertained that the duke was frequently at the theatre of Strasbourg, lived a very retired life, was sometimes absent for ten or twelve days together, and appeared passionately fond of hunting, in which the greater part of his time was employed (4). On this slender basis did this iniquitous Council of State, under the immediate directions of Napoléon, hold it established that the Duke d'Enghien was the mysterious stranger alluded to in the depositions of Georges' associates, upon

(1) Réfutat. de M. le Duc de Rovigo, 134.

Jan. 24, 1802. (2) The Prince of Condé, father to the Duke d'Enghien, had acted in an equally generous manner, when a proposal was made to him by a person who offered to assassinate the first consul. In a letter to the Comte d'Artois, he gives the following account of the transaction:—"Yesterday, a man arrived here (in London) on foot, as he said, from Paris to Calais. His manner was gentle, and tone of voice sweet, notwithstanding the errand on which he came. Understanding that you were not here, he came to me at eleven o'clock in the morning, and proposed, with the greatest simplicity, to get quit of the usurper in the most expeditious manner. I did not give him time to conclude the details of his project, but instantly rejected them with the horror they were fitted to inspire, assuring him, at the same time, that if you were here you would do the same; that we should ever be the enemies of the man who had usurped the power and throne of our king, as long as he excluded him from it; that we had com-

bated him with open arms, and would do so again, if an occasion should present itself; but that we would never carry on hostility by such means, which were suited only to the Jacobins; and that if they be-took themselves to crimes, certainly we should not follow their example. I then sent for the Baron de Roll, who confirmed all that I had said of your determination in that respect."—*Réfutation de M. le Duc de Rovigo*, 49.—*Pièces Just.* No. 1.

(3) The description they gave was as follow:—"Every ten or twelve days, their master received a visit from a person with whose name they were unacquainted, but who was evidently a man of high importance. He appeared to be about thirty-six years of age, his hair was light, his height and size of ordinary dimensions, his dress elegant; he was always received with great respect, and when he entered the apartment all present rose and remained standing, without the exception even of MM. Polignae and Rivière. He was frequently closeted with Georges, and on these occasions they were always alone."—*Rovigo's Memoir*, 11.

(4) Rovigo, Mem. ii. 34.

which Napoléon himself dictated and signed an order for his arrest in a neutral territory, with such minute directions for the seizure of the prince and his conveyance to Strasbourg, that it was evident his destruction was already resolved on. Cambacérès, the second consul, who had voted in the convention for the death of Louis, made the strongest remonstrances against this proposed measure, especially its accomplishment by means of a violation of the neutral territory of Baden; but Napoléon cut him short by the observation (1);—"You have *become* singularly chary of the blood of the Bourbons (2)."

Occupation of the Prince at that time. The truth was, that the unfortunate prince was at Ettenheim, on account of a passion with which he was inspired for the Princess de Rohan, an emigrant lady of distinction in that neighbourhood, and it was to visit her that he was absent for the periods which in the suspicious mind of the first consul, could have been for no other purpose but to concert measures with Georges in the French metropolis. His mode of life is thus described by Savary, who afterwards was so deeply implicated in his execution. "Several emigrants had arrived in the environs, and were entertained by the prince. He was passionately fond of the chase, had a *liaison de cœur* with a French lady who shared his exile, and was frequently absent for several days together. This may easily be conceived, when it is recollected what a passion for the chase is, and what the attractions of the mountains of the Black Forest (3)." In truth, he had never been at Paris at all, nor engaged in any conspiracy whatever against either the government or life of the first consul; and the mysterious stranger who was supposed to be him in the conferences with Georges afterwards turned out to be Pichegru (4).

He is seized and conducted to Strasbourg. The designs of the first consul were too faithfully carried into effect. The execution of the order was intrusted to General Ordaner, who following punctually the directions he had received, set out from New Brisach with three hundred gens-d'armes, and arrested the prince in his bed at night on the 13th March. He was immediately conducted to Strasbourg, with all his papers and all the persons in the house, and intelligence despatched to Paris by the telegraph of his arrest. When it was known at the Tuileries that he had been seized, Joéephine, who never failed to exert her influence in behalf of misfortune, implored the first consul to show mercy. She threw herself on her knees, and earnestly begged his life; but he said, with a stern air, "Mind your own matters; these are not the affairs of women; let me alone." His violence on this occasion exceeded any thing that had been witnessed since his return from Egypt. He was so prepossessed with the idea that the Bourbon princes were one and all leagued in a conspiracy against his life, that he was incapable of exercising the natural powers of his mind in considering the evidence on the subject. "I am resolved," said he, "to put an end to these conspiracies; if the emigrants will conspire, I will cause them to be shot. I am told there are some of them concealed in the hôtel of M. de Cobentzell" (the Austrian ambassador), "I do not believe it; if it were so, I would shoot Cobentzell along with them. The Bourbons must be taught that they are not to sport with life with impunity; such matters are not child's play (5)."

M. Talleyrand, aware of the imminent danger which the duke ran if he con-

(1) Bour. v. 305, 306. Rovigo, ii. 37.

(2) Napoléon enjoined the officer intrusted with the mission to take 200 dragoons, and send 300 more, with four pieces of light cannon, to Kehl, and 100 men, with two pieces of cannon, from New

Brisach.—See ROVIGO, ii. 263.—*Pièces Just.*, No. 1.

(3) ROY, ii. 35.

(4) Bour. v. 307. ROY, ii. 59.

(5) Bour. v. 316, 311.

He had been vainly warned of his danger. continued in his residence at Ettenheim, had secretly sent him warning to remove, through the lady to whom he was attached at that place, and similar intelligence was at the same time transmitted by the King of Sweden, by means of his minister at Carlsruhe; and it augments our regret at the issue of this melancholy tale, that he was only prevented from availing himself of the intelligence, and escaping the danger, by the tardiness of the Austrian authorities in procuring him passports. Upon receiving the warning he resolved to join his grandfather, but in doing so it was necessary that he should pass through part of the Austrian territories. Sir Charles Stuart, the English ambassador at Vienna, wrote for this purpose to the Austrian Government to demand a passport for the duke, and it was their tardiness in answering, that occasioned the delay, which permitted his arrest by Napoléon, and cost him his life (1).

He is removed to Paris and sent to Vincennes. Orders arrived at Strasbourg from Paris on the 18th March to have the Duke d'Enghien forthwith forwarded to the capital. The carriage which conveyed him arrived at the barriers of Paris on the 20th, at eleven o'clock forenoon. He was there stopped, and detained for above five hours, until orders were received from the first consul. No council was summoned; Napoléon took upon himself alone the disposal of his fate. At four in the evening orders arrived to have him conducted by the exterior barriers to VINCENNES, an ancient castellated fortress of great strength, a mile and a half beyond the faubourg St.-Antoine, which had been long used as a state prison, and it was dark before he arrived there. Every thing was already prepared for his reception; not only his chamber was ready, but his grave was dug (2).

Where he is delivered over to a military commission by Napoléon's orders. No sooner was Napoléon informed of the arrival of the Duke d'Enghien at the barriers, than he wrote out and signed an order for his immediate delivery to a military commission, to be tried for bearing arms against the Republic, for having been in the pay of England, and engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic (3). The order was directed to Murat, the governor of Paris, who forthwith sent for General Hullin and six of the senior colonels of regiments in Paris, to form a military commission. They immediately proceeded to Vincennes, where they found Savary, with a strong body of *gendarmerie d'élite*, in possession of the castle and all the avenues leading to its approach. The subsequent proceedings cannot be better given than in the words of M. Harel, the governor of the castle (4).

"In the evening of the 20th March, when the prince was arrived at the barrier, they sent to enquire of me whether I could lodge a prisoner in the

(1) Bour. v. 304. 305. Rev. ii. 300.

(2) Bour. v. 328. 330.

(3) The order was as follows:

"Paris, 29 Ventose, An. xii., (20 March, 1804.)

"The Government of the Republic decree as follows:

"Art 1.—The late Duke d'Enghien, accused of having borne arms against the Republic, of having been and still being in the pay of England: of being engaged in the plots set on foot by that power against the external and internal security of the Republic, shall be delivered over to a military commission, composed of seven members named by the governor of Paris, who shall assemble at Vincennes.

"II.—The grand judge, minister of war, and

general governor of Paris, are charged with the execution of the present decree.

"The First Consul (Signed) BONAPARTE.

"By The First Consul (Signed) HUGHES MARET.

"A true copy.

"The General-in-Chief, Governor of Paris,
"(Signed) MURAT."

See *Mémoire de M Dupin sur les actes de la Commission militaire pour juger le duc d'Enghien*, 38.—*Pièces Just.* No. 2.

In Murat's order, following on this decree, the commission was directed to "assemble immediately at the chateau of Vincennes to take cognizance, without separating, of the accused, on the charges set forth in the decree of the Government."—*Ibid.* 93.

(4) Bour. v. 328, 329. Rev. ii. 39.

castle. I answered that I could not, as no rooms were in repair but my own chamber and the council hall. They desired me then to prepare a room for a prisoner, who would arrive in the evening, and to *dig a grave in the court*. I said that would not be easy, as the court was paved. They replied, I must then find another place, and we fixed on the ditch, where in effect it was prepared.

"The prince arrived at seven in the evening; he was dying of cold and hunger, but his air was by no means melancholy. As his room was not yet ready, I received him into my own, and sent out to get food in the village. The prince sat down to table, and invited me to partake his refreshments. He put many questions about Vincennes, and told me he had been brought up in the environs of the castle, and conversed with much kindness and affability. He repeatedly asked what do they want with me? what are they going to do with me? but these questions made no alteration upon his tranquillity, and indicated no disquietude. My wife, who was unwell, was in bed in an alcove in the same room, concealed by a tapestry; her emotion was extreme, for she was foster-sister to the prince, had enjoyed a pension from his family before the Revolution, and she at once recognized him by his voice (1)."

Gross iniquity committed towards him.

The duke went to bed shortly after; but before he had time to fall asleep, the officers arrived, and conducted him into the council-chamber. General Hullin and six other officers were there assembled; Savary arrived soon after the interrogatories began, and took his station in front of the fire, immediately behind the president's chair. The accused was charged with "having borne arms against the Republic, with having offered his services to the English Government, the enemies of the French people, with having received and accredited the agents of the English Government, and furnished them with the means of obtaining intelligence, and conspired with them against the exterior and interior security of the state; with having put himself at the head of an assemblage of emigrants and others in the pay of England, formed on the frontiers of France in the territory of Baden; carried on communications in Strasbourg calculated to disturb the peace of the adjoining departments, and favour the views of England, and being engaged in the conspiracy set on foot at Paris against the life of the first consul, and about, in case of its success, to enter France (2)." The law in such a case required that a counsel should be allowed to the accused; but none was permitted to the prince, and he was obliged, at midnight, to enter unaided upon his defence (3).

He is convicted upon his declaration only, without any evidence.

No evidence whatever was brought forward against the accused; no witnesses were examined; the documentary evidence consisted only of one single writing, namely, the act of accusation (4). The whole case against him rested upon the answers he gave to the interrogatories put by the commission, and they were clear, consistent, and unequivocal, openly avowing the truth, but containing not one single admission which could be tortured into evidence of his culpability, (5) "There

(1) Bour. v. 330, 331. Biog. des Contemporains. Art. D'Enghien.

(2) Jugement sur le Duc d'Enghien. Mem. par Dupin, 49.

(3) Dupin, 12, 13.

(4) "On n'avait," says Savary, "qu'un seul document pour toute pièce à charge et à décharge; c'était l'arrêt des Consuls du 20 mars. La minute du jugement rédigé à Vincennes le porte textuellement. 'Lecture faite des pièces tant à charge qu'à décharge au nombre d'une.'"—Rovigo, ii, 251.

(5) The material parts of the declaration were as follow:—

Being asked if he had taken up arms against France? he answered, "That he had served through the whole war; that he had never been in England, but had received a pension from that power, and had no other means of subsistence; that he had resided for two years and a half at Ettenheim in the Brisgaw, by permission from the sovereigns of that country; that he had applied for permission to reside at Fribourg, also in the Brisgaw, and remained

were," says Savary, the warmest apologist of Napoléon, "neither documents, nor proofs, nor witnesses, against the prince; and in his declaration he emphatically denied the accusation brought against him. His connexions with England, in the rank in which he was born, his correspondence with his grandfather, the Prince of Condé, could not be considered as evidence of any conspiracy. And even if it had been otherwise, what judge is so ignorant as not to know that the admissions of an accused person are never sufficient to condemn him, if unsupported by other testimony (1)?" "I must confess," says General Hullin, "the prince presented himself before us with a noble assurance; he indignantly repelled the aspersion of having been directly or indirectly engaged in any conspiracy against the life of the first consul, but admitted having borne arms against France, saying, with a courage and resolution which forbid us even for his own sake to make him vary on that point, 'that he had maintained the rights of his family, and that a Condé could never re-enter France but with his arms in his hands. My birth, my opinions, render me for ever the enemy of your government' (2)."

At the conclusion of his declaration, the prince added:—"Before signing the present *proces verbal* I earnestly request to be permitted to have a private audience of the first consul. My name, my rank, my habits of thought, and the horror of my situation, induce me to hope that he will accede to that demand." A member of the commission proposed that this request should be forwarded to Napoléon; but Savary, who was behind the president, represented that such a demand was inopportune (3). The request, however, made such an impression, that when the sentence was about to be made out, the president took up the pen, and was beginning to write a letter, expressing the wish of the prince to have an interview with him, but Savary whispered to him, "What are you about?"—"I am writing," said he, "to the first consul, to express the wish of the council and of the accused."—"Your affair is finished," replied Savary, taking the pen out of his hand, "that is my business (4)."—"In truth," says Savary, "General Hullin had received the most severe instructions. Even the case of the accused demanding an interview with the first consul (5), had

His noble
demeanour
before the
judges.

only at Ettenheim for the pleasures of the chase; that he had corresponded with his grandfather in London, and also with his father, whom he had never seen since 1795; that he had been commander of the advance guard since 1796, and acted with the advanced guard before that time; that he had never seen General Piebegré, and had no connexion whatever with him; that he knew he desired to see him, but he congratulated himself upon his not having seen him, if it be true that he had intended to make use of the vile means ascribed to him; that he had no connexion with General Dumouriez, and never saw him; and that since the peace he had occasionally corresponded with some of his comrades in the interior of the Republic on their own affairs and his, but no correspondence had taken place of the kind alluded to in the interrogatory." [See the declarations in Savary, ii. 275. *Pièces Just.* No. iv.]

The iniquities committed on the trial of the Duke d'Enghien were so numerous, as to render it one of the most atrocious proceedings recorded in history. 1. The neutral territory of the Grand Duke of Baden was violated by an armed force, without a shadow of reason, to arrest an individual engaged in no overt acts of hostility, upon the mere suspicion of being engaged in correspondence with the conspirators in France. 2. The arrest was illegal, on the footing of having borne arms against the Republic; for the decrees of the Convention and Directory on that subject, inhuman as they were, ap-

plied only to emigrants taken in France, or in an enemy's or conquered country, and Baden was neither the one nor the other, but a friendly state. 3. The laws against the emigrants did not apply to the Bourbons, who were a class apart, and were forever banished from the French territory, and even such as they were they had been universally mitigated in practice since the accession of the first consul. 4. The military commission was incompetent to try plots undertaken against the Republic, their cognizance being confined to the ordinary tribunals. 5. The whole proceedings at Vincennes were illegal, as having been carried on, contrary to law, in the night; as no defender or counsel was assigned to the accused; as no witnesses or documents were adduced against him, as his declarations admitted nothing criminal, and if they had, they would not *per se* have warranted a conviction; as the conviction did not specify of what he was found guilty, and left a *blank* for the laws under which the sentence was pronounced, all directly in the face of statutory enactments.—See an able memoir by Dupin, i. 20, *Discussion des actes de la Commission militaire pour juger le Duc d'Enghien.*

(1) *Rev.* ii. 252.

(2) Hullin, 8.

(3) Hullin, 13.

(4) Hullin, 13, 14.

(5) *Rev.* ii. 250.

been provided for, and he had been prohibited from forwarding such a communication to the government."

His sentence and execution.

Without a vestige of evidence against the prince, did this iniquitous military tribunal, acting under the orders of a still more iniquitous Government, find him guilty of all the charges, and order him to be immediately executed. After the interrogatory had ceased, and while the commission were deliberating with closed doors, he returned to his chamber, and fell asleep. "He was so well aware of his approaching fate," says Harrel, "that when they conducted him by torch-light down the broken and winding staircase which led to the fosse where the execution was to take place, he asked where they were taking him, and pressing my arm, said, 'Are they going to leave me to perish in a dungeon, or throw me into an *oubliette*?' " When he arrived at the foot of the stair, and entering into the fatal ditch, saw, through the grey mist of the morning, a file of men drawn up, he uttered an expression of joy at being permitted to die the death of a soldier, and only requested that a confessor might be sent for; but this last request was denied him. He then cut off a lock of his hair, which he delivered with his watch and ring to the officer who attended him, to be forwarded to the Princess de Rohan and his parents; and turning to the soldiers, exclaimed, "I die for my king and for France!" calmly gave the word of command, and fell pierced by seven balls. His remains were immediately thrown, dressed as they were, into the grave which had been prepared the evening before at the foot of the rampart (4).

No other authority than that of Napoléon himself is required to stamp the character of this transaction. Immediately after the execution was over, Savary hastened to the first consul to inform him of what had been done. He received the account with much emotion. "There is something here," said he, "which surpasses my comprehension. Here is a crime, and one which leads to nothing (2)." The prince's innocence was soon completely demon-

His innocence is completely established after his death.

strated. Hardly were his uncoffined remains cold in their grave, when the witnesses who had spoken of the mysterious personage who met with Georges, and was supposed to be the Duke d'Enghien, upon being confronted with Pichegru, at once recognised him as the person to whom they had alluded. "The first consul," says Savary, "upon receiving this information, mused long, and gave vent, by an exclamation of grief, to his regret at having consented to the seizure of that unhappy man. Notwithstanding his obvious interest to have the affair cleared up, he enjoined absolute silence regarding it, either because he considered such conduct most conducive to his interest, or because he was unwilling to confess the error into which he had fallen (5)."

(1) Mém. sur le Due d'Enghien, ii. 171. 172. Roy. Vindication, 40. Bour. v. 332. 333.

The spot where this murder was committed is marked by a little cross in the bottom of the fosse of Vincennes, on the side of the forest, about twenty yards from the drawbridge leading into the inner building. The author visited it in August 1833, when the cannon on the ramparts were loaded with grape-shot, and the whole walls of the fortress were covered with workmen armed to the teeth, converting the Gothic edifice into a stronghold destined to bridle the licentious population of Paris, and establish the Oriental despotism of Louis-Philippe. The monument of feudal power, the scene of despotic cruelty, the instrument of revolutionary punishment, arose at once to the view. "Les hommes agitent," says Bossuet, "mais Dieu les mène."

(2) Roy. ii. 45.

Napoléon's (3) The murder of the Duke d'Enghien was so atrocious a proceeding, of himself that almost every one concerned in it at St-Helena, has made an effort to throw the blame off his own shoulders, and implicate more deeply the other actors in the bloody tragedy. Savary, General Hullin, and Napoléon himself, have all endeavoured to vindicate themselves, at the expense of their associates in the crime; but the only inference which can justly be drawn from a comparison of their observations is, that they were all guilty, and the first consul most of all. In commenting on this subject, which frequently recurred to his thoughts during the solitude of St. Helena, he at times ascribed the catastrophe to a deplorable excess of zeal in the persons by whom he was surrounded; [Las Cases, vii. 257.] at others to an unfortunate prepossession, taken up at an unguarded moment, when he was

Remark-
able retri-
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murder.

A memorable retribution awaited all the actors in this bloody tragedy. Murat, seized eleven years afterwards on the Neapolitan territory, when attempting to excite the people to a revolt, was delivered over to a military commission, tried under a law which he himself had made, and shot. General Hullin, after having spent, as he himself said, "twenty years in unavailing regrets; bowed down by misfortune; blind, and unhappy," wished for the grave to relieve him from his sufferings (1); Savary lived to witness calamities to himself and his country sufficient, in his own words, to draw from his eyes tears of blood (2), and Napoléon, vanquished in war, precipitated from his throne, stript of his possessions, was left an exile amidst the melancholy main, to reflect on the eternal laws of justice which he had violated, and the boundless gifts of fortune which he had misapplied. Whether Providence interferes in the affairs of mankind by any other method than general laws, and the indignation which deeds of violence excite in the human heart, must remain for ever a mystery; but in many cases the connexion between national, equally as individual, crime, and its appropriate punishment, is so evident as to be obvious even on the surface of history. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien lighted again the flames of continental war, and induced that terrible strife which ultimately brought the Tartars of the Desert to the walls of Paris. From it may be dated the commencement of that train of events which precipitated Napoléon from the throne of Charlemagne to the rock of St.-Helena.

Consterna-
tion which
this act ex-
cited in
Paris.

When the melancholy event was known in Paris on the morning of the 21st, an universal stupor and consternation prevailed. Few were to be found who approved of the deed; distrust, terror, anxiety, were depicted in every countenance. It was openly stigmatized by a great proportion of the people as a bloody and needless assassination; among none was the general grief more poignant than the warmest partisans of Napoléon; the bright morning of the consulate seemed overcast, and the empire to be ushered in by deeds of Oriental cruelty. Crowds issued daily through the barrier de Trône, to visit, in the fosse of Vincennes, the spot where the victim had suffered; a favourite spaniel, which had followed the prince to the place of execution, faithful in death, was to be seen constantly lying on the grave. The interest excited by its appearance was so strong, that by an order of the police the dog was removed, and all access to the place prohibited (3).

And in the
foreign am-
bassadors.

The consternation which prevailed among the members of the diplomatic body was still greater. Couriers were instantly des-

worked up to madness by the reports he received of conspiracies and plots in every direction around him; [Las Cas. vii. 253, 257.] but in his testament he reverted to the more manly course of admitting the deed, taking upon himself its whole responsibility, and endeavouring to justify it on reasons of state necessity. "I arrested the Duke d'Engliien," said he in that solemn instrument, "because that measure was necessary to the security, the interest, and the honour of the French people, when the Count d'Artois maintained, on his own admission, sixty assassins. In similar circumstances I would do this same." [Test. de Nap. sec. 6.] As if any reasons of honour, interest, or security can ever call for or justify the death of an innocent man without either enquiry, evidence, or trial. [Test. de Nap. sec. 6.]

It is but justice to Napoléon, however, to add, that he said at St. Helena,—"Most certainly if I had been informed in time of certain features in the opi-

nions and character of the prince, and especially if I had seen a letter which he wrote to me, but which was never delivered, God knows for what reason, till after he was no more, must certainly I would have pardoned him." [Las Cas. vii. 258.] Savary asserts that Napoleon said to Real, after hearing the circumstances of the prince's death;—"Unhappy T—, what have you made me do?" [Savary, Vindication, 60.] and Napoleon said to O'Meara at St. Helena, that "Fallegrand had kept the duke's letter, written to him from Strasbourg, and only delivered it two days after his death;" [O'Meara, i. 321, 346.] but Bourrienne asserts that the whole story of such a letter having been written and kept back is an entire fabrication. See BOURRIENNE, v. 312.

(1) Hullin's Mémoires, 1.

(2) Savary, iv. 382.

(3) Rev. ii. 45. Bour. v. 339. Big. iv. 343.

patched to St.-Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and London; and the ambassadors of all the powers at Paris met to concert measures on the subject. "All Paris," says M. Dalberg, the plenipotentiary of Baden, "is in consternation; Europe will shudder at the deed. We are approaching a terrible crisis; the ambition of Bonaparte knows no bounds; nothing is sacred in his eyes; he will sacrifice every thing to his passions. M. Cobentzell, Lucehesini, and Oubril are concerting measures on the part of Austria, Prussia, and Russia (1)." M. Talleyrand, the minister of foreign affairs, gave a ball on the night of the day on which the prince was executed; but its aspect was mournful, and several members of the diplomatic body sent their apology. The Cabinet of Prussia presented an energetic note, complaining of the violation of the territory of Baden, while that of Russia ordered a court mourning for his death, which was worn by all the ambassadors of that power at foreign courts, and addressed a vigorous remonstrance to the French Government. The higher classes at Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, were vehement in their condemnation of the sanguinary proceeding; the indignation of the English people, the vehemence of the English press, knew no bounds; and already were to be seen, both in the diplomatic relations of the European powers (2), and the feelings awakened in their subjects, the seeds of the coalition which brought the continent in arms to the fields of Austerlitz and Eylau.

Courage-
ous conduct
of M. Châteaubriand.

That indignation which the monarchies of Europe did not as yet venture openly to express, a single courageous individual, but one whose weight was equal to a nation in arms, did not hesitate immediately to manifest. The illustrious author of the "*Génie du Christianisme*," M. CHATEAUBRIAND, had been recently appointed ambassador of France at the republic of the Valais, and he was presented to the first consul on the morning of the 21st, to take leave preparatory to his departure. He observed at the time a striking alteration on the visage of the first consul, and a sombre expression in his countenance; his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal what was passing in his mind; but Chateaubriand knew of nothing at the time to which it could have been owing. Hardly had he left the Tuileries when intelligence arrived of the death of the Duke d'Enghien; he instantly sent in his resignation of the appointment. This intrepid conduct excited a vehement burst of anger in the breast of the first consul; and the friends of Chateaubriand were in the greatest alarm every morning for a considerable time, expecting to hear of his arrest during the night; but the Princess Eliza, who was inspired with the highest admiration for that great author, at length succeeded in averting a tempest which in its outset might have proved fatal to one of the brightest ornaments of modern literature. From that period, however, may he dated the commencement of that enmity between that great author and the first consul, which continued uninterrupted till the Restoration (3).

Opinion
which Na-
poléon
entertained
of him.

Napoléon was strongly irritated by any opposition to his wishes, or resistance to his will, and accordingly he never forgave Chateaubriand for the public reproof administered on this memorable occasion; but his feelings had no influence on his judgment, and no man could better appreciate dignified or heroic conduct in an adversary. Although, therefore, the author of the "*Genius of Christianity*" never afterwards received encouragement from the first consul, he occupied a high place in his

(1) M. Dalberg's letter, March 22, 1804, Paris. *Rev.* ii. 290.

(2) *Big.* iii. 345. *Ann. Reg.* 1804. *State papers*, 642. *Bour.* vi. 4, 5. *Rev.* ii. 244.

(3) *Bour.* v. 348, 349. *Bign.* iii. 344.

estimation, and this continued in exile even after the essential injury done by that author to his cause by the celebrated pamphlet on the "Constitutional monarchy," published at the Restoration. "Chateaubriand," said he, "has received from nature the sacred fire; his works attest it; his style is not that of Racine, it is that of a prophet. There is no one but himself in the world who could have said with impunity in the Chamber of Peers that the great-coat and hat of Napoléon, placed on the end of a stick on the coast of Brest, would make Europe run to arms from one end to another (1)."

Death of
Pichegru.

This tragic event was soon followed by another still more mysterious. Early on the morning of the 5th April, General Pichegru was found strangled in prison. Since his apprehension he had undergone ten separate examinations, in the course of which he had been repeatedly confronted with Georges, Lajolais, and all the witnesses who were examined against them. On all occasions, however, he had evinced an unconquerable firmness and resolution. No one was injured by his answers; and nothing whatever had been elicited from him calculated to effect the great object of implicating Moreau in the conspiracy. Such was the effect produced by his courageous demeanour, that Real said openly before several persons on coming from one of his examinations,—“What a man that Pichegru is?” In all his declarations he was careful to abstain from any thing which might involve any other person, and exhibited a grandeur of character and generous resolution in his fetters, which excited the admiration even of his enemies. He positively refused, however, to sign any of his judicial declarations; alleging as a reason, that he was too well acquainted with the arts of the police, who, having once got his signature, would by a chemical process efface all the writing which stood above it, and insert another statement, containing every thing which they wished him to admit. He loudly announced his intention of speaking out boldly on his trial, and in particular declared that he was resolved “to unfold the odious means by which he and his companions had been entrapped into the conspiracy by the police. That they had at length become fully sensible of the Machiavelian devices which had been practised upon them, from the facility given to their landing and coming to Paris, and the utter nullity of all the reports they had received of the general disposition in their favour. That having had their eyes at length opened, they were only solicitous to get out of Paris, and were making preparations for that purpose when they were arrested by the police.” This intention to speak out at the trial was in an especial manner declared on the day of his last examination taken before Real, and next morning at eight o’clock he was found strangled in his cell (2).

Surgeons’
report on
his death.

The surgeons who were called to examine the body of the deceased signed a report, in which they stated that “the body was found with a black silk handkerchief hard twisted round the neck by means of a small stick about five inches long, which was kept tight on the left cheek on which it rested by one end, which prevented it from unwinding, and produced the strangulation which had terminated in death.” The *gendarmes* in attendance declared that they heard no noise, except a considerable coughing on the part of the general, which lasted till one, when it ceased; and that the sound resembled that of a person who had difficulty of respiration (3). This is all the light which positive evidence throws on this mysterious transaction; but it were well for the memory of Napoléon if mo-

(1) Nap. in Mont. iv. 248. Bour. v. 349, 359.

(2) Bour. v. 23, 31. Big. iii. 411.

(3) Bour. vi. 31, 32. Rev. ii. 55. Ann. Reg. 1804, 368. State papers.

ral presumptions of greater strength than any such testimony did not incline to the darker side (1).

Reflections on the probable privacy of the first consul to his death. "When you would discover," says Machiavel, "who is the author of a crime, consider who had an interest to commit it." Judging by this standard, moral presumption weighs heavily against the first consul. He was on the eve of the greatest step in his life; the imperial sceptre was within his grasp, and the public authorities had already been instructed to petition him to assume the crown of Charlemagne. At the same time the crisis was of the most violent kind. The Royalist party were in the highest state of excitement, in consequence of the execution of the Duke d'Enghien; the Republicans, in sullen indignation, awaited the trial of Moreau. In these critical circumstances it was impossible to over-estimate the effect which might have been produced on such inflammable materials by the bold declarations of Pichegru at his trial, openly denouncing the intrigues and treachery of the police, and tearing aside the veil which concealed the dark transactions by which Fouché had precipitated the leaders of the opposite parties into measures so eminently calculated to aid the ascent of Napoléon to the throne. The first consul, it is true, had no cause either to be apprehensive of Pichegru, or to doubt his conviction at the trial; but his ministers had every reason to fear the effect which might be produced by the revelations made by so energetic and intrepid a character, and the strongest grounds for believing that he would utterly negative all attempts to implicate his great rival Moreau in the conspiracy. In these circumstances, private assassination became the obvious expedient, and within the gloomy walls of the Temple numerous wretches were to be found, trained to crime, and profoundly versed in all the means of perpetrating it in the way least likely to incur detection. There can be no reasonable doubt therefore, that Pichegru was murdered, but there is no evidence to connect Napoléon with the act; and the probability is, that it was perpetrated by Fouché and the police, to prevent the exposure of the infamous means used by them to implicate both Moreau and the Royalists in the trammels of a conspiracy, which they had so much reason to apprehend from the illustrious captive's known character and declared resolution.

This view is strongly confirmed, when it is recollected, on the other hand, Pichegru himself had no conceivable motive for committing suicide. Death to so old a soldier and determined a character could have few terrors; and the experience of the Revolution has proved that its prospect hardly ever led to self-destruction. He had uniformly and energetically declared his resolution to speak fully out at the trial, and nothing had occurred to shake that determination, for his own condemnation he must from the first have regarded as certain. Voluntary strangulation in the way in which Pichegru perished, if not an impossible, is at least a highly difficult act; the religious impressions which he had preserved from his youth upwards rendered it highly improbable; and the secrecy which Government maintained in regard to his declarations, necessarily led to the conclusion that they contained matter which it was deemed advisable to bury in the tomb. So universal was the impression produced by these circumstances, that M. Real, on the morning of his death, said, "Though nothing can be more apparent than that this was a

(1) It is not the least interesting circumstance in this melancholy story, that Pichegru had been the school companion of Napoléon at the military academy of Brienne. They had been bred up in the same house, and it was he who taught Napoléon the four first rules of arithmetic. Though considerably

older than the first consul, they had received their commissions as lieutenants of artillery at the same time. Now the one was about to ascend the throne of France, while the other was strangled in a dungeon.—See BOURNEMINE, vi, 13, 15.

suicide, yet it will always be said that, despairing of conviction, we strangled him in prison (1); a *cri de conscience* coming from such a character, at so early a period, which is not the least remarkable circumstance in this mysterious case. Bourrienne, Napoléon's private secretary, declares it as his firm conviction that he was murdered (2); and Savary, while he denies this himself, tells us that the belief of his assassination was so general, that a high functionary, a friend of his own, spoke of it some years afterwards as a matter concerning which no doubt could be entertained, and mentioned the *gendarmes* as the persons by whom the bloody deed had been carried into execution (3). The populace of Paris, struck by the mysterious circumstances of his death, ascribed it to the Mamelukes who had accompanied Napoléon from Egypt, and had been trained to such deeds in the recesses of Eastern seraglios (4).

At length, after long and tedious preparatory examinations, Moreau, Georges, the two Polignacs, La Rivière, and all the accused, were brought to trial. Before leaving the Temple, Georges harangued the other prisoners in the court, and earnestly recommended prudence and moderation, and that they should abstain from criminating each other. The solemnity of the occasion, and the recollection that it was from the same walls that Louis XVI had been taken to the scaffold, had subdued to a sadder and milder mood his naturally daring and vehement character. "If in the trials which await us," said he, "your firmness should ever forsake you, look on me, recollect that I am with you, remember that my fate will be the same as your own. Yes! we cannot be separated in death, and it is that which should console us. Continue, then, mild and considerate towards each other, redouble your mutual regards, let your common fate draw tighter the bonds of your affection. Regard not the past. We are placed in our present position by the will of God; in the hour of death let us pray that our country, rescued from the yoke which oppresses it, may one day be blessed under the rule of the Bourbons. Never forget that it was from the prison which we are about to quit that Louis XVI went forth to the scaffold. Let his sublime example be your model and your guide (5)."

Trial of
Moreau,
Georges,
and others.

Early on the 28th May, the doors of the Palace of Justice were thrown open, and the trial began. An immense crowd instantly rushed in, and occupied every avenue to the hall; the doors were besieged by thousands, urgent to obtain admittance. The public anxiety rose to the highest pitch. Persons of the chief rank and greatest considera-

(1) *Rev.* ii. 56.

(2) *Bour.* vi. 25, 35.

(3) *Rev.* ii. 56.

Napoléon's defence of himself on this subject at St.-Helena. In discoursing on this subject at St.-Helena, Napoléon observed, "that he would be ashamed to defend himself against such a charge; its absurdity was so manifest on its very face. What could I gain by it? A man of my character does not act without sufficient motives. Have I ever been known to shed blood by mere caprice? Whatever efforts may have been made to blacken my memory, those who know me are aware that my nature is foreign to crime; there is not in my whole career, a single act of which I could not speak before any tribunal on earth, I do not say, without embarrassment, but with advantage. In truth Pichegru saw that his situation was desperate; his daring mind could not endure the infamy of punishment; he despaired of my clemency, or despised it, and put himself to death. Had I been inclined to commit a crime, it was not Pichegru, but Moreau, that I

would have struck." [*Las Cas*, vii. 244.] Had Napoléon's veracity been equal to his ability as a chronicler of the events of his time, this passage would have been deserving of the highest consideration; but the slightest acquaintance with his writings and actions must be sufficient to convince every impartial person, that he had no regard whatever to truth, in any thing that he either said or wrote, and fired off words as he would do shot in a battle, to produce a present effect, without the slightest idea that they ever would be sifted by subsequent ages, or ultimately recoil upon himself. He forgets that it was to secure the conviction of Moreau, and cut off the damning evidence that he could give in regard to him, that the private assassination of Pichegru became expedient, and that the more he elevates the character of the Republican General who was brought to trial, the more he magnifies the probability of the destruction of the Royalist chief whose testimony might have led to his acquittal.

(4) *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 165.

(5) *Bour.* vi. 47.

tion in Paris were there; the remnants of the old nobility, the leaders of the modern Republic, flocked to a scene where the fate of characters so interesting to both was to be determined. The prisoners, to the number of forty-five, were put to the bar together. Public indignation murmured aloud at seeing the conqueror of Hohenlinden seated amidst persons, many of whom were regarded as the hired bravoës of England. In the course of the trial, which lasted twelve days, a letter from Moreau to the first consul, written from the prison of the Temple, was read, in which he stated his case with so much simplicity and candour, that it produced the most powerful effect on the audience (1). The result of the trial was, that Moreau's innocence was completely established, or rather the prosecutor totally failed to prove any criminal connexion on his part with the conspirators; not one witness could fix either a guilty act or important circumstance upon him. He admitted having seen Pichegru on several occasions, but positively denied that he had ever been in presence of Georges; and, though two witnesses were adduced who swore to that fact, their testimony was unworthy of credit, being that of accused persons under trial for the same crime (2). Throughout the whole trial his demeanour was dignified, mild, and unassuming. On one occasion only his indignant spirit broke forth, when the president accused him of a desire to make himself dictator:—"Me dictator!" exclaimed he, "and with the partisans of the Bourbons! Who then, would be my supporters? I could find none but in the French soldiers, of whom I have commanded nine-tenths and saved above fifty-thousand. They have arrested all my aides-de-camp, all the officers of my acquaintance, but not a shadow of suspicion could be found against any one, and they have all been set at liberty. Can there be such folly as to suppose that I proposed to make myself dictator by means of the partisans of the old French princes, who have combated for the Royalist cause since 1792? Do you really believe that these men, in twenty-four hours, should have been so suddenly changed as to make me dictator? You speak of my fortune, of my income; I began with nothing, and might now have been worth 50,000,000 francs; I possess only a house and a small property attached to it; my allowances amount to 40,000 francs, and let that be compared with my services (3)."

Letter of Moreau to Napoléon. (1) Moreau there said, "In the campaign of 1797 we took the papers of the Austrian staff; amongst them were several which seemed to implicate Pichegru in a correspondence with the French princes; this discovery gave us both great pain, but we resolved to bury it in oblivion, as Pichegru, being no longer at the head of the army, was not in a situation to do injury to the Republic. The events of the 18th Fructidor succeeded, disquietude became universal; and two officers who were acquainted with that correspondence, represented to me the necessity of making it public. I was then a public functionary, and could no longer preserve silence. During the two last campaigns in Germany, and since the peace, he has occasionally made remote and circuitous overtures to me as to the possibility of entering into a correspondence with the French princes, but I considered them so ridiculous that I never made any answer.

"As to the present conspiracy, I can equally assure you that I have not had the smallest share in it. I repeat it, general, whatever proposition may have been made to me, I rejected it in opinion, and regarded it as the most absurd of projects. When it was represented to me that the occasion of a descent into England would be favourable to a change of government, I answered, that the Senate was the au-

thority to which all Frenchmen would look in case of difficulty, and that I should be the first to range myself under its authority. Such overtures made to me, a private individual, wishing to keep up no connexions, neither in the army, nine-tenths of which have served under my orders, nor in the state, imposed upon me no duty but that of refusal; the infamy of becoming an informer was repugnant to my character; ever judged with severity, such a person becomes odious, and deserving of eternal reprobation when he turns against those from whom he has received obligations, or with whom he has maintained terms of friendship. Such, general, have been my connexions with Pichegru; they will surely convince you that rash and ill-founded conclusions have been drawn from a conduct on my part perhaps imprudent, but far from being criminal." These words bear the stamp of truth, and they embrace the whole of what was proved against Moreau. Not one of the 119 witnesses examined at the trial said more against him.—BOBARTIENNE, vi. 118, 120.

(2) Lajolais and Picot were the persons who spoke to it, and Lajolais was the secret agent of Fouché throughout the whole transaction, and both were fellow-prisoners at the bar with Moreau. [Rovigo, ii. 63.]

(3) Bour. vi. 115, 123, 124. Rov. ii:

Intense interest excited at Paris.

As the case went on, and the impossibility of convicting Moreau of the capital charge preferred against him became apparent, the disquietude of the first consul was extreme. He sent in private for the judges, and questioned them minutely as to the probable result of the process; and as it had become impossible to convict him of any share in the conspiracy, it was agreed that he should be found guilty of the minor charge of remotely aiding them. Some of the judges proposed that he should be entirely acquitted, but the President Hemart informed them that such a result would only have the effect of impelling the Government into measures of still greater severity; and therefore this compromise was unanimously agreed to. Napoléon strongly urged a capital sentence, in the idea probably of overwhelming his rival by a pardon; but the judges returned the noble answer: "and if we do so, who will pardon us?" In truth, the temper of the public mind was such, that any capital sentence on so illustrious a person would probably have produced a violent commotion, and it was extremely doubtful whether the soldiers of the army of the Rhine would not have risen at once to his rescue. So intense was the interest excited by his situation, that when Lecourbe, one of the bravest and most distinguished of his lieutenants, entered the court with the infant child of Moreau in his arms, all the military present spontaneously rose and presented arms; and if Moreau had given the word, the court would that moment have been overturned, and the prisoners liberated. Whenever he rose to address the judges, the *gendarmes*, by whom he was guarded, rose also, and remained uncovered till he sat down. In fact, the public mind was so agitated, that the influence of Moreau in fetters almost equalled that of the first consul on the throne (1).

Stoical indifference of Georges.

The demeanour of Georges throughout the whole trial was stoical and indifferent; he rejected the humane proposals made to him by Napoléon to save his life, if he would abandon his attempts to reinstate the Bourbons, saying, "that his comrades had followed him into France, and he would follow them to death." Armand and Jules Polignac excited the warmest interest, by the generous contest which ensued between them as to which had been really implicated in the conspiracy, each trying to take the whole blame upon himself, and to exculpate the other (2).

Condemnation of the prisoners.

When the debates were closed, and the judges retired to deliberate, the public anxiety rose to the highest pitch; they remained four-and-twenty hours in consultation; and all the while, the court, and all its avenues, were thronged with anxious multitudes. The most breathless suspense prevailed, when the judges returned to the court, and Hémart, seating himself in the president's chair, read out the sentence, which condemned Georges Cadoudal, Bouvet de Lozier, Roussillon, M. de Rivière, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, Picot, Costor San Victor, and others, to the number of sixteen, to death; and Moreau, Jules de Polignac, Leridant, Roland, and a young girl named Issay, to two years' imprisonment (5).

Public feeling on this subject.

Though the preservation of Moreau's life, which had been placed in such imminent hazard, was universally considered as a subject

(1) Bour. vi. 124, 126; Big. iii. 420.

(2) Armand de Polignac first declared publicly, that he alone was accessory to the conspiracy, and that his brother was entirely innocent, and earnestly implored that the stroke of justice might fall on him alone. On the following day, his brother Jules rose and said, "I was too much moved yesterday at what my brother said to be able to attend to what I was to advance in my own defence; but to-day, when I am more cool, I implore you not to

give credit to what his generosity has prompted him to suggest in my behalf. If one of us must perish, I am the guilty person. Restore him to his weeping wife; I have none to lament me; I can brave death. Too young to have enjoyed life, how can I regret it?"—"No," exclaimed Armand, "you have life before you; I alone am the guilty person, I alone ought to perish"—Bour. vi. 138, 139.

(3) Bour. vi. 138, 140. Big. iii. 421. Rev. ii. 62, 63.

of congratulation, yet the condemnation of so great a number of persons, many of whom belonged to the highest society in Paris, to death together, spread a general consternation through the capital. During four years of a steady and lenient administration, the people had not only lost their indifference, but acquired a horror at the shedding of blood; and a catastrophe of this sort, which recalled the sanguinary scenes of the Convention, diffused universal distress. To this feeling soon succeeded a sense of the gross injustice done to Moreau, found guilty upon the unsupported declarations of two conspirators who were condemned along with himself; and with so strong a sense of the iniquity of the conviction in the breast of the judges, that they were obliged to sentence him to a punishment, ridiculous and inadequate if he were guilty, oppressive if innocent (1).

Clemency of the first consul, after the convictions were obtained Napoléon, however, was not really cruel; he was, on the contrary, in general averse to measures of severity, and only callous to all the suffering they occasioned, when they seemed necessary either for the projects of his ambition, or the principles of his state policy. His object in all these measures was to attain the throne, and for this purpose the death of the Duke d'Enghien, which struck terror into the Royalists, and the condemnation of Moreau, which paralysed the Republicans, seemed indispensable. Having attained these steps, he yielded not less to his own inclinations than the dictates of sound policy in pardoning many of the persons convicted. Murat, immediately after the sentence was pronounced, repaired to Napoléon, and earnestly entreated him to signalize his accession to the imperial throne by pardoning all the accused; but he could not obtain from him so splendid an act of mercy. Joséphine, never wanting at the call of humanity, exerted her powerful influence in favour of several of the persons under sentence; many other persons at the court followed her example, and others were pardoned, in particular Lajolais, in consideration of the services they had rendered to the police during the conspiracy. In these different ways, Bouvet de Lozier, Rivière, Armand de Polignac, Lajolais, and Armand Gaillard, and three others, experienced the mercy of the first consul. The remainder were executed on the 25th June, on the place de Grève; they all underwent their fate with heroic fortitude, protesting with their last breath their fidelity to their king and country, and Georges, in particular, insisted upon dying first, in order that his companions, who knew that he had been offered his pardon by the first consul, might see that he had not deserted them in the extreme hour (2).

His lenity to Moreau. Napoléon asserted to Bourrienne, shortly after the trial was over, that he had been greatly annoyed by the result of the process, chiefly because it prevented him from utterly extinguishing Moreau as the head of a party in the state; that assuredly he never would have suffered him to perish on the scaffold; but that his name, withered by a capital conviction, would no longer have been formidable, and that he had been led to direct a prosecution, from his Council assuring him that there could be no doubt of a conviction. He added, that if he had foreseen the result, he would have privately urged Moreau to travel, and even have given him a foreign embassy to colour his departure (3). After the sentence was pronounced, he acted with indulgence to his fallen rival. On the very day on which he requested permission to retire to America, Napoléon granted it; he purchased his estate of Gros-Bois, near Paris, which he conferred upon Berthier, and paid the ex-

(1) *Rev. ii. 63, 64. Bour. vi. 140, 141.*(2) *Bour. vi. 142, 144. Rev. ii. 66.*(3) *Bour. vi. 156, 157. Rev. ii. 66.*

penses of his journey to Barcelona, preparatory to embarking for the United States, out of the public treasury. His ardent mind had been singularly captivated by the stern resolution of Georges; after his sentence was pronounced, he sent Real to the Temple, and offered, if he would attach himself to his service, to give him a regiment, and even make him one of his aides-de-camp; but the heroic Vendéen remained faithful to his principles even in that extremity, and preferred dying with his comrades to all the allurements of the imperial throne (1).

Death of
Captain
Wright, in
prison, at
Paris.

One other deed of darkness belongs to the same period in the government of Napoléon. Captain Wright, from whose vessel Pichegru had been disembarked, was afterwards shipwrecked on the coast of Morbihan, and brought, with all his crew, to Paris, where they were examined as witnesses on the trial of Georges. This intrepid man, who had formerly been a lieutenant on board Sir Sidney Smith's ship, when he stopped the Eastern career of Napoléon at Acre, positively declined to give any evidence, saying, with the spirit which became a British officer, "Gentlemen, I am an officer in the British service; I care not what treatment you have in reserve for me; I am not bound to account to you for the orders I have received, and I decline your jurisdiction." He added, after his deposition, taken in prison, was read over in court, that "they had not annexed to that declaration the threat held out to him, that he should be shot if he did not reveal the secrets of his country (2)." Some time after this, but the precise date is not known, as it was not revealed by the French Government for long afterwards, Captain Wright was found in his cell in the Temple with his throat cut from ear to ear. By whom this was done remains, and probably will ever remain, a mystery. The French authorities gave out that he had committed suicide in prison; but the character of that officer, and the letters he had written shortly before his death, in which he positively declared he had no intention of laying violent hands on himself, rendered that event extremely improbable. The previous threats which he publicly declared on the trial they had made to him, and the strong desire which the French Government had to implicate the English Cabinet in a conspiracy against the life of the first consul, in order to weaken the force of public indignation in Europe at the death of the Duke d'Enghien, render it more than probable that he was cut off in order to extinguish the evidence which he could give as to the disgraceful methods resorted to by the police to extort declarations from their prisoners; or possibly, as was asserted in England at the time, to destroy the traces of torture on his person (3).

Napoléon
resolves to
assume the
Imperial
Crown.

It was in the midst of these bloody events that Napoléon assumed the IMPERIAL CROWN, and the shadow of the expiring Republic was transformed into the reality of Byzantine servitude. Eighteen months before, he had declared in the Council of State, "that the principle of

(1) Bour. v. 159. Ann. Reg. 1804, 195. Rev. ii. 65, 66

His opinion of Georges. "There is one man," said Napoléon, "among the conspirators whom I regret, that is Georges. His mind is of the right stamp; in my hands he would have done great things. I appreciate all the firmness of his character, and I would have given it a right direction. I made Real inform him, that if he would attach himself to me, I would not only pardon him, but give him a regiment. What do I say? I would have made him one of my aides-de-camp. Such a step would have excited a great clamour, but I should

not have cared for it. Georges refused every thing. He is a bar of iron. What can I now do? He must undergo his fate, for such a man is too dangerous in a party; it is a necessity of my situation." [Bour. vi. 159.] This is a sufficient proof that Napoléon was aware that assassination formed no part of the design of the conspirators against him, for assuredly he would never have taken the chief of such a band into his service.

(2) Bour. v. 135, 136. Rev. ii. 60. Scott, v. 126, 128.

(3) Scott, v. 127, 129. Ann. Reg. 1805. Sir Robert Wilson's Egypt, 72. O'Meara, i. 275.

hereditary succession was absurd, irreconcilable with the sovereignty of the people, and impossible in France (1);” and four years before that he had announced to the Italian states, “that his victories were the commencement of the era of representative governments;” and already he was prepared to adopt a measure which should establish that absurd and impracticable system in that very country, and overturn, within all the states that were subjected to his influence, those very representative institutions. *Vestigia nulla retrorsum* was the principle of his policy. He never looked back to the past, or attempted to reconcile former professions with present actions; success, not duty, was the ruling principle of his conduct; he deemed nothing done while any thing remained to do.

This explains his murdering the duke d'Enghien.

It was neither from a thirst for blood, nor a jealousy of the Bourbons, that he put the Duke d'Enghien to death. Expedience, supposed political expedience, was the motive. “When about to make himself emperor,” says Madame de Staël, “he deemed it necessary, on the one hand, to dissipate the apprehensions of the revolutionary party as to the return of the Bourbons; and to prove, on the other, to the Royalists, that when they attached themselves to him, they finally broke with the ancient dynasty. It was to accomplish that double object that he committed the murder of a prince of the blood, of the Duke d'Enghien. He passed the Rubicon of crime, and from that moment misfortune was written on his destiny (2).” Interposing boldly, like the Committee of Public Safety on occasion of the fall of Danton, between the Royalists and Republicans, he struck redoubtable blows to both; proving to the former, by the sacrifice of their brightest ornament, that all prospect of reconciliation with them was at an end; and to the other, by the trial of their favourite leader, that all hopes of reviving in the people the dreams of democratic enthusiasm were extinguished; while to the great body of revolutionary proprietors, the millions who had profited by the preceding convulsions, and were desirous only to preserve what they had gained, he held out the guarantee of a hereditary throne, and a dynasty competent to restrain all the popular excesses of which the recollection was so deeply engraven in the public mind (3).

First broaching of the project to the Senate.

The season chosen for the first broaching of these ideas, which had been long floating in prospect in the thoughts of all reflecting persons, was shortly after the death of the Duke d'Enghien; and when a vague disquietude pervaded the public mind as to the result of the conspiracies and trials which excited so extraordinary an interest. In a secret conference with several of the leading members of the Senate, held six days after that event, Napoléon represented to them the precarious state of the Republic, dependent as it was on the life of a single individual, daily exposed to the daggers of assassins; passed in review the different projects which might be adopted to give it more stability, a Republic, the restoration of the ancient dynasty, or the creation of a new one; and discussed them all as a disinterested spectator, totally unconnected with any plans which might be ultimately adopted. The obsequious senators, divining his secret intentions, warmly combated the transference of power to any other hands, and conjured him to provide as soon as possible for the public weal, by making supreme power hereditary in a race of sovereigns, commencing with himself. Feigning a reluctant consent, he at length said: “Well, if you are really convinced that my nomination as emperor is neces-

(1) Thib. 454.

(2) Rêv. Franç. ii. 328.

(3) Bign. iii. 377.

sary to the welfare of France, take at least every possible precaution against my tyranny; yes, I repeat it, against my tyranny; for who knows how far, in such a situation, I may be tempted to abuse the authority with which I may be invested (1)?"

The project thus set on foot was the subject of secret negotiations for above a month between the Senate and the Government. It was agreed that the first public announcement of it should come from the Tribune, as the only branch of the legislature in which the shadow even of popular representation prevailed. So completely had the strength of that once formidable body been prostrated, and its character changed by the alterations made on its constitution when the consulate for life was proclaimed, that it proved the ready instrument of these ambitious projects. Every thing was arranged with facility for acting the great drama in presence of the people. The moment was chosen; the dispositions were made; the speeches, addresses, and congratulations agreed on; the parts assigned to the principal actors, before the curtain drew up, or the people were admitted to the spectacle. At length, on the 25th April, the representation began in the hall of the Tribune (2).

The Tribune is put forward to make the proposal in public. April 25, 1804.

MM. Curée and Siméon were the most distinguished orators on the side of the Government in that branch of the legislature. "Revolutions," said they, "are the diseases of the body politic; every thing which has been overturned was not in reality deserving of censure. There are certain bases of public prosperity at the foundation of every social edifice. Seasons of discord may displace them for a time, but ere long their own weight restores them to their natural situation; and if a skilful hand superintends the reconstruction of the building during that period of returning stability, they may regain a form which shall endure for centuries. It is in vain that we are reminded of the long possession of the ancient dynasty. Principles and facts alike oppose their restoration. The people, the sole fountain and depositary of power, may displace a family, by virtue of the same authority by which they seated them on the throne. Europe has sanctioned the change by recognising our new government. The reigning family in England have no other title to the throne but the will of the people. 'When Pepin was crowned, it was only,' says Montesquieu, 'a ceremony the more, and a phantom the less. He acquired nothing by it but the ornaments of royalty; nothing was changed in the nation. When the successors of Charlemagne lost supreme authority, Hughes Capet already held the keys of the kingdom: the crown was placed on his head because he alone was able to defend it.'

Speech of the Movers on the occasion.

"An eternal barrier separates us from the return of the factions which would tear our entrails, and that royal family which we proscribed in 1792 because it had violated our rights. It is by placing the crown on the head of the first consul alone that the French can preserve their dignity, their independence, and their territory. Thus only will the army be assured of a brilliant establishment, faithful chiefs, intrepid officers, and the glorious standards which have so often led it to victory: it will neither have to fear unworthy humiliations, disgraceful disbanding, or horrid civil wars, where the bones of the defenders of their country are exposed to the winds. Let us hasten then to demand hereditary succession in the supreme magistracy; 'for in voting this to a chief,' as Pliny said to Trajan, 'we prevent the return of a master.' But at the same time let us give a worthy name

(1) De Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 329, 330. *Thib.* 455.
Bour. vi. 52.

(2) *Bign.* iii. 379, 380. *Bour.* vi. 52. *Thib.* 455.

to so great a power; let us adorn the first magistrate in the world by a dignified epithet; let us choose that which shall at once convey the idea of the first civil functions, recall glorious recollections, and in no ways infringe on the sovereignty of the people. I see, for the chief of the national power, no name so worthy as that of EMPEROR. If it means victorious consul, who is so worthy to bear it? What people, what armies were ever more deserving of such a title in their chief? I demand, therefore, that we lay before the Senate the wish of the nation, that Napoléon Bonaparte, at present first consul, be declared Emperor, and in that quality remain charged with the government of the French Republic; that the imperial dignity be declared hereditary in his family; and that such of our institutions as are only sketched out be definitely arranged (1).” No sooner was the harangue delivered than a crowd of orators rushed forward to inscribe their names on the tribune to follow in the same course. The senate of Augustus was never more obsequious.

Notwithstanding the headlong course which public opinion was following towards despotic power, and the obvious necessity for it to stay the discord from which such boundless suffering had ensued, there were some determined men who stood forward to resist the change, undeterred by the frowns of power, unseduced by the cheers of the multitude, uninstructed by the lessons of experience. Carnot in the Tribunate, and Berlier in the Council of State, were the foremost of this dauntless band. There is something in the spectacle of moral courage, of individual firmness withstanding public transports, of conscious integrity despising regal seductions, which must command respect, even when advocating a course which is impracticable or inexpedient. “In what a position,” said they, “will this proposition place all those who have advocated the principles of the Revolution! When hereditary succession to the throne is established, there will no longer remain a shadow to the Republic of all for which it has sacrificed so many millions of lives. I cannot believe that the people of France are disposed so soon to abandon all that has been so dearly acquired. Was liberty, then, only exhibited to man to increase his regrets for a blessing which he never can enjoy? Is it to be for ever presented to his eyes as the forbidden fruit to which he dares not reach out his hand? Has nature, which has inspired us with so pressing a desire for this great acquisition, doomed us in its search to continual disappointment? No! I can never be brought to regard a blessing so generally preferred to all others, without which all others are nothing, as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, and that the system which it goes to establish is easier of institution, and more stable in duration, than either arbitrary power or an unrestrained oligarchy.” Every one respected the courage and motives of these upright men, but the fallacy of their arguments was not the less apparent, the public tendency to despotism not the less irresistible (2). In the Council of State the hereditary succession was carried by a majority of 20 to 7; and in the Tribunate by a still larger majority, Carnot alone voting in the minority.

The theatrical representation thus got up in the Tribunate, and the exchange of addresses, consultations, public and private, which followed, soon produced the desired effect. In Napoléon’s words, it was now evident that the pear was ripe. Addresses flowed in from all quarters, from the army, the municipalities, the cities, the chambers of commerce, all imploring the first consul to ascend the imperial throne,

Honour-
able resist-
ance of
Carnot.

Universal
adulation
with which
Napoléon
was sur-
rounded.

(1) Bour. vi. 55, 56. Bign. iii. 381, 382.

(2) Bour. vi. 61, 62. Bign. iii. 382, 383. Thib. 40.

and vying with each other in the strains of servile adulation. Their general strain was, "Greatest of men, complete your work; render it as immortal as your glory; you have extricated us from the chaos of the past; you have overwhelmed us with the blessings of the present; nothing remains but to guarantee for us the future." To the address of the Senate, imploring him to assume the purple, Napoléon replied, "We have been constantly guided by the principle that sovereignty resides in the people; and that therefore every thing, without exception, should be rendered conducive to their interest, happiness, and glory. It is to attain this end that the supreme magistracy, the Senate, the Council, the Legislative Body, the Electoral Body, and all the branches of administration, have been instituted. The people of France can add nothing to the happiness and glory which surround me; but I feel that my most sacred as my most pleasing duty is to assure to its children the advantages secured by that revolution which cost so much, and above all, by the death of so many millions of brave men who died in defence of our rights. It is my most earnest desire that we may be able to say, on the 14th July in this year—'Fifteen years ago, by a spontaneous movement, we ran to arms, we gained liberty, equality, and glory.' Now these first of blessings, secured beyond the possibility of chance, are beyond the reach of danger; they are preserved for you and your children. Institutions, conceived and commenced in the midst of the tempests of war, both without and within, are about to be secured, while the state resounds with the designs and conspiracies of our mortal enemies, by the adoption of all that the experience of ages has demonstrated to be necessary to guarantee the rights which the nation has deemed essential to its dignity, its liberty, and its happiness(1)."

Key which it affords to his whole policy on the throne.

In this answer is to be found the key to the whole policy of the first consul on the throne, and the secret of the astonishing facility with which he established, on the ruins of revolutionary passions, the most despotic throne of Europe. Aware that the great body of mankind are incapable of judging on public affairs, but perfectly adequate to a perception of their private interests, he invariably observed the principles there set forth, of carefully protecting all the revolutionary interests, and constantly addressing the people in the language of revolutionary equality. By steadily adhering to these rules, he succeeded in at once calming their interested fears, and flattering their impassioned feelings; by constantly holding out that the people were the source of all power, he blinded them to the fact that they had ceased to be the possessor of any; and by religiously respecting all the interests created by the Revolution, he rendered the nation indifferent to the abandonment of all the principles on which it was founded.

He is declared Emperor of the French, May 18.

All things being at length matured, the Senate, by a decree on the 18th May, declared Napoléon EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH; but referred to the people the ratification of their device, which declared the throne hereditary in his family, and that of his brothers, Joseph and Lucien. The obsequious body hastened to St.-Cloud with the decree, when the Emperor received them with great magnificence. "Whatever," said he, "can contribute to the good of the country, is essentially connected with my happiness. I submit the law concerning the succession to the throne to the sanction of the people. I hope France will never repent of the honours with which she has environed myself and my family. Come what may, my spirit will be no longer with my posterity from the moment that they shall cease to merit the love and the confidence of the great nation (2).

General
concurrence
of the
nation.

The appeal to the people soon proved that the first consul, in assuming the imperial dignity, had only acted in accordance with the wishes of the immense majority of the nation. Registers were opened in every commune of France, and the result showed that there were 3,572,529 votes in the affirmative (1), and only 2569 in the negative. History has recorded no example of so unanimous an approbation of the foundation of a dynasty; no instance of a nation so joyfully taking refuge in the stillness of despotism.

Rank con-
ferred on
his family.

Various changes, necessarily flowing from this great step, immediately followed. On the day after his accession, the Senate published a *senatus consultum*, by which the imperial dignity was established in the Bonaparte family, and the rank and precedence of his relations, as well as the other dignitaries of the empire, regulated. Various important alterations on the constitution were made by this decree, if constitution it could be called, which had only the shadow of representative institutions with the reality of military despotism; but they will more appropriately come to be considered in the chapter relating to the internal government of the Emperor. The whole real powers of government were, by the new *senatus consultum*, vested in the Senate and the Council of State; in other words, in the Emperor. The Legislative Body continued its mute inglorious functions. The Tribunate, divided into several sections, and obliged to discuss in these separate divisions the projects of laws transmitted to it by the Legislative Body (2); lost the little consideration which still belonged to it, and paved the way for its total suppression, which soon after ensued. In every thing but name the Government of France was thenceforward an absolute despotism.

Absolute
power vested
in the Em-
peror.

Creation of
the Mar-
shals of the
Empire.

Napoléon's first step on coming to the throne was to create the Marshals of the empire, and it was ordered that they should be addressed as *M. le Maréchal*. Those first named were eighteen in number, well known in the annals of military glory; Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Masséna, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Davoust, Bessières, Kellermann, Lefebvre, Pérignon, and Serrurier. He already projected the creation in their favour of those new patents of nobility, which were destined to recall the most glorious events of the empire, and form a phalanx of Paladins to defend the imperial throne (3).

Rapid pro-
gress of
court eti-
quette.

On the same day Napoléon fixed the titles and precedence of all the members of his family. He directed that his brothers and sisters should receive the title of imperial highness; that the great dignitaries of the empire should adopt that of most serene highness; and that the address of "my lord" should be revived in favour of these elevated personages. Thenceforth the progress of court etiquette and Oriental forms was as rapid at the Tuileries as in the seraglio of the Byzantine empire. "Whoever," says Madame de Staël, "could suggest an additional piece of etiquette from the olden time, propose an additional reverence, a new mode of knocking at the door of an antechamber, a more ceremonious method of presenting a petition, or folding a letter, was received as if he had been a benefactor of the human race. The code of imperial etiquette is the most remarkable authentic record of human baseness that has been recorded by history (4)."

(1) Bign. iii. 388.

(2) Art. 96. *Senatus Cons.* May 19, 1804. Bign. iii. 363. Bour. vi. 76, 77.

(3) Bour. vi. 78. Bign. iii. 401.

(4) *Rév. Franç.* ii. 334, 335. Bour. vi. 77, 78.

Dignified
protest of
Louis
XVIII.

No sooner did he receive intelligence of the assumption of the imperial crown by Napoléon, than Louis XVIII, on the shores of the Baltic, hastened to protest against an act so subversive of the

Reflections
on these
events.

Such was the termination of the political changes of the French Revolution : such the consequences of the first great experiment tried in modern Europe of regenerating society by destroying all its institutions. Born of the enthusiasm and philanthropy of the higher and educated classes, adopted by the fervour and madness of the people, coerced by the severity of democratic tyranny, fanned by the gales of foreign conquest, disgraced by the cupidity of domestic administration; having exhausted every art of seduction, and worn out every means of delusion, it sunk at length into the stillness of absolute power. But it was not the slumber of freedom, to awaken fresh and vigorous in after-days; it was the deep sleep of despotism; the repose of a nation worn out by suffering; the lethargy of a people who in the preceding convulsions had destroyed all the elements of durable freedom.

Difference
between
the English
and French
revolutions.

In this respect there is a remarkable difference between the state of the public mind and the disposition of the people in England during the usurpation of Cromwell, and in France under the empire of Napoléon. Both were military despotisms, originating in the fervour of former times; but the philosophic observer might discern under the one symptoms of an unconquered spirit, destined to restore the public freedom when the tyranny of the moment was overpast; in the other, the well-known features of Asiatic servility, the grave, in every age, of independent institutions. The English nobility kept aloof from the court of the protector; he strove in vain to assemble a house of peers; the landed proprietors remained in sullen silence on their estates; such was the refractory spirit of the commons, that every parliament was dissolved within a few weeks after it assembled, and when one of his creatures suggested that the crown should be offered to the victorious soldier, the proposal was rejected by a great majority of the very parliament which he had moulded in the way most likely to be subservient to his will. But the case was very different in France. There the nation rushed voluntarily and headlong into the arms of despotism; the first consul experienced scarcely any resistance in his strides to absolute power either from the nobility, the commons, or the people; all classes vied with each other in their servility to the reigning authority; the old families eagerly sought admittance into his antechambers, the new greedily coveted the spoils of the empire, the cities addressed him in strains of Eastern adulation, the peasants almost unanimously seated him on the throne. Rapid as his advances to absolute power were, they could hardly keep pace with the desire of the nation to receive the chains of a master; and with truth might he apply to all his subjects what Tiberius said of the Roman Senate :—" Oh! homines ad servitutem parati."

Which were
all owing
to the
violence and
injustice of
the French
convul-
sions.

We should widely err if we supposed that this extraordinary difference was owing either to any inherent servility in the French character, or any deficiency in the spirit of freedom among the inhabitants of that country when the contest commenced. There never was a nation more thoroughly and unanimously imbued

rights of his family. "In taking the title of Emperor," said the exiled prince, "Bonaparte has put the seal to his usurpation. That new act of a revolution, in which every thing has been fundamentally null, cannot doubtless impair my rights; but being accountable for my conduct to other sovereigns, whose rights are not less injured than my own, and whose thrones are shaken by the principles which the Senate of Paris has dared to put forth; accountable to France, to my family, to my own honour, I should consider myself guilty of

betraying the common cause if I preserved silence on this occasion. I declare, then, after renewing my protest against all the illegal acts committed since the commencement of the Revolution, that far from recognising the new title conferred on Bonaparte by a body which has itself no legal existence, I protest against that title, and all the subsequent acts to which it may give rise." This protest was so little regarded by the French Government, that it was published on the 1st July in the *Moniteur*.—See BUCON, iii, 389, 391.

with the passion, both for liberty and equality, than the French were during the early years of the Revolution; and in the prosecution of that object they incurred hardships, and underwent sufferings, greater perhaps than any other people ever endured in a similar time. It was the magnitude of the changes produced by the Revolution, the prostration of all the higher classes which it induced, which produced this effect. When France emerged from the Revolution, almost all the old families were destroyed; commerce and manufactures were ruined, and the only mode of earning a subsistence which remained to the classes above the cultivators of the soil, was by entering into the service, and receiving the pay of Government. Necessity, as much as inclination, drove all into servility to the reigning authority; if they did not pay court to persons in power, they had no alternative but to starve. Necker, in his last and ablest work had already clearly perceived this important truth. "If by a revolution in the social system, or in public opinion," says he, "you have lost the elements of great proprietors, you must consider yourselves as having lost the elements requisite for the formation of a tempered monarchy, and turn, with whatever pain, to a different constitution of society. I do not believe that Bonaparte himself, with all his talent, his genius, and his power, could succeed in establishing in France a constitutional hereditary monarchy. There is a mode of founding a hereditary monarchy, however, widely different from all the principles of freedom; the same which introduced the despotism of Rome; the force of the army, the Prætorian guards, the soldiers of the East and the West. May God preserve France from such a destiny." What a testimony to the final result of the Revolution, from the man who, by the duplication of the *Tiers-État*, had so great a share in creating it (1)!

Vast concentration of influence at this period in the hands of the Government.

Madame de Staël has well explained the prodigious and unprecedented accumulation of power and influence which was concentrated in the hands of the first consul when reconstructing the disjointed members of society after the preceding convulsions.

"Every mode of earning a subsistence had disappeared during ten years of previous suffering. No person could consider himself secure of his livelihood; men of all classes, ruined or enriched, banished or rewarded, equally found themselves at the mercy of the supreme power. Thousands of Frenchmen were on the list of emigrants; millions were the possessors of national domains; thousands were proscribed as priests or nobles; tens of thousands feared to be so for their revolutionary misdeeds. Napoléon, who fully appreciated the immense authority which such a state of dependence gave him, took care to keep it up. To such a one he restored his property, from another he withheld it; by one edict he gave back the unalienated woods to the old proprietors, by another he suspended the gift. "There was hardly a Frenchman in the whole kingdom, who had not something to solicit from the Government, and that something was the means of existence. The favour of Government thus led, not to an increase of vain or frivolous pleasures, but to a restoration of your country, a termination of exile, the bread of life. That unheard-of state of dependence, proved fatal to the spirit of freedom in the nation. An unprecedented combination of circumstances put at the disposition of a single man the laws passed during the Reign of Terror, and the military force created by Revolutionary enthusiasm. All the local authorities, all the provincial establishments were suppressed or annulled; there remained only in France a single centre of movement, and that was Paris; and all the men in the provinces who were

(1) Necker, *Dernières Vues*, 235, 240.

driven to solicit public employment were compelled to come to the capital to find their livelihood. Thence has proceeded that rage for employment or situations under Government, which has ever since devoured and degraded France (1).”

Total destruction of the liberty of the press.

Another element which powerfully contributed to the same effect, was the complete concentration of all the influence of the press in the hands of Government, in consequence of the changes and calamities of former times. “The whole journals of France were subjected,” says the same author, “to the most rigorous censure; the periodical press repeated, day after day, the same observations without any one being permitted to contradict them. Under such circumstances, the press, instead of being, as is so often said, the safeguard of liberty, becomes the most terrible arm in the hand of power. In the same way, as regular troops are more formidable than militia to the independence of the people, so do hired writers deprave and mislead public opinion, much more than could possibly take place when men communicated only by words, and formed their opinions on facts which fell under their observation. When the appetite for news can be satisfied only by continued falsehood; when the reputation of every one depends on calumnies, universally diffused, without the possibility of their refutation; when the opinions to be advanced on every circumstance, every work, every individual, are submitted to the observations of journalists as a file of soldiers to the commands of their officers, the art of printing becomes what was formerly said of cannon, ‘the last logic of kings (2).’”

Inference in political science to which this leads.

These profound observations suggest an important conclusion in political science, which is, that the press can be regarded as the bulwark of liberty only as long as, independent of it, the elements of freedom exist in the different classes of society; and that if these elements are destroyed, and the balance in the state subverted, either by an undue preponderance of popular or regal power, it instantly changes its functions, and instead of the arm of independence, becomes the instrument of oppression. It immensely augments the power of the weapons with which the different classes of society combat each other; but the direction which this great engine receives, and the objects to which it may be directed, are as various as the changing dispositions and fleeting passions of mankind. In a constitutional monarchy, where a due balance is preserved between the different classes of society, the cause of freedom is strengthened by its influence; but in another state of things it may be perverted to very different purposes, and become, as in Republican America, the organ of democratic, or in Imperial France, the instrument of sovereign oppression. The only security, therefore, for durable freedom, is to be found in the preservation of the rights and liberties of all classes of the people; in the due ascendancy of wealth and education, as well as the energy and independence of popular industry; and the gates to Oriental servitude may be opened as wide by the vehemence of democratic injustice, as the advances of regal ambition or the force of military power.

(1) De Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 259, 261, 372, 373.

(2) De Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 263, 264.



